Wilmot v. State of New York

297 N.E.2d 90, 32 N.Y.2d 164, 344 N.Y.S.2d 350, 1973 N.Y. LEXIS 1359
CourtNew York Court of Appeals
DecidedApril 25, 1973
DocketClaims 49084, 51429
StatusPublished
Cited by47 cases

This text of 297 N.E.2d 90 (Wilmot v. State of New York) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Wilmot v. State of New York, 297 N.E.2d 90, 32 N.Y.2d 164, 344 N.Y.S.2d 350, 1973 N.Y. LEXIS 1359 (N.Y. 1973).

Opinions

Jones, J.

We affirm the order of the Appellate Division which sustained the award made by the Court of Claims.

In 1958, claimants purchased some 49 acres of land in the Town of Henrietta, just south of the City of Rochester, for development as a regional shopping center. In 1967 they learned that the projected route of the Genesee Expressway would go through their property and that the State contemplated appropriating for that purpose an 11-acre strip of land which would bisect the 49-acre tract, thereby rendering it unsuited for development as a regional shopping center. With the appropria[167]*167tion imminent, claimants entered into an option agreement dated June 1, 1967 to sell to Lenrieh Associates 24 acres comprising the westerly portion of the original tract which would remain after the bisecting appropriation, at a price of $28,000 per acre. Performance by the purchaser was expressly made conditional on the purchaser’s satisfying itself that soil and drainage conditions and zoning restrictions would permit construction of a shopping center, and on the purchaser’s obtaining a firm lease from a supermarket operator covering not less than 20,000 square feet of ground floor retail area within the premises. Specific provisions were contained in that agreement for co-ordination of the sale of the 24-acre parcel with the appropriation by the State.

The actual date of the taking by the State was June 13, 1967, when the State appropriated 11 acres in the middle of the original 49-acre tract. The claimant was then left with two noncontiguous parcels of the original trace — the 24-acre westerly parcel which was subject to the option agreement with Lenrieh Associates, and an approximately 14-acre parcel on the east.

The specified conditions having been met to the purchaser’s satisfaction, Lenrieh Associates exercised its rights to purchase the 24-acre westerly parcel and title was closed on October 12, 1967.

Claimants then instituted the present action to recover damages for the taking of the 11 acres by the State, and for consequential damages to the remaining easterly 14-acre parcel.

The Court of Claims found that the highest and best use of claimants’ property was as a regional shopping center, predicating such finding on the character and potentiality of the original 49-acre tract. On this basis the Court of Claims found a per-acre value of $24,000 for the land appropriated and, using the same figure for pretaking value and an after-taking figure of $15,000 computed consequential damages at $9,000 per acre for the claimants’ remaining easterly 14 acres.1

[168]*168The State argues that by negotiating the option agreement with Lenrich Associates looking to the sale of the westerly 24-acre parcel, the claimants themselves frustrated the use of their property for the development of any regional shopping center. The testimony as to use for regional shopping center purposes assumed the availability of 49 acres; there was no testimony that 25 acres would be sufficient for the development of a regional shopping center. The State contends that the Court of Claims should have determined highest and best use on the basis of the remaining 25 acres only, and that accordingly it erred in basing its computations on use for a regional shopping center at $24,000 per acre.

We agree with the Court of Claims. Confronted as that court found them to be with imminent appropriation of a central portion of their land, the claimants in good faith took steps to mitigate their damages by the disposition of the 24-acre westerly parcel. In consequence of this action the State was relieved of all claims for compensation with respect to these .24 acres. Obviously this land was not itself appropriated by the State. The State’s exposure to claims for consequential damage with respect to this parcel, however, was entirely eliminated in consequence of the sale to Lenrich Associates. The present claimants would no longer be owners and were thus foreclosed from asserting any such claim. Lenrich Associates, the new owners to be, on the other hand, had no predicate for any such claim because the State was taking no part of their property. Accordingly, no part of the award made by the Court of Claims includes any compensation by way of either direct or consequential damages, attributable to the 24-acre parcel later conveyed to Lenrich Associates.

The claimants should not be prejudiced because they took steps in the face of imminent appropriation prudently to mitigate damages. ‘ ‘ As Judge Seldeh observed years ago,. there rests on a party seeking damage the active duty of making reasonable exertions to render the injury as light as possible ’ (Hamilton v. McPherson, 28 N Y 72, 77). * * * the party seeking damages is under the duty to make a reasonable effort ’ to avoid consequences of the act complained of [People’s Gas & Elec. Co. v. State of New York (189 App. Div. 421, 424)]. It is, indeed, a rule of broad acceptance that ‘ No recovery may be [169]*169had for losses which the person injured might have prevented by reasonable efforts and expenditures ’ (25 C. J. S., Damages, § 33, p. 698; see, also, 29A C. J. S., Eminent Domain, § 155, p. 655).” (Mayes Co. v. State of New York, 18 N Y 2d 549, at p. 554.)

Had the claimants made no effort to dispose of the westerly 24-acre parcel prior to the taking, there would be no question but what the highest and best Use would have been predicated on the original 49-acre parcel.2 It ill becomes the State now to seek in effect to penalize the claimants because they sought (and succeeded) in good faith and with economic common sense to mitigate the consequences of a forced appropriation by the State which was not of their making and may have been most unwelcome to them.

“ The constitutional requirement of just compensation requires that the property owner be indemnified so that he may be put in the same relative position, insofar as this is possible, as if the taking had not occurred ” (City of Buffalo v. Clement Co., 28 N Y 2d 241, at p. 258, citations omitted).

In our view, the courts below were justified in concluding on these facts that the prospective sale to Lenrich Associates was in time3 and substance so clearly referrable to the appropriation as to be incidental to and inseparable from it. Accordingly the Court of Claims properly computed the claimants ’ compensation as of the date of the appropriation based on the character of the property immediately before the appropriation and the appropriation-related sale.

The order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed.

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Bluebook (online)
297 N.E.2d 90, 32 N.Y.2d 164, 344 N.Y.S.2d 350, 1973 N.Y. LEXIS 1359, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/wilmot-v-state-of-new-york-ny-1973.