Wireless Investors LLC v. Semtech Incorporated, et al.

• Court: District Court, D. Arizona
• Decided: December 18, 2025
• Docket: 2:25-cv-02633
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Wireless Investors LLC, No. CV-25-02633-PHX-DJH

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 Semtech Incorporated, et al.,

13 Defendants. 14 15 This case was removed from Maricopa County Superior Court on July 25, 2025. 16 On August 4, 2025, Plaintiff Wireless Investors LLC (“Plaintiff”) filed a Motion to 17 Remand to State Court. (Doc. 11). Defendant Anduril Industries, Inc. (“Defendant 18 Anduril” or “Anduril”) and specially appearing Defendant Semtech Corporation 19 (“Defendant Semtech” or “Semtech”) (collectively, “Defendants”) filed a Joint Opposition 20 of Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand on August 18, 2025. (Doc. 15). Plaintiff then filed a 21 Reply on August 25, 2025. (Doc. 16).1 22 I. Background 23 Plaintiff filed suit against Defendants in Maricopa County Superior Court of 24 Arizona on May 24, 2025. (See Doc. 1-1). A First Amended Complaint was filed on June 25 22, 2025. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 2). The claims alleged against one or both Defendants are breach 26 of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, common law 27 fraud, conversion/civil conspiracy, aiding and abetting fraud and conversion, tortious

28 1 Defendants have also each filed Motions to Dismiss. (Docs. 9 & 14). The Court will address these Motions by separate order. 1 interference with economic expectation, negligent misrepresentation, and unjust 2 enrichment. (Doc. 1-1 at ¶¶ 37–148). Defendant Anduril accepted service of the necessary 3 documents on July 10, 2025. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 4). 4 On July 25, 2025, Defendant Anduril removed the case to the United States District 5 Court for the District of Arizona, based on diversity jurisdiction. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 6). In 6 Defendant’s Notice of Removal, it claims that complete diversity of citizenship exists– 7 Plaintiff is a citizen of Arizona, Defendant Anduril is a citizen of California (principal place 8 of business) and Delaware (state of incorporation), and Defendant Semtech is a citizen of 9 California (principal place of business) and Delaware (state of incorporation). (Id. at ¶¶ 10 11–13). Defendant Anduril further states that Plaintiff identified a breach for non-payment 11 of $684,741.68 and labeled this case as a “Tier 3 action,” which under Arizona Rule of 12 Civil Procedure 26.2(c)(3)(C) is an action “claiming $300,000 or more in damages….” (Id. 13 at ¶¶ 18–19). Finally, although Defendant Semtech maintains that it was not properly 14 served, it consented to Defendant Anduril’s removal. (Id. at ¶9). Thus, Defendant Anduril 15 claims that the requisites for diversity jurisdiction are established and removal is proper. 16 Following the case’s removal to federal court, Plaintiff moved to remand 17 proceedings to state court. (Doc. 11). 18 II. Legal Standard 19 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), removal is appropriate for “any civil action brought in 20 a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction....” 21 A defendant desiring to remove a civil action from state court to federal court must file 22 their notice of removal “within 30 days after the receipt by the defendant, through service 23 or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading setting forth the claim for relief upon which 24 such action or proceeding is based.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1). The notice of removal must 25 contain “a short and plain statement of the grounds for removal, together with a copy of all 26 process, pleadings, and orders served upon such defendant or defendants in such action.” 27 Id. at 1446(a). 28 Removal must be based on federal question jurisdiction or diversity jurisdiction. 1 SteppeChange LLC v. VEON Ltd., 354 F. Supp. 3d 1033, 1039 (N.D. Cal. 2018). As the 2 proponent of the Court’s jurisdiction, the removing defendant bears the burden of 3 establishing that removal jurisdiction exists by a preponderance of the evidence. Abrego 4 Abrego v. The Dow Chemical Co., 443 F.3d 676, 685 (9th Cir. 2006). Federal question 5 jurisdiction exists where the action arises under federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Diversity 6 jurisdiction exists where the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 and the case is 7 between citizens of different states, or citizens of a state and citizens or subjects of a foreign 8 state. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2). In diversity cases, the general rule is that the amount claimed 9 by a plaintiff in their complaint determines the amount in controversy, unless it appears to 10 a legal certainty that the claim is for less than the jurisdictional amount. Saint Paul 11 Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288–89 (1938). 12 III. Discussion 13 Plaintiff challenges removal on three bases. Plaintiff first argues that removal was 14 improper because the parties’ contract requires the application of Arizona law to their 15 dispute. Second, Plaintiff says Semtech failed to join the Notice of Removal in writing and 16 thus did not give consent to the removal. Finally, Plaintiff argues that removal will result 17 in a severing of the case, leading to judicial inefficiency and conflicting results. (Doc. 11 18 at 1–2). Plaintiff further argues that limited discovery is warranted to determine whether 19 complete diversity exists. (Id. at 2). 20 At the outset, the Court notes the amount in controversy requirement is not in 21 dispute. Plaintiff concedes that damages exceed $75,000. (See Doc. 16 at 2 n. 1). The 22 Court will address each of Plaintiff’s arguments in turn. 23 A. Complete Diversity 24 Plaintiff first argues that the choice of law provision in Plaintiff and Defendant 25 Anduril’s General Services Agreement (“GSA”) “impedes complete diversity and the 26 propriety of removal exists when [Auduril] omitted the contract and the dispute is 27 grounded in Arizona law and local facts.” (Doc. 11 at 4–7). 28 First, Plaintiff’s argument that the GSA’s choice of law provision somehow destroys 1 complete diversity here is unavailing. Understandably, Plaintiff offers no authority to 2 buttress this notion.2 Both Plaintiff and Anduril acknowledge that the GSA does not 3 include a forum selection clause (Doc. 11 at 5; Doc. 15 at 5), but rather mandates that 4 disputes are governed by Arizona laws. As federal courts apply state substantive law as 5 necessary, such a choice of law provision can be given full effect in federal court. See 6 Magellan Real Est. Inv. Tr. v. Losch, 109 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1157 (D. Ariz. 2000) (“Arizona 7 courts…would effectuate the intent of parties who drafted a choice of law provision by 8 applying the chosen law to all claims within the scope of the provision.”). 9 Plaintiff’s position that the predominance of Arizona law in this case warrants 10 remand also fails. In support of its argument, Plaintiff submits that Arizona courts are 11 better suited to interpreting Arizona substantive law and the key events occurred in 12 Arizona. (Doc. 11 at 6–7). Be that as it may, these points do not factor into whether 13 removal was proper or remand is necessary. And the cases cited by Plaintiff do not support 14 Plaintiff’s position. Hunter v. Philip Morris USA, 582 F.3d 1039 (9th Cir. 2009) does not 15 stand for the proposition that “[e]ven facially diverse cases may be remanded if the context 16 reveals a local controversy.” (Doc. 11 at 4). Instead, the Ninth Circuit in Hunter reasoned 17 that where the complaint did not obviously fail to state a claim against a defendant, a 18 nondiverse defendant was not fraudulently joined, and thus the case should have been 19 remanded. Hunter, 582 F.3d at 1048. Berg v. First State Ins. Company also does not 20 support Plaintiff’s contention that courts sometimes find remand appropriate when removal 21 undermines a state court forum for contract disputes governed by state law. 915 F.2d 460 22 (9th Cir. 1990). In fact, neither the remand nor the removal of a case is discussed in Berg. 23 Rather, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the case’s two remaining state law 24 claims because “state issues predominate[d] and all federal claims [were] dismissed.” Id. 25 at 468. Of course, under the Erie doctrine, “federal courts sitting in diversity apply state 26 substantive law and federal procedural law.” Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518

27 2 Notably, the quote identified by Plaintiff, “[w]here significant contacts with the forum state exist and no unique federal interest is implicated, remand may be appropriate,” does 28 not appear anywhere in Gardner v. UICI, 508 F.3d 559 (9th Cir. 2007). Plaintiff, nonetheless, utilizes it again in its Reply. (Doc. 16 at 3). 1 U.S. 415, 427 (1996). This means that federal courts routinely apply and consider relevant 2 state law, when adjudicating state law claims. 3 Importantly, these arguments in no way establish that complete diversity is lacking. 4 The pertinent information before the Court is that Plaintiff is a citizen of Arizona 5 (Doc. 11 at 7), Defendant Anduril is a citizen of California (principal place of business) 6 and Delaware (state of incorporation) (Doc. 1 at ¶ 12), and Defendant Semtech is believed 7 to be a citizen of California (principal place of business) and Delaware (state of 8 incorporation) (id. at ¶ 13). As Plaintiff has not demonstrated a nondiverse party, the 9 diversity requirement under § 1332 is satisfied. 10 B. Consent to Removal 11 Plaintiff next argues that Defendant Semtech “did not join” the removal in 12 noncompliance with § 1441’s requirement that all defendants either consent to or join a 13 removal. (Doc. 11 at 3). No further detail or argument about Defendant Semtech’s failure 14 to join or consent to the removal is provided in Plaintiff’s Motion. In response, Defendants 15 argue that Semtech has not been properly served, so Semtech’s absence from removal 16 notice does not render it defective. (Doc. 15 at 5). Defendants, additionally, point to the 17 consent averment in the Notice and the email from Semtech’s counsel giving consent to 18 removal. (Id. at 5–6). Plaintiff, in its Reply, argues that Semtech’s consent was ambiguous 19 but, if Semtech consented, then it waived its challenges to service and forum. (See Doc. 20 16 at 2–5). 21 “When a civil action is removed solely under section 1441(a), all defendants who 22 have been properly joined and served must join in or consent to the removal of the action.” 23 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(A); Hewitt v. City of Stanton, 798 F.2d 1230, 1232 (9th Cir. 1986). 24 Put differently, a party that has not been properly served need not join a removal petition. 25 Emrich v. Touche Ross & Co., 846 F.2d 1190, 1193 n. 1 (9th Cir. 1988). 26 Here, the parties dispute whether Defendant Semtech has been properly served. 27 Indeed, Defendant Semtech’s pending Motion to Dismiss is partially based on improper 28 service. (Doc. 9). Resolution of that issue, however, is not necessary to find that Semtech 1 consented to the removal of this action because even if Semtech has been properly served, 2 it has also clearly consented to the case’s removal. The Notice of Removal states that 3 “Defendant Semtech consents to removal to the District of Arizona under Section 1441, 4 without waiving any defenses.” (Doc. 1 at ¶ 9). The Notice also cites Proctor v. Vishay 5 Intertechnology Inc., 584 F.3d 1208, 1225 (9th Cir. 2009) to establish that “an averment of 6 the other defendants’ consent and signed by an attorney of record is sufficient” consent to 7 removal, and it points to an email from Semtech’s counsel consenting to removal. (Id.; 8 Doc. 1-1 at 137). In the email, Semtech’s counsel states: 9 I am writing to provide you with written confirmation of Semtech Corporation’s consent to removing the action filed in Maricopa County 10 Superior Court captioned Wireless Investors, LLC, et al. v. Semtech, Inc., et 11 al., Case No. CV2025-018236.

12 Semtech agrees that the federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction under 13 28 U.S.C. §1332(a) because (1) there is complete diversity of citizenship between Plaintiff and Defendants; (2) the amount in controversy exceeds 14 $75,000, exclusive of interests and costs; and (3) all other requirements for 15 removal have been satisfied. Semtech is a citizen of Delaware and California.

16 I understand that Plaintiff’s failure to properly serve Semtech may make the 17 need for Semtech’s consent unnecessary, but Semtech intends to challenge service via a Rule 12(b)(5) Motion after removal as indicated in my 18 correspondence with Mr. McGill earlier today.

19 In light of the above, you have permission to include an averment of 20 Semtech’s consent with Anduril’s removal notice. See Proctor v. Vishay Intertechnology Inc., 584 F.3d 1208, 1225 (9th Cir. 2009). 21 (Doc. 1-1 at 137). 22 Plaintiff nonetheless argues that Semtech’s consent to removal was ambiguous. 23 (Doc. 16 at 3). The Court disagrees. Defendant’s counsel provided “written confirmation 24 of Semtech Corporation’s consent to removing the action” when he granted “permission to 25 include an averment of Semtech’s consent with Anduril’s removal notice.” (Doc. 1-1 at 26 137). The Notice, then, clearly states that “Defendant Semtech consents to removal[.]” 27 (Doc. 1 at ¶ 9). See Shah v. Aerotek, Inc., 2021 WL 3373789, *3 (D. Or. 2021) (“[The 28 defendant’s] Notice of Removal states that ‘[t]he Defendants who have been served 1 consent to this removal’…is legally sufficient.”). Not only does the Notice of Removal 2 sufficiently state that Semtech consents to removal, Johnson v. Prologis NA2 U.S., LLC, 3 2022 WL 13800427, *6 (C.D. Cal. 2022) (“Unlike other circuits, the Ninth Circuit allows 4 one defendant to ‘vouch’ for the consent of another defendant under certain 5 circumstances.”), but the email exhibit also explicitly confirms Semtech’s consent. 6 (See Doc. 1-1 at 137) 7 Plaintiff also argues that, if Semtech consented to removal, it has also waived any 8 objections to service, personal jurisdiction or forum. (See Doc. 16 at 4–5). The only 9 support Plaintiff provides for its waiver argument is City of Cleveland v. Ameriquest Mort. 10 Securities, Inc., 615 F.3d 496 (6th Cir. 2010). There, during oral argument, the plaintiff 11 contested the removal of its case, arguing that a defendant’s consent to removal was 12 invalid. Id. at 502. However, in its briefing on the motion to remand, plaintiff had 13 conceded that all defendants gave their consent to removal. Id. The court determined that 14 “[b]ecause the argument raised by Cleveland at oral argument is inconsistent with the 15 arguments it made during the thirty day period, it has waived its objection to [the 16 defendant’s] consent.” Id. The circumstances in Cleveland that resulted in the waiver of 17 the plaintiff’s argument are dissimilar to those here, and the case lends no support to 18 Plaintiff’s waiver argument that Semtech has waived service, personal jurisdiction, or 19 forum objections by consenting to removal of this case to federal court. Defendant 20 Semtech has not presented any contradictory positions to the Court about the propriety of 21 removal or any other matter that would otherwise serve as a basis for finding it has waived 22 its service, personal jurisdiction or forum arguments. Semtech agreed that federal subject 23 matter jurisdiction existed in this action and is not attempting renege on its consent. Thus, 24 unlike the plaintiff in Cleveland, Semtech has not waived any argument by way of 25 contradictory statements to the Court. 26 Moreover, the Notice clearly states that Semtech’s consent was given “without 27 waiving any defenses” (Doc. 1 at ¶ 9), and Semtech’s counsel clearly states Defendant 28 Semtech’s intent to challenge the improper service in the consenting email. (Doc. 1-1 at 1 137). Lastly, Plaintiff provides no support for its argument that Anduril lacked the 2 authority to state, in the Notice, that Semtech’s consent was given without waiving any 3 defenses. (See Doc. 16 at 4). 4 In brief, Defendant Semtech’s consent to removal was properly averred and does 5 not act as a waiver of its defenses. 6 C. Severance of the Case and Inconsistent Judgments 7 Plaintiff contends in a heading, without any further explanation, that removal “Will 8 Lead to Severance, Inefficiency, and Potentially Conflicting Results” and asserts that “[t]he 9 Court should focus on whether joinder of allegedly conspiratorial defendants, as opposed 10 to severance, would be equitable under all the circumstances.” (Doc. 11 at 7–8). Plaintiff 11 fails to explain how the four out-of-circuit cases he string-cites apply here. (See id. at 7– 12 8). In no manner does Plaintiff demonstrate how removal has or would sever any part of 13 this case or how remanding Plaintiff’s case to state court would ameliorate this potential 14 issue. The Court will not speculate; Plaintiff has insufficiently advanced its argument. 15 Plaintiff’s equity argument (Doc. 11 at 7–8) is also not supported by its cited cases. 16 The circumstances here, where Plaintiff filed a lawsuit in state court against two diverse 17 Defendants and is attempting to remand proceedings with no amendments to the named 18 Defendants, are readily distinguishable from the cases cited by Plaintiff. Compare Irizarry 19 v. Marine Powers Intern., 153 F.R.D. 12, 14-15 (D.P.R. 1994) (determining that the 20 plaintiff’s motion to amend was not an improper attempt to add a non-diverse party solely 21 for the purpose of defeating federal jurisdiction and the denial of joinder would not serve 22 the interest of judicial economy); Hensgens v. Deere & Co., 833 F.2d 1179, 1181–82 (5th 23 Cir. 1987) (discussing equitable factors that the district court should consider in deciding 24 whether justice required allowing the joinder of a non-diverse defendant);3 Kelley v. 25 3 Plaintiff’s parenthetical explanation of Hensgens states “denying remand would sever the 26 action and impose a financial burden on the plaintiff, and judicial inefficiency and the danger of conflicting results move the court to disfavor parallel federal and state actions.” 27 (Doc. 11 at 8). The Hensgens court identified equitable factors that should be weighed in that matter and remanded the matter to the district court “to consider whether justice 28 requires Hensgens to amend to add [the non-diverse defendant].” 833 F.2d at 1182. The court did not, however, offer the opinion expressed by Plaintiff. 1 Vermont Mut. Ins. Co., 407 F. Supp. 2d 301, 306–10 (D. Mass. 2005) (discussing and 2 balancing equitable factors in regard to plaintiff’s motion to amend that sought to add a 3 nondiverse party). 4 “The district court, when faced with an amended pleading naming a new nondiverse 5 defendant in a removed case, should scrutinize that amendment more closely than an 6 ordinary amendment.” Hensgens, 833 F.2d at 1182. “In this situation, justice requires that 7 the district court consider a number of factors to balance the defendant's interests in 8 maintaining the federal forum with the competing interests of not having parallel lawsuits.” 9 Id. (emphasis added). Here, Plaintiff is not seeking to amend its Complaint in any fashion, 10 much less in a manner that defeats federal jurisdiction, and, therefore, the balancing of 11 equitable factors is unnecessary. 12 D. Jurisdictional Discovery 13 Having found no present cause to remand proceedings, Plaintiff, alternatively, 14 requests that it be able to conduct limited jurisdictional discovery. (Doc. 11 at 9). 15 Defendant Anduril opposes the request because the Court has no reason to suspect that the 16 jurisdictional evidence is false and Plaintiff failed to specify what facts it hopes to discover. 17 (Doc. 15 at 7). 18 “A district court is vested with broad discretion to permit or deny discovery[.]” 19 Laub v. U.S. Dept. of Int., 342 F.3d 1080, 1093 (9th Cir. 2003). “And it is clear that a court 20 may allow discovery to aid in determining whether it has in personam or subject matter 21 jurisdiction.” Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Exp. Co., 556 F.2d 406, 430 n. 24 (9th 22 Cir. 1977). “[Jurisdictional] discovery should be granted when... the jurisdictional facts 23 are contested or more facts are needed.” Laub, 342 F.3d at 1093. 24 Here, Plaintiff requests that discovery should be granted concerning “Semtech’s 25 misleading assertion that it did not consolidate, combine, acquire or assume the IoT 26 Solutions Agreement’s rights and obligations in the IoT connectivity industry.” (Doc. 16 27 at 11). Plaintiff further asserts that discovery is needed “to test Semtech assertions about 28 having no connection to Sierra Wireless, Inc.” (Id. at 8). However, the Court has not been 1 || presented with any valid reason to question the pertinent facts that Defendant Semtech has its principal place of business in California and is incorporated in Delaware. Moreover, 3|| Plaintiff failed to identify the facts it seeks to discover or how they would change the Court’s analysis. See Estate of Palfy v. Del Dios Care, LLC, 2022 WL 1017892, *5 (S.D. 5 || Cal. 2022). The Court also has concerns that the Defendant that Plaintiff would be seeking 6|| discovery from is arguing that it was not properly served. Plaintiff's request for jurisdictional discovery 1s, therefore, denied. 8 As a final matter, the citations offered by Plaintiff throughout its Motion and Reply 9|| are concerning. The citations, at times, included nonexistent quotes, misstated the holding, 10 || did not support the premise put forth by Plaintiff, or were not applicable to the current situation. Plaintiff is cautioned to exercise greater diligence in compiling the legal authority it submits to the Court. 13 Accordingly, 14 IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs Motion to Remand (Doc. 11) is DENIED. 15 Dated this 18th day of December, 2025. 16

18 norable' Dian¢g4. Hurmetewa 19 United States District Judge 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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