Wolfe v. Schulz Refrigeration

Opinion

No. 14385 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1979

ROBERT WOLFE and FRANCIS WOLFE, his wife, d/b/a THE MINT BAR, Plaintiffs and Appellants,

SCHULZ REFRIGERATION, Defendants and Respondents.

Appeal from: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, Honorable Edward Dussault, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellants: Morrison Law Firm, Missoula, Montana Joan Jonkel argued, Missoula, Montana For Respondents: Boone, Karlberg & Haddon, Missoula, Montana Sam Haddon argued, Missoula, Montana

Submitted: September 19, 1979 -- . . Decided:.. , . -. , - ... .,. &A ' , = . 3 ,, . - ---

Filed:

Clerk M r . J u s t i c e John Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion o f t h e Court.

c his a p p e a l i s t a k e n by t h e p l a i n t i f f s from t h e D i s -

t r i c t C o u r t ' s d e n i a l of p l a i n t i f f s ' motion f o r a new t r i a l

following a jury v e r d i c t f o r defendant. The p l a i n t i f f s a r e

t h e owners and o p e r a t o r s o f t h e Mint Bar i n P o l s o n , Montana.

P l a i n t i f f s purchased t h e b a r i n F e b r u a r y 1969 and managed i t

a s a p a r t n e r s h i p u n t i l i t was d e s t r o y e d by f i r e on December

5 , 1974. The f i r e o r i g i n a t e d i n a s m a l l s t o r a g e room where c l e a n i n g m a t e r i a l s w e r e k e p t and i n which a t i m e c l o c k

device w a s located. The t i m e c l o c k s e r v e d t o r e g u l a t e t h e

f l o w of e l e c t r i c i t y t o t h e b e e r c o o l e r t o p e r i o d i c a l l y

d e f r o s t it.

Defendant owns and o p e r a t e s a r e f r i g e r a t i o n sales and

s e r v i c e business i n Polson. D e f e n d a n t ' s employee r e p l a c e d

t h e t i m e c l o c k mechanism i n p l a i n t i f f s ' b a r on August 11,

1973. T h i s r e p l a c e m e n t r e q u i r e d no e l e c t r i c a l w i r i n g and

consisted s o l e l y of a t t a c h i n g four w i r e s already i n place t o t e r m i n a l s p r o v i d e d i n t h e t i m e c l o c k mechanism. A t the t i m e

of t h e o r i g i n a l i n s t a l l a t i o n , t h e w i r e s from t h e c i r c u i t b r e a k e r box t o t h e t i m e c l o c k were n o t p l a c e d i n c o n d u i t

pipe. Defendant c o n t e n d s t h a t a t t h e t i m e of r e p l a c e m e n t h e

p o i n t e d o u t t h e d a n g e r s o f t h e unencased w i r i n g t o p l a i n -

t i f f s , b u t p l a i n t i f f s deny t h a t t h i s o c c u r r e d . The a b s e n c e

o f c o n d u i t e v e n t u a l l y a l l o w e d t h e i n s u l a t i o n on t h e w i r e s t o

b e worn away as a r e s u l t o f e i t h e r v i b r a t i o n c a u s e d by a compressor u n i t o r by c l e a n i n g m a t e r i a l s , s u c h a s mops and

brooms, r u b b i n g a g a i n s t t h e w i r e s . With no p r o t e c t i v e c o v e r i n g on t h e w i r e s , t h e c u r r e n t a r c e d which, i n t u r n , caused t h e f i r e . P l a i n t i f f s entered i n t o a contract f o r f i r e insurance w i t h T r a n s a m e r i c a I n s u r a n c e i n F e b r u a r y 1974. A s a condi-

t i o n f o r m a i n t a i n i n g p l a i n t i f f s a s i t s i n s u r e d s , Trans-

america conducted a f i r e i n s p e c t i o n o f t h e p r e m i s e s on March

1, 1974. The i n s p e c t i o n r e p o r t d e s c r i b e d t h e e l e c t r i c a l

s y s t e m a s "romex w i t h c i r c u i t b r e a k e r s and i t a p p e a r s t o be

i n good c o n d i t i o n . "

P l a i n t i f f s brought an a c t i o n f o r negligence a g a i n s t

d e f e n d a n t t o r e c o v e r damages c a u s e d by t h e f i r e . Defendant

s o u g h t t o prove t h a t p l a i n t i f f s w e r e c o n t r i b u t o r i l y n e g l i -

g e n t by f a i l i n g t o remedy t h e dangerous c o n d i t i o n of t h e

wiring. t h e c l o s e of t r i a l , t h e D i s t r i c t Court read

s e v e r a l i n s t r u c t i o n s t o t h e jury. Among t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s

g i v e n w e r e I n s t r u c t i o n Nos. 1 7 and 2 3 t o which p l a i n t i f f s

objected. I n s t r u c t i o n No. 17 s t a t e d :

" F a i l u r e on t h e p a r t o f e i t h e r P l a i n t i f f t o l o c a t e o r r e c o g n i z e a d a n g e r o u s c o n d i t i o n on t h e p r e m i s e s o f t h e Mint B a r i s i n law a form o f c o n t r i b u t o r y n e g l i g e n c e on t h e p a r t o f t h e P l a i n t i f f s i f s u c h f a i l u r e i s a p r o x i m a t e c a u s e of t h e damages com- plained of." I n s t r u c t i o n No. 2 3 s t a t e d :

" I f you f i n d from t h e e v i d e n c e t h a t T r a n s a m e r i c a I n s u r a n c e Company, i n u n d e r t a k i n g t o i n s p e c t t h e p r e m i s e s and t o l o c a t e and e l i m i n a t e any f i r e h a z a r d s p r e s e n t , a c t e d on b e h a l f o f i t s i n s u r e d s , R o b e r t Wolfe and F r a n c e s Wolfe, such a c t s of T r a n s a m e r i c a are imputed t o i t s i n s u r e d s , R o b e r t Wolfe and F r a n c e s Wolfe."

The j u r y r e t u r n e d a v e r d i c t f o r d e f e n d a n t . Plaintiffs

f i l e d a motion f o r a new t r i a l a f t e r t h e v e r d i c t w a s r e n - d e r e d , c o n t e n d i n g t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t committed r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r i n i n s t r u c t i n g t h e jury. The t r i a l c o u r t d e n i e d t h e motion f o r a new t r i a l and p l a i n t i f f s a p p e a l e d . I n particu-

l a r , p l a i n t i f f s c h a l l e n g e j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n s on t h e i s s u e s o f

c o n t r i b u t o r y n e g l i g e n c e and agency a s b e i n g e r r o n e o u s s t a t e - ments o f t h e law. Two i s s u e s a r e p r e s e n t e d t o t h i s C o u r t on a p p e a l :

1. Did t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t commit r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r i n

g i v i n g a j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n which s t a t e d t h a t f a i l u r e on t h e

p a r t of p l a i n t i f f s t o l o c a t e - r e c o g n i z e a dangerous c o n d i - or

t i o n on t h e i r p r e m i s e s w a s c o n t r i b u t o r y n e g l i g e n c e i f s u c h

f a i l u r e w a s a p r o x i m a t e c a u s e of t h e damages?

2. Did t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t commit r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r i n

g i v i n g a j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n which s t a t e d t h a t t h e a c t s o f a

p a r t y w e r e imputed t o t h e p l a i n t i f f s i f t h e p a r t y a c t e d on

b e h a l f of t h e p l a i n t i f f s where t h e r e w a s i n s u f f i c i e n t e v i -

dence introduced a t t h e t r i a l regarding t h e elements of

agency?

T h i s C o u r t h a s had s e v e r a l o c c a s i o n s t o c o n s i d e r t h e

s u b j e c t of a l l e g e d e r r o r i n jury i n s t r u c t i o n s . W e have

previously held t h a t a p a r t y has t h e duty of r a i s i n g h i s

o b j e c t i o n t o t h e i n s t r u c t i o n a t t h e t i m e of t r i a l o r t h e

opportunity i s l o s t . R o b e r t s R e a l t y Corp. v. C i t y o f G r e a t

F a l l s ( 1 9 7 2 ) , 160 Mont. 1 4 4 , 154, 500 P.2d 956, 962. Objec-

t i o n s t o i n s t r u c t i o n s n o t r a i s e d i n t h e t r i a l c o u r t cannot

be r a i s e d f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e on a p p e a l . Seder v. K i e w i t

Sons' Co. ( 1 9 7 1 ) , 156 Mont. 322, 330, 479 P.2d 448, 452. We

have a l s o r e q u i r e d a p a r t y t o s t a t e h i s ground f o r a n o b j e c -

t i o n with s p e c i f i c i t y . P i c k e t t v . Kyger ( 1 9 6 8 ) , 1 5 1 Mont.

87, 96, 439 P.2d 57, 62; Kearns v . McIntyre Const. Co.

Mont.

Rule 51, M.R.Civ.P., provides i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t :

" O b j e c t i o n s made s h a l l s p e c i f y and s t a t e t h e p a r - t i c u l a r grounds on which t h e i n s t r u c t i o n i s ob- j e c t e d t o and it s h a l l n o t be s u f f i c i e n t i n s t a t i n g t h e ground of s u c h o b j e c t i o n t o s t a t e g e n e r a l l y t h e i n s t r u c t i o n does n o t state t h e l a w o r i s a g a i n s t t h e law, b u t s u c h ground o f o b j e c - t i o n s h a l l s p e c i f y p a r t i c u l a r l y where t h e i n - s t r u c t i o n i s i n s u f f i c i e n t o r does n o t s t a t e t h e law, o r what p a r t i c u l a r c l a u s e t h e r e i n i s ob- jected to."

F i n a l l y , w e have d e t e r m i n e d t h a t , where e r r o r i s a l l e g e d

i n a p a r t i c u l a r i n s t r u c t i o n , a reviewing c o u r t s h a l l c o n s i d e r the instructions i n their entirety. I n B r o t h e r s v . Town of

V i r g i n i a C i t y ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 1 7 1 Mont. 352, 359, 558 P.2d 464, 468,

we stated: "When d e t e r m i n i n g whether j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n s w e r e properly given o r refused t h e reviewing c o u r t considers the instructions i n t h e i r entirety. F u r t h e r m o r e , t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s a r e r e a d i n con- n e c t i o n w i t h o t h e r i n s t r u c t i o n s g i v e n and t h e y a r e c o n s i d e r e d i n l i g h t of t h e e v i d e n c e adduced. ( C i t a t i o n o m i t t e d . ) Where t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s t o t h e j u r y i n t h e i r e n t i r e t y s t a t e t h e law a p p l i - cable t o t h e case, a p a r t y cannot c l a i m reversi- b l e e r r o r a s t o t h e g i v i n g o r denying of c e r t a i n instructions. (Citation omitted. ) "

I n t h i s c a s e p l a i n t i f f s contend t h a t t h e giving of I n s t r u c t i o n No. 1 7 c o n s t i t u t e d r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r . Plaintiffs

m a i n t a i n t h a t t h e i n s t r u c t i o n was a n o v e r b r o a d s t a t e m e n t o f

t h e l a w i n t h a t i t imposed a d u t y on t h e p a r t of p l a i n t i f f s

t o l o c a t e o r r e c o g n i z e a l l dangerous c o n d i t i o n s on t h e i r

premises. P l a i n t i f f s contend t h a t t h e i n s t r u c t i o n f a i l e d t o

mention t h a t t h e law r e q u i r e d no more t h a n t h a t o f a n o r d i -

n a r i l y p r u d e n t p e r s o n under t h e same c i r c u m s t a n c e s . Plain-

t i f f s argue t h a t t h e e r r o r prejudiced t h e i r s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t s and was n o t c u r e d by t h e c o n t e x t of o t h e r i n s t r u c -

t i o n s given.

Defendant c o n t e n d s t h a t I n s t r u c t i o n No. 17 was a p r o p e r and a c c u r a t e s t a t e m e n t of t h e l a w . If the instruction was e r r o n e o u s , d e f e n d a n t a r g u e s t h a t t h e e r r o r w a s c u r e d by t h e c o n t e x t of o t h e r i n s t r u c t i o n s and d i d n o t s e r i o u s l y a f f e c t o r p r e j u d i c e t h e s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t s of p l a i n t i f f s . I n a n a l y z i n g t h e s e arguments, o u r a t t e n t i o n i s f i r s t

drawn t o t h e grounds upon which p l a i n t i f f s o b j e c t e d t o t h e

instruction a t trial. There, p l a i n t i f f s s t a t e d :

"Plaintiffs object ... on t h e b a s i s t h a t it i m p l i e s t h a t p l a i n t i f f s a r e a b l e t o l o c a t e and r e c o g n i z e t h e d a n g e r o u s c o n d i t i o n . The e v i d e n c e uncontroveried before t h e Court i n t h e case i s t h a t n e i t h e r p l a i n t i f f w a s informed of t h e dan- gerous condition, o r t h a t they recognized the d a n g e r o u s c o n d i t i o n , and i t i s n o t s u b j e c t t o c l a i m o f c o n t r i b u t o r y n e g l i g e n c e and n o t a p r o p e r instruction . , . a l s o o b j e c t on t h e b a s i s t h a t i t p l a c e s a burden upon p l a i n t i f f s Wolfes which i s a burden which, under t h e f a c t s of t h i s case, t h e l a w d o e s n o t r e q u i r e them t o assume."

I n e s s e n c e , p l a i n t i f f s ' o b j e c t i o n was t h a t I n s t r u c t i o n

No. 1 7 p l a c e d a h i g h e r d u t y on p l a i n t i f f s t h a n t h a t f i x e d by law. This Court has previously questioned t h e sufficiency of t h e s p e c i f i c i t y of t h i s o b j e c t i o n i n a s i m i l a r case. In

LeCompte v , W a r d e l l ( 1 9 5 9 ) , 134 Mont. 490, 498, 333 P.2d

1028, 1033, w e s t a t e d : "Defendants contend t h a t t h e c o u r t e r r e d i n giv- i n g i n s t r u c t i o n s No. 26 and 28 o v e r t h e i r ob- jection. These i n s t r u c t i o n s i n e f f e c t made de- f e n d a n t s l i a b l e f o r a want of care toward p l a i n - t i f f i f t h e y knew o r i n t h e e x e r c i s e o f r e a s o n a b l e care s h o u l d have known t h a t p l a i n t i f f w a s p r e s e n t on d e f e n d a n t s ' p r o p e r t y . The o n l y o b j e c t i o n t o t h e s e i n s t r u c t i o n s was t h a t t h e y p l a c e d a h i g h e r d u t y upon d e f e n d a n t s t h a n t h a t f i x e d by law. Whether t h i s o b j e c t i o n w a s s u f f i c i e n t l y s p e c i f i c ... i s doubtful."

Assuming f o r t h e p u r p o s e s o f argument t h a t t h e o b j e c -

t i o n w a s s u f f i c i e n t l y s p e c i f i c , we think t h a t the i n s t r u c -

t i o n w a s i n f a c t erroneous. Where t h e law o f c o n t r i b u t o r y

n e g l i g e n c e r e q u i r e s t h a t a p a r t y a c t a s a n o r d i n a r i l y pru- d e n t p e r s o n under t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s , S t e n b e r g v. B e a t r i c e Foods Mon t .

294, 296, t h e i n s t r u c t i o n d o e s n o t temper t h e d u t y owed w i t h t h e q u a l i f i c a t i o n t h a t t h e law e x p e c t s no more of a p e r s o n than i s reasonable. While e r r o n e o u s , however, t h e i n s t r u c t i o n w a s c u r e d by

t h e c o n t e x t of o t h e r i n s t r u c t i o n s g i v e n by t h e t r i a l c o u r t .

The o m i s s i o n of t h e r e a s o n a b l e man t e s t i n I n s t r u c t i o n No.

1 7 i s c u r e d by I n s t r u c t i o n Nos. 1 0 and 12. See Peek v .

F o r b e s (Colo. App. 1 9 7 0 ) , 470 P.2d 85, 88. I n s t r u c t i o n No.

1 2 d e f i n e s c o n t r i b u t o r y n e g l i g e n c e i n t e r m s of n e g l i g e n c e

and I n s t r u c t i o n No. 1 0 d e f i n e s n e g l i g e n c e a s t h e want o f

c a r e o r s k i l l of a r e a s o n a b l e and p r u d e n t p e r s o n under t h e

same c i r c u m s t a n c e s . The r e a s o n a b l e man t e s t i s t h e r e f o r e

provided.

I n s t r u c t i o n No. 1 2 s t a t e d :

" C o n t r i b u t o r y n e g l i g e n c e i s n e g l i g e n c e on t h e p a r t of a c l a i m a n t which c o n t r i b u t e d a s a p r o x i - m a t e c a u s e t o h i s damages. A p e r s o n who i s con- t r i b u t o r i l y n e g l i g e n t c a n n o t r e c o v e r f o r any damages s u s t a i n e d by him."

I n s t r u c t i o n No. 1 0 s t a t e d i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t :

". . . n e g l i g e n c e means want o f s u c h o r d i n a r y care o r s k i l l . Such want of o r d i n a r y c a r e o r s k i l l e x i s t s when t h e r e i s a f a i l u r e t o do t h a t which a r e a s o n a b l e and p r u d e n t p e r s o n would o r d i n a r i l y have done under t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f t h e s i t u a t i o n , o r d o i n g what s u c h p e r s o n under t h e e x i s t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s would n o t have done. "

W e hold, t h e r e f o r e , t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s giving of

I n s t r u c t i o n No. 1 7 d i d n o t c o n s t i t u t e r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r .

Plaintiffs' second i s s u e c o n c e r n s whether t h e g i v i n g o f

I n s t r u c t i o n No. 23 was r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r . P l a i n t i f f s argue

on a p p e a l t h a t t h e i n s t r u c t i o n w a s e r r o n e o u s b e c a u s e i t

f a i l e d t o r e q u i r e t h e j u r y t o f i r s t e s t a b l i s h a n agency

r e l a t i o n s h i p b e f o r e a p p l y i n g t h e i n s t r u c t i o n and b e c a u s e it

f a i l e d t o d e f i n e what c o n s t i t u t e s a n agency r e l a t i o n s h i p .

I n e s s e n c e , p l a i n t i f f s ' argument i s t h a t t h e i n s t r u c t i o n i s

incomplete.

I n s t r u c t i o n No. 23 e s s e n t i a l l y a s k e d t h e j u r y , by em-

p l o y i n g t h e p r i n c i p l e s o f agency, t o impute t h e a c t s of Trans- a m e r i c a t o p l a i n t i f f s Wolfe. I n t h i s way, c o n t r i b u t o r y n e g l i -

gence c o u l d be imputed t o t h e Wolfes b e c a u s e Transamerica

had o r d e r e d a n i n s p e c t i o n of t h e Mint Bar p r e m i s e s which r e v e a l e d t h a t t h e w i r i n g was i n good c o n d i t i o n . Agency, o f

c o u r s e , i s t h e f i d u c i a r y r e l a t i o n which r e s u l t s i n t h e mani-

f e s t a t i o n of c o n s e n t by one p e r s o n t h a t t h e o t h e r s h a l l a c t

on h i s b e h a l f and a d h e r e t o h i s c o n t r o l and c o n s e n t by t h e other so t o act. B u t l e r Mfg. Co. v. J . & L. Implement Co.

( 1 9 7 5 ) , 167 Mont. 519, 523, 540 P.2d 962, 965.

I n reviewing t h e i n s t r u c t i o n , our f i r s t concern i s

whether t h e r e w a s s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e t o w a r r a n t t h e t r i a l

court giving the instruction. I n t e g r a l t o any agency r e l a -

t i o n s h i p a r e t h e e l e m e n t s o f c o n s e n t and c o n t r o l . With r e -

s p e c t t o t h e element of c o n t r o l , defendant introduced a t t h e

t r i a l a r e p o r t of t h e i n s p e c t i o n which i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e

f i e l d m a n , who conducted t h e i n s p e c t i o n , had c o n t a c t e d t h e

Wolfes b e f o r e making t h e i n s p e c t i o n . However, d u r i n g t h e

t r i a l , t h e f i e l d m a n c o u l d n o t s p e c i f i c a l l y remember c o n t a c t i n g

t h e Wolfes b u t t e s t i f i e d t h a t i t was h i s u s u a l b u s i n e s s p r a c -

t i c e t o do s o . Concerning t h e e l e m e n t o f c o n s e n t , t h e b r a n c h

manager f o r p l a i n t i f f Transamerica t e s t i f i e d t h a t , i n o r d e r -

i n g i n s p e c t i o n s , T r a n s a m e r i c a a t t e m p t s t o p r o t e c t t h r e e peo-

ple: t h e company, t h e a g e n t , and t h e i n s u r e d . In t h i s sense,

h e t e s t i f i e d t h a t T r a n s a m e r i c a a c t e d on b e h a l f of t h e p l a i n -

t i f f s Wolfe. However, d u r i n g r e d i r e c t e x a m i n a t i o n , t h e

b r a n c h manager a l s o a d m i t t e d t h a t t h e f i e l d m a n w a s n e v e r

employed o r h i r e d by t h e Wolfes.

W e believe t h a t t h e evidence i s c l e a r l y i n s u f f i c i e n t a s

a m a t t e r of law t o w a r r a n t t h e g i v i n g of ~ n s t r u c t i o nNo. 23

and t h a t t h e i n s t r u c t i o n was e r r o n e o u s on t h i s ground. ~erely

c o n t a c t i n g a n owner and o b t a i n i n g p e r m i s s i o n t o i n s p e c t h i s p r e m i s e s i s n o t s u f f i c i e n t c o n t r o l t o e s t a b l i s h a n agency

relationship. Nor c a n one a c t on b e h a l f o f a n o t h e r where,

as i n t h i s c a s e , a f i e l d m a n i s n o t h i r e d by t h e Wolfes t o

c o n d u c t a n i n s p e c t i o n and t h e i n s p e c t i o n i s o r d e r e d p r i -

m a r i l y f o r t h e b e n e f i t of a n i n s u r a n c e company.

However, w e b e l i e v e t h a t t h e r e a r e s e v e r a l f a c t o r s which,

when t a k e n t o g e t h e r , n e c e s s i t a t e t h e a f f i r m a n c e of t h e judg-

ment of t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t .

F i r s t , w e n o t e t h a t p l a i n t i f f s ' grounds f o r o b j e c t i o n

t o I n s t r u c t i o n No. 2 3 a p p e a r t o be d i f f e r e n t on a p p e a l t h a n

they w e r e a t trial. P l a i n t i f f s a r g u e on a p p e a l t h a t t h e

i n s t r u c t i o n i s incomplete; it f a i l s t o r e q u i r e t h e jury t o

f i r s t e s t a b l i s h a n agency r e l a t i o n s h i p b e f o r e a p p l y i n g t h e

i n s t r u c t i o n and i t f a i l s t o d e f i n e what c o n s t i t u t e s a n agency

relationship. P l a i n t i f f s ' o b j e c t i o n a t t r i a l , however, w a s

t h a t t h e i n s t r u c t i o n w a s u n s u p p o r t e d by t h e e v i d e n c e . At

the t r i a l plaintiffs stated:

"Plaintiffs object . . . on b e h a l f o f Trans- america p a r t i c u l a r l y . Again, i t ' s a n assurnp- t i o n t h a t t h e e v i d e n c e d o e s n o t s u p p o r t , be- c a u s e i t i m p l i e s t h a t Transamerica h a s a d u t y t o somebody when t h e y make a n i n s p e c t i o n which c r e a t e s a l e g a l o b l i g a t i o n on t h e p a r t of T r a n s a m e r i c a , which t h e law d o e s n o t r e c o g n i z e , and, a s s u c h , i t i s n o t a c o r r e c t s t a t e m e n t o f t h e law and v e r y p r e j u d i c i a l t o P l a i n t i f f Transamerica i n t h i s case."

The o b j e c t i o n t h a t t h e i n s t r u c t i o n " i s n o t a c o r r e c t

s t a t e m e n t of t h e law" i s n o t a s u f f i c i e n t l y s p e c i f i c and s u s -

tainable objection. Rule 51, M.R.Civ.P. Where t h e ground

of t h e o b j e c t i o n i s d i f f e r e n t , o b j e c t i o n s c a n n o t be r a i s e d

f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e on a p p e a l . S e d e r v. K i e w i t Sons' Co.,

s u p r a ; P i c k e t t v. Kyger, s u p r a ; Kearns v. McIntyre Const. Co.,

supra. Secondly, we note that plaintiffs Wolfe failed to spe- cifically object to Instruction No. 23 at the trial level. Rather, the record discloses that counsel for plaintiff Trans- america made the only formal objection. Although the record is not entirely clear whether the trial court permitted plaintiffs to make their objections jointly or independently, we believe that a party has some responsibility to assert his objection at the trial level if he wishes to raise it on appeal. Third, we also believe that, where a party considers an instruction incomplete, as is the case here, it has some responsibility to request and provide the trial court with an instruction that properly covers the situation. Pataniq v. Silverstone (1966), 3 Ariz-App. 424, 415 P.2d 139. Here, plaintiffs wish to assert error on the basis of an instruc- tion being incomplete, yet no attempt or request was made to provide an instruction which covered the issue in question. Finally, we believe that the verdict was supported by the evidence and that, if the case were tried again, the same verdict would be rendered. If the judgment is one which could be properly rendered consistent with the evidence and law of the case, error in instructions is not reversible. "One test that has been frequently held deter- minative of the prejudicial character of error in instructions is the correctness of the re- sult. If that is correct, the error is not reversible." Westinghouse Electric Elevator Co. v. LaSalle Monroe Bldg. Corporation (1945), 326 I11.App. 598, 63 N.E.2d 411, 416. We hold, therefore, that there is no reversible error in the record and affirm the judgment of the District Court. We c o n c u r :

P

Chief J u s t i c e Mr. Chief Justice Haswell, dissenting: I would hold that the giving of instructions 17 and 23 constitutes reversible error entitling plaintiffs to a new trial. The majority correctly hold that the giving of each of these instructions is error. I part with the majority in holding these errors harmless, however. In my view the errors affect the substantial rights of the plaintiffs and cannot qualify as harm- less errors. Rule 14, M.R.App.Civ.P. Instruction 17 flatly and unequivocally told the jury that failure of either plaintiff to locate or recognize the danger- ous condition is contributory negligence. In my opinion the omis- sion of the reasonable man standard is not cured by Instruction 10 defining negligence in terms of this test. The two instructions are contradictory in my judgment. Who can say with reasonable certainty which instruction the jury followed in arriving at its verdict? But the fundamental error was the giving of instruction 23. As stated by the majority, this instruction asked the jury, by em- ploying agency principles, to impute the acts of Transamerica to plaintiffs. In this way contributory negligence could be imputed to plaintiffs because Transamerica had ordered an inspection of the Mint Bar premises which revealed the wiring was in good con- dition. The majority hold the error harmless because of supposed defects in plaintiffs' objection to the instruction at the trial and because the same result would be reached if the case were tried again. Plaintiffs did object to the instruction at the trial on valid grounds that should have been sustained, specifically that the evidence did not support giving the instruction. The majority hold the evidence is clearly insufficient as a matter of law to warrant the giving of this instruction. I find no basis for re- quiring the plaintiffs to provide the trial court with an instruction that properly covers the situation as held by the majority. This was defendant's instruction and the responsibility was on the defendant to offer an instruction correctly stating the law. More importantly, how could plaintiffs or anyone else offer a correct instruction on imputed negligence arising from an agency relationship where the evidence was insufficient to establish an agency? Finally to justify the giving of an erroneous instruction on the ground that if the case was tried again, the same result would be reached requires a clairvoyance possessed by few appel- late judges. In my view, predicting the result on retrial is pure speculation. Here the error cannot be harmless. A verdict for the defendant could have been reached by imputing the negligence of Transamerica to the plaintiffs. The substantial rights of the plaintiffs were thus compromised by the erroneous jury instruc- tion defeating the harmless error test in Rule 14, M.R.App.Civ.P.

Chief Justice

Mr. Justice Daniel J. Shea dissents and will file a written dissent later.