Wilson Line, Inc. v. Commissioner

8 T.C. 394, 1947 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 274
CourtUnited States Tax Court
DecidedFebruary 24, 1947
DocketDocket No. 8697
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 8 T.C. 394 (Wilson Line, Inc. v. Commissioner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Tax Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Wilson Line, Inc. v. Commissioner, 8 T.C. 394, 1947 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 274 (tax 1947).

Opinion

OPINION.

Arnold, Judge:

The issue is whether the gain to petitioner realized upon the sale of the dismantled marine railway is subject to excess profits tax. Respondent concedes on the brief that the amount of the profit was $5,269.28, instead of $6,169.28, as originally determined.

In computing excess profits net income, gains or losses from sales or exchanges of capital assets held for more than six months are excluded, pursuant to section 711 (a) (1) (B), or 711 (a) (2) (D),of the Internal Revenue Code, as amended. The applicable regulations (sec. 35.711-(a) 2, Regulations 112) provide that, for the purpose of making this adjustment, gains and losses from sales or exchanges of capital assets are determined under the definitions and in the manner provided in chapter 1 of the code. The term “capital assets” is defined for the purpose of chapter 1 of the code in section 117 (a).1 Section 117 (j), as amended,2 provides that certain gains and losses shall be considered as gains and losses from sales or exchanges of capital assets held for more than six months. This applies to gains from .involuntary conversions or from the sale of property used in the business of a character which is subject to the allowance for depreciation provided in section 23 (1), held for more than six months, if it is not property of a kind includible in the taxpayer’s inventory or property held primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of the taxpayer’s business.

The property here involved was held for more than six months and there were no other sales of capital assets in the taxable year. The petitioner’s contention is that the gain is to be treated as long term capital gain under section 117 (j), since the property was removed involuntarily and held in storage for future use and was therefore property used in petitioner’s business, and was of a character subject to the allowance for depreciation and was not includible in inventory or held for sale to customers in the ordinary course of petitioner’s business. Petitioner contends, in the alternative, that the marine railway, in its dismantled state, constituted a capital asset held for more than six months, the sale of which in 1942 gave rise to long term capital gain, since it was not stock in trade, nor Jield for sale to customers in the ordinary course of petitioner’s business, nor property of a kind which would properly be included in the petitioner’s inventory. The petitioner says that under either alternative in computing its excess profits net income it is entitled, under section 711 (a) of the code, to exclude this gain.

The stored parts of the marine railway were not stock in trade of the petitioner, nor property held primarily for sale in the ordinary course of the petitioner’s business, which was transportation by water. The property was not of a kind which would properly be included in the petitioner’s inventory. Either the property constituted a capital asset or it was property, used in the trade or business, of a character which is subject to the allowance for depreciation, held for more than six months, and under section 117 (j), supra, the gain upon its sale is to be considered as gain from the sale of capital assets held for more than six months. This property does not come within any provisions of section 117 which would exclude the gain upon its sale from treatment as capital gain.

The respondent contends that when the marine railway was dismantled because of the condemnation of the land upon which it was situated the petitioner sustained a loss in useful value measured by the difference between the cost and the salvage value estimated to be recoverable, and that the amount received on the sale in May 1942 over this salvage value is a recovery of part of the loss which was sustained at the time of the removal and such recovery constitutes ordinary gain. Respondent says the 1937 transaction was the abandonment or scrapping of an asset not then sold, and the 1942 transaction was a recovery of salvage.

In computing gain or loss on the condemnation transaction the basis of the land and demolished structures was offset against the condemnation award. For this purpose the basis of the marine railway, adjusted for depreciation to the condemnation date, was reduced by the estimated salvage value of the preserved parts thereof. The gain reported on the condemnation transaction was reported as capital gain and, while the amount thereof was redetermined by the respondent, it was still treated as capital gain. In so far as the marine railway was concerned, the dismantling was treated as a closed transaction for the purpose of computing gain or loss. This treatment was necessary for the determination of the gain on the condemnation transaction as a whole. The cradle, winch, motor, and other preserved parts were thereafter carried on petitioner’s books at an estimated value of $2,500. The respondent accepted this basis in the adjustment of the condemnation transaction.

The respondent cites Industrial Cotton Mills Co., 43 B. T. A. 107. In that case it was held that, where the taxpayer discarded certain machinery because of changes in business conditions, sold part for salvage value and junked the remainder, the loss sustained was not a loss upon sale of capital assets, but a loss resulting from a loss of useful value of capital assets and was deductible in full as an ordinary loss instead of being limited to $2,000 as in the case of a capital loss. The loss was reduced by the amount recovered from the sale of part of the machinery. The discarded machinery was useless to the taxpayer or to any one else engaged in similar manufacturing.

However, there was no such abandonment in the present case. The marine railway was, prior to December 2, 1937, an asset used in the taxpayer’s business and subject to the allowance for depreciation provided in section 23 (1) of the Internal Revenue Code. It was, along with other properties, removed when the state condemned the tract of land upon which it was situated. The parts of the railway which were readily removable and could be used again on another location if petitioner chose to re-erect the railway were removed and preserved by the petitioner. The parts which could not be readily removed were abandoned. Other structures on the condemned land, including a wharf, were demolished. The petitioner built a new wharf to replace the one which had been upon the condemned land. Although the retained parts of the marine railway were not thereafter actually used by the petitioner, they could have been used by the petitioner, or any other owner of ships of a size within the capacity of the cradle, as a marine railway if the necessary land was procured and piling was driven upon which to lay the rails. The vice president and general manager of the petitioner testified that he was a member of the petitioner’s board of directors and was the officer in charge of matters pertaining to the marine railway; that it was his intention at the time of the condemnation to re-erect the marine railway, but that the petitioner acquired new boats too large to be accommodated by this equipment and was able to have the hulls of its boats painted elsewhere, so that when an offer was received for the equipment the petitioner agreed to sell. The equipment was sold as a dismantled marine railway.

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Wilson Line, Inc. v. Commissioner
8 T.C. 394 (U.S. Tax Court, 1947)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
8 T.C. 394, 1947 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 274, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/wilson-line-inc-v-commissioner-tax-1947.