Wood Products Development Co. v. Cloud Oak Flooring Co.

267 F. Supp. 193, 152 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 670, 1966 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10405
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Missouri
DecidedNovember 2, 1966
DocketNos. 2057, 2058
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 267 F. Supp. 193 (Wood Products Development Co. v. Cloud Oak Flooring Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Missouri primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Wood Products Development Co. v. Cloud Oak Flooring Co., 267 F. Supp. 193, 152 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 670, 1966 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10405 (W.D. Mo. 1966).

Opinion

JOHN W. OLIVER, District Judge.

I.

The evidence was received in this case before Graham v. John Deere Company, 383 U.S. 1, 86 S.Ct. 684, 15 L.Ed.2d 545 (1966) and United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39, 86 S.Ct. 708, 15 L.Ed.2d 572 (1966) were decided. Those cases were handed down during the briefing stage of this case. We requested and have had the benefit of counsels’ views as to the impact of those decisions on this case.

The patent cases decided by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit since Graham and Adams establish that the path generally followed in this Circuit prior to the 1952 enactment of Section 103 of Title 35, United States Code, in regard to the now codified element of nonobviousness must now be followed under the command of those recent Supreme Court decisions.

The fact that every patent involved in the post -Graham Eighth Circuit cases has been held to be invalid, some as a result of reversals of district court judgments rendered before Graham and Adams were decided, does not, by any means, suggest that no patents are to be sustained by the district courts in this Circuit.

L & A Products, Inc., et al. v. Britt Tech. Corporation et al., (8th Cir. 1966) 365 F.2d 83, No. 18275, decided August 29, 1966, notes that it would be “an oversimplification to conceive of Graham and Adams as two poles, one of which would necessarily govern each patent case when it comes under a court’s scrutiny.” Judge Blackmun pointed out that those two cases must be regarded “so far as the nonobviousness test is concerned, as the Supreme Court’s own contribution to its indicated case-by-case development” and that other post -Graham decisions of the Eighth Circuit must be viewed in the same manner.

Piel Manufacturing Company v. George A. Rolfes Co., (8th Cir. 1966) 363 F.2d 57, notes the basic affinity between the Supreme Court’s decision in Graham and the pre-Graham cases decided by the Court of Appeals of this Circuit. Selmix Dispensers, Inc. v. Multiplex Faucet Co., (8th Cir. 1960) 277 F.2d 884, and Caldwell v. Kirk Mfg. Co., (8th Cir. 1959) 269 F.2d 506, cert. denied 361 U.S. 915, 80 S.Ct. 260, 4 L.Ed.2d 185 (1959), were cited as examples of the many cases that illustrate the point.

Referring to Graham and to the two Eighth Circuit cases just mentioned, Judge Larson stated all three “decisions can be considered descendants of Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248, 13 L.Ed. 683 (1950) * * (363 F.2d at 58, N. 2).

American Infra-Red Radiant Co. v. Lambert Industries, Inc. (8th Cir. 1966) 360 F.2d 977; Kell-Dot Industries, Inc. v. Graves, (8th Cir. 1966) 361 F.2d 25; Skee-Trainer, Inc. v. Gareliek Mfg. Co., (8th Cir. 1966) 361 F.2d 895; and Automated Building Components v. Hydro-Air Engineering, (8th Cir. 1966), 362 F.2d 989, all reflect firm Eighth Circuit acceptance of Graham’s direct holding that the rule of Hotchkiss is now codified in Section 103 and Graham’s rejection of the argument that judicial precedents were intended to be swept away by Section 103 in order that the level of patentability be lowered.

Graham’s declaration that the now Section 103 codified standard of Hotchkiss had “remained invariable in this [Supreme] Court” for over a hundred years (383 U.S. at 19, 86 S.Ct. at 694): its recognition that improper use of the Hotchkiss test is a label “brought about a large variety of opinions as to its meaning both in the Patent Office, in the courts, and at the bar” (383 U.S. at 12, 86 S.Ct. at 691); its recognition of “a [195]*195notorious difference between the standards applied by the Patent Office and by the courts” (383 U.S. at 18, 86 S.Ct. at 694); all contributed to the Supreme Court’s firm direction to lower federal courts that “the inquiry which the Patent Office and the courts must make as to patentability must be beamed with greater intensity on the requirements of § 103 * * (383 U.S. at 19, 86 S.Ct. at 694).

L & A Products, Inc., supra, consistent with the rule announced in Graham, states the path to be followed in regard to the nonobvious requirement and leads to several basic inquiries, namely, “the determination of the scope and content of the prior art, the ascertainment of the difference between the prior art and the claims at issue, and the resolution of the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.” (page 86 of 365 F.2d). The quotation, of course, is a direct paraphrase from 383 U.S. at 17, 86 S.Ct. 1, from Graham.)

Study of the file wrappers of the patents here involved reveals that primary inquiry into the basic questions of obviousness and nonobviousness was not always in focus in the processing of the patents through the Patent Office. We do not want to be understood as saying those questions were totally unnoticed. The appeal taken to the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals in connection with the Yellow patent, reported as Application of Tibbals, 1963, 316 F.2d 955, 20 CCPA 1260, for example, illustrates that Section 103 was not totally ignored by the Patent Office. But the fact that the appeal was so vigorously prosecuted in connection with the Patent Office’s rejection of the Yellow patent’s Claims 27 and 28 on the basis of Lindblom’s prior art indicates that plaintiff was convinced he could get some appellate authority to say that Section 103 meant something different than what the Supreme Court was later to say in Graham that section does mean.

• In a not wholly dissimilar manner, the pr e-Graham suggested findings of fact and suggested conclusions of law filed in this case before that case was handed down tended to give but passing attention to Section 103. In its pr e-Graham brief, plaintiff did quote Section 103; agreed that the Eighth Circuit rule applied a “higher standard” of invention; noted that Graham and the other cases were then pending on certiorari; but argued generally that under the Eighth Circuit rule the patents were valid. Hotchkiss was not cited.

Defendant in its pre-Graham brief described this case as “primarily a ‘fact case’ which presents a ‘fact’ controversy.” Some attention was directed to the question of obviousness but the beam of inquiry was not focused with the intensity subsequently required by Graham. Defendant initially requested 251 findings of fact before Graham;

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Loctite Corp. v. Fel-Pro Inc.
94 F.R.D. 1 (N.D. Illinois, 1980)
Glendale Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Fox
481 F. Supp. 616 (C.D. California, 1979)
Kaehni v. Diffraction Company
342 F. Supp. 523 (D. Maryland, 1972)
Uarco Inc. v. Moore Business Forms, Inc.
306 F. Supp. 369 (N.D. Illinois, 1969)
Trimble Products Inc. v. W. T. Grant Co.
283 F. Supp. 707 (S.D. New York, 1968)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
267 F. Supp. 193, 152 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 670, 1966 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10405, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/wood-products-development-co-v-cloud-oak-flooring-co-mowd-1966.