Willow Wind, Inc. v. City of Midwest City

1989 OK 171, 790 P.2d 1067, 1989 Okla. LEXIS 198, 1989 WL 155054
CourtSupreme Court of Oklahoma
DecidedDecember 26, 1989
Docket68805, 68834
StatusPublished
Cited by12 cases

This text of 1989 OK 171 (Willow Wind, Inc. v. City of Midwest City) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Oklahoma primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Willow Wind, Inc. v. City of Midwest City, 1989 OK 171, 790 P.2d 1067, 1989 Okla. LEXIS 198, 1989 WL 155054 (Okla. 1989).

Opinions

ALMA WILSON, Justice:

In 1982, the City of Midwest City enacted ordinances providing for a method by which private developers could construct water and sewer lines, dedicate them to the city, and receive back a portion of the cost of the construction. The city would charge a one-time fee to subsequent developers to tie on to the line. After the fee was collected, the developer who originally laid the line would receive ninety percent of the tie-on fee, and the city would retain ten percent as an administrative charge. This arrangement was to continue over fifteen years. The city repealed the ordinances in 1986 on the grounds that they were unconstitutional after the private developers who had relied upon these ordinances had filed suit. Willow Wind, Inc., and Beaver Investment Company filed a declaratory judgment action and alternatively asked for a writ of mandamus. Tinker Investment & Mortgage Corp. filed an inverse condemnation/unjust enrichment suit for damages due to the loss of a valuable property right, that is to receive reimbursement for money it expended in the installation of its water and sewer line. The city moved for summary judgment in both cases and the trial court granted summary judgment to the city, finding that the ordinances were unconstitutional. The two cases were consolidated upon appeal. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for trial on the merits. This Court granted certiorari to consider whether the ordinances violated our state’s constitution.

The City of Midwest City contends that the pay-back ordinances violated Article 10, §§ 14, 17, 26, and 27 of the Constitution of the State of Oklahoma. Those sections provide in pertinent part:

§ 14
Taxes shall be levied and collected by general laws, and for public purposes only....
§ 17
The Legislature shall not authorize any county or subdivision thereof, city, town, or incorporated district, to become a stockholder in any company, association, or corporation, or to obtain or appropriate money for, or levy any tax for, or to [1069]*1069loan its credit to any corporation, association, or individual.
§ 26
Except as herein otherwise provided, no county, city, town, township, school district, or other political corporation, or subdivision of the state, shall be allowed to become indebted, in any manner, or for any purpose, to an amount exceeding, in any year, the income and revenue provided for such year without the assent of three-fifths of the voters thereof, voting at an election, to be held for that purpose ....
§ 27
Any incorporated city or town in this State may, by a majority of the qualified property tax paying voters of such city or town, voting at an election to be held for that purpose, be allowed to become indebted in a larger amount than that specified in section twenty-six, for the purpose of purchasing or constructing public utilities, or for repairing the same, to be owned exclusively by such city....

The City of Midwest City argues that the assessment for which the pay-back ordinances provide is a tax, primarily for the benefit of the private contractors and therefore violates §§ 14 and 17; and also that the ordinances were not enacted pursuant to §§ 26 and 27, because no election was held. The appellants argue that the pay-back ordinances do not authorize a tax, but only authorize a fee to be charged for the use of the water and sewer line. They also argue that the pay-back scheme does not violate §§26 and 27 because the ordinances do not create a debt for the city. Therefore, this Court must first determine if the ordinances authorize a tax, and whether they create a debt against the city.

In this state a tax and a special assessment are distinguishable. “[A] special assessment is not a tax in its general meaning, but an enforced assessment for betterment to real property as benefited.” City of Lawton v. Morford, 146 Okla. 222, 293 P. 1068, 1069 (1930). In the case of Alley v. City of Muskogee, 53 Okla. 230, 156 P. 315, 316 (1916), this Court held:

[L]ike general taxes, special assessments are enforced proportional contributions, imposed not at regularly recurring periods to provide a continuous revenue, but instead are levied only occasionally as required; they are imposed, not upon the general body of the citizens, but upon a limited class of persons who are interest-. ed in a local improvement, and who are assumed to be benefited by the improvement to the extent of the assessment; they are imposed and collected as an equivalent, actual or presumed, for the benefit, and to pay the cost of the improvement. Special assessments proceed upon the theory that when a local improvement enhances the value of neighboring property, it is reasonable and competent of the Legislature to provide that such property should pay for the improvement. In a general levy of taxes, a contribution is exacted in return for the general benefits of government; in special assessments, the contribution is exacted because the property of the taxpayer is considered by the Legislature to be benefited over and beyond the general benefit of the community.

In the case at bar, the City of Midwest City adopted its ordinances to finance water and sewer lines. These ordinances initially require the developer and/or owner to pay for the connection of the lines to those currently maintained by the city. Subsequent developers benefiting from these lines are required to make payments on a per lot and per acre basis. These assessments are used to reimburse the initial developers ninety percent of their costs, with ten percent retained by the city. Because the assessment is levied only occasionally, as subsequent developers connect lines to those already existing, these assessments must be categorized as special assessments and not taxes as the term is used in Article 10, § 14. Therefore, the ordinances do not violate that section of this state’s constitution.1

[1070]*1070Such a conclusion does not resolve the issue because, although the ordinances do not violate § 14, we must examine whether they are in violation of § 17 which forbids the legislature from authorizing any city to appropriate money for the benefit of any corporation, association, or individual. Municipalities have no power to levy special assessments for public improvements unless a statute confers the power either expressly or by necessary implication. American-First Nat. Bank of Oklahoma City v. Peterson, 169 Okla. 588, 38 P.2d 957, 961 (1935). Therefore, if the legislature is precluded from authorizing a city to appropriate money for the benefit of a corporation, association, or individual, then a municipality is precluded from appropriating such funds.

Lawrence v. Schellstede, 348 P.2d 1078, 1080 (Okla.1960), holds that § 17 was adopted for the purpose of preventing the investment of public funds in private enterprises. In citing Lawrence, the case of Sublett v. City of Tulsa, 405 P.2d 185, 197 (Okla.1965), emphasizes that expenditures resulting in a public use or purpose are not prohibited by §§ 14 and 17 of Article 10.

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Willow Wind, Inc. v. City of Midwest City
1989 OK 171 (Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 1989)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
1989 OK 171, 790 P.2d 1067, 1989 Okla. LEXIS 198, 1989 WL 155054, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/willow-wind-inc-v-city-of-midwest-city-okla-1989.