Wilson v. People

94 Ill. 299
Illinois Supreme Court·Decided January 15, 1880·Published·Cited by 30 cases

Opinion

Mr. Justice Scholfield

delivered the opinion of the Court:

An indictment was returned by the grand jury of,Hancock county into the circuit court of that county, at its October term, 1876, against Zachariah Wilson, alias Zack Wilson, Nicholas Wilson, alias Nick Wilson, and James Wilson, for the murder of Thomas McDonald.

James Wilson was put upon his trial alone, upon that indictment, at the March term, 1877, of the Hancock circuit court. The jury returned a verdict of guilty,- as charged in the indictment, against him, and fixed his punishment at fourteen years imprisonment in the penitentiary. The court, after overruling motions for a new trial and in arrest of judgment, gave judgment upon the verdict of the jury, and the present writ of error is prosecuted to reverse that judgment.

While empanneling the jury, William Gray was called as a juror in the case, and, being first duly sworn, testified, in response to questions touching his qualifications as a juror: “ I have read newspaper accounts of the commission of the crime with which the defendant is charged, and have also conversed with several persons in regard to it since coming to Carthage and during my attendance upon this term of court; do not know whether they are witnesses in the case or not; do not know who the witnesses in the case are. From accounts I have read and from conversations I have had, I have formed an opinion in the case; would have an opinion in the case now, if the facts should turn out as I heard them, and I think it would take some evidence to remove that opinion; would be governed by the evidence in the case, and can give the defendant a fair and impartial trial, according to the law and the evidence.” The defendant, by his counsel, thereupon challenged said Gray, for cause, but the court refused to allow the challenge, and held that he was a competent juror to try the case. To this the defendant excepted, and then challenged Gray peremptorily.

A. A. Garlinghauser was also called as a juror in the case, and, after he was examined touching his qualifications as a juror, the defendant challenged him peremptorily.

The point is made that the court erred in holding these jurors to be competent.

The question of Garlinghauser’s competency was not raised in the court below. The bill of exceptions simply shows that, after his examination touching his competency, the defendant challenged him peremptorily. It fails to show that the question of his competency was presented to the court by challenge for cause or otherwise.

We think all objection to Gray’s competency is clearly removed by the statute, if indeed he would have been incompetent otherwise. It provides in two of the clauses of sec. 14, chap. 78 (Rev. Stat. 1874, p. 633,) as follows: “Provided, further, that it shall not be a cause of challenge that a juror has read in the newspapers an account of the commission of the crime with which the prisoner is charged, if such juror shall state, on oath, that he believes that he can render an impartial verdict according to the law and the evidence: And, provided, further, that in the trial of any criminal cause, the fact that a person called as a juror has formed an opinion or impression based upon rumor or upon newspaper statements (about the truth of which he has expressed no opinion), shall not disqualfy him to serve as a juror in such case, if he shall, upon oath, state that he believes he can fairly and impartially render a verdict therein in accordance with the law and the evidence, and the court shall be satisfied of the truth of such statement.”

The opinion formed seems not to have been decided, but one of a light and transient character which, at no time, would have disqualified the juror from serving. It was said, in Smith v. Eames, 3 Scam. 81, “If the opinion be merely of a light and transient character, such as is usually formed by persons in every community, upon hearing a current report, and which may be changed by the relation of the next person met with, and which does not show a conviction of the mind and a fixed conclusion thereon, or if it be hypothetical, the challenge ought not to be allowed.” See also, to the same effect, Gardner v. The People, 3 Scam. 88; Thompson v. The People, 24 Ill. 65; Leach v. The People, 53 id. 317.

But even if the juror had been incompetent, still, under the ruling in Robinson v. Randall, 82 Ill. 522, holding that he was competent was an error that did no harm, and could not, therefore, be held to be ground for reversal. The defendant exhausted but two of his peremptory challenges, and hence, when he accepted the jurors by whom he was tried, he was entitled to eighteen peremptory challenges; and it must, therefore, be presumed the jurors by whom he was tried were entirely unobjectionable to him.

The most important question in the case, and that to which our attention shall now be directed, is, whether the verdict is against the law and the evidence?

The fact that Thomas McDonald was shot and killed by Zachariah Wilson, in Wade’s drug store, in the town of Plymouth, Hancock county, on Monday, the 14th of August, 1876, is not controverted. It is controverted, however, 1st, that James Wilson wás a party to that killing; and 2d, that such killing was felonious.

The evidence shows, that on Saturday, the 12th day of August, 1876, Zachariah Wilson and Thomas McDonald were in Plymouth. Wilson had got on his horse to go home, and, whilst his horse was drinking at a public well, McDonald seized the bridle and threatened to whip Wilson—cursing and abusing him with loud and profane epithets—and daring him to get off his horse and fight. Wilson seems to have taken this very quietly, at the time, remaining on his horse, and, when ready to go, disengaging McDonald’s hold without difficulty. The witnesses all concur that he let his horse walk off at a moderate pace, and kept watching McDonald over his shoulder, who followed him for some distance, abusing him, threatening him, and challenging him to fight. Some of the witnesses think McDonald had a knife or pistol, or both, in his hands at the time, while others, with equal opportunity for observation, deny that he displayed any weapons whatever. Some of the witnesses also say that McDonald, at this time, threatened to kill Wilson, while others, with equal opportunity of hearing, deny that he made such threats. Without stopping to consider on which side is the weight of evidence in these respects, we think it sufficient to say that all of the witnesses concur that McDonald did not use, or attempt to use, any weapon upon Wilson ; and they also concur in describing such conduct on the part of Wilson, as pretty clearly indicated, that he, in fact, had no fear of McDonald. It is shown, however, that his anger was aroused, and that he resolved to have revenge.

Zachariah Wilson, when examined as a witness, admitted that he intended, on Monday, the 14th of August, to cowhide McDonald, qualifying it, however, with the proviso, “if McDonald did not let him alone.”

Whether the defendant was in Plymouth, on Saturday, is not certain,—both he and Zachariah deny that he was—but one of the defendant’s witnesses (Washington) makes McDonald say, on Saturday, that he was threatening him and Zachariah, and he Avould kill both before they left town.

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Wilson v. People, 94 Ill. 299 (Ill. 1880).

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