Hernando Bank v. Huff

609 F. Supp. 1124, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19880
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Mississippi
DecidedMay 13, 1985
DocketDC83-49-NB-O
StatusPublished
Cited by12 cases

This text of 609 F. Supp. 1124 (Hernando Bank v. Huff) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Mississippi primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hernando Bank v. Huff, 609 F. Supp. 1124, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19880 (N.D. Miss. 1985).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BIGGERS, District Judge.

This diversity case involves valuation of the stock of several shareholders who dissented to the change of corporate form by plaintiff Hernando Bank, a banking corporation, to a banking corporation owned by a one-bank holding company, plaintiff Gateway Capitol Corporation. In a vote taken on September 9, 1982, a sufficient number of shareholders in the Hernando Bank approved the change in corporate form; thus, the Hernando Bank subsequently became a wholly-owned subsidiary of Gateway Capital Corporation. The defendants herein dissented to the proposed merger and perfected their rights pursuant to Miss.Code Ann. § 79-3-161 (1972) to demand that their stock be purchased by the plaintiff Hernando Bank. 1

A. Statutory Construction

In accordance with the Mississippi statute, the Hernando Bank obtained an appraisal of the stock from Morgan-Keegan of Memphis, Tennessee. Morgan-Keegan determined that the stock had a fair market value of $78.50 per share, to which the Hernando Bank added accrued dividends and offered the defendants the sum of $80.50 per share. 2 This offer was rejected by the defendants; thus, the plaintiffs seek a court determination of the proper value per share of stock.

*1126 Cal-Maine Foods, Inc. v. Duvic, 264 So.2d 383 (Miss.1972) is the only reported decision involving the statute in issue. In that case, the Mississippi Supreme Court found no reversible error in the valuation placed on dissenters’ stock by a chancellor, stating that such determination under Mississippi law is a purely factual issue to be resolved by the trier of fact. Id. at 384. Inasmuch as the absence of case law requires this court to make an “Erie guess” regarding construction of the statute, see Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198, 204-05, 76 S.Ct. 273, 277, 100 L.Ed. 199, 206 (1956), the factors viewed by the chancellor provide this court with some guidance. These factors include

the liquidating value, the net asset value, the market value, the asset value, the dividends, the earnings prospects, the nature of the enterprise, the general market conditions, the availability of financing, management’s performance, prospects for dividends, past and future earnings, general economic conditions under which the company was operated, particular industry involved, the trends within that industry, the long range obligations of the company, and the long range prospects of the company, and including the offers of the defendant to the complainant ... and the investing experience of the complainant and of the defendant____

Duvic v. Cal-Maine Foods, Inc., No. 81,-116, slip op. at 9 (Miss.Ch., 1st Jud.Dist. Hinds Cty. July 20, 1971).

The defendants argue that the statute excludes consideration of any purchase offers, since fair value must be determined on the date prior to approval of the proposed corporate action and without reference to appreciation or depreciation in anticipation of such action. This provision indicates to the court that the corporation should be viewed as a going concern, rather than a liquidated entity. 3 However, the statutory prohibition against the consideration of any appreciation or depreciation in anticipation of a corporate merger in no way excludes consideration of purchase offers made for this or comparable corporations. In fact, since the going concern value of a company is generally defined as “its worth as an operating business to another firm or individual,” see Western & Brigham, Essentials of Managerial Finance 443 (6th ed. 1982), such offers have particular relevance. In the case of an offer for a comparable company, the relevance of a purchase offer is not diminished due to the consummation of the sale.

B. Minority Discount

Furthermore, the defendants argue at length that their stock shares should be valued as a pro rata share of the corporation, and that a “minority discount” due to the lack of corporate control in such shares is improper. The defendants strenuously contend that a minority shareholder should not be “punished” for his lack of a controlling interest by discounting his stock, especially since the corporate change in form is involuntary with respect to the dissenter. See Dreiseszun v. FLM Industries, Inc., 577 S.W.2d 902, 906 (Mo.App.1979) (minority discount improper); Woodward v. Quigley, 257 Iowa 1077, 133 N.W.2d 38, 41, modified on rehearing, 257 Iowa 1077, 136 N.W.2d 280 (1965) (same).

Despite the superficial appeal of the defendants’ argument, the court is unconvinced that a minority share of stock should be valued as though it were a controlling share of a corporation. Accordingly, the court concludes that in the present case a minority discount is proper in determining the fair value of the stock of the dissenters.

C. Valuation

Courts universally view three elements in determining the fair value of *1127 stock — market value, asset value, and investment (or earnings) value. Valuation of Dissenters’ Stock Under Appraisal Statutes, 79 Harv.L.Rev. 1453, 1457 (1966). However,

all three elements do not have to influence the result in every valuation proceeding. It suffices if they are all considered. Compelling the consideration of all of them, including those which may turn out to be unreliable in a particular case, has the salutary effect of assuring more complete justification by the appraiser of the conclusion he reaches. It also provides a more concrete basis for court review.

Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Bade, 37 N.Y.2d 585, 376 N.Y.S.2d 103, 106, 338 N.E.2d 614, 616 (N.Y.1975). This court approves of the approach adopted in Endicott and other cases, and therefore shall consider all three methods.

1. Market Value Approach

Market value, or fair market value, is “the amount that a purchaser who is willing, but not required to buy, would pay, and that a seller who is willing but not required to sell, would accept”; Bear Creek Water Association v. Town of Madison, 416 So.2d 399, 402 (Miss.1982); furthermore, it is necessary that “both the purchaser and the seller be fully informed of all the circumstances involving the value and use of the property.” Id. at 403. In determining fair market value of stock, the price at which recent sales were made obviously is relevant.

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Bluebook (online)
609 F. Supp. 1124, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19880, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hernando-bank-v-huff-msnd-1985.