Woolworth v. Conboy

170 F. 934, 23 L.R.A.N.S. 743, 1909 U.S. App. LEXIS 4768

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
• Decided: June 3, 1909
• Docket: No. 2,909
• Status: Published

Opinion

AMIDON, District Judge

(after stating the facts as above). The "motion should have been granted. It was not negligent to maintain the open stairway. It was separated from the part of the store to which patrons were invited or accustomed to resold. Indeed, if it had been situated in a portion of the room used by the public, that would not have constituted negligence. Important retail establishments are now accustomed to occupy several stories of the building in which their business is carried on. Open stairways leading from one story to another are a part of the ordinary equipment of such premises. Even when elevators, are provided, there is usually a stairway adjacent to the shaft, and there are frequentfy other stairways in such rooms. Such stairways are closed on three sides, as was the one in this case; but the entrance is left open. Any other arrangement would be manifestly impracticable, and defeat the very object which the stairways are designed to accomplish. Such open stairways being an ordinary feature of store premises, the public, when resorting there, assume the risk arising therefrom, and are bound to protect themselves by the use of their eyes against such dangers. Mr. Justice Holmes, then speaking as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, states the rule applicable to such a situation as follows, in Hunnewell v. Haskell, 174 Mass. 557, 55 N. E. 320:

“There is no duty on the part of' a shopkeeper to give warning of the presence of an ordinary flight of stairs in broad daylight, or to guard the necessary access to it, even if there is a crowd in his shop. The sides of the opening were guarded. Every one who is on an upper story knows that there probably are stairs from it somewhere, and must look out for them. The case is different from that of a hole in the floor which commonly is covered, and which is of a kind not to be expected.”

, See, also, Dunn v. Kemp, 36 Wash. 183, 78 Pac. 782.

The crowd on the present occasion seems to have been some- ' what more violent than usual. Still such crowds are often found in large stores at the time of special sales, and during holiday seasons. They are an unavoidable feature of mercantile life in large Cities. The defendant on the occasion in question had no reason to believe that such a sale as it was conducting would lead to any uncontrolled or violent, conduct on the part of customers visiting the store, and was not therefore required to maintain its store in an unusual condition of safety to meet such an emergency. It had no reasonable cause to anticipate such violence, but, on the contrary, had a right to believe that patrons would demean themselves with a proper regard to others using the store. It was not, therefore, guilty of any negligence by reason of anything done by the crowd. In the excitement plaintiff seems to have lost her head and become wholly oblivious of her own safety or environment. She has met ■ with an accident which is quite frequent, and there is nothing in this record justifying the shifting of her misfortune upon the defendant.

The judgment must be reversed, and a new trial granted.