Wise v. Broadway

433 S.E.2d 857, 315 S.C. 273, 1993 S.C. LEXIS 162

• Court: Supreme Court of South Carolina
• Decided: July 19, 1993
• Docket: 23908
• Status: Published

Opinions

Harwell, Chief Justice:

This is an automobile collision case. Appellant William H. Wise, Jr. asserts that the trial judge erred in finding that he was not entitled to punitive damages based on testimony that respondent James H. Broadway had violated a traffic law and thus was negligent per se. We reverse and remand for a new trial.

I. FACTS

Early in the morning of September 9, 1988, appellant was driving to work. Respondent was following appellant’s automobile at a distance of three to four car lengths. He was driving a heavy-duty pickup truck with a half-full 140-gallon fuel tank in the back. Both parties were traveling at approximately twenty to twenty-five miles per hour. The weather was misting rain and the streets were wet.

Appellant stopped to allow oncoming traffic to pass before turning left into a gas station. Respondent braked but the weight in the back of his truck shifted and he was unable to bring his vehicle to a halt on the wet pavement in time to avoid colliding with the rear of appellant’s automobile. Appellant suffered personal injury as well as property damage to his car.

Appellant brought an action alleging that he had been harmed as the result of respondent’s negligence, gross negligence, willfulness, and wantonness. Respondent asserted that appellant had been contributorily negligent. The case subsequently was tried before a jury.

At the conclusion of appellant’s case-in-chief, respondent moved to strike appellant’s prayer for punitive damages on the ground that there was no evidence respondent had acted recklessly, willfully, or wantonly, so as to warrant submitting punitive damages to the jury. Appellant argued that if the jury found respondent guilty of violating a traffic statute,¹ as alleged, respondent would be guilty of negligence per se. He further argued that if the jury found respondent guilty of violating the statute, the violation would constitute evidence of recklessness, willfulness, and wantonness. The trial judge disagreed, stating, “I’m just saying that I don’t think that a simple violation of this statute would give rise to anything but actual damages. It would be evidence of negligence [per se], simple negligence.” Accordingly, the trial judge struck appellant’s prayer for punitive damages. The jury found for respondent.²

II. DISCUSSION

Appellant contends that the violation of a statute constitutes negligence per se, and is sufficient evidence of recklessness, willfulness, and wantonness to require the jury to determine whether, in light of all the evidence, respondent was guilty of reckless, willful, and wanton conduct so as to entitle appellant to a verdict for punitive damages. We agree.

The causative violation of a statute constitutes negligence per se and is evidence of recklessness and willfulness, requiring the submission of the issue of punitive damages to the jury. Daniels v. Bernard, 270 S.C. 51, 240 S.E. (2d) 518 (1978); Shearer v. DeShon, 240 S.C. 472, 126 S.E. (2d) 514 (1962). Violation of a statute does not constitute recklessness, willfulness, and wantonness per se, but is some evidence that the defendant acted recklessly, willfully, and wantonly. Keel v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 108 S.C. 390, 95 S.E. 64 (1918). It is always for the jury to determine whether a party has been reckless, willful, and wanton. Ralls v. Saleeby, 178 S.C. 431, 182 S.E. 750 (1935). However, it is not obligatory as a matter of law for the jury to make such a finding in every case of a statutory violation. Fisher v. J.H. Sheridan Co., 182 S.C. 316, 189 S.E. 356 (1937).

Here, there is evidence from which the jury could have concluded that respondent violated section 56-5-1930(a). Had the jury so found, the violation of section 56-5-1930(a) would be negligence per se and evidence of recklessness from which the jury could find that the respondent was guilty of reckless conduct, and, consequently, liable for punitive damages.

We find that the trial judge erred in granting respondent’s motion to strike and removing the issue of punitive damages from the jury’s deliberations. Accordingly, the jury verdict in favor of respondent is reversed, and the case is remanded for a new trial.

Reversed and remanded.

Finney and Moore, JJ., concur. Chandler, J., concurring in separate opinion. Toal, J., dissenting in separate opinion.

1 Appellant alleged that respondent violated S.C. Code Ann. § 56-5-1930(a) (1976), which provides:

The driver of a motor vehicle shall not follow another vehicle more closely than is reasonable and prudent, having due regard for the speed of such vehicle and the traffic upon and the condition of the highway.

2 The jury’s inability to consider the issue of reckless and wanton conduct on the part of respondent effectively eliminated appellant’s defense to respondent’s claim that he had been contributorily negligent. See Wilson v. Duke Power Co., 273 S.C. 610, 258 S.E. (2d) 101 (1979) (contributory negligence not available as a defense when defendant was reckless).