Judge Harold R. Banke.
Ridgeview Institute, Inc. (“Ridgeview”) sued Dan B. Wingate for an unpaid account balance. Wingate counterclaimed for false imprisonment, negligence in Ridgeview’s selection, training, and supervision of its staff, and violation of the Georgia Fair Business Practices Act (“FBPA”). Enumerating three errors, Wingate appeals the summary judgment awarded to Ridgeview.
The underlying case arose after Wingate voluntarily consented to undergo alcohol detoxification treatment at Ridgeview beginning on May 18. At the time of his admission, Wingate signed a document entitled “AGREEMENT AND CONDITIONS OF VOLUNTARY ADMISSION.” On June 9, after several weeks of inpatient treatment, Wingate decided that he wanted to participate in an outpatient program and sought his release. According to Ridgeview’s express discharge procedures contained in the Agreement and Conditions of Voluntary Admission document, upon Ridgeview’s receipt of a proper written discharge request, “you will be discharged unless that physician determines, after consideration of the recommendations of the treatment team, that your discharge would be unsafe to you or to others.”
After Wingate requested his discharge, his treating physician refused to consent and, utilizing DHR Form 2021, authorized Win-gate’s involuntary retention. In denying Wingate’s request, Perry G. Seese, M.D., wrote, “[h]e is again determined to leave the hospital to [650]*650‘find his own treatment program.’ He is angry, depressed, and at a high risk of relapse.” Several days later, on June 17, another physician concluded that an “outpatient in an evening program would suffice.” Ridgeview then permitted Wingate’s discharge.
Wingate claimed that Ridgeview failed to comply with OCGA § 37-7-22 because the DHR certificate failed to contain a finding that the “chief medical officer finds that the discharge would be unsafe for the patient or others.” Wingate also alleged inter alia that Ridgeview misrepresented its services and failed to properly train its staff to implement procedures to ensure that persons would not be improperly detained. OCGA § 10-1-393 (b) (2), (7).
The trial court struck Wingate’s amended counterclaim which sought to add counts for abusive process, fraud, and breach of contract. After finding that Ridgeview’s involuntary retention of Win-gate was not unlawful and that no claim for false imprisonment could lie, the court apparently reasoned Wingate’s claim under the FBPA, being derivative, failed as a matter of law. Held:
1. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in striking Win-gate’s amended counterclaim. Conerly v. First Nat. Bank &c., 209 Ga. App. 601, 604 (3) (434 SE2d 143) (1993). Without seeking leave of court, more than one year after filing his original counterclaim, Win-gate filed an amended counterclaim raising additional issues. The court correctly determined that these new counterclaims were compulsory and improper under OCGA § 9-11-13 (f). Cornelius v. Auto Analyst, 222 Ga. App. 759, 762-763 (3) (476 SE2d 9) (1996).
2. Wingate contends that Ridgeview was not entitled to summary judgment on the issue of false imprisonment. We agree.
In enacting the statutory framework relating to the hospitalization of alcoholics, the General Assembly explicitly established that “[i]t [is] the policy of this state to recognize the personal physical integrity of all patients.” OCGA § 37-7-163 (a). To effectuate this express policy, the legislature established procedural safeguards which require “rigid adherence” to ensure no unlawful deprivation of a patient’s personal liberty. Kendrick v. Metro. Psychiatric Center, 158 Ga. App. 839, 842 (282 SE2d 361) (1981) (physical precedent only).
In the underlying case, although Ridgeview attempts to apply part of this law to Wingate, its justification for so doing is not clear. Without question, Wingate entered Ridgeview as a voluntary participant in a treatment program under the terms of a contractual agreement with Ridgeview. He was not taken into custody or involuntarily committed for treatment. Nor was he admitted to an “evaluating facility” for the purpose of “evaluation” or “observation” under the terms of OCGA § 37-7-20 (a).
For these reasons, Ridgeview’s reliance on OCGA § 37-7-22 is ill-conceived. By its express terms, that statute applies to patients vol[651]*651untarily admitted for observation and diagnosis to an evaluating facility, not to those voluntarily admitted upon application for treatment. OCGA § 37-7-20 (a). In fact, Form 2021 specifically states that it is a “Certificate Authorizing Retention in Evaluating Facility Pending Transfer to Treatment Facility.” Ridgeview offered no explanation as to why it could employ this form when Wingate had not been admitted for evaluation.
Even assuming arguendo that this statute had been applicable to Wingate, the law mandates that after a voluntarily admitted patient seeks his release, he “must be discharged from the facility, unless the chief medical officer finds that the discharge would be unsafe for the patient or others.” (Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 37-7-22 (a). Here, the record unquestionably is devoid of the mandatory finding that Wingate’s discharge would be unsafe for him or anyone else. Instead, as the physician noted on Wingate’s discharge summary, “At that point, I felt he was a great risk for relapse and began involuntary proceedings.” Implicitly recognizing the vital liberty interest at risk, the General Assembly narrowly tailored the exceptional circumstances which would authorize involuntary medical treatment of an alcoholic patient to: “[i]n cases of grave emergency where the medical staff of the facility in which an alcoholic . . . has been accepted for treatment determines that immediate . . . intervention is necessary to prevent serious physical consequences or death and where delay in obtaining consent would create a grave danger to the physical health of such person, as determined by at least two physicians. . . .” (Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 37-7-163 (e).
Ridgeview offered no authority supporting its arbitrary substitution of “best interest of the patient” criteria for the statutorily mandated finding that the “discharge would be unsafe to the patient or others.” OCGA § 37-7-22 (a). Compare Etheridge v. Charter Peachford Hosp., 210 Ga. App. 482, 486 (7) (436 SE2d 669) (1993).
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Judge Harold R. Banke.
Ridgeview Institute, Inc. (“Ridgeview”) sued Dan B. Wingate for an unpaid account balance. Wingate counterclaimed for false imprisonment, negligence in Ridgeview’s selection, training, and supervision of its staff, and violation of the Georgia Fair Business Practices Act (“FBPA”). Enumerating three errors, Wingate appeals the summary judgment awarded to Ridgeview.
The underlying case arose after Wingate voluntarily consented to undergo alcohol detoxification treatment at Ridgeview beginning on May 18. At the time of his admission, Wingate signed a document entitled “AGREEMENT AND CONDITIONS OF VOLUNTARY ADMISSION.” On June 9, after several weeks of inpatient treatment, Wingate decided that he wanted to participate in an outpatient program and sought his release. According to Ridgeview’s express discharge procedures contained in the Agreement and Conditions of Voluntary Admission document, upon Ridgeview’s receipt of a proper written discharge request, “you will be discharged unless that physician determines, after consideration of the recommendations of the treatment team, that your discharge would be unsafe to you or to others.”
After Wingate requested his discharge, his treating physician refused to consent and, utilizing DHR Form 2021, authorized Win-gate’s involuntary retention. In denying Wingate’s request, Perry G. Seese, M.D., wrote, “[h]e is again determined to leave the hospital to [650]*650‘find his own treatment program.’ He is angry, depressed, and at a high risk of relapse.” Several days later, on June 17, another physician concluded that an “outpatient in an evening program would suffice.” Ridgeview then permitted Wingate’s discharge.
Wingate claimed that Ridgeview failed to comply with OCGA § 37-7-22 because the DHR certificate failed to contain a finding that the “chief medical officer finds that the discharge would be unsafe for the patient or others.” Wingate also alleged inter alia that Ridgeview misrepresented its services and failed to properly train its staff to implement procedures to ensure that persons would not be improperly detained. OCGA § 10-1-393 (b) (2), (7).
The trial court struck Wingate’s amended counterclaim which sought to add counts for abusive process, fraud, and breach of contract. After finding that Ridgeview’s involuntary retention of Win-gate was not unlawful and that no claim for false imprisonment could lie, the court apparently reasoned Wingate’s claim under the FBPA, being derivative, failed as a matter of law. Held:
1. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in striking Win-gate’s amended counterclaim. Conerly v. First Nat. Bank &c., 209 Ga. App. 601, 604 (3) (434 SE2d 143) (1993). Without seeking leave of court, more than one year after filing his original counterclaim, Win-gate filed an amended counterclaim raising additional issues. The court correctly determined that these new counterclaims were compulsory and improper under OCGA § 9-11-13 (f). Cornelius v. Auto Analyst, 222 Ga. App. 759, 762-763 (3) (476 SE2d 9) (1996).
2. Wingate contends that Ridgeview was not entitled to summary judgment on the issue of false imprisonment. We agree.
In enacting the statutory framework relating to the hospitalization of alcoholics, the General Assembly explicitly established that “[i]t [is] the policy of this state to recognize the personal physical integrity of all patients.” OCGA § 37-7-163 (a). To effectuate this express policy, the legislature established procedural safeguards which require “rigid adherence” to ensure no unlawful deprivation of a patient’s personal liberty. Kendrick v. Metro. Psychiatric Center, 158 Ga. App. 839, 842 (282 SE2d 361) (1981) (physical precedent only).
In the underlying case, although Ridgeview attempts to apply part of this law to Wingate, its justification for so doing is not clear. Without question, Wingate entered Ridgeview as a voluntary participant in a treatment program under the terms of a contractual agreement with Ridgeview. He was not taken into custody or involuntarily committed for treatment. Nor was he admitted to an “evaluating facility” for the purpose of “evaluation” or “observation” under the terms of OCGA § 37-7-20 (a).
For these reasons, Ridgeview’s reliance on OCGA § 37-7-22 is ill-conceived. By its express terms, that statute applies to patients vol[651]*651untarily admitted for observation and diagnosis to an evaluating facility, not to those voluntarily admitted upon application for treatment. OCGA § 37-7-20 (a). In fact, Form 2021 specifically states that it is a “Certificate Authorizing Retention in Evaluating Facility Pending Transfer to Treatment Facility.” Ridgeview offered no explanation as to why it could employ this form when Wingate had not been admitted for evaluation.
Even assuming arguendo that this statute had been applicable to Wingate, the law mandates that after a voluntarily admitted patient seeks his release, he “must be discharged from the facility, unless the chief medical officer finds that the discharge would be unsafe for the patient or others.” (Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 37-7-22 (a). Here, the record unquestionably is devoid of the mandatory finding that Wingate’s discharge would be unsafe for him or anyone else. Instead, as the physician noted on Wingate’s discharge summary, “At that point, I felt he was a great risk for relapse and began involuntary proceedings.” Implicitly recognizing the vital liberty interest at risk, the General Assembly narrowly tailored the exceptional circumstances which would authorize involuntary medical treatment of an alcoholic patient to: “[i]n cases of grave emergency where the medical staff of the facility in which an alcoholic . . . has been accepted for treatment determines that immediate . . . intervention is necessary to prevent serious physical consequences or death and where delay in obtaining consent would create a grave danger to the physical health of such person, as determined by at least two physicians. . . .” (Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 37-7-163 (e).
Ridgeview offered no authority supporting its arbitrary substitution of “best interest of the patient” criteria for the statutorily mandated finding that the “discharge would be unsafe to the patient or others.” OCGA § 37-7-22 (a). Compare Etheridge v. Charter Peachford Hosp., 210 Ga. App. 482, 486 (7) (436 SE2d 669) (1993). Where, as here, a patient’s detention is not evidenced by a showing of objective compliance with all applicable procedures, a claim for false imprisonment may lie. Williams v. Smith, 179 Ga. App. 712, 716 (2) (348 SE2d 50) (1986). In the absence of the requisite medical finding, we cannot say as a matter of law that Ridgeview demonstrated “rigid adherence” with the statutory procedural safeguards. Kendrick, 158 Ga. App. at 842. Compare Hudgins v. Bawtinhimer, 196 Ga. App. 386, 387 (2) (395 SE2d 909) (1990) (procedurally valid certificate by physician or valid court order precludes claim for false imprisonment).
Without offering any authority or precedent, the dissent rewrites the explicit language of “unsafe for the patient,” under the guise of construing its meaning. Even if we apply the dissent’s suggested criteria to Wingate, Ridgeview offered no evidence that Wingate exhib[652]*652ited “life-threatening levels of intoxication, withdrawal, or imminent danger thereof [or was] under the influence of alcoholic beverages [or was] incapable of caring for himself or protecting himself.”
Further, the dissent’s statutory revision of the plain language of OCGA § 37-7-20 (a) is neither persuasive nor supportable. Although the dissent includes patients admitted for treatment under this section, the legislature did not choose to do so. By its express terms, this Code section pertains to “any patient . . . making application [for observation and diagnosis]” and makes no mention of patients in Wingate’s situation who voluntarily seek treatment. OCGA § 37-7-20.
In light of the lack of evidence of Ridgeview’s strict compliance with OCGA § 37-7-22, even assuming arguendo that this statute had any applicability to Wingate’s situation, summary judgment on Win-gate’s false imprisonment claim must be reversed. Heath v. Peachtree Parkwood Hosp., 200 Ga. App. 118, 119 (2) (407 SE2d 406) (1991). To hold otherwise would not only eviscerate the mandatory statutory criteria of OCGA §§ 37-7-22 (a) and 37-7-163, but it would also erode individual rights “in the name of medical expediency.” Kendrick, 158 Ga. App. at 842.
3. Wingate contends that a jury must resolve whether Ridgeview violated the FBPA (OCGA § 10-1-390 et seq.) by engaging in false and deceptive practices. We agree. In light of the evidence that Ridgeview failed to comply with OCGA § 37-7-22 and with its own written internal discharge procedures, summary judgment on Win-gate’s claim under the FBPA must be reversed.
Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part.
McMurray, P. J., Blackburn and Eldridge, JJ, concur. Andrews, C. J., Pope, P. J., and Beasley, J., concur in part and dissent in part.