Wollaston v. Schroeder Cutting, Inc.

42 P.3d 1065, 2002 WL 313723
CourtAlaska Supreme Court
DecidedApril 9, 2002
DocketS-9520
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 42 P.3d 1065 (Wollaston v. Schroeder Cutting, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Alaska Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Wollaston v. Schroeder Cutting, Inc., 42 P.3d 1065, 2002 WL 313723 (Ala. 2002).

Opinions

OPINION

MATTHEWS, Justice.

Chris Wollaston was injured on' June 27, 1996, when he stepped in a hole, landed on the ball of his right foot, and bent his toes sharply upward, feeling a tear in the back of his heel. At the time of the injury he was working as a logger for Schroeder Cutting, Inc., at a logging camp at Hobart Bay. Wolla-ston could not work the next day and left camp the day after that. He was treated for the injury on June 30, 1996, by Dr. Riederer, a family practitioner in Juneau. Dr. Riederer diagnosed Wollaston as having a ligamen-tous injury-a mild to modest ankle sprain-with no evidence of fracture. Dr. Riederer noted that Wollaston might "need [an] estimated 7-10 days off if modified work [was] not available."

Wollaston moved to Texas where he was seen on August 1, 1996, and January 21, 1997, by Dr. Whittemore, an orthopedic specialist. Dr. Whittemore diagnosed a sprain or stretching of the ligaments at the back of the ankle. After the January 1997 visit, Dr. Whittemore noted some improvement but not to the extent that Wollaston could return to work as a logger. Dr. Whittemore opined that Wollaston had a permanent partial impairment of four percent.

[1066]*1066Wollaston had previously injured his right ankle on December 13, 1995, in a basketball game. He jumped and came down on another player's foot, dislocating his ankle. The dislocation was reduced at a hospital emer-geney room and the ankle was placed in a cast-splint device. About two months later, on February 21, 1996, Wollaston returned to work as a logger for Schroeder Cutting in Hobart Bay. There is conflicting testimony concerning the extent of Wollaston's recovery from the December 1995 injury. Wollaston and five witnesses testified that he was not limping and had no evident problems after the first injury. But two employees of Schroeder Cutting and the company's owner testified that Wollaston walked with a limp from the time he returned to work until the time he left Hobart Bay in late June.

Wollaston sought lost time benefits from the date of the injury until September 9, 1996, when he went to work as a cabinet maker, and permanent partial disability benefits based on continuing problems with his ankle. A hearing was held before the Workers' Compensation Board on September 15, 1998.

Dr. Whittemore's deposition testimony was presented at this hearing. Dr. Whittemore testified based on his treatment of Wollaston and his review of the records of the earlier injury, that the June 1996 injury was a substantial factor in bringing about Wollaston's residual ankle disability. He differentiated the June work-related injury from the December 1995 injury, noting that the ligaments that were stretched or torn in the work injury were different from those that were affected by the basketball injury.

Dr. Riederer also testified at the hearing. He stated that when he observed Wollaston he did not anticipate that there would be any permanent adverse residual effects from the fall, and that his opinion was that the disability would last no more than ten days.

The board decided that the June 27, 1996 injury was compensable through July 7, 1996. But the board also concluded "[blJased on Dr. Riederer's testimony," that after July 7, 1996, "the defendant had presented substantial evidence to overcome the presumption of compensability." The question presented in this appeal is whether Dr. Riederer's testimony constitutes substantial evidence1 rebutting the presumption of compensability for the period after July 7, 1996. We answer this question in the negative.

Dr. Riederer's testimony was predictive based on a fixed past perspective. He saw Wollaston only on June 30, 1996, and based on this visit predicted that the consequences of the June 27 injury would clear up in seven to ten days. Dr. Riederer's testimony never progressed from predicting Wollaston's course of recovery from the perspective of the June 80 visit, to a current expression of opinion as to Wollaston's actual condition or its causes. But he did make it clear that his June 80 prediction could be wrong and if it was a specialist should be consulted.2 He did [1067]*1067not testify that Wollaston did not have longer lasting consequences caused by the work-related injury and thus did not contradiet Dr. Whittemore's testimony that the work-related injury has had a residual effect.

Under AS 23.30.120(a) a claim is presumed to be compensable$3 The burden is on the employer to prove noncompensability through substantial evidence4 We held in Grainger v. Alaska Workers' Compensation Board that an employer can overcome the presumption of compensability "by presenting substantial evidence that either (1) provides an alternative explanation which, if accepted, would exclude work-related factors as a substantial cause of the disability; or (2) directly eliminates any reasonable possibility that employment was a factor in causing the disability."5 We added in Big K Grocery v. Gibson that an employer may "rebut the presumption of compensability by presenting a qualified expert who testifies that, in his or her opinion, the claimant's work was probably not a substantial cause of the disability." 6

Dr. Riederer's testimony did not satisfy any of these formulations. He did not exclude the June 1996 work-related injury as a cause of Wollaston's continuing problems. Likewise he said nothing that directly eliminated any reasonable possibility that the work-related injury had consequences beyond July 7. Finally, Dr. Riederer did not [1068]*1068testify that in his opinion Wollaston's disability is probably not attributable in any substantial way to the work-related injury.7

The presumption of compensability therefore has not been rebutted and thus the statutory presumption that Wollaston's claim [1069]*1069is covered controls. It follows that insofar as it terminated compensation as of July 7, 1996, the decision of the board must be reversed8

REVERSED and REMANDED for remand to the board for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

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247 P.3d 957 (Alaska Supreme Court, 2011)
Smith v. University of Alaska, Fairbanks
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Thoeni v. Consumer Electronic Services
151 P.3d 1249 (Alaska Supreme Court, 2007)
Wollaston v. Schroeder Cutting, Inc.
42 P.3d 1065 (Alaska Supreme Court, 2002)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
42 P.3d 1065, 2002 WL 313723, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/wollaston-v-schroeder-cutting-inc-alaska-2002.