[341]*341Gribbs, J.
Plaintiff appeals from a November 18, 1994, order of the Worker’s Compensation Appellate Commission, which held that plaintiff’s employer is not required to purchase a new specially equipped van to accommodate plaintiff’s work-related injuries. This Court previously denied plaintiff’s application for leave to appeal in an unpublished order, entered May 25, 1995 (Docket No. 181602), but our Supreme Court, in lieu of granting leave to appeal, has remanded the matter to this Court for consideration as on leave granted. 451 Mich 863 (1996). We reverse.
Plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident on February 15, 1977, while in the course of his employment as a traveling traffic representative for defendant Gateway Transportation Company. His injuries were severe, resulting in paraplegia with only limited use of his right arm. For the most part, plaintiff’s claim of work-related disability was not disputed in this case and worker’s compensation benefits were voluntarily paid.1
Initially, plaintiff’s benefits were paid by Gateway’s previous worker’s compensation insurer, Carriers Insurance Company. In addition to other benefits, Carriers provided plaintiff with a van that had been modified with special equipment to accommodate his injuries, such as a lift for his wheelchair, hand controls, power seats, and automatic doors. Apparently, Carriers provided the van to plaintiff as a medical expense benefit under § 315(1) of the Worker’s Disa[342]*342bility Compensation Act, MCL 418.315(1); MSA 17.237(315)(1), which provides, in pertinent part:
The employer shall furnish, or cause to be furnished, to an employee who receives a personal injury arising out of and in the course of employment, reasonable medical, surgical, and hospital services and medicines, or other attendance or treatment recognized by the laws of this state as legal, when they are needed. . . . The employer shall also supply to the injured employee dental service, crutches, artificial limbs, eyes, teeth, eyeglasses, hearing apparatus, and other appliances necessary to cure, so far as reasonably possible, and relieve from the effects of the injury. If the employer fails, neglects, or refuses so to do, the employee shall be reimbursed for the reasonable expense paid by the employee, or payment may be made in behalf of the employee to persons to whom the unpaid expenses may be owing, by order of the worker’s compensation magistrate. [Emphasis added.]
Plaintiff provided gas and maintenance for the van at his own expense. When Carriers later went bankrupt, defendant Michigan Property & Casualty Guaranty Association assumed liability as Gateway’s worker’s compensation insurer.
After using the specially equipped van for a number of years, plaintiff asked Michigan Property & Casualty Guaranty Association to furnish him with a new van to replace the previously provided one, but his request was denied. At the hearing before a worker’s compensation magistrate, plaintiff testified that the van needed to be replaced because its mileage was getting quite high and it was beginning to require both minor and major repairs more frequently. Plaintiff also presented expert testimony from his treating physician who opined that because of a combination of plaintiff’s work-related injuries and his somewhat [343]*343unusual height (6’ 7”), plaintiff is unable to get in and out of a car, even a specially equipped one, and therefore use of a van is medically required.
Relying on an earlier decision,2 where the WCAC held that a van modified for handicap use does not constitute an “appliance” under § 315(1), the magistrate found that Gateway is not required to provide plaintiff with the van itself, but only the special equipment and vehicle modifications necessary to accommodate his physical handicap3. The magistrate ruled:
Plaintiff has asked for either the replacement of or substantial mechanical repairs be made to his van. Apparently, the original insurance company provided this van to him. Based upon Blake v General Motors Corporation, 1991 WACO No 98, 4 MI WCLR 1072 (1991), I will not order defendants to provide plaintiff with a van. However, I will require defendants to pay for any modifications which must be made to a van or automobile which plaintiff may purchase which are required as a result of plaintiff’s paraplegia and size. (Plaintiff testified that he is six feet seven inches tall, and therefore requires modification to the ceiling of his van because of his height).
On appeal, the wcac adopted and affirmed this portion of the magistrate’s decision, rejecting plaintiff’s attempt to distinguish the Blake case on the basis of the fact that a specially equipped van is the only [344]*344method of transportation plaintiff can use because of his unique injuries and size:
Plaintiffs argument essentially turns on the magistrate’s interpretation of the word “reasonable,” and asserts that Blake v General Motors Corp, 1991 ACO #98, relied upon by the magistrate, is distinguishable. We disagree. In order for us to reverse the magistrate on this issue, we would be obliged to characterize the entire vehicle as an appliance. We would be stretching the statute beyond the clear legislative intent if we did so. Granted, plaintiff presents some unique characteristics to be dealt with; he has a severe handicap and he is of unusual (but not extraordinary) height. We are not convinced, however, that the entire van would have to be rebuilt to accommodate these characteristics. We believe that the rationale in Blake is correct, and affirm the magistrate on this issue.
A decision of the WCAC is subject to reversal for legal error, such as when the WCAC bases its findings on a misconception of law or fails to correctly apply the law. Jones-Jennings v Hutzel Hosp (On Remand), 223 Mich App 94, 105; 565 NW2d 680 (1997). Statutory interpretation is a question of law, and while this Court ordinarily accords deference to the construction placed upon statutory provisions by the administrative agency charged with enforcement of those provisions, that principle does not control where the agency interpretation is clearly wrong. Id.
In this case we are presented with the question whether a specially equipped vehicle may constitute an “appliance” within the meaning of § 315(1) of the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act, or more particularly, whether the entire vehicle itself, as opposed to merely its special modifications, may constitute a compensable “appliance.” This issue is a question of law. See Kushay v Sexton Dairy Co, 394 Mich 69, 71-[345]*34572; 228 NW2d 205 (1975). While this Court has never addressed this issue in the worker’s compensation context, we previously have held that the full cost of a specially equipped van may constitute an allowable expense for “reasonably necessary products, services and accommodations for an injured person’s care, recovery, or rehabilitation” within the meaning of § 3107(a) the no-fault act, MCL 500.3107(a); MSA 24.13107(a). Davis v Citizens Ins Co, 195 Mich App 323; 489 NW2d 214 (1992). We find no reason to employ a more restrictive interpretation to § 315(1) in the worker’s compensation context.
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[341]*341Gribbs, J.
Plaintiff appeals from a November 18, 1994, order of the Worker’s Compensation Appellate Commission, which held that plaintiff’s employer is not required to purchase a new specially equipped van to accommodate plaintiff’s work-related injuries. This Court previously denied plaintiff’s application for leave to appeal in an unpublished order, entered May 25, 1995 (Docket No. 181602), but our Supreme Court, in lieu of granting leave to appeal, has remanded the matter to this Court for consideration as on leave granted. 451 Mich 863 (1996). We reverse.
Plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident on February 15, 1977, while in the course of his employment as a traveling traffic representative for defendant Gateway Transportation Company. His injuries were severe, resulting in paraplegia with only limited use of his right arm. For the most part, plaintiff’s claim of work-related disability was not disputed in this case and worker’s compensation benefits were voluntarily paid.1
Initially, plaintiff’s benefits were paid by Gateway’s previous worker’s compensation insurer, Carriers Insurance Company. In addition to other benefits, Carriers provided plaintiff with a van that had been modified with special equipment to accommodate his injuries, such as a lift for his wheelchair, hand controls, power seats, and automatic doors. Apparently, Carriers provided the van to plaintiff as a medical expense benefit under § 315(1) of the Worker’s Disa[342]*342bility Compensation Act, MCL 418.315(1); MSA 17.237(315)(1), which provides, in pertinent part:
The employer shall furnish, or cause to be furnished, to an employee who receives a personal injury arising out of and in the course of employment, reasonable medical, surgical, and hospital services and medicines, or other attendance or treatment recognized by the laws of this state as legal, when they are needed. . . . The employer shall also supply to the injured employee dental service, crutches, artificial limbs, eyes, teeth, eyeglasses, hearing apparatus, and other appliances necessary to cure, so far as reasonably possible, and relieve from the effects of the injury. If the employer fails, neglects, or refuses so to do, the employee shall be reimbursed for the reasonable expense paid by the employee, or payment may be made in behalf of the employee to persons to whom the unpaid expenses may be owing, by order of the worker’s compensation magistrate. [Emphasis added.]
Plaintiff provided gas and maintenance for the van at his own expense. When Carriers later went bankrupt, defendant Michigan Property & Casualty Guaranty Association assumed liability as Gateway’s worker’s compensation insurer.
After using the specially equipped van for a number of years, plaintiff asked Michigan Property & Casualty Guaranty Association to furnish him with a new van to replace the previously provided one, but his request was denied. At the hearing before a worker’s compensation magistrate, plaintiff testified that the van needed to be replaced because its mileage was getting quite high and it was beginning to require both minor and major repairs more frequently. Plaintiff also presented expert testimony from his treating physician who opined that because of a combination of plaintiff’s work-related injuries and his somewhat [343]*343unusual height (6’ 7”), plaintiff is unable to get in and out of a car, even a specially equipped one, and therefore use of a van is medically required.
Relying on an earlier decision,2 where the WCAC held that a van modified for handicap use does not constitute an “appliance” under § 315(1), the magistrate found that Gateway is not required to provide plaintiff with the van itself, but only the special equipment and vehicle modifications necessary to accommodate his physical handicap3. The magistrate ruled:
Plaintiff has asked for either the replacement of or substantial mechanical repairs be made to his van. Apparently, the original insurance company provided this van to him. Based upon Blake v General Motors Corporation, 1991 WACO No 98, 4 MI WCLR 1072 (1991), I will not order defendants to provide plaintiff with a van. However, I will require defendants to pay for any modifications which must be made to a van or automobile which plaintiff may purchase which are required as a result of plaintiff’s paraplegia and size. (Plaintiff testified that he is six feet seven inches tall, and therefore requires modification to the ceiling of his van because of his height).
On appeal, the wcac adopted and affirmed this portion of the magistrate’s decision, rejecting plaintiff’s attempt to distinguish the Blake case on the basis of the fact that a specially equipped van is the only [344]*344method of transportation plaintiff can use because of his unique injuries and size:
Plaintiffs argument essentially turns on the magistrate’s interpretation of the word “reasonable,” and asserts that Blake v General Motors Corp, 1991 ACO #98, relied upon by the magistrate, is distinguishable. We disagree. In order for us to reverse the magistrate on this issue, we would be obliged to characterize the entire vehicle as an appliance. We would be stretching the statute beyond the clear legislative intent if we did so. Granted, plaintiff presents some unique characteristics to be dealt with; he has a severe handicap and he is of unusual (but not extraordinary) height. We are not convinced, however, that the entire van would have to be rebuilt to accommodate these characteristics. We believe that the rationale in Blake is correct, and affirm the magistrate on this issue.
A decision of the WCAC is subject to reversal for legal error, such as when the WCAC bases its findings on a misconception of law or fails to correctly apply the law. Jones-Jennings v Hutzel Hosp (On Remand), 223 Mich App 94, 105; 565 NW2d 680 (1997). Statutory interpretation is a question of law, and while this Court ordinarily accords deference to the construction placed upon statutory provisions by the administrative agency charged with enforcement of those provisions, that principle does not control where the agency interpretation is clearly wrong. Id.
In this case we are presented with the question whether a specially equipped vehicle may constitute an “appliance” within the meaning of § 315(1) of the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act, or more particularly, whether the entire vehicle itself, as opposed to merely its special modifications, may constitute a compensable “appliance.” This issue is a question of law. See Kushay v Sexton Dairy Co, 394 Mich 69, 71-[345]*34572; 228 NW2d 205 (1975). While this Court has never addressed this issue in the worker’s compensation context, we previously have held that the full cost of a specially equipped van may constitute an allowable expense for “reasonably necessary products, services and accommodations for an injured person’s care, recovery, or rehabilitation” within the meaning of § 3107(a) the no-fault act, MCL 500.3107(a); MSA 24.13107(a). Davis v Citizens Ins Co, 195 Mich App 323; 489 NW2d 214 (1992). We find no reason to employ a more restrictive interpretation to § 315(1) in the worker’s compensation context.
The Worker’s Disability Compensation Act is remedial legislation that should be interpreted liberally in a humanitarian manner in favor of the injured employee. Wells v Firestone Tire & Rubber Co, 421 Mich 641, 651; 364 NW2d 670 (1984); Matney v Southfield Bowl, 218 Mich App 475, 486; 554 NW2d 356 (1996). Literal constructions that produce unreasonable or unjust results that are inconsistent with the purpose of the act should be avoided. Rowell v Security Steel Processing Co, 445 Mich 347, 354; 518 NW2d 409 (1994). Like the provision of the no-fault act interpreted in Davis, supra, the clear purpose of § 315(1) is to provide the injured employee with such services and products as are reasonably necessary to cure or relieve the effects of ipjury. Here, plaintiff’s evidence (which was never rejected by the magistrate or the wcac) indicated that one of the effects of his injury is a loss of mobility, including an inability to use an ordinary car, or even a specially equipped one, for transportation. We conclude that under these circumstances the entire specially equipped van that plaintiff requires for transportation, and not just its [346]*346special modifications, may be considered a reasonably necessary “appliance” for purposes of § 315(1).
Our conclusion is supported by the decisions of courts in several other states that have held that specially equipped vans for paraplegics may constitute, in their entirety, a compensable “appliance” or “apparatus” under worker’s compensation statutes similar to § 315(1). Terry Grantham Co v Industrial Comm, 154 Ariz 180; 741 P2d 313 (Ariz App, 1987); Aino’s Custom Slip Covers v DeLucia, 533 So 2d 862 (Fla App, 1988); Edgewood Boys’ Ranch Foundation v Robinson, 451 So 2d 532 (Fla App, 1984); Manpower Temporary Services v Sioson, 529 NW2d 259 (Iowa, 1995); Mississippi Transportation Comm v Dewease, 691 So 2d 1007 (Miss, 1997). We find the following passage from the Iowa Supreme Court’s decision in Manpower Temporary Services particularly instructive:
We begin with the unusually strong medical evidence of necessity and of the record that [the injured employee’s] family status and past lifestyle reveal no other use for the van. That evidence refutes any contention that the van is a frill or luxury and reveals what can be described as an appliance, not greatly different from crutches or a wheelchair. The point is that a van is necessary in order to make [the injured employee’s] wheelchair fully useful.
In another context, like other courts, we have agreed with the dictionary definition that describes the term “appliance” as “a means to an end.” Murray v Royal Indem Co, 247 Iowa 1299, 1301, 78 NW2d 786, 787 (1956). The “end” of the van is merely an extension of [the injured employee’s] 300-pound wheelchair. Without a van she is, more than need be, a prisoner of her severe paralysis. The [factfinder] could thus reasonably view the van as an appliance, a necessary part of [the injured employee’s] care. [529 NW2d 264.]
[347]*347We acknowledge that there are decisions from courts in some other states that deny worker’s compensation coverage for specially equipped cars and vans on the ground that such vehicles simply do not constitute a medical apparatus or device,4 and decisions from courts in still other states that allow reimbursement only for the cost of the special vehicle modifications or allow the employer to offset the cost of the vehicle before modification with the cost of an average, midpriced car of the same year.5 However, we are persuaded that, under the circumstances of this case, and given the kind of substantial vehicle modifications that this plaintiff requires, the entire vehicle may here be considered an “appliance” covered by § 315(1), even though it is not actually necessary to rebuild the entire vehicle to accommodate the handicap.6 The wcac’s interpretation of the term “appliance” is unduly restrictive and contrary to the principle of interpreting the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act in a liberal and humanitarian manner so as to effectuate the remedial goal of relieving injured workers from the effects of injury.
We reject defendants’ contention that plaintiff is seeking “something he would need whether he had ever been injured at work or not.” While it is possible [348]*348that plaintiff might have procured a new car or even a van for himself had he not been injured, it is not certain that he necessarily would have needed to do so. Presumably, as an uninjured person, plaintiff would have had several options to using a motor vehicle of his own for his transportation needs, such as using ordinary public transportation, carpooling, bicycling, and so forth. However, because of his work-related injuries, he is no longer able to use most of those alternative means of transport. For that reason, plaintiff’s need for a specially equipped van, not merely its special equipment, is related to his work iryuxy. Cf. Davis, supra at 327-328. Even if most or all of plaintiff’s travel in the van is strictly personal in nature and unrelated to treatment for his injuries, his need for the van remains work-related for purposes of § 315(1).
The order of the wcac is reversed in part, to the extent it denies plaintiff the full cost of a replacement van under § 315(1), and this case is remanded to the wcac for entry of an order granting plaintiff the full cost of the replacement van, not merely its special modifications. We do not retain jurisdiction.
S. J. Latreille, J., concurred.