Williams v. United States

Opinion

1 2

3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

4 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

5 * * *

6 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Case Nos. 3:16-cr-00086-MMD-WGC-1

7 Respondent/Plaintiff, ORDER v. 8 RONALD WILLIAMS III, 9 Petitioner/Defendant. 10 11 12 I. SUMMARY 13 Williams plead guilty to one count of Felon in Possession of a Firearm, in violation 14 of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2) (ECF Nos. 25, 27) and 15 on November 7, 2017, the Court sentenced him to 70 months imprisonment (ECF No. 16 29). Before the Court is Williams’ motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his conviction 17 and sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). (ECF No. 32 (the “Motion”).)1 Williams filed his 18 Motion in response to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Rehaif v. U.S., 139 S. Ct. 2191 19 (2019), arguing that the Supreme Court’s reinterpretation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g) and 20 924(a)(2) in Rehaif renders his indictment defective for failure to include a requisite mens 21 rea element. But because Williams’ claims are procedurally barred, because he waived 22 the right to raise constitutional claims like this one when he plead guilty unconditionally, 23 and as further explained below, the Court will deny the Motion. 24 II. BACKGROUND On December 14, 2016, a grand jury indicted Petitioner Ronald Williams on two 25 counts of Felon in Possession of a Firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 26 27

28 1The government opposes the Motion. (ECF No. 34.) Williams filed a reply. (ECF 1 924(a)(2). (ECF No. 1.) As to Count Two, Felon in Possession of a Firearm, the indictment alleges the following: 2

3 On or about November 23, 2016, in the State and District of Nevada, Ronald Williams III, defendant herein, having been convicted of crimes punishable 4 by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . . . did knowingly possess a Norinco rifle . . . a Norinco rifle . . . a Smith & Wesson rifle . . . a Smith & 5 Wesson rifle . . . a Heckler & Koch rifle . . . said possession being in and affecting commerce; all in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 6 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). 7 (Id.) Williams plead guilty to Count Two of the indictment and Count One was dismissed. 8 (ECF Nos. 25, 27.) On November 7, 2017, the Court sentenced Williams to 70 months 9 imprisonment and three years supervised release. (ECF No. 29.) Judgment was entered 10 on November 13, 2017. (ECF No. 30.) Williams did not appeal his sentence. He is 11 scheduled to be released on November 12, 2021. (ECF No. 32 at 5.) On June 16, 2020, 12 he filed the Motion. (ECF No. 32.) 13 III. LEGAL STANDARD 14 As noted, Williams requests his sentence be vacated, set aside, or corrected under 15 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a) following the Supreme Court’s decision in Rehaif, 139 S. Ct. 2191. 16 (Id.) Under § 2255, a federal prisoner may “move the court which imposed the sentence 17 to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence” if the sentence was imposed in violation of 18 the Constitution or laws of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). On June 21, 2019, the 19 Supreme Court decided Rehaif, overruling longstanding Ninth Circuit precedent regarding 20 the required mens rea under 922(g) and 924(a)(2).2 See 139 S. Ct. at 2200. Prior to the 21 decision, the government was only required to prove the defendant knowingly possessed 22 a firearm. See id. But under Rehaif, the government “must prove both that the defendant 23 knew he possessed a firearm and that he knew he belonged to the relevant category of 24 persons barred from possessing a firearm.” Id. Thus, the decision added a new mens rea 25 element to 922(g) and 924(a)(2). 26 /// 27 2See U.S. v. Enslin, 327 F.3d 788,798 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding the government did 28 not need to prove defendant knew of their prohibited status under 922(g).) 1 IV. DISCUSSION 2 Williams argues that his indictment failed to state a federal crime by omitting a 3 necessary element of § 922(g)(1) required under Rehaif, depriving the court of subject 4 matter jurisdiction and rendering his conviction unconstitutional. (ECF No. 32.) As to the 5 constitutionality of the conviction, Williams claims that the indictment lacked a cognizable 6 claim, violating his Fifth Amendment right requiring that the grand jury find probable cause 7 to support all necessary elements of the crime, and his Sixth Amendment right 8 guaranteeing notice of the nature and cause of the accusations against him. (Id.) Further, 9 Williams argues that the government was required to demonstrate not only that he knew 10 of his prohibited status, but also that he knew his status prohibited him from possessing 11 a firearm. (Id.) Ultimately, Williams maintains these errors are structural, requiring the 12 Court vacate his conviction and release him. (Id.) 13 The government responds that Williams’ claims are waived by his unconditional guilty 14 plea, and procedurally barred because they were not raised on direct appeal. (ECF No. 15 34.) 16 As further explained below, the Court addresses each issue Williams raises and 17 finds as follows. First, Williams’ petition is timely. Second, Rehaif applies retroactively. 18 Third, the government is not required to demonstrate Williams knew he was barred from 19 possessing a firearm. Fourth, the Court had subject matter jurisdiction at the time it 20 imposed his sentence. Fifth, Williams’ claims are procedurally barred because while he 21 can demonstrate cause, he has failed to demonstrate prejudice and there is no structural 22 error. Finally, Williams waived his right to bring a challenge by pleading guilty. In short, 23 the Motion is ultimately denied because Williams waived his right by pleading guilty and 24 the Motion is procedurally barred. 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// 1 A. The Petition is Timely 2 Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, a “1-year period of limitation” applies and runs from the 3 latest of four time triggers.3 See 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Williams claims that his Motion is timely 4 because it was filed within one year of Rehaif being decided. (ECF No. 32 at 10.) Under 5 this standard, the Motion is timely. Rehaif was decided June 21, 2019, and thus Williams 6 had until June 20, 2020 to file for relief. The Motion was filed June 16, 2020. (ECF No. 7 32.) Thus, it was filed within one year of the Court’s decision in Rehaif. Moreover, the 8 government does not contest timeliness. 9 B. Retroactivity 10 Williams next argues that the new rule established in Rehaif applies retroactively 11 to his case. (Id. at 10-11.) As the government does not dispute retroactivity,4 the Court 12 assumes without deciding that Rehaif applies retroactively to Williams’ § 2255 claims. 13 See U.S. v. Abundis, Case No. 2:18-cr-00158-MMD-VCF-1 (D. Nev. Nov. 30, 2020). 14 C. Required Proof 15 Williams further argues that the plain language of Rehaif requires the government 16 not only demonstrate he knew of his prohibited status—as previously convicted of a crime 17 punishable by more than one year—but knew that this status barred him from possessing 18 a firearm. (ECF No. 32 at 7-9.) The Court finds that the government was only required to 19

20 3The four time triggers are: “(1) The date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final; (2) the date on which the impediment to making a motion created by 21 governmental action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the movant was prevented from making a motion by such governmental 22 action; (3) the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme 23 Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or (4) the date on which the facts 24 supporting the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255. 25 4The government only cursorily addresses retroactivity and at no point refutes 26 Williams’ argument that Rehaif applies retroactively. (ECF No. 34 at 6 (“Just as Williams argues with respect to the retroactivity analysis, see ECF No. 32, at 11, the government 27 believes that Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995) provides an ‘excellent parallel’ for the procedural default analysis.”).) 28 1 prove that Williams knew of his prohibited status, not that Williams knew his status barred 2 him from possessing a firearm. See Abundis, Case No. 2:18-cr-00158-MMD-VCF-1. 3 D. Subject Matter Jurisdiction 4 Next, Williams argues that because the indictment did not describe each element 5 of the offense he was charged with, it failed to make out a federal offense, depriving the 6 Court of jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231—a defect constituting structural error. (ECF 7 No. 32 at 15-16.) To the extent the indictment was defective for failing to allege the mens 8 rea element under Rehaif, it did not deprive this Court of subject matter jurisdiction. See 9 Abundis, Case No. 2:18-cr-00158-MMD-VCF-1. 10 E. Procedural Default 11 The government also argues that Williams’ claims are procedurally defaulted. 12 (ECF No. 34 at 6.) While a defendant is permitted to attack the legality of his sentence or 13 conviction, a defendant who fails to raise the claim on direct appeal is procedurally 14 defaulted unless the defendant can demonstrate: (1) cause and prejudice; or (2) actual 15 innocence. See Bousley 523 U.S. at 622 (citations omitted); U.S. v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 16 167-168 (1982). 17 Williams does not contest that he did not raise the claim in the Motion during his 18 direct appeal, but Williams responds he can overcome his procedural default because the 19 errors in his indictment are structural, requiring only a showing of cause to set it aside. 20 (ECF No. 32 at 13, 16-21.) Alternatively, Williams argues that he can overcome 21 procedural default because he has sufficiently demonstrated cause and prejudice. (ECF 22 No. 38 at 7-10.) The Court finds that Williams demonstrates cause but not prejudice or 23 structural error. 24 1. Cause 25 A defendant has cause to overcome procedural default when the “constitutional 26 claim is so novel that its legal basis is not reasonably available to counsel.” Reed v. Ross, 27 468 U.S. 1, 16 (1984). A claim is not reasonably available if it “overturn[s] a longstanding 28 1 and widespread practice to which this Court has not spoken, but which a near-unanimous 2 body of lower court authority has expressly approved.” Id. at 17 (quotation omitted). 3 The Court finds Williams has cause because Rehaif overturned longstanding 4 practice approved by a near unanimous body of lower courts, making his claim based on 5 Rehaif “novel.” See Abundis, Case No. 2:18-cr-00158-MMD-VCF-1. 6 2. Prejudice 7 The actual prejudice prong of the procedural default analysis requires a defendant 8 show “not merely that the errors created a possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to 9 his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire proceedings with error of 10 constitutional dimensions.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 US at 478, 488 (1986). For defective 11 indictments, the question is “whether an error or omission in an indictment worked to the 12 prejudice of the accused.” U.S. v. James, 980 F.2d 1314, 1316 (9th Cir. 1992). More 13 specifically, the question is whether the defendant had “been given adequate knowledge 14 of the missing element[] in order to satisfy the due process requirement.” Id. at 1318. 15 Williams argues that without adequate knowledge of the missing element, due 16 process was not satisfied because he was not given notice and not able to put on a 17 thorough defense. (ECF No 38 at 17-21.) The government relies on the Ninth Circuit’s 18 decision in U.S. v. Benamor, 937 F.3d 1182, 1186 (9th Cir. 2019), to argue that, given his 19 criminal history, no reasonable possibility exists that Williams did not know he had been 20 convicted of a crime for which he could be sentenced to more than a year imprisonment. 21 (ECF No. 34 at 17-19.) 22 In Benamor, the defendant filed a petition for rehearing following Rehaif, arguing 23 that the evidence was insufficient because the government failed to prove he knew he 24 was a felon. See 937 F.3d at 1188. The Ninth Circuit pointed to the defendant’s stipulation 25 that he had been convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year to relieve the 26 government’s burden. See id. But the Ninth Circuit also acknowledged that “the stipulation 27 does not end the discussion as to Defendant’s knowledge of his status.” Id. Rather, the 28 court pointed to defendant’s seven prior felony convictions, several of which were 1 sentences for more than one year imprisonment imposed, as well as the nine years he 2 actually spent in prison and conclusively indicated there was no error in not instructing 3 the jury to find knowledge of prohibited status. Id. And although, as Williams points out, 4 the plain error standard does not apply here,5 Benamor is instructive. There, the Ninth 5 Circuit relied on the stipulation but focused primarily on the nine years in prison. Many 6 courts determining prejudice have similarly relied predominantly on a defendant’s criminal 7 history to find it is implausible that the defendant did not know they had been convicted 8 of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.6 9 Here, the Court similarly finds it implausible that Williams was unaware of his 10 status, as formerly convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding

11 5“This is the wrong standard. Tellingly, the government cites no case applying the plain error standard to habeas petitions. This is because ‘use of the ‘plain error’ standard 12 to review [a] § 2255 motion [is] contrary to long-established law.’” (ECF No. 38 at 19 (citing Frady, 456 U.S. at 167).) 13

14 6See e.g., U.S. v. Reynolds, Case No. 2:16-cr-00296-JAD-PAL-3, 2020 WL 5235316, at *4 (D. Nev., Sept. 2, 2020) (finding that 13 total years in prison on five felony 15 convictions “renders it implausible that Reynolds did not know at the time of this offense that he had been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding 16 one year and forecloses his actual-prejudice arguments.”); U.S. v. Lowe, Case No. 2:14- cr-00004-JAD-VCF, 2020 WL 2200852, at *2 (D. Nev. May 6, 2020) (finding that evidence 17 of serving five years in prison “proves beyond a reasonable doubt that Lowe well knew at 18 the time of the offense that he had been convicted of ‘a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.’”); Whitley v. U.S., Case No. 04 Cr. 1381 (NRB), 2020 WL 19 1940897, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 22, 2020) (finding that “any argument that Whitley was prejudiced therefrom is belied by the sheer implausibility that, after having been convicted 20 of multiple prior felony convictions for which sentences exceeding a year had been imposed, and having in fact served more than a year in prison in connection therewith, 21 Whitley nevertheless lacked the requisite awareness of his restricted status.”); MacArthur 22 v. U.S., Case No. 1:12-cr-00084-JAW, 2020 WL 1670369, at *10 (D. Me. Apr. 3, 2020) (“The record, including the presentence investigation report, shows that Petitioner had 23 numerous prior felony convictions over many years before the § 922(g) conviction at issue…[thus] the Government would have been able to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 24 that Petitioner knew of his prohibited status at the time he possessed the firearm.”); Floyd v. U.S., Case No. 19 C 6578, 2020 WL 374695, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 23, 2020) (“His plea 25 agreement stated that he had previously been convicted of a crime (heroin 26 manufacturing/delivery) for which he was sentenced to four years in prison, and he admitted at his plea hearing that he ‘had been convicted of at least one crime punishable 27 by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. It is inconceivable that Floyd would have declined to plead guilty…’”) (citations omitted). 28 1 one year, given his criminal history. By the time Williams allegedly possessed the firearm, 2 he had previously served more than a year in prison for a prior conviction for felon in 3 possession of a firearm. (ECF No. 34 at 18; see Presentence Investigation Report at ¶ 4 37 (Williams was sentenced to 12 to 48 months imprisonment on August 2013 conviction 5 for Ex-Felon in Possession of a Firearm).) 6 Thus, as other courts have concluded,7 Williams is unable to demonstrate 7 prejudice given his criminal record. The Court finds that Williams did not suffer prejudice. 8 Accordingly, Williams cannot overcome procedural default. 9 3. Structural Error 10 Alternatively, Williams argues that the constitutional errors are structural, requiring 11 only a showing of cause and not prejudice. The Court finds no structural error fatally 12 infected Williams’ indictment. See U.S. v. Feehan-Jones, Case No. 3:15-cr-00011-MMD- 13 VPC-1 (D. Nev. Dec. 2, 2020). 14 F. Claims Waived by Unconditional Guilty Plea 15 Finally, the government argues that by pleading guilty unconditionally, Williams 16 waived his right to make any non-jurisdictional challenges to the indictment under the rule 17 announced in Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973). (ECF No. 34 at 14.) The 18 Court finds Williams’ claims are barred by his guilty plea. See Abundis, Case No. 2:18- 19 cr-00158-MMD-VCF-1. Therefore, the claims are both procedurally barred, as discussed 20 above, and also barred by his guilty plea. 21 V. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY 22 Before Williams can appeal the Court’s decision to deny his Motion, he must obtain 23 a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B); Fed. R. App. P. 22; 9th Cir. R. 22- 24 1; U.S. v. Washington, 653 F.3d 1057, 1059 (9th Cir. 2011). To receive such a certificate, 25 a petitioner must make “‘a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right’ as to 26 7As discussed above in footnote 6, other courts have predominantly relied on the 27 amount of time in custody to find no prejudice exists. See, e.g., Lowe, 2020 WL 2200852, at *2 n.15 (collecting cases). 28 1 || each issue the petitioner seeks to appeal.” Washington, 653 F.3d at 1059 (quoting 28 2 || U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), (3)). “The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would 3 || find the district court's assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack 4 || v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). The Court determines that reasonable jurists 5 || would not find its reasoning debatable or wrong. Thus, the Court will deny a certificate of 6 || appealability. 7 || □□ CONCLUSION 8 The Court notes that the parties made several arguments and cited to several 9 || cases not discussed above. The Court has reviewed these arguments and cases and 10 || determines that they do not warrant discussion as they do not affect the outcome of the 11 || motion before the Court. 12 It is therefore ordered that Williams’ motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his 13 || conviction and sentence (ECF No. 32) is denied. 14 It is further ordered that a certificate of appealability is denied. 15 The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in accordance with this order and close this 16 || case. 17 DATED THIS 2™ Day of December 2020. 18

20 MARANA CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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