Wright v. Martin

• Court: Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
• Decided: October 29, 2025
• Docket: 24-1390
• Status: Published

Opinion

United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit

No. 24-1390

DAVID DAOUD WRIGHT,

Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.

DANIEL W. MARTIN, Warden, Wyatt Detention Facility,

Defendant, Appellee,

JOHN DOE 1-3,

Defendants.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

[Hon. John J. McConnell, Jr., U.S. District Judge]

Before

Montecalvo, Lipez, and Aframe, Circuit Judges.

Amato A. DeLuca, with whom DeLuca, Weizenbaum, Barry & Revens, Ltd. was on brief, for appellant.

Aaron L. Weisman, with whom Pannone Lopes Devereaux & O'Gara LLC was on brief, for appellee.

October 29, 2025 LIPEZ, Circuit Judge. Appellant David Daoud Wright

alleges that, while confined at the Donald W. Wyatt Detention

Facility ("Wyatt") in Central Falls, Rhode Island, awaiting

resentencing on federal charges, he suffered violations of his

rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Seeking

financial redress, he filed a complaint pro se in the District of

Rhode Island against Daniel Martin, Wyatt's then-warden, and three

unknown Wyatt officials pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The

defendants filed a motion to dismiss Wright's complaint, which the

district court granted in a text order, citing a prior district

court decision that held Wyatt officials act under color of

federal law -- not state law -- and thus are not subject to suit

under § 1983. Because we conclude that Wright's complaint

plausibly alleges action under color of state law, we reverse.

I.

A. Facts and Procedural History

We draw this brief factual recitation "from the

complaint, taking the well-pleaded facts as true and construing

all reasonable inferences in [Wright's] favor." Zhou v. Desktop

Metal, Inc., 120 F.4th 278, 283 (1st Cir. 2024). Wright was

detained at Wyatt from January 2020 to June 2021 pending

resentencing on federal criminal charges. During his

approximately seventeen-month period of confinement at Wyatt,

Wright -- a practitioner of Sunni Islam -- communicated with Martin

- 2 - and various other officials regarding his faith, including his

desire to hold "religious services" and obtain "religious

program[ming] and religious property." In response, the Wyatt

officials told Wright "that his religious adherence was

problematic" and subjected him to "harassment" and "insults."

Martin also denied Wright permission to host congregational prayer

in the Wyatt chapel, despite Wright explaining the importance of

such prayer to his Islamic faith, and even though congregational

prayer was prohibited in all other areas of the facility.

Eventually, Martin facilitated Wright's transfer out of Wyatt,

which Wright contends was to "teach him a lesson for complaining

too much."

Proceeding pro se, Wright filed a complaint against

Martin and three unknown Wyatt officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

seeking damages for the defendants' alleged retaliatory acts and

infringement upon Wright's free exercise of religion in violation

of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The defendants moved to

dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that they did

not act under color of state law and thus were not subject to suit

under § 1983. In a text order, the district court granted the

defendants' motion to dismiss, explaining that "[f]or the reasons

set forth in Glennie v. Garland, C.A. No. 21-231[], 2023

- 3 - WL 2265247 (D.R.I. Feb. 28, 2023), Mr. Wright has failed to set

forth a justiciable [§] 1983 claim." This appeal followed.

B. Background on the Facility1

In 1991, the Rhode Island General Assembly enacted the

Municipal Detention Facility Corporations Act (the "Act"), which

permitted each municipality within the state to establish a

municipal detention facility corporation with the power to erect

and operate a detention facility. See R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 45-54-1

to -2 (1991). The Act's purpose was twofold: "to meet the need

for economic development" within Rhode Island and to "address the

detention facility needs of the United States." Id. § 45-54-2(b);

see also City of Central Falls v. Cent. Falls Det. Facility Corp.,

No. 94-3939, 1997 WL 839936, at *3 (R.I. Super. Ct. June 23, 1997).

Pursuant to the Act, the City of Central Falls created the Central

Falls Detention Facility Corporation (the "CFDFC") to develop a

pretrial detention facility, which became Wyatt. See Central

Falls, 1997 WL 839936, at *1. The CFDFC is the only corporation,

and Wyatt the only detention facility, created under the Act. See

id.

1We take this background on Wyatt from the public record, including prior state and district court decisions. See Giragosian v. Ryan, 547 F.3d 59, 66 (1st Cir. 2008) ("A court may consider matters of public record in resolving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.").

- 4 - Per the Act, the CFDFC "is a public corporation" that

"is an instrumentality and agency of [Central Falls], but has a

distinct legal existence from" it. R.I. Gen. Laws § 45-54-1(a).

The CFDFC is governed by a five-member board of directors appointed

by the mayor of Central Falls and approved by the city council.

See id. § 45-54-5(a); see also LaCedra v. Donald W. Wyatt Det.

Facility, 334 F. Supp. 2d 114, 121 (D.R.I. 2004). Among the

CFDFC's more than two dozen enumerated "[p]owers" is the power to

enter into all agreements "necessary or incidental to the

performance of [the CFDFC's] duties and the execution of its

powers," R.I. Gen. Laws § 45-54-6(14); "[t]o provide for the care,

custody, control and transportation of all detainees or inmates

committed to detention or incarceration at" Wyatt, id.

§ 45-54-6(20); to hire, retain, discipline, and discharge

"employees for the operation of" Wyatt, id. § 45-54-6(22); and

"[t]o make and promulgate necessary rules and regulations"

regarding, among other things, "religious services . . . for all

persons detained at" Wyatt, id. § 45-54-6(26). The CFDFC also may

"delegate any or all" of its powers under the Act "to its duly

designated agents . . . or employees at its discretion." Id.

§ 45-54-6(27).

After initial struggles to secure funding, the CFDFC

entered into an agreement with the Rhode Island Port Authority and

- 5 - Economic Development Corporation,2 which offered to finance Wyatt's

construction by issuing revenue bonds. See Central Falls, 1997 WL

839936, at *1. The CFDFC agreed to pay the bonds "through per

diem charges collected from the housing of prisoners." Id. Around

this time, the CFDFC also "contracted with the U.S. Marshals

Service to house federal pretrial detainees at Wyatt," Sarro v.

Cornell Corr., Inc., 248 F. Supp. 2d 52, 55 (D.R.I. 2003), the

revenue from which would allow the CFDFC to cover its debt

payments, see Central Falls, 1997 WL 839936, at *1.

Shortly before the facility was scheduled to open,

however, the Marshals Service informed the CFDFC that it would be

sending far fewer detainees than initially promised. See id. To

satisfy "its financial obligations" and generate "revenue for the

State of Rhode Island and the City of Central Falls," the CFDFC

contracted with North Carolina to house individuals at Wyatt

incarcerated by that state. Id. At some point, the CFDFC also

entered into a contract to house individuals incarcerated by

Massachusetts authorities. See id. at *5. Indeed, for a period,

around twenty percent of the individuals at Wyatt were state

detainees. See id. at *1, *5. In subsequent years, the CFDFC

apparently has also entered into agreements to house individuals

at Wyatt in the custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, U.S.

2 This entity is now known as the Rhode Island Commerce Corporation. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-64-1.1 (2014).

- 6 - Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the U.S. Navy, and the

Mashantucket Pequot Tribe. See About the Facility, Donald W. Wyatt

Detention Facility, https://perma.cc/GR8X-E564. However, the

complaint does not allege, nor does the public record reveal, the

historical or current breakdown of state, federal, and tribal

detainees at Wyatt.

II.

"We review de novo a district court's allowance of a

motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under

Rule 12(b)(6)." Rivera v. Kress Stores of P.R., Inc., 30 F.4th

98, 102 (1st Cir. 2022). To survive a motion to dismiss, the

"complaint need not set forth detailed factual allegations, but it

must contain sufficient factual matter to state a claim to relief

that is plausible on its face." In re Curran, 855 F.3d 19, 25

(1st Cir. 2017) (citation modified).

Section 1983 provides a federal cause of action against

a "person" acting "under color of" state law who deprives another

of "any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution" or federal laws. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. A defendant

acts "under color of state law" by "exercis[ing] power 'possessed

by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer

is clothed with the authority of state law.'" Boniface v. Viliena,

145 F.4th 98, 116 (1st Cir. 2025) (quoting West v. Atkins, 487

U.S. 42, 49 (1988)); see also Belbachir v. County of McHenry, 726

- 7 - F.3d 975, 978 (7th Cir. 2013) (observing that § 1983

"imposes tort liability on state and local employees . . . for

violating federal rights").

A. Nature of the Facility

Martin argues that he cannot be liable under § 1983

because at the time of the alleged constitutional violations, he

was acting under color of federal law rather than state law. See

Rogers v. Vicuna, 264 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2001) ("[Section] 1983

cannot form the basis of an action against individuals acting under

color of federal law."). In support, Martin relies primarily on

the District of Rhode Island's holding in Glennie, upon which the

district court based its dismissal of Wright's complaint. That

case involved a suit against various Wyatt officials under, inter

alia, § 1983, brought by an individual detained at Wyatt while

awaiting adjudication on federal charges. Glennie, 2023 WL

2265247, at *1. In deciding whether the defendant officials were

amenable to suit under § 1983 for their alleged constitutional

violations, the Glennie court evaluated prior decisions from the

District of Rhode Island that had reached inconsistent conclusions

on that issue. See id. at *15; compare Sarro, 248 F. Supp. 2d at

61, 64 (holding that Wyatt employees act under color of federal

law), with LaCedra, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 140-41 (holding that Wyatt

employees act under color of state law).

- 8 - Notably, at the time that both Sarro and LaCedra were

decided, the CFDFC had contracted with a private corporation,

Cornell Corrections, Inc., "to operate the facility and employ

[its] staff." Sarro, 248 F. Supp. 2d at 55 ("Under the terms of

that contract, Cornell [Corrections] has the exclusive use of the

facility and the exclusive authority to operate it."); see also

LaCedra, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 121. Thus, given that Wyatt was a

"privately[]operated facility" and the defendant officials were

"private prison guards," the Sarro and LaCedra courts looked to

the various tests "for determining whether a private party acts

under color of state law." Sarro, 248 F. Supp. 2d at 54, 59-61;

see also LaCedra, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 139-42. The Glennie court

likewise understood Wyatt to be "privately operated," Glennie,

2023 WL 2265247, at *14 n.21 (citation modified), so it also

applied those tests, ultimately concluding that "Wyatt's 'private

prison guards [are] federal actors,'" id. at *16 (quoting Sarro,

248 F. Supp. 2d at 61).

Relying on the information available to him at the

motion-to-dismiss stage -- the explanation of Wyatt's creation and

early years provided in Sarro, LaCedra, and Central Falls -- Wright

assumes on appeal that Wyatt is currently operated by a "private

contractor[,] Cornell Corrections." In light of that assumption,

he urges us to follow LaCedra and hold that Martin acted under

color of state law because Martin's private employer, Cornell

- 9 - Corrections, can "trace [its] traditional public function of

prison operations" to the State of Rhode Island. LaCedra, 334

F. Supp. 2d at 140-41. However, at oral argument, counsel for

Martin appropriately corrected Wright's mistaken assumption,

explaining that Cornell Corrections is not, in fact, Martin's

employer because the CFDFC cut ties with that company in 2007.3

Rather, counsel clarified that the CFDFC has itself been operating

Wyatt for many years and that Wyatt's officials are employed

directly by the CFDFC. At this stage, we will accept the truth of

counsel's representations and thus assume -- favorably to Wright,

as we shall explain -- that Wyatt is currently owned and operated,

and Wyatt's officials are employed, by the CFDFC.4 See Zhou, 120

F.4th at 283.

Proceeding under such an assumption, which does not

conflict with the allegations in Wright's complaint, leads to a

different analysis than that undertaken by the courts in Sarro,

3 Counsel's representations are consistent with publicly available information. See Follow-up Report on Wyatt Detention Facility Ri July 2011, Prison Legal News, https://perma.cc/UU92- 74AW. 4 Our approach reflects that information about Wyatt's operation and Martin's employment is more readily available to Martin than to Wright. See Menard v. CSX Transp., Inc., 698 F.3d 40, 45 (1st Cir. 2012) (explaining that "'some latitude' may be appropriate" when deciding a motion to dismiss "where, as here, 'some of the information needed may be in the control of [the] defendants'" (alteration in original) (quoting Pruell v. Caritas Christi, 678 F.3d 10, 15 (1st Cir. 2012))).

- 10 - LaCedra, and Glennie, where, as noted above, the pertinent question

was "whether a private party acts under color of state [or federal]

law." Sarro, 248 F. Supp. 2d at 59. Here, we are accepting that

Martin is an employee of "a public corporation" that -- under a

Rhode Island statute -- is an "agency" of the City of Central Falls

and is governed by board members appointed by the city's mayor and

approved by its city council. R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 45-54-1(a), -5(a).

In other words, the CFDFC appears simply to be an extension of the

City of Central Falls itself. See Lebron v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger

Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 397 (1995) (holding "[t]hat

[g]overnment-created and -controlled corporations are (for many

purposes at least) part of the [g]overnment itself" because "[i]t

surely cannot be that government, state or federal, is able to

evade the most solemn obligations imposed in the Constitution by

simply resorting to the corporate form"); cf. R.I. Gen. Laws

§ 45-54-3(15) (defining "State" as including "any . . . public

corporation, agency, or instrumentality of the state").

Accordingly, in assessing the adequacy of Wright's complaint, we

view the facility as municipally owned and operated and Martin as

a municipal employee.

Despite the municipal governance, Martin insists that

Wyatt is a federal facility because the purpose of the statute

under which the CFDFC was created was to enable the confinement of

"federal, not State of Rhode Island, detainees." (Emphasis

- 11 - omitted.) Even if our inquiry would differ for a facility whose

sole purpose was to house federal detainees, "address[ing] the

detention facility needs of the United States" was only one of the

Act's stated purposes, as we noted above. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 45-

54-2(b). Through the Act, the Rhode Island General Assembly also

"declared that a need for economic development projects exists

within" Rhode Island and that "the development of" Wyatt "would

help to meet" that "economic" need, thus "further[ing] the public

policy of the [S]tate." Id. § 45-54-2(b)-(c). At the facility's

inception, when housing nonfederal detainees became economically

advantageous, the CFDFC contracted to do so. See Central Falls,

1997 WL 839936, at *1. In other words, it appears that Rhode

Island saw a "widely reported" need of the United States and

determined that meeting the federal need would advance the State's

own interests. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 45-54-2. When the demand for

a federal detention facility was less substantial than

anticipated, the CFDFC served the State's interest by agreeing to

house state detainees, and nothing in the statute precluded it

from doing so. See Central Falls, 1997 WL 839936, at *8

(concluding that the CFDFC "is not required exclusively to house

federal inmates in its facility"). We therefore do not see how

the Act's purpose supports Martin's contention that Wyatt is a

federal facility notwithstanding its decidedly municipal

attributes.

- 12 - B. Impact of the Federal Contract

Martin also asserts that, even accepting that Wyatt is

a municipal facility, Wright has not stated a claim because "Wright

was at all relevant times a federal detainee" held at Wyatt

pursuant to the CFDFC's contract with the U.S. Marshals Service.

We have not previously addressed whether a contract with a federal

agency to house federal detainees converts a state- or municipal-

owned and operated facility into a federal one. As the Seventh

Circuit has noted, however, "[c]ases similar to this, allowing

[§] 1983 claims by federal prisoners against county or city

employees, are legion." Belbachir, 726 F.3d at 978 (collecting

cases).

Belbachir, for example, involved a suit by the estate of

a noncitizen who died while confined in a county jail, where she

was placed pursuant to a contract between the county and federal

immigration authorities. Id. at 977-78. Explaining that "the

contract did not federalize" the county jail, "which continued to

house nonfederal as well as federal prisoners," the Seventh Circuit

held that the noncitizen's estate "rightly base[d] [its] federal

claims on" § 1983. Id. at 978; cf. Logue v. United States, 412

U.S. 521, 529–30 (1973) (declining, in context of claim under

Federal Tort Claims Act, to characterize as federal employees

county jailers who were overseeing federal prisoners pursuant to

contract with federal agency).

- 13 - Similarly, in Henderson v. Thrower, the Fifth Circuit

permitted "a federal prisoner" who "was temporarily placed in the

Mobile, Alabama city jail" pursuant to a contract between the city

and the Federal Bureau of Prisons to proceed against various jail

officials under § 1983. 497 F.2d 125, 125-26 (5th Cir. 1974) (per

curiam). The court explained that the contract between the city

and the federal government, while allowing the federal government

to inspect the facility, did not "authorize federal interference

with the operation of the" city jail. Id. at 126. Because the

defendant officials "supervised and treated all" individuals in

the jail "by virtue of the positions conferred on them by the city,

a creature of the State of Alabama," the officials could not

"escape liability under § 1983 on the basis of [the] plaintiff's

peculiar status." Id.; see also, e.g., E. D. v. Sharkey, 928 F.3d

299, 303-04 (3d Cir. 2019) (allowing § 1983 suit brought by federal

immigration detainee confined at county facility pursuant to

contract with federal agency); Porro v. Barnes, 624 F.3d 1322,

1324-25 (10th Cir. 2010) (similar); Loe v. Armistead, 582 F.2d

1291, 1293 (4th Cir. 1978) (similar).

We agree with our sister circuits that the mere fact of

a contract to house federal detainees does not transform a

municipally owned and operated facility into a federal one, or a

municipal employee into a federal actor. Importantly, Wright's

complaint does not allege that the contract somehow deputized

- 14 - Wyatt's employees as federal agents or "federalize[d]" Wyatt,

which, as noted above, has historically "house[d] nonfederal as

well as federal" detainees. Belbachir, 726 F.3d at 978; see also

Li v. City of Santa Ana, No. 8:20-cv-00068, 2021 WL 3207957, at

*4-5, *5 n.3 (C.D. Cal. May 25, 2021) (rejecting defendants'

argument that, upon entering contract with U.S. Marshals Service,

county jail became "completely 'federalized'" because plaintiffs

"have produced evidence that the [j]ail still houses state and

local detainees"); Green v. Scarbrough, No. 7:20-CV-00123, 2021 WL

11732421, at *2 (M.D. Ga. Apr. 19, 2021) (similar), R. & R.

adopted, No. 7:20-CV-123, 2021 WL 11732694 (M.D. Ga. Sep. 2, 2021).

Nor does the complaint allege that, under the contract, the U.S.

Marshals Service assumed responsibility for the day-to-day

treatment of persons housed at Wyatt or the promulgation of rules

and regulations affecting that treatment -- including rules

pertaining to religious services -- which, by statute, rests with

the CFDFC unless otherwise delegated. See R.I. Gen. Laws

§§ 45-54-6(20), (26)-(27); see also, e.g., Henderson, 497 F.2d at

126; Jarno v. Lewis, 256 F. Supp. 2d 499, 503 (E.D. Va. 2003).

Accordingly, and in light of Martin's counsel's representations,

Wright has adequately pleaded that Martin's allegedly

unconstitutional conduct occurred under color of state law.

The cases that Martin cites in arguing otherwise -- in

addition to Glennie -- invariably involve suits against private

- 15 - prison employees at privately operated facilities. See, e.g.,

Spikes v. Car Toys, Inc., No. 21-CV-00681, 2024 WL 4135234, at *1

(D. Colo. Sep. 10, 2024) (suit against "a private company that

operates a detention facility . . . that houses federal detainees

and prisoners pursuant to a contract with the United States

Marshals Service"); Rocha-Jamarillo v. Madrigal, 727 F. Supp. 3d

1370, 1388 (M.D. Ga. 2024) (suit against "private detention center

entities" holding detainees "on behalf of the federal

government"). Those cases are inapt, however, given that, for the

reasons we have explained, no private conduct is at issue here.

Cf. Doe v. United States, 831 F.3d 309, 314-16 (5th Cir. 2016)

(applying tests for determining "whether private conduct is fairly

attributable to the State" and distinguishing Henderson on the

ground that, in that case, "the jail was county owned and operated;

it unequivocally derived its existence from the state. No private

contractor was involved." (citation modified)).

***

In sum, because Wright has plausibly pleaded that Martin

acted under color of state law in allegedly infringing upon

Wright's constitutional rights, we reverse the decision of the

district court and remand for further proceedings consistent with

this opinion.

So ordered.

- 16 -