Bruñe, C. J.,
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a divorce case in which the wife appeals from a decree granting the husband an absolute divorce on the ground of abandonment. To a large extent the case grew out of the wife’s consuming religious zeal, which led her to spend much time at church services, not only on Sundays but also throughout the week—both late afternoons and evenings—to the neglect of her home and husband, and also, as she frequently took her teen-age son along, to the interruption of his normal life, particularly his home studies. After this had been going on for about a year, the husband told her she would have to-choose between her home and her great religious activity.
Matters came more or less to a head in the middle of January, 1959. For some months prior to that time marital rela[214]*214tions had been suspended1 by the wife. On or about January 12, the husband, in effect, called upon the wife to make the choice above stated, but he had no objection to her religious activity if limited to more or less usual proportions. The husband testified that after a few minutes’ thought, his wife replied, “Well, I’m leaving, I’m going to work for the Eord.” At about this same time there was some discussion of the wife leaving for a few days to help a sick friend. The husband at first agreed to her doing so, but withdrew his consent before her departure. She says that in the interim she had made a commitment in reliance on his assent. Be that as it may, the wife’s absence extended not over a few days but over a period of months; and we think the evidence warranted the conclusion that the wife deliberately chose when she left to abandon her husband and her home rather than curtail her virtually all-consuming religious activity.
She returned several months later, in April, to get some clothes and a small machine and spent about forty-five minutes talking with the son, but she did not see or speak to her husband. She then departed again.
Early in September, 1959, she returned a second time. On this occasion she first telephoned the son, who suggested that she come over some afternoon when he would be there in the afternoon. He did not want her to come when his father would be there because he anticipated an argument. The wife came at about 9:30 that evening without prior notice to the husband, let herself in with her key and, without more ado, went to her room downstairs and took off her dress and hung it in the closet. The husband and son, hearing the noise of the opening or closing of the door after they had gone to bed upstairs, came down and found the wife standing backed against the wall in her room. The husband’s greeting was far from [215]*215a welcome, but the wife refused even to speak to him at all. The husband soon thereafter called in the police who talked for a time but were not in a position to do anything and soon left. The next day the husband went to the police station and swore out a warrant for the arrest of the wife on charges of disorderly conduct allegedly committed in January. It seems evident that the charge made in the affidavit executed to obtain the warrant was quite unsupportable. The obvious purpose of the husband in these proceedings was to bring about a mental examination of the wife, and as a result of her examination by two doctors she was committed to the Spring Grove State Hospital, a mental institution. She was, however, never adjudicated insane and was discharged some eleven months later after having been allowed to go off for a number of week-ends spent with friends. The husband was evidently no enthusiast for having his wife return to the home, and she was unwilling to give up the religious attachments and activities which had led to the breach in January, 1959.
The Chancellor delivered his ruling from the bench at the conclusion of the hearing. In it he reviewed carefully and in detail all of the testimony which we have only summarized to some extent, and he dealt fully with the wife’s alleged efforts at reconciliation. The case is almost wholly one of fact and of the application to the facts of established rules of law.
In the light of our review of all of the testimony (which is perhaps unusually repetitious), we could not say that the Chancellor was clearly in error—if in error at all—in concluding that the wife deserted the husband on January 15, 1959, that the desertion continued for more than eighteen months prior to the filing of the bill, that the wife, the deserting party, made no genuine effort towards reconciliation, and that there was no reasonable hope of reconciliation.
There seems to be no doubt that “the wife took the decisive step of leaving the home” in January, 1959. (See Besche v. Besche, 209 Md. 442, 449, 121 A. 2d 708.) It is not a case where the husband left and claimed constructive desertion by the wife. Further, we think that there is no substantial question that the wife left of her own free will and not as a re-[216]*216suit of being forced to do so by her husband’s conduct. She evidently preferred as her chief occupation carrying on her very zealous religious life rather than living simply as the wife of a hard working farmer, with religion as a part of her life but not as a virtually all-consuming part of it. Not only could the Chancellor properly find the actual separation, but he could also properly find, we think, an intention on the part of the wife to terminate the marriage relation in order that she might devote herself to what she considered the work of the Lord. These facts were sufficient to establish desertion. See Gill v. Gill, 93 Md. 652, 49 A. 557; Fleegle v. Fleegle, 136 Md. 630, 110 A. 889; Dunnigan v. Dunnigan, 182 Md. 47, 51, 31 A. 2d 634; Miller v. Miller, 185 Md. 79, 82, 42 A. 2d 915; Flohr v. Flohr, 195 Md. 482, 487, 73 A. 2d 874; Zulauf v. Zulauf, 218 Md. 99, 105, 145 A. 2d 414, and cases there cited.
In accordance with what we have just said, we think that the Chancellor was not in error—certainly not clearly in error—in finding that the separation in January, 1959, was not with the husband’s consent. Though the cause of friction in the home in this case was doubtless much less acute than that in Moran v. Moran, 219 Md. 399, 149 A. 2d 399, we cannot say that the husband was unjustified in calling upon his wife to choose between her more than intensive religious life and her marital life. That he called upon her to do so does not mean that he assented to either choice she might make. She rejected the call to domestic duty and chose what she doubtless considered a higher duty. That was her deliberate choice and her husband could not prevent it. See Moran v. Moran, supra; Miller v. Miller, supra, 185 Md. at 85; Miller v. Miller (a wholly separate case), 178 Md. 12, 21, 11 A. 2d 630; all holding that acquiescence to or assent to what one cannot prevent does not amount to a voluntary agreement thereto.
The wife’s visit to the house in April, 1959, to pick up a few things involved no effort towards reconciliation. Her return in September seems a strange interlude. Though the husband’s actions in response to her physical return might, under some circumstances, constitute agreement to continued separation, or actual desertion on his part (see Hite v. Hite, [217]*217210 Md. 576, 582, 124 A. 2d 581), we cannot say that the Chancellor was in error in concluding that the husband’s conduct did not amount to such acquiescence or to desertion on his part.
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Bruñe, C. J.,
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a divorce case in which the wife appeals from a decree granting the husband an absolute divorce on the ground of abandonment. To a large extent the case grew out of the wife’s consuming religious zeal, which led her to spend much time at church services, not only on Sundays but also throughout the week—both late afternoons and evenings—to the neglect of her home and husband, and also, as she frequently took her teen-age son along, to the interruption of his normal life, particularly his home studies. After this had been going on for about a year, the husband told her she would have to-choose between her home and her great religious activity.
Matters came more or less to a head in the middle of January, 1959. For some months prior to that time marital rela[214]*214tions had been suspended1 by the wife. On or about January 12, the husband, in effect, called upon the wife to make the choice above stated, but he had no objection to her religious activity if limited to more or less usual proportions. The husband testified that after a few minutes’ thought, his wife replied, “Well, I’m leaving, I’m going to work for the Eord.” At about this same time there was some discussion of the wife leaving for a few days to help a sick friend. The husband at first agreed to her doing so, but withdrew his consent before her departure. She says that in the interim she had made a commitment in reliance on his assent. Be that as it may, the wife’s absence extended not over a few days but over a period of months; and we think the evidence warranted the conclusion that the wife deliberately chose when she left to abandon her husband and her home rather than curtail her virtually all-consuming religious activity.
She returned several months later, in April, to get some clothes and a small machine and spent about forty-five minutes talking with the son, but she did not see or speak to her husband. She then departed again.
Early in September, 1959, she returned a second time. On this occasion she first telephoned the son, who suggested that she come over some afternoon when he would be there in the afternoon. He did not want her to come when his father would be there because he anticipated an argument. The wife came at about 9:30 that evening without prior notice to the husband, let herself in with her key and, without more ado, went to her room downstairs and took off her dress and hung it in the closet. The husband and son, hearing the noise of the opening or closing of the door after they had gone to bed upstairs, came down and found the wife standing backed against the wall in her room. The husband’s greeting was far from [215]*215a welcome, but the wife refused even to speak to him at all. The husband soon thereafter called in the police who talked for a time but were not in a position to do anything and soon left. The next day the husband went to the police station and swore out a warrant for the arrest of the wife on charges of disorderly conduct allegedly committed in January. It seems evident that the charge made in the affidavit executed to obtain the warrant was quite unsupportable. The obvious purpose of the husband in these proceedings was to bring about a mental examination of the wife, and as a result of her examination by two doctors she was committed to the Spring Grove State Hospital, a mental institution. She was, however, never adjudicated insane and was discharged some eleven months later after having been allowed to go off for a number of week-ends spent with friends. The husband was evidently no enthusiast for having his wife return to the home, and she was unwilling to give up the religious attachments and activities which had led to the breach in January, 1959.
The Chancellor delivered his ruling from the bench at the conclusion of the hearing. In it he reviewed carefully and in detail all of the testimony which we have only summarized to some extent, and he dealt fully with the wife’s alleged efforts at reconciliation. The case is almost wholly one of fact and of the application to the facts of established rules of law.
In the light of our review of all of the testimony (which is perhaps unusually repetitious), we could not say that the Chancellor was clearly in error—if in error at all—in concluding that the wife deserted the husband on January 15, 1959, that the desertion continued for more than eighteen months prior to the filing of the bill, that the wife, the deserting party, made no genuine effort towards reconciliation, and that there was no reasonable hope of reconciliation.
There seems to be no doubt that “the wife took the decisive step of leaving the home” in January, 1959. (See Besche v. Besche, 209 Md. 442, 449, 121 A. 2d 708.) It is not a case where the husband left and claimed constructive desertion by the wife. Further, we think that there is no substantial question that the wife left of her own free will and not as a re-[216]*216suit of being forced to do so by her husband’s conduct. She evidently preferred as her chief occupation carrying on her very zealous religious life rather than living simply as the wife of a hard working farmer, with religion as a part of her life but not as a virtually all-consuming part of it. Not only could the Chancellor properly find the actual separation, but he could also properly find, we think, an intention on the part of the wife to terminate the marriage relation in order that she might devote herself to what she considered the work of the Lord. These facts were sufficient to establish desertion. See Gill v. Gill, 93 Md. 652, 49 A. 557; Fleegle v. Fleegle, 136 Md. 630, 110 A. 889; Dunnigan v. Dunnigan, 182 Md. 47, 51, 31 A. 2d 634; Miller v. Miller, 185 Md. 79, 82, 42 A. 2d 915; Flohr v. Flohr, 195 Md. 482, 487, 73 A. 2d 874; Zulauf v. Zulauf, 218 Md. 99, 105, 145 A. 2d 414, and cases there cited.
In accordance with what we have just said, we think that the Chancellor was not in error—certainly not clearly in error—in finding that the separation in January, 1959, was not with the husband’s consent. Though the cause of friction in the home in this case was doubtless much less acute than that in Moran v. Moran, 219 Md. 399, 149 A. 2d 399, we cannot say that the husband was unjustified in calling upon his wife to choose between her more than intensive religious life and her marital life. That he called upon her to do so does not mean that he assented to either choice she might make. She rejected the call to domestic duty and chose what she doubtless considered a higher duty. That was her deliberate choice and her husband could not prevent it. See Moran v. Moran, supra; Miller v. Miller, supra, 185 Md. at 85; Miller v. Miller (a wholly separate case), 178 Md. 12, 21, 11 A. 2d 630; all holding that acquiescence to or assent to what one cannot prevent does not amount to a voluntary agreement thereto.
The wife’s visit to the house in April, 1959, to pick up a few things involved no effort towards reconciliation. Her return in September seems a strange interlude. Though the husband’s actions in response to her physical return might, under some circumstances, constitute agreement to continued separation, or actual desertion on his part (see Hite v. Hite, [217]*217210 Md. 576, 582, 124 A. 2d 581), we cannot say that the Chancellor was in error in concluding that the husband’s conduct did not amount to such acquiescence or to desertion on his part. The wife seems to have had something of a religious obsession and her conduct on her return manifested neither affection nor a desire for reconciliation. The husband was undoubtedly concerned (and very possibly selfishly so) about her mental condition and he took the first available action (though by a method which we cannot approve) to have her sent to a mental institution for examination and treatment. Cf. Stecher v. Stecher, 226 Md. 155, 157, 172 A. 2d 515. Even though the husband’s conduct may have been far from admirable, we think that the Chancellor was warranted in finding that the wife did not, at the time of her physical return in September make any real effort to effect a reconciliation (see Thurlow v. Thurlow, 212 Md. 222, 129 A. 2d 170) and resumption of marital relations. Since she was the deserting party, it was her obligation to make such an effort. Diamond v. Diamond, 182 Md. 103, 32 A. 2d 376; Miller v. Miller, supra, 185 Md. at 84; Hooper v. Hooper, 224 Md. 65, 69, 166 A. 2d 734. We think that the Chancellor was also warranted in concluding that neither a gesture towards reconciliation said to have been made by the wife when the husband visited her at Spring Grove, nor a conversation when, after leaving the hospital, she went with some friends to the farm where he was working amounted to a genuine effort at reconciliation, and the last conversation appears to have taken place after the expiration of the statutory eighteen months’ period of desertion.
We may note that the appellant wife makes no suggestion that she was in such mental condition at any time as to have been incapable of forming or maintaining an intent to desert. Cf. Kruse v. Kruse, 179 Md. 657, 22 A. 2d 475, and Stecher v. Stecher, supra.
We finding nothing to indicate that the Chancellor was in error in finding that there was no reasonable hope of reconciliation. On the contrary, the evidence would seem to indicate that if the wife returned to the home the same situation which gave rise to the breach would develop again.
[218]*218It has been stated repeatedly and it is now established as one of our Rules that in a case where the Chancellor has seen and heard the witnesses, his judgment on the facts is not to be reversed by this Court unless it is clearly erroneous. Maryland Rule 886 a; Provenza v. Provenza, 226 Md. 63, 66, 172 A. 2d 503, Stecher v. Stecher, supra. This case, we think, falls within the settled rule.
Since the wife is not entitled to a divorce, she is not entitled to alimony. However, we find no error in the order requiring the husband to pay the costs of this appeal and his wife’s counsel fees in a reasonable amount. Fries v. Fries, 166 Md. 604, 171 A. 703; Daiger v. Daiger, 154 Md. 501, 140 A. 717.
The wife does not, on this appeal, contest the award of custody of the son to the husband.
The decree of divorce does not undertake to dispose of the property rights of the parties and they are not before us.
Decree and order affirmed, costs to be paid by the appellee.