SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.
¶ 1. This is a review of a published decision of the court of appeals affirming in part and reversing in part a judgment of the Circuit Court for Milwaukee County, Dominic S. Amato, Judge.1
¶ 2. Patricia Wischer, Marjorie DeGrave, and Ramona Dulde-Starr sued individually and as special administrators of their deceased husbands' estates. Their husbands died during the construction of the retractable roof of the Miller Park baseball stadium in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. The defendants were Mitsubishi [10]*10Heavy Industries America, Inc. (MHIA) and others2 involved in the construction. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found that MHIA had acted "in an intentional disregard of the rights of the plaintiff[s]." The circuit court entered judgment against MHIA for punitive damages in the amount of $84,625,000.3
[11]*11¶ 3. The court of appeals reversed the judgment on punitive damages. This review involves only the judgment for punitive damages against MHIA and its insurers.4 The plaintiff may receive punitive damages under Wis. Stat. § 895.85(3) (1999-2000)5 "if evidence is submitted showing that the defendant acted maliciously toward the plaintiff or in an intentional disregard of the rights of the plaintiff."
¶ 4. Three questions of law are presented for review:
(1) Is the court of appeals correct in interpreting Wis. Stat. § 895.85(3) to mean that a defendant must intend to cause injury to the plaintiffs or have knowledge that its conduct was practically certain to cause the accident or injury to the plaintiffs?6
[12]*12(2) Was the evidence sufficient to submit a punitive damages award question to the jury?7
(3) If there was sufficient evidence to submit a punitive damages award question to the jury, is the jury's punitive damages award in the amount of $94 million excessive and in violation of MHIA's due process rights?
¶ 5. We respond to these questions as follows:
¶ 6. (1) The court of appeals erroneously interpreted Wis. Stat. § 895.85(3). In Strenke v. Hogner, mandated on the same date as this opinion, this court has overruled the court of appeals' interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 895.85(3) set forth in its decision in the instant case.8 The court of appeals interpreted § 895.85(3) in the instant case as follows: "[t]he phrase 'intentional disregard of the rights of the plaintiff in Wis. Stat. § 895.85(3) can only be reasonably interpreted to require either an intent by a defendant to cause injury to the plaintiffs or knowledge that the defendant's conduct was practically certain to cause the accident or injury to the plaintiffs."9
[13]*13¶ 7. We concluded in Strenke v. Hogner that the requirement in Wis. Stat. § 895.85(3) that the defendant act " 'in an intentional disregard of the rights of the plaintiff necessitates that the defendant act with a purpose to disregard the plaintiffs rights or be aware that his or her conduct is substantially certain to result in the plaintiffs rights being disregarded."10 Accordingly, we conclude that Wis. Stat. § 895.85(3) requires a plaintiff to show that a defendant acted maliciously to the plaintiff or intentionally disregarded the rights of the plaintiff, not that a defendant intended to cause harm or injury to the plaintiff.
¶ 8. (2) We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to submit a punitive damages award question to the jury. The jury could have believed that the crane collapsed, as the plaintiffs claimed, because it was used in high winds, no wind-speed calculations were made, and the crane's load chart limitations were exceeded; without wind calculations the 45-stories-high crane was lifting a billboard-size load of nearly one million pounds on a windy afternoon. One need not be an engineer or have heard all the evidence about the maximum safe wind speed and load limitations for operating this gigantic crane as it lifted this gigantic load on a windy day to know that wind plays an important factor in maneuvering objects outdoors. Anyone who has hung wet laundry, set up an outdoor art display, or driven a motor vehicle on a high bridge knows the havoc wind can play with items light or heavy. A reasonable jury could find that the plaintiffs had proved by the middle burden of proof, "clear and [14]*14convincing evidence," that MHIA acted in an intentional disregard of the rights of the plaintiffs, that is, that MHIA was aware that its conduct was substantially certain to result in the plaintiffs' rights being disregarded.
¶ 9. (3) We decline to address the issue of the constitutionality of the amount of the punitive damages award because numerous issues remain unresolved and are not before us. Some of those issues may affect a constitutional analysis under Trinity Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Tower Insurance Co.,11 State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell,12 and BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore.13 For example, was MHIA entitled to offer evidence of its net worth for the jury to consider in deciding the amount of punitive damages? What effect does the secret settlement agreement between the plaintiffs and MHIA have on the potential exposure for both MHIA and its insurers?
¶ 10. Given the nature of the outstanding issues, we decline to address the constitutionality of the $94 million award at this time.
¶ 11. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals that reversed the judgment of the circuit court awarding punitive damages and remand the cause to the court of appeals for resolution of the remaining and as yet unresolved issues.
H-i
¶ 12. The basic tragic facts can be stated simply. Three ironworkers, Jeffrey Wischer, William DeGrave, and Jerome Starr, fell to their deaths at approximately [15]*155:14 p.m. on July 14,1999. They were working at Miller Park stadium, the future home of the Brewers, Milwaukee's major league baseball team. The three men were in a basket held by a crane, preparing to bolt down a section of Miller Park's retractable roof that was being hoisted into place by the large "Big Blue" crane. As Big Blue moved the enormous piece of roof into place, Big Blue collapsed. Big Blue's boom hit the crane holding the men and the men fell to their deaths.14
¶ 13. The construction of Miller Park involved hundreds of contractors and subcontractors. The task of building the stadium's state-of-the-art retractable roof was contracted to MHIA. Although another contractor designed the roof, MHIA was responsible for installing it, along with the drive system that would move its panels. The panels are designed to open and close, thereby allowing baseball games to be played outdoors in nice weather and functionally indoors during inclement weather. Danny's Construction Company, Inc. had the contract to bolt the stadium roof into place. The three deceased ironworkers worked for Danny's Construction.
¶ 14. The retractable roof is made up of a number of large panels. The panels were lifted into place one at a time. The panel lifted on July 14th, labeled 4R3, was the largest of all the panels. It had an approximate weight of 913,000 pounds and the approximate dimensions of a billboard, 120 feet wide and 76 feet high.15 The weight was represented as the equivalent of 285 [16]*16Ford Taurus automobiles; the dimensions are similar to 3V2 Boeing 747 airplane wings.16
¶ 15. Obviously, moving a panel of this size required a crane equal to the task. For this purpose, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries leased a very large crane, the Transilift 1500 Series IIIA, from Lampson International.17 The Transilift 1500, a/k/a "Big Blue," was designed and built by Neil F. Lampson, a British crane designer and manufacturer.
¶ 16. Big Blue was a special crane. It was forty-five stories high. It was not only huge and capable of lifting large loads, but it also was ambulatory by virtue of the two crawlers upon which it sat. The crane could thus pick up a load in one spot and move the load across the ground for placement by the boom and jib.18 But being big and mobile came at a price. The specifications for the slope and firmness of the ground upon which the crane sat and moved were exacting.
¶ 17. The crane was shipped to the site and assembled by a crew supplied by Lampson International. Lampson International also provided a crew for the operation of the crane. Fred Flowers was the crane operator; Alan Watts was the flagger and supervisor for the Lampson crew.19
[17]*17¶ 18. Overall construction of, and responsibility for, the roof of the stadium remained in MHIA's control; Victor Grotlisch was MHIA's site manager and Wayne Noel was MHIA's safety superintendent.20 At trial the plaintiffs focused on Grotlisch's conduct prior to the event, on the day of the event, and after the event. Suffice it to say, the plaintiffs attempted to paint Grotlisch as an arrogant, intimidating, on-site supervisor who routinely disregarded workers' safety. The plaintiffs further alleged that in the wake of the accident Grotlisch tried to cover up a potential cause for the accident, which, according to the plaintiffs, was his failure to ensure that wind-speed calculations were made and factored into the lift plan.
¶ 19. Construction generally, and the placement of this roof particularly, were dangerous undertakings. Recognizing this fact, the owner of the stadium, Southeast Wisconsin Professional Baseball Park District, arranged for. extensive, layered commercial general liability insurance policies to cover Miller Park's construction.21 Five different insurers provided six different layers of coverage.22
[18]*18¶ 20. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned a compensatory damage verdict of $5.25 million and a punitive damage award of $94 million against MHIA.
¶ 21. The preceding facts are background. More detailed facts relating to the lifting and placement of the roof will be discussed below in relation to the analysis of whether the evidence was sufficient to submit the punitive damage award question to the jury.
II
¶ 22. We turn first to the question of the correct interpretation of the phrase, "in an intentional disregard of the rights of the plaintiff," in Wis. Stat. § 895.85(3).23 The court heard both the instant case and Strenke v. Hogner on the same day. Both cases focus on the interpretation of this phrase.
¶ 23. The court of appeals concluded in its decision in the instant case that "in an intentional disregard [19]*19of the rights of the plaintiff' means that "a defendant was unambiguously required to have (1) a general intent to perform an act, and (2) either (i) a specific intent to cause injury by that act or (ii) knowledge that the act is practically certain to result in injury."24
¶ 24. The court of appeals' reading of Wis. Stat. § 895.85(3) in its decision in the instant case is erroneous and was overruled in Strenke v. Hogner.25 The correct interpretation of the statute is set forth in this court's majority opinion in Strenke v. Hogner: "Notably, there is no requirement of intent to injure or cause harm in the [jury] instruction. Rather, the focus is on the disregard of rights."26 We concluded in Strenke v. Hogner that "[t]he legislature did not intend an 'intentional disregard of the rights of the plaintiff to require 'intent to cause injury to the plaintiff.' "27 In Strenke v. Hogner we explained the proper interpretation of the statute as follows:
[T]he statute's requirement that the defendant act 'in an intentional disregard of the rights of the plaintiff necessitates that the defendant act with a purpose to disregard the plaintiffs rights or be aware that his or her conduct is substantially certain to result in the plaintiffs rights being disregarded.28
[20]*20¶ 25. The interpretation of the statute set forth in Strenke v. Hogner is consistent with the explanation of the statute set forth in Wisconsin Civil Jury Instruction 1707.1, the instruction given in the present case.29
¶ 26. Pursuant to Strenke v. Hogner, we conclude that the court of appeals erred in its interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 895.85(3) and that the circuit court's instructions to the jury on "intentional disregard of the plaintiffs' rights" were proper.
HH HH HH
¶ 27. The next question is whether the evidence is sufficient to warrant submission of the question of a punitive damages award to the jury.
¶ 28. The court of appeals concluded that submission of the award of punitive damages to the jury was improper inasmuch as the plaintiffs conceded in their post-verdict motion for summary judgment against Federal Insurance Co.30 that no evidence was presented [21]*21that the defendant intended to injure them. The circuit court made the same finding.31
¶ 29. The court of appeals erred, as we have previously explained, in interpreting Wis. Stat. § 895.85(3) to require proof that the defendant intended to injure the plaintiffs. Rather, the focus in § 895.85(3) is on the intentional disregard of rights.
¶ 30. According to Strenke v. Hogner; a defendant's act or course of conduct must be deliberate. A defendant must be aware that his or her conduct is substantially certain to result in the plaintiffs rights being disregarded — the rights of the plaintiff to safety, health, or life, a property right, or some other right. Furthermore, the course of conduct must actually disregard the rights of the plaintiff. Finally, the act or course of conduct must he sufficiently aggravated to warrant punishment by a punitive damages award.32
¶ 31. We therefore must determine whether the evidence presented to the jury is sufficient, under a correct interpretation of the statute, to demonstrate an intentional disregard of the rights of the plaintiffs to warrant submission of a punitive damages award question to the fact finder33 On this question, a reviewing court must make sure that the circuit court properly performed its gate-keeping function by ensuring the sufficiency of the evidence. Punitive damages are not recoverable if a wrongdoer's conduct is merely negligent. Only when the wrongdoer's conduct is so aggravated that it meets the elevated standard of an "inten[22]*22tional disregard of rights" should a circuit court send the issue of punitive damages to a jury.34
¶ 32. Whether there was sufficient evidence to submit the question of a punitive damages award is a question of law that this court reviews independently of the circuit court and the court of appeals, benefiting from their analyses.35
¶ 33. After examining the conduct of MHIA employees, the circuit court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to submit the question of a punitive damages award to the jury under its correct interpretation of the statute.36 The circuit court reasoned as follows:
All the plaintiff has to do at this stage of the proceedings is show a prima facie case. He doesn't have to do anything other than present competent evidence that would support a prima facie case under the appropriate burden of proof. The testimony on this subject could only be invaded ... if it was inherently incredible or inherently implausible, and the [testimony here is not inherently incredible or inherently implausible.]
Setting aside the testimony of the experts on this subject and the references that some of experts testified, such as Mr. Shapiro [the plaintiffs' crane expert], just setting that aside, the evidence offered by the [23]*23people there working at Miller Park, along with the admissions by Mr. Grotlisch, Mr. Noel, that in and of itself rises to the level of the plaintiff establishing a prima facie case for the allowance of punitive damages. I don't have to reach the testimony of the experts. I don't want to get involved in their descriptive phraseology of what is or what is not. I know there was testimony by some of the experts as to a conscious disregard. The court doesn't have to reach that because there's enough evidence in the record to show not only a conscious disregard but an intentional disregard of the rights of plaintiffs in this case.37
¶ 34. The relevant question for this court is whether the evidence, if believed by the jury, was sufficient so that a reasonable jury could find that the plaintiffs had proved by the middle burden of proof, "clear and convincing evidence," that MHIA was aware that its conduct was substantially certain to result in the plaintiffs' rights being disregarded.38
¶ 35. We now turn to an examination of the relevant facts. The record in this case is extensive. The trial transcripts alone exceed 7,800 pages. The jury heard from a multitude of witnesses and saw hundreds of exhibits. The parties disagreed about what caused Big Blue to collapse. We are satisfied, as was the circuit court, that the evidence presented, if believed by the jury, was sufficient to support the submission of the punitive damage award question to the jury. Indeed MHIA conceded that if the plaintiffs' interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 895.85(3) is correct, the evidence is sufficient to go to [24]*24the jury.39 We are, however, not bound by this concession.40
¶ 36. The plaintiffs claim that the crane collapsed because it was used in high winds, no wind-speed calculations were made, and the crane's load chart limitations were exceeded.
¶ 37 Wind is a significant consideration for crane operators. Wind creates intense pressure on the central pin that connects the boom to the base of the crane.41 Howard Shapiro, the plaintiffs' crane expert, testified about the effect of wind as follows:
The wind acts against each and every piece of the crane exerting a pressure against it, and it causes a boom to bend slightly in the direction away from the wind. If there's a load on the hook, the wind will blow on that load and exert a force on that load. And the only connect between a load on the crane and the crane itself is the hoist line. So whatever force wind exerts on the load travels up the hoist line and into the crane at the very top of the crane where the hoist line is attached.42
The central pin, or "king pin," failed, according to the plaintiffs' evidence, because the wind on the load trans[25]*25mitted force on the very top of the crane in a concentrated manner that was then transferred to the very base of the crane.43
¶ 38. Given the effect of wind on a crane, the crane comes with a load chart that places limits on the crane's use. The load chart "is really the main communication between the manufacturer of the crane and the users of the crane. It tells you what the crane is capable of doing, and it sets up the limitations on the use of the crane. And those are just the necessary things that you have to deal with to use a crane safely."44
¶ 39. The load chart in this case stated that Big Blue's maximum safe wind speed was 20 mph, regardless of the load 45 Shapiro testified that Big Blue's load chart meant "that no matter what you're doing with this crane, if you're going to be lifting loads, 20 miles per hour is the maximum wind speed that you can permit during that operation or that you can conduct that operation in."46 According to Shapiro, as the dimensions of the load increase, the maximum safe wind speed should be reduced 47 The limitations set forth in the load chart are supposed to be factored in with considerations such as the load weight and dimensions, the wind speed, and other conditions to form a "lift plan."48 Shapiro testified that the lift plan in this case was completely inadequate and that the failure to do wind-sail calculations, that is, the effect of the wind on the [26]*26load, was a violation of industry standards, OSHA standards, and the load chart.49
¶ 40. Evidence showed that MHIA was responsible for using wind calculations and that Grotlisch was in charge of lift operations. According to Grotlisch's testimony, he was aware that tragedy might well result from lifting a piece of the roof as large as 4R3 if there was a failure to do wind-speed calculations to determine if it was safe to lift.50 Grotlisch unequivocally admitted on direct examination his awareness of the importance of the wind:
Q: You also told me [counsel for plaintiffs], Mr. Grot-lisch, that if wind speeds reached 20 miles per hour with gusts up to 26 miles per hour, any attempt to lift 4R3 would be unsafe?
A: I believe we discussed that [at a prior deposition],
Q: I know we discussed it, but I want you to, if you could, sir, tell me whether or not you remember it or you agree that that's what you told me.
A: I believe I told you that and agreed to that.51
Q: You also told me, did you not, Mr. Grotlisch, that when you proceed with a lift at Miller Park, due to variable winds, the topography, the size of 4R3, the size [27]*27of the crane, without doing the calculations of the effect of the wind on the load, that this could be a dangerous practice?
A: Yes.
Q: It could lead to the crane tipping over; isn't that an effect?
A: That's an effect.
Q: And it could also be a dangerous practice because it could fall over and kill people; isn't that also true?
A: Correct.
Q: People such as the plaintiffs?
A: That is correct.
Q: You were reasonably certain, were you not, prior to July 14th, 1999 that if these wind load calculations were not being done with a piece the size of 4R3, that not only was it a dangerous practice, but there was a probability that a tragedy could occur?
A: That is correct.52
¶ 41. In addition to hearing that Grotlisch was aware of the dangers, the jury also heard evidence that neither Grotlisch nor anyone associated with MHIA or Lampson International used wind-speed calculations to determine the maximum safe wind speed in which pieces of the roof could be lifted.53 Again, on direct examination Grotlisch testified as follows:
[28]*28Q: ... You told me, did you not, in your January deposition that on the 14th, when 4R3 was being lifted, you had no idea what effect the wind might have on the load as to how it might affect the crane.
A: Correct.
Q: You knew that wind speed studies addressed the effects that wind would have on a suspended load with respect to whether it could overturn the crane?
A: Yes.54
The jury heard that despite this awareness of the need for wind-speed calculations, the danger of conducting a lift without the calculations, and the potential for tragedy, Grotlisch failed to ask for wind speeds and failed to incorporate any wind speeds into determining whether the lift of 4R3 could be conducted safely.
¶ 42. Grotlisch testified that he knew the maximum safe wind for Big Blue was 20 mph.55 Additionally, the lease from Lampson International provided that the crane could not be operated in winds in excess of 20 [29]*29mph.56 The lease also provided that this limit did not reflect the effect different weights and dimensional loads might have on the crane's limits, and Grotlisch testified that he was aware of this fact.57
¶ 43. Grotlisch did not need the lease to tell him that the dimensions of the load affected the maximum safe lift speed. Grotlisch had conducted 50 lifts with other cranes at other construction sites. He was aware of the need to use wind-speed calculations for a safe lift and had used wind-speed calculations in these prior lifts.58
¶ 44. The plaintiffs' primary crane expert, Shapiro, called Grotlisch's failures "unconscionable."59 "The behavior on the 14th I feel was unconscionable. I don't really understand how Mr. Grotlisch would have permitted that operation to go forward in the face of those winds."60 Shapiro characterized the failure to use wind-speed calculations the "most callous and outrageous disregard of workers' safety that [he had] ever experienced .. . where someone [had] been injured or killed."61 The jury could have agreed with Shapiro that Grotlisch was "playing Russian Roulette" with the lives of those at the stadium that day, except, as Shapiro noted, "his own."62 Shapiro explained that on each of the [30]*30previous nine times a piece of the roof was lifted without factoring the wind speed, Grotlisch and MHIA got lucky. When the 4R3 was lifted, however, their luck ran out.
¶ 45. Shapiro was not the only witness who questioned the wisdom of lifting under these conditions. An elevator operator employed by HCH Miller Park Joint Venture, Heinz Zeitler, testified that just before the accident he told an MHIA employee, Harumi Saeki, that "I thought they were crazy for making the lift [because of the wind conditions]" and that the winds were getting worse in the afternoon, not better.63
¶ 46. After doing the calculations of wind and load that Grotlisch should have done or had done for him, Shapiro determined that the maximum safe wind speed for lifting panel 4R3 was 11.5 mph.64 Witnesses agreed that the tragedy would have been averted had the lift been performed in winds of 11.5 mph.65
¶ 47. The parties and witnesses disagree about what the wind speed was at the time of the accident. Grotlisch claimed that the winds were below 15-16 mph when the crane went down.66 Several witnesses testified that the wind speed far exceeded the 11.5 mph that Shapiro determined was the maximum safe wind speed.
¶ 48. A local meteorologist, John Malan of WTMJ-TV testified that at the time of the accident, Mitchell International Airport, 9.6 miles from Miller [31]*31Park, was reporting winds at 21 mph steady, gusting to 26 mph.67 Further, ironworkers and operating engineers testified they observed winds between 20 to 32 mph throughout the afternoon, with gusts up to 35 mph.68 According to video exhibits of the construction site, winds were high, with flags, light poles, bushes, and treetops blowing in the wind.69 Shapiro estimated winds around 27 to 29 mph at the time of the accident.70
¶ 49. The evidence showed that MHIA was aware of the high winds. An Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) official on site that day told Wayne Noel, the MHIA safety superintendent, that a worker was blown off a scaffold by the wind.71 The OSHA official also testified that about two hours before the lift, he heard Wayne Noel (on internal radio communications) state that he had reports of wind speeds of 32 mph.72
¶ 50. In his deposition, which was read to the jury, Dennis Frazer, the MHIA field supervisor who reported directly to Grotlisch, stated that about 45 minutes before the lift, it appeared to be "too windy to do the [32]*32lift."73 Wayne Noel testified he spoke with Grotlisch twice in the afternoon to express concern about the high speed of the winds.74
¶ 51. Communications between employees of MHIA and Lampson International stated that wind speeds were above 20 mph with gusts of 29 to 32 mph in the hour before the tragic lift75 An employee of Danny's Construction Co. testified that Wayne Noel was taking a wind reading with a hand-held anometer, although Noel denied using an anometer.76
¶ 52. On all the nine previous lifts by Big Blue, neither Grotlisch nor anyone else acting for MHIA did the necessary calculations for the purposes of determining the maximum safe wind speed in which Big Blue could operate 77 Grotlisch admitted not considering the wind speed, asserting that he assumed Lampson International was taking the wind speed into account. Nevertheless, according to the plaintiffs' evidence, Grot-lisch never asked anyone from Lampson International about or for wind-speed calculations at the time of the lift.78 Grotlisch explained that had he known that Lampson International had neglected the calculations, he would not have proceeded with the lift.79 He explained the failure to assure that the proper calculations were done by agreeing that he "dropped the ball."80
[33]*33¶ 53. Grotlisch testified that it would be a conscious disregard of the safety of workers if he proceeded with the lift had he observed wind speeds in excess of 20 mph with gusts of 26 mph.81
¶ 54. MHIA challenged the plaintiffs' evidence of wind speed and offered alternative interpretations of the estimates of wind speed at the time of the incident. For example, MHIA relies on Wayne Noel's testimony that the workers who were involved in the lift that day were told that "anyone in the room can stop this [lift] for any reason at any time if it is unsafe to continue,"82 yet no one stopped the lift. MHIA also relies on the testimony of a Lampson International employee in charge of the mechanical operation of the crane, Alan Watts, that he assured Grotlisch that "there were not any problems with the lift."83
¶ 55. MHIA also presented evidence of other possible causes of the incident (not attributable to the conduct of its employees) such as Lampson International's alterations to the crane (including creating a gap in the king pin unit),84 Lampson International's failure to equip the crane with a tiltme-ter (or slope indicator) to alert the operator to unsafe [34]*34operating conditions, Danny's Construction Company's decision to place the three deceased ironworkers in the basket, thereby placing them in harm's way contrary to OSHA's regulations, and potential problems with either construction of the concrete runway upon which Big Blue moved or the ground underneath the runway.
¶ 56. Although the parties presented countervailing evidence about the cause of Big Blue's collapse, the jury could have believed — and apparently did believe— the plaintiffs' explanation of the incident.
¶ 57. Accordingly, the jury could have concluded that MHIA was aware that its conduct was substantially certain to result in the plaintiffs' rights being disregarded. The jury could have reached this conclusion by believing that MHIA's course of conduct was deliberate in failing to follow the load chart, in failing to adhere to common practices used with other lifts at other sites, and in failing to calculate the maximum safe wind speed for a crane 45 stories high that was lifting, on a windy afternoon, a mass with a large surface area that weighed almost a million pounds.
¶ 58. To sum up, we are satisfied that the evidence about MHIA's failure to determine and factor in the wind speed, if believed, was, under the circumstances of the present case, in and of itself sufficient evidence, that MHIA was aware that its conduct was substantially certain to result in the plaintiffs' rights being disregarded. The circuit court therefore properly submitted the question of a punitive damages award to the jury.
[35]*35IV
¶ 59. As we previously stated, we decline to address the issue of the constitutionality of the amount of the punitive damages award because numerous issues remain unresolved and are not before us. Some of those issues may affect a constitutional analysis under Trinity Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Tower Insurance Co.,85 State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell,86 and BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore.87
¶ 60. In summary, we respond to the three questions of law presented as follows:
¶ 61. (1) The court of appeals erroneously interpreted Wis. Stat. § 895.85(3). In Strenke v. Hogner, mandated on the same date as this opinion, this court has overruled the court of appeals' interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 895.85(3) set forth in its decision in the instant case.88 We concluded in Strenke v. Hogner that the requirement in Wis. Stat. § 895.85(3) that the defendant act" 'in an intentional disregard of the rights of the plaintiff necessitates that the defendant act with a purpose to disregard the plaintiffs rights or be aware that his or her conduct is substantially certain to result in the plaintiffs rights being disregarded."89 Accordingly, we conclude that Wis. Stat. § 895.85(3) requires a plaintiff to show that a defendant acted maliciously toward the plaintiff or intentionally disregarded the [36]*36rights of the plaintiff, not that a defendant intended to cause harm or injury to the plaintiff.
¶ 62. (2) We further conclude that the evidence was sufficient to submit a punitive damages award question to the jury. The jury could have believed that the employees of MHIA did not compute or get the needed calculations of maximum safe wind speed for operating a crane 45 stories high while lifting a billboard-size load of nearly one million pounds in a windy afternoon.
¶ 63. (3) We decline to address the issue of the constitutionality of the amount of the punitive damages award because numerous issues remain unresolved and are not before us.
¶ 64. Accordingly, the decision of the court of appeals is reversed and the cause is remanded to the court of appeals for resolution of the remaining and as yet unresolved issues.
By the Court. — The decision of the court of appeals is reversed and the cause is remanded to the court of appeals.
Justice DAVID T. PROSSER did not participate.