Woodward v. Quigley

133 N.W.2d 38, 257 Iowa 1077
CourtSupreme Court of Iowa
DecidedMay 4, 1965
Docket51390
StatusPublished
Cited by34 cases

This text of 133 N.W.2d 38 (Woodward v. Quigley) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Iowa primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Woodward v. Quigley, 133 N.W.2d 38, 257 Iowa 1077 (iowa 1965).

Opinions

[1081]*1081Stuart, J.

— The corporate life of the Telegrapb-Herald, a newspaper in Dubuque, Iowa, was due to expire December 31, 1961. At a special stockholders’ meeting on June 9, 1960, a resolution was duly adopted by a majority of all the stockholders extending the corporate existence perpetually. Of the 1200 shares of stock outstanding all voted in favor of the renewal except the 379 shares owned by defendant. Section 491.25 of the Code provides in part:

“In all cases of renewal, those stockholders voting for such renewal must purchase at its real value the stock voted against such renewal, and shall have three years from the date such action for renewal was taken in which to purchase and pay for the stock voting against such renewal, which purchase price shall bear interest at the rate of five percent per annum from the date of such renewal action until paid.”

Plaintiffs recognize their obligation to purchase the stock under this statute, but the parties have been unable to agree on the “real value” of defendant’s stock. This action was brought by the majority stockholders to secure a court determination of its “real value”. The trial court established a value of $1750 per share and both parties have appealed.

In Robbins v. Beatty, 246 Iowa 80, 91, 67 N.W.2d 12, 18, we define “real value” as the “intrinsic value, determined from a consideration of every relevant factor bearing on the question of value”, including “the rate of dividends paid, the security afforded that dividends will be regularly paid, possibility that dividends will be increased or diminished, the size of the accumulated surplus applicable to payment of dividends, record of the corporation, its prospects for the future, selling price of stocks of like character, value of its assets, book values, market conditions, and reputation of the corporation. It is unwise to attempt to state every factor that may bear on value of stock in a particular case.”

I. The three standards that have received almost universal recognition in appraising the intrinsic value of stock under statutes of this type are (1) market value of the stock (2) net asset value of the corporation, and (3) investment value. 13 Fletcher Cyclopedia Corporations 335, section 5899 et seq. [1082]*1082“All relevant factors” referred to in the Robbins case can be considered under one or more of these three standards.

Market value of the stock, if it is possible to establish a value through sales on the open market, is a factor to be considered, but is not too dependable as a guide to intrinsic worth. The market price is subject to fluctuation for many reasons other than the intrinsic worth of the stock or the condition of the corporation. In this particular case, there is no evidence of any sales of stock upon the open market and admittedly no market value for stock in the Telegraph-Herald was established. This standard will not be considered here.

II. While most courts consider “net asset value” in attempting to arrive at the real value of the stock, there are wide differences in the way it is defined and computed. Fletcher defines the term as “the share which the stock represents in the value of the net assets of the corporation. It is a value based on a hypothetical dissolution and distribution of the corporate assets, and is one of the factors to be considered in an appraisal proceeding.” 13 Fletcher Cyclopedia Corporations 339, section 5899.2. See also 55 Michigan Law Review 689, 692. The Delaware Supreme Court flatly states it has rejected the dissolution method of arriving at net value of corporate assets and requires them to be valued as a “going concern”. Felder v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 39 Del. Ch. 76, 159 A.2d 278. However, it does not appear from the facts of the eases that they have actually followed this practice. In the Felder case the Delaware Court rejected the capitalized earnings method of valuing the assets for reasons which we consider sound, saying:

“The appraiser’s approach seems unacceptable to me because it uses an element of value (capitalized earnings) to determine the maximum value for another element (asset value). It seems clear that the fair value of assets at a given date are not necessarily fully reflected in capitalized earnings as of that date. * * * One might turn it around and say that the capitalized earnings formula is unacceptable because it does not ‘jibe’ with the fair asset value. Could we say there was no asset value where the capitalized earnings figure was zero ?” Felder v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., supra, page 83 of 39 Del. Ch., page 282 of 159 A.2d.

[1083]*1083The co-urt then accepted the valuation of a witness who arrived at “sound value” by computing the replacement cost and depreciating it. The court said “sound value” was sufficiently close to “actual value” to warrant its use. Depreciated replacement cost does not place the value of the assets on a “going concern” basis.

The Delaware court in Sporberg v. City Specialty Stores, Inc., 35 Del. Ch. 560, 123 A.2d 121, 126, accepted a valuation of real estate which was based upon the capitalization of the estimated net rental income at six percent. This is not a valuation as part of a going concern (ladies’ apparel and accessories) but a valuation of the property as rental property.

We are unable to perceive how a going concern valuation can avoid being influenced by the earnings. Capitalization of earnings which Delaware rejected seems to be the most widely recognized method of valuing assets of a going concern. Net asset value should not be influenced by earnings. We therefore prefer the Fletcher method of determining net asset value by valuing the assets as such. This offers protection to the minority stockholder in a corporation with a poor earnings record. In such instance the value as a going concern might be less than the dissolution value of the assets. It would not be fair to limit the minority interest to a value influenced by poor earnings, when the minority might prefer to liquidate and convert the assets into cash, and at the same time place the majority in a position where it could later liquidate and receive the entire benefit of the greater liquidation value. Net asset value will, in most instances, be of far less importance than the investment value of the stock, because the real value of the stock is still to be determined as in a going concern. However, net asset value as defined by Fletcher is a factor to be considered. The weight to be given this factor will depend upon the facts in each case.

We do not find the evidence here on the net asset value very satisfactory. Plaintiffs depend upon the evidence of Mr. James P. McKean of the American Appraisal Company in which he expresses his opinion as to the “real value” of the assets of the corporation. Even though there is a detailed appraisal of the physical assets, his testimony reveals that his real value was [1084]*1084limited, to the.value, oí tbe 'earnings.capitalized at six percent. He..testified:, . : • , ■ ■ . . , • ;

■ “My real value appraisal of. tbe net assets of tbe Telegraphy Herald, as. of; June 9, I960, in tbe -amount of $1,649,307, if divided by $99,000, my estimated future, income, would yield.

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133 N.W.2d 38, 257 Iowa 1077, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/woodward-v-quigley-iowa-1965.