Y. M. v. Minga Wofford, et al.

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: November 19, 2025
• Docket: 1:25-cv-01063
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 9 10 11 Y. M., ) Case No.: 1:25-cv-01063-SKO (HC) ) 12 Petitioner, ) ORDER DENYING RESPONDENT’S MOTION ) TO DISMISS, GRANTING PETITION FOR WRIT 13 ) OF HABEAS CORPUS, AND DIRECTING ) RESPONDENT TO PROVIDE BOND HEARING 14 v. ) BEFORE AN IMMIGRATION JUDGE 15 ) ) (Doc. 12) 16 MINGA WOFFORD, et al., ) ) 17 Respondents. ) ) 18 )

19 Petitioner is an immigration detainee proceeding with counsel with a petition for writ of habeas 20 corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Petitioner filed the instant petition on August 22, 2025. (Doc. 1.) 21 On September 26, 2025, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the petition. (Doc. 12.) Petitioner filed a 22 timely opposition, (Doc. 14), and Respondent did not file a reply. 23 Petitioner challenges his continued detention by the Bureau of Immigration and Customs 24 Enforcement (“ICE”). He claims his prolonged detention without a bond hearing violates his 25 procedural due process rights under the Fifth Amendment. He contends he should be provided a bond 26 hearing before an immigration judge (“IJ”) at which the Government must justify his continued 27 detention by clear and convincing evidence. 28 1 For the reasons discussed below, the Court will deny Respondent’s motion to dismiss, grant the 2 petition, and direct Respondent to provide a bond hearing before an IJ. 3 I. BACKGROUND 4 Petitioner is a native and citizen of Haiti, (Doc. 1 at 2), who entered the United States in 1992 5 and was granted parole to pursue an asylum claim. (Doc. 12-1 at 3, 9.) He admitted to being a 6 member of the gang “Zoe Pound.” (Doc. 12-1 at 3, 10.) 7 In December of 1998, Petitioner was found guilty of possession with intent to distribute 8 cocaine; sale, manufacture, or deliver cocaine; and possession of cocaine. (Doc. 12-1 at 3, 9.) He was 9 sentenced to 75 days confinement. (Doc. 12-1 at 3, 9.) 10 On June 8, 1999, Petitioner was found guilty of possession with intent to distribute cannabis. 11 (Doc 12-1 at 3, 9.) Petitioner was sentenced to 60 days confinement. (Doc. 12-1 at 3, 9.) 12 In October of 1999, Petitioner was found guilty of possessing with intent to sell, and resisting 13 an officer without violence. (Doc. 12-1 at 3, 9.) He was sentenced to 180 days’ confinement. (Doc. 12- 14 1 at 3, 9.) 15 On September 25, 2005, Petitioner was found guilty of possession with intent to distribute 16 cocaine and selling cocaine near a school zone. (Doc. 12-1 at 3, 9.) He was sentenced to 7 months and 17 13 days confinement. (Doc. 12-1 at 3, 9.) 18 On May 16, 2006, an IJ ordered Petitioner removed in abstentia. (Doc. 12-1 at 3, 9.) 19 In November of 2006, Petitioner was found guilty of conspiracy to possess with intent to 20 distribute cocaine, possession of a firearm during drug trafficking, and possession of a firearm by a 21 convicted felon. (Doc. 12-1 at 3, 9.) He was sentenced to 60 months incarceration for each count. 22 (Doc. 12-1 at 3, 9.) 23 On March 9, 2023, ICE placed Petitioner in custody pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) after 24 completion of his term for drug trafficking. (Doc. 12-1 at 4.) On May 20, 2023, he was transferred to 25 the Golden State Annex Detention Facility in McFarland, California. (Doc. 12-1 at 4.) 26 On June 5, 2023, Petitioner filed a motion to reopen removal proceedings. (Doc. 12-1 at 4.) On 27 June 26, 2023, an IJ granted Petitioner’s motion and reopened proceedings. (Doc. 12-1 at 4.) 28 1 On September 25, 2023, Petitioner appeared at a master calendar hearing. (Doc. 12-1 at 4.) The 2 IJ continued the matter to November 15, 2023, to provide Petitioner time to prepare his applications 3 for relief from removal. (Doc. 12-1 at 4.) 4 On November 15, 2023, Petitioner appeared at his second master calendar hearing. (Doc. 12-1 5 at 4.) The IJ again continued the matter to November 30, 2023, to provide Petitioner additional time to 6 prepare his applications for relief from removal. (Doc. 12-1 at 4.) 7 On November 30, 2023, Petitioner appeared at his third master calendar hearing. (Doc. 12-1 at 8 4.) The IJ again continued the matter to January 4, 2024, to provide Petitioner additional time to 9 prepare his applications for relief from removal. (Doc. 12-1 at 4.) 10 On January 4, 2024, Petitioner appeared at his fourth master calendar hearing. (Doc. 12-1 at 4.) 11 The IJ again continued the matter to February 8, 2024, to provide Petitioner additional time. (Doc. 12- 12 1 at 4.) 13 On February 8, 2024, Petitioner appeared at his fifth master calendar hearing. (Doc. 12-1 at 4.) 14 The IJ again continued the matter to March 6, 2024, to provide Petitioner additional time. (Doc. 12-1 15 at 4.) 16 On March 6, 2024, Petitioner appeared at his sixth master calendar hearing. (Doc. 12-1 at 4.) 17 The IJ set a final individual hearing for April 23, 2024. (Doc. 12-1 at 5.) 18 On March 23, 2024, counsel for Petitioner filed a motion to continue the hearing so he could 19 prepare. (Doc. 12-1 at 5.) The IJ rescheduled the hearing for May 23, 2024. (Doc. 12-1 at 5.) 20 On May 23, 2024, Petitioner and counsel appeared at a seventh master calendar hearing. (Doc. 21 12-1 at 5.) The IJ set a hearing for July 22, 2024. (Doc. 12-1 at 5.) 22 On July 22, 2024, Petitioner and counsel appeared at the individual hearing. (Doc. 12-1 at 5.) 23 The hearing was continued to September 12, 2024, due to insufficient time to complete the hearing. 24 (Doc. 12-1 at 5.) 25 On September 11, 2024, counsel for Petitioner requested a continuance of the hearing. (Doc. 26 12-1 at 5.) The IJ reset the hearing for October 29, 2024. (Doc. 12-1 at 5.) 27 28 1 On October 29, 2024, Petitioner and counsel appeared at the hearing. (Doc. 12-1 at 5.) The IJ 2 continued the hearing due to insufficient time to complete the hearing. (Doc. 12-1 at 5.) On November 3 25, 2024, the IJ set Petitioner’s merits hearing for January 6, 2025. (Doc. 12-1 at 5.) 4 On January 6, 2025, Petitioner and counsel appeared at the hearing. (Doc. 12-1 at 5.) The IJ 5 reset the matter to February 18, 2025, due to insufficient time. (Doc. 12-1 at 5.) 6 On February 18, 2025, the IJ denied Petitioner’s applications for relief and ordered Petitioner 7 removed from the United States to Haiti. (Doc. 12-1 at 5.) 8 On March 14, 2025, Petitioner filed a notice of appeal with the Board of Immigration Appeals 9 (“BIA”). On August 15, 2025, the BIA dismissed the appeal. (Doc. 12-1 at 5.) 10 On August 18, 2025, Petitioner filed a petition for review of the BIA decision with the Ninth 11 Circuit Court of Appeals. (Doc. 12-1 at 5.) The petition currently remains pending. 12 II. DISCUSSION 13 A. Motion to Dismiss 14 Habeas corpus petitions are subject to summary dismissal pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules 15 Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts. The provisions of Rule 4, which 16 are applicable to § 2241 petitions under Rule 1(b), provide in pertinent part: “If it plainly appears from 17 the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court, the 18 judge must dismiss the petition and direct the clerk to notify the petitioner.” The Advisory Committee 19 Notes to Rule 8 indicate that the Court may dismiss a petition for writ of habeas corpus, either on its 20 own motion under Rule 4, pursuant to the respondent’s motion to dismiss, or after an answer to the 21 petition has been filed. 22 B. Jurisdiction 23 A district court may grant a writ of habeas corpus when the petitioner “is in custody in 24 violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). 25 “[D]istrict courts retain jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to consider habeas challenges to 26 immigration detention that are sufficiently independent of the merits of [a] removal order.” Lopez- 27 Marroquin v. Barr, 955 F.3d 759, 759 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196, 1211–12 28 (9th Cir. 2011)). Pertinent here, the Supreme Court specifically directed that federal courts have 1 jurisdiction to review a constitutional challenge to a non-citizen's detention under § 1226(c). See 2 Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517 (2003). 3 C. Mandatory Detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) 4 Petitioner has been detained for approximately 2 years and 8 months pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 5 1226(c), which, in relevant part, provides: 6 (c) Detention of criminal aliens

7 (1) Custody

8 The Attorney General shall take into custody any alien who--

9 (A) is inadmissible by reason of having committed any offense covered in section 1182(a)(2) of this title, 10 (B) is deportable by reason of having committed any offense covered in section 11 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), (A)(iii), (B), (C), or (D) of this title,

12 (C) is deportable under section 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) of this title on the basis of an offense for which the alien has been sentence1 to a term of imprisonment of at least 1 year, 13 (D) is inadmissible under section 1182(a)(3)(B) of this title or deportable under section 14 1227(a)(4)(B) of this title, or

15 (E)(i) is inadmissible under paragraph (6)(A), (6)(C), or (7) of section 1182(a) of this title; and (ii) is charged with, is arrested for, is convicted of, admits having committed, 16 or admits committing acts which constitute the essential elements of any burglary, theft, larceny, shoplifting, or assault of a law enforcement officer offense, or any crime that 17 results in death or serious bodily injury to another person,

18 when the alien is released, without regard to whether the alien is released on parole, supervised release, or probation, and without regard to whether the alien may be 19 arrested or imprisoned again for the same offense.

20 . . . .

21 (4) Release

22 The Attorney General may release an alien described in paragraph (1) only if the Attorney General decides pursuant to section 3521 of Title 18 that release of the alien 23 from custody is necessary to provide protection to a witness, a potential witness, a person cooperating with an investigation into major criminal activity, or an immediate 24 family member or close associate of a witness, potential witness, or person cooperating with such an investigation, and the alien satisfies the Attorney General that the alien 25 will not pose a danger to the safety of other persons or of property and is likely to appear for any scheduled proceeding. A decision relating to such release shall take 26 place in accordance with a procedure that considers the severity of the offense committed by the alien. 27

28 8 U.S.C.A. § 1226 (West). 1 Section 1226(a) permits the Attorney General to release aliens on bond, “[e]xcept as provided 2 in subsection (c).” As noted above, Section 1226(c) states that the Attorney General “shall take into 3 custody any alien who” falls into one of the enumerated categories involving criminal offenses and 4 terrorist activities. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1). Section 1226(c)(2) then states that the Attorney General 5 may release an alien described in § 1226(c)(1) “‘only if the Attorney General decides’ both that doing 6 so is necessary for witness-protection purposes and that the alien will not pose a danger or flight risk.” 7 Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 303 (2018) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(2)) (emphasis in original). 8 In Jennings, the Supreme Court held that “together with § 1226(a), § 1226(c) makes clear that 9 detention of aliens within its scope must continue ‘pending a decision on whether the alien is to be 10 removed from the United States.’” Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)). Further, the Supreme Court noted 11 that “[b]y expressly stating that the covered aliens may be released ‘only if’ certain conditions are met, 12 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(2), the statute expressly and unequivocally imposes an affirmative prohibition on 13 releasing detained aliens under any other conditions.” Id. at 304 (emphasis in original). Thus, the 14 Supreme Court held that “§ 1226(c) mandates detention of any alien falling within its scope and that 15 detention may end prior to the conclusion of removal proceedings ‘only if’ the alien is released for 16 witness-protection purposes.” Id. Here, Petitioner does not meet the conditions for release. Therefore, 17 statutorily, § 1226(c) mandates detention. Petitioner contends that, although the statute mandates 18 detention, his detention without a bail review hearing has become so unreasonably prolonged as to 19 violate his Fifth Amendment procedural due process rights. 20 The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause provides that “[n]o person shall be ... deprived of 21 life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” “It is well established that the Fifth Amendment 22 entitles aliens to due process of law in deportation proceedings,” Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 23 (1993), and “[a] statute permitting indefinite detention of an alien would raise a serious constitutional 24 problem,” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001). The Supreme Court nevertheless has 25 recognized that “[d]etention during deportation proceedings is a constitutionally permissible part of 26 [the deportation] process.” Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 531 (2003); see also Carlson v. Landon, 342 27 U.S. 524, 538 (1952) (“[d]etention is necessarily a part of this deportation procedure”). 28 1 It is undisputed that Petitioner’s detention is mandatory under § 1226(c), and he does not meet 2 any of the conditions for release pursuant to § 1226(c)(2). Petitioner nonetheless claims his detention 3 has become so unreasonably prolonged that due process requires he be provided an individualized 4 bond hearing. The Supreme Court has not directly addressed the constitutionality of prolonged 5 detention in the context of an as-applied challenge to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c); however, the Supreme 6 Court’s statutory decisions regarding mandatory detention provide guidance regarding prolonged 7 detention in an as-applied challenge under the Due Process Clause. 8 In Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), the Court considered a due process challenge to 9 detention of aliens under 8 U.S.C. § 1231, which governs detention following a final order of removal. 10 The Court in Zadvydas read § 1231 to authorize continued detention of an alien following the 90-day 11 removal period for only such time as is reasonably necessary to secure the alien's removal. Id. at 699. 12 Zadvydas is materially different from the present case. In Zadvydas, the aliens challenging their 13 detention following final orders of deportation were ones for whom removal was “no longer 14 practically attainable.” Id. at 690. The civil confinement at issue was not limited, “but potentially 15 permanent.” Id. at 691. The Court observed that where “detention's goal is no longer practically 16 attainable, detention no longer bears a reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual was 17 committed.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Zadvydas distinguished § 1231 from 18 § 1226 on these very grounds, noting that “post-removal-period detention, unlike detention pending a 19 determination of removability, has no obvious termination point.” Id. at 697. Here, however, removal 20 is practically attainable. As the Supreme Court noted in Jennings, “detention under § 1226(c) has a 21 definite termination point: the conclusion of removal proceedings.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 304. 22 In Demore v. Kim, a lawful permanent resident alien challenged the no-bail provision of the 23 Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), complaining that his six-month detention violated due 24 process because he had not been provided an individualized bond hearing. 538 U.S. 510. The Supreme 25 Court rejected this claim, observing first that Congress, in its “broad power over naturalization and 26 immigration proceedings,” “regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied to United 27 States citizens.” Id. at 521 (quoting Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79-80 (1976)). Additionally, 28 detention pending removal necessarily serves the purpose of preventing aliens from fleeing prior to or 1 during removal proceedings. Id. at 527-28. Also, the Court noted that detention under § 1226(c) has a 2 definite termination point. Id. at 529. Although the Supreme Court did not specify an outer limit as to 3 what constitutes a permissible detention period, it acknowledged that “the detention at stake under § 4 1226(c) lasts roughly a month and a half in the vast majority of cases ... and about five months in the 5 minority of cases in which the alien chooses to appeal.” Id. at 530. Nevertheless, the majority went on 6 to hold that six months did not run afoul of the due process clause in part because the delayed 7 proceedings were the result of the alien’s own requests. Id. at 530–31. In analyzing whether 8 prolonged detention violates due process, many courts have looked to Justice Kennedy’s concurrence 9 in Demore, which noted that, “since the Due Process Clause prohibits arbitrary deprivations of liberty, 10 a lawful permanent resident alien such as respondent could be entitled to an individualized 11 determination as to his risk of flight and dangerousness if the continued detention became 12 unreasonable or unjustified.” Id. at 532 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 13 In 2015, the Ninth Circuit applied the canon of constitutional avoidance to hold that for 14 noncitizens detained under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b), 1226(a), and 1226(c), “the government must provide 15 periodic bond hearings every six months so that noncitizens may challenge their continued detention.” 16 Rodriguez v. Robbins, 804 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir.2015). In Jennings v. Rodriguez, however, the Supreme 17 Court determined that the Ninth Circuit had misapplied the doctrine of constitutional avoidance and 18 the “implicit 6-month time limit on the length of mandatory detention” under § 1226(c) fell “far short 19 of a ‘plausible statutory construction.’” 583 U.S. 281, 296, 303-04. The Jennings Court interpreted § 20 1226(c) as having a “definite termination point” to the length of detention, - the “conclusion of 21 removal proceedings” – and remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit to consider the constitutional 22 arguments on their merits. Id. at 304. Jennings therefore held that § 1226(c) on its face authorized 23 detention without a bond hearing. The Court did not, however, provide guidance on whether an alien 24 could assert a challenge under the Fifth Amendment due process clause as applied to a petitioner in his 25 individual circumstance. 26 Several courts including the Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuit, as well as numerous district 27 courts, including this Court, have found that unreasonably long detention periods may violate the due 28 process clause. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Marin (“Rodriguez IV”), 909 F.3d 252, 256 (9th Cir. 2018) (the 1 Ninth Circuit asserted “grave doubts that any statute that allows for arbitrary prolonged detention 2 without any process is constitutional....”); Diop v. ICE/Homeland Sec., 656 F.3d 221, 235 (3d Cir. 3 2011) (detention of an alien for a period of nearly three years without further inquiry into whether it 4 was necessary to ensure his appearance at the removal proceedings or to prevent a risk of danger to the 5 community, was unreasonable, and, therefore, a violation of the Due Process Clause”); German Santos 6 v. Warden Pike, 965 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2020) (reversing and remanding to district court to order bond 7 hearing while detained under § 1226(c)); Diep v. Wofford, 1:24-cv-01238-SKO, 2025 WL 604744 8 (E.D. Cal Feb. 25, 2025) (ordering bond hearing for noncitizen detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) for 9 13 months); A.E. v. Andrews, 1:25-cv-00107-KES-SKO, 2025 WL 1424382 (E.D. Cal. May 16, 2025) 10 (ordering bond hearing for noncitizen detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) for 20 months). 11 The Ninth Circuit has also noted that many courts have applied the Mathews1 test in 12 considering due process challenges in the immigration context. Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 13 1189, 1206 (9th Cir. 2022). However, the Supreme Court, when confronted with constitutional 14 challenges to immigration detention, has not resolved them through express application of Mathews. 15 See, e.g., Demore, 538 U.S. at 523, 526–29; see also Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 168, 16 122 S.Ct. 694, 151 L.Ed.2d 597 (2002) (“[W]e have never viewed Mathews as announcing an all- 17 embracing test for deciding due process claims.”). Nevertheless, several district courts in the Ninth 18 Circuit including this Court have employed the Mathews test in the context of evaluating whether due 19 process entitles a petitioner to a bond hearing. See, e.g., Jensen v. Garland, 2023 WL 3246522, at *4 20 (C.D. Cal. 2023); Galdillo v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 2021 WL 4839502, at *3 (C.D. Cal. 2021); 21 Jimenez v. Wolf, 2020 WL 510347, at *3 (N.D. Cal. 2020); Riego v. Scott, 2025 WL 660535 (E.D. 22 Cal. 2025); Diep, No. 1:24-CV-01238-SKO (HC), 2025 WL 604744; A.E., 1:25-cv-00107-KES-SKO, 23 2025 WL 1424382. 24 The Ninth Circuit has also noted the common use of the Mathews test and assumed (without 25 deciding) that it applies to due process claims in the immigration detention context. Rodriguez Diaz v. 26 27

28 1 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 1 Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1206-07 (9th Cir. 2022). Thus, the Court finds application of the Mathews test 2 in this case appropriate. 3 Under the Mathews test, the “identification of the specific dictates of due process generally 4 requires consideration of three distinct factors.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334–35. “First, the private 5 interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such 6 interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute 7 procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the 8 fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would 9 entail.” Id. at 335. 10 In the first factor, the Court must evaluate Petitioner’s private interest. Petitioner has now been 11 detained approximately 2 years and 8 months. Compared to the six-month presumptive period set forth 12 in Zadvydas beyond which continued detention becomes prolonged, Petitioner’s period of detention 13 qualifies as substantially prolonged. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. In addition, the Ninth Circuit has held 14 that an individual's private interest in “freedom from prolonged detention” is “unquestionably 15 substantial.” Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196, 1208 (9th Cir. 2011). Thus, the factor appears to weigh 16 heavily in favor of Petitioner. 17 However, in Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, the Ninth Circuit stated that “in evaluating the first 18 prong of the Mathews analysis, we cannot simply count his months of detention. We must also 19 consider the process he received during this time, the further process that was available to him, and the 20 fact that his detention was prolonged due to his decision to challenge his removal order.” 53 F.4th at 21 1208. The Ninth Circuit stated it was “important not to overstate the strength of Petitioner’s showing 22 under the first Mathews factor.” 53 F.4th at 1213. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that detentions longer 23 than six months were considered “prolonged” in the context of detentions “for which no individualized 24 bond hearings had taken place at all.” In Rodriguez Diaz, the petitioner had received a bond hearing 25 after he was detained. Id. at 1207. Here, unlike the petitioner in Rodriguez Diaz, Petitioner has not 26 received the benefit of a bond hearing. The Ninth Circuit noted that detentions longer than six months 27 were considered “prolonged” in cases such as this where “no individualized bond hearings had taken 28 place at all.” Id. at 1207. The appellate court found this distinction significant. Id. Thus, Petitioner’s 1 private interest in being free from prolonged detention of over 2 years and 8 months weighs in his 2 favor. 3 The Court also considers whether the reason for the lengthy period of detention is due to 4 Petitioner’s own actions. Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1208; Demore, 538 U.S. at 530-31. Arguably, 5 some of the detention period was due to Petitioner’s requests for continuances: April 22, 2024 – May 6 23, 2024, and September 11, 2024 – October 29, 2024. However, the balance of the detention period 7 cannot be attributed solely to Petitioner, because most of the continuances were ordered by the IJ. In 8 addition, the rest of the detention period was due to proceedings before the IJ, in the BIA and in the 9 Ninth Circuit. Thus, Petitioner’s private interest in being free from prolonged detention is not 10 diminished by this own actions. 11 As to the second factor, “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of [Petitioner’s] interest through 12 the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards,” 13 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335, the Court finds this factor also weighs in favor of Petitioner. The “risk of 14 an erroneous deprivation of [a petitioner's] interest is high” where “[h]e has not received any bond or 15 custody redetermination hearing[.]” Jimenez, 2020 WL 510347, at *3. Thus, the probable value of 16 additional procedural safeguards, i.e., a bond hearing, is high, because Respondents have provided 17 virtually no procedural safeguards at all. Given that Petitioner has been held without a bond hearing 18 for well over two-and-a-half years and it is not clear when detention will end, the risk of erroneous 19 deprivation weighs in favor of granting a bond hearing. 20 In the third factor, the Court weighs the government’s interest, “including the function 21 involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute requirement would 22 entail.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. As previously discussed, the government has a strong interest in 23 effecting removal. Demore, 538 U.S. at 531. In addition, the government has a strong interest in 24 protecting the public from the risk of danger posed by releasing an individual who is a self-admitted 25 gangmember with an extensive criminal history. Id. at 515. As other courts have recognized, however, 26 the key government interest at stake here “is not the continued detention of Petitioner, but the 27 government's ability to detain him without a bond hearing.” Zagal-Alcaraz v. ICE Field Office 28 Director, 2020 WL 1862254, at *7 (D. Or. 2020) (collecting cases). Here, the government’s asserted 1 interest is hinged on mere speculation about Petitioner’s risk of flight or dangerousness. Providing a 2 bond hearing would not undercut the government’s asserted interests in effecting removal or 3 protecting the public. Indeed, the purpose of a bond hearing is to inquire whether the alien represents a 4 flight risk or danger to the community. See In re Guerra, 24 I.&N. Dec. 37 (B.I.A. 2006). Given “the 5 minimal cost of conducting a bond hearing, and the ability of the IJ to adjudicate the ultimate legal 6 issue as to whether Petitioner's continued detention is justified,” courts have concluded that “the 7 government's interest is not as weighty as Petitioner’s.” Zagal-Alcaraz, 2020 WL 1862254, *7 8 (quoting Lopez Reyes v. Bonnar, 362 F. Supp. 3d 762, 777 (N.D. Cal. 2019)). The Court agrees with 9 this analysis. Although the Government has a strong interest, it is outweighed by Petitioner’s. 10 In sum, the three Mathews factors weigh in Petitioner’s favor and outweigh the government’s 11 interest in further detention without inquiry into whether he represents a flight risk or danger to the 12 community. The Court thus finds that Petitioner’s prolonged detention without a bond hearing before 13 an IJ violates his Fifth Amendment due process rights. Thus, Respondent will be directed to provide 14 Petitioner with a bond hearing before an IJ. 15 D. Bond Hearing 16 Having determined that a bond hearing is required, the Court turns to the question of who bears 17 the burden of proof at this hearing. Petitioner contends that the Government should bear the burden of 18 proof to justify detention by clear and convincing evidence. Respondent contends that Petitioner 19 should bear that burden. 20 The Court finds that “the government must prove by clear and convincing evidence that an 21 alien is a flight risk or a danger to the community to justify denial of bond” and that the bond hearing 22 must comport with the other requirements of Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196, 1208 (9th Cir. 2011). 23 See Martinez v. Clark, 124 F.4th 775, 785 (9th Cir. 2024) (stating that “the BIA properly noted that 24 the government bore the burden to establish by clear and convincing evidence that Martinez is a 25 danger to the community” with respect to a bond hearing for a noncitizen detained under § 1226(c)); 26 Black v. Decker, 103 F.4th 133, 159 (2d Cir. 2024) (affirming district court's order “requir[ing] the 27 government to show at such a bond hearing, by clear and convincing evidence, the need for Black's 28 continued detention” under § 1226(c)); German Santos v. Warden Pike Cnty. Corr. Facility, 965 F.3d 1 203, 214 (3d Cir. 2020) (holding that in order to justify a noncitizen's continued detention under § 2 1226(c) “the Government bears the burden of persuasion by clear and convincing evidence. That 3 evidence must be individualized and support a finding that continued detention is needed to prevent 4 him from fleeing or harming the community”). In the event Petitioner is “determined not to be a 5 danger to the community and not to be so great a flight risk as to require detention without bond,” the 6 immigration judge should consider Petitioner's financial circumstances and alternative conditions of 7 release. Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 1000 (9th Cir. 2017); Black, 103 F.4th at 138 (The 8 district court “correctly directed the immigration judge (“IJ”), in setting his bond and establishing 9 appropriate terms for his potential release, to consider his ability to pay and alternative means of 10 assuring appearance.”). 11 III. ORDER 12 For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 13 1) Respondent’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 12) is DENIED; 14 2) Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus be GRANTED; 15 3) Respondent is DIRECTED to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing before an IJ within 16 twenty-one (21) days in which the Government must demonstrate by clear and convincing 17 evidence that Petitioner is not a flight risk or a danger to the community, or in the 18 alternative, release Petitioner on appropriate conditions of supervision; and 19 4) The parties are DIRECTED to file a status report within seven (7) days after relief as 20 ordered is granted, or the expiration of the twenty-one (21) day period, whichever occurs 21 first. 22 23 IT IS SO ORDERED.

24 Dated: November 19, 2025 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto . 25 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

26 27 28