Williams v. United States Marshals

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 BILLY PAUL WILLIAMS, Case No.: 22-cv-0139-BAS-BLM #61027298, 12 ORDER: (1) SCREENING SECOND Plaintiff, 13 AMENDED PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. vs. § 1915(e)(2)(B) AND § 1915A(b); AND 14

U.S. MARSHAL DOE #1, U.S. 15 (2) DIRECTING PLAINTIFF TO MARSHAL DOE #2, PROVIDE WRITTEN NOTICE 16 Defendants. IDENTIFYING DOE DEFENDANTS 17 FOR SERVICE OF PROCESS 18 19 I. INTRODUCTION 20 Plaintiff Billy Paul Williams is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis against 21 Defendants U.S. Marshal Doe #1 and U.S. Marshal Doe #2. Under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) 22 and 1915A(b), the Court has a duty to screen Plaintiff’s claims sua sponte. Having 23 reviewed the filings, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint 24 clears the “low threshold” of sua sponte screening. The Court, however, is unable to serve 25 Doe defendants. As a result, the Court will require Plaintiff to attempt to identify the Doe 26 defendants and file the proper notice or motion with the Court on or before February 27, 27 2023. 28 1 II. BACKGROUND 2 Plaintiff is a federal detainee being held at Otay Mesa Detention Center California.1 3 On January 31, 2022, proceeding pro se, he initiated this civil action pursuant to Bivens v. 4 Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). (See 5 Compl., ECF No. 1 at 1.) Plaintiff names two United States Marshals, Does #1 and Doe 6 #2, as Defendants. (Id.) On February 2, 2022, the Court dismissed the action without 7 prejudice for failure to satisfy the filing fee requirement under 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). (ECF 8 No. 2.) The Court notified Plaintiff that he had 45 days to either (a) pay the $402 civil filing 9 and administrative fee in full; or (b) complete and file a Motion to Proceed In Forma 10 Pauperis (“IFP”). (Id.) On February 14, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Proceed IFP. (ECF 11 No. 3.) On February 25, 2022, the Court granted Plaintiff’s IFP motion, sua sponte 12 screened his Complaint, and dismissed it for failing to state a claim. (ECF No. 4.) The 13 Court granted Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint to correct the pleading 14 deficiencies identified. (Id.) Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint on May 2, 2022. 15 (FAC, ECF No. 9.) On June 30, 2022, the Court dismissed the FAC without prejudice for 16 failure to state a claim and gave Plaintiff another opportunity to amend. (ECF No. 10.) On 17 July 27, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint. (SAC, ECF No. 11.) 18 In his SAC, Plaintiff alleges on August 4, 2021, he was transported from 19 Metropolitan Correctional Center (“MCC”) to federal court by two unidentified2 United 20 21 22 1 On July 31, 2021, Plaintiff was arrested, charged with importation of a controlled substance in violation 23 of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952 and 960, and ordered detained. See United States v. Williams, 3:21-cr-2409-WQH, ECF No. 19. After Plaintiff was indicted, his criminal case was given a new case number, 3:22-cr-1305- 24 WQH. On September 23, 2022, Plaintiff pleaded guilty to a superseding indictment and remains detained awaiting sentencing. See United States v. Williams, 3:22-cr-1305-WQH, ECF No. 22; see also Bias v. 25 Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1225 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[A court] may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters 26 at issue.” (quoting Bennett v. Medtronic, Inc., 285 F.3d 801, 803 n.2 (9th Cir. 2002))). 27 2 While Plaintiff states he does not know the names of the U.S. Deputy Marshals at this time, he notes he was transported to this courthouse on the morning of August 4, 2021. (See SAC at 3.) The Court takes 28 judicial notice of the fact that a detention hearing was held regarding Plaintiff’s criminal case on that date 1 States Deputy Marshals, Doe #1 and Doe #2. (SAC at 2.) During transport, Plaintiff’s 2 ankles were shackled. (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff states he told Doe #1 and Doe #2 that he has 3 “screws in [his] ankles” and asked that they not shackle him too tightly. (Id.) Both 4 Defendants “ignored” Plaintiff’s request. At some point later, Plaintiff asked Doe #2 if he 5 could loosen the shackles because they were causing pain. (Id.) Doe #2 told him to “suck 6 it up.” (Id.) Ultimately, both Defendants refused to loosen the shackles despite Plaintiff’s 7 complaints. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that as a result, he now has nerve damage in his ankle. 8 (Id.) He seeks compensatory and punitive damages. (Id. at 7.) 9 III. LEGAL STANDARD 10 The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires the Court to review complaints filed by 11 all persons proceeding IFP and by those, like Plaintiff, who are “incarcerated or detained 12 in any facility [and] accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, 13 violations of criminal law or the terms or conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, 14 or diversionary program,” at the time of filing or “as soon as practicable after docketing.” 15 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A. 16 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b), the Court must sua sponte dismiss a 17 prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a 18 claim, or seeks damages from defendants who are immune. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 19 1122, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. 20 Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). “The 21 purpose of [screening] is ‘to ensure that the targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not 22 bear the expense of responding.’” Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 907 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) 23 (quoting Wheeler v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)). 24 “The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 25

26 27 before the Honorable Judge William Q. Hayes. See United States v. Williams, 3:21-cr-2409-WQH, ECF No. 8. 28 1 which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 2 Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 3 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 4 2012) (noting that screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard 5 applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6 12(b)(6)”). 7 Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as 8 true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 9 678 (2009) (cleaned up). A court must accept all factual allegations pleaded in the 10 complaint as true and must construe them and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of 11 the nonmoving party. See Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337–38 (9th Cir. 12 1996). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the 13 elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 14 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief 15 [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 16 experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. The “mere possibility of misconduct” or 17 “unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting this 18 plausibility standard. Id. at 678–79. 19 IV. ANALYSIS 20 A. Screening Excessive Force Claim 21 Plaintiff claims on August 4, 2021, Defendants Doe #1 and Doe #2 used excessive 22 force in shackling him too tightly, despite his warning that he had “metal screws” in his 23 ankles. (SAC at 3.) While Plaintiff references the Eighth Amendment’s “cruel and unusual” 24 language, the Court liberally construes Plaintiff’s claim under the Due Process Clause of 25 26 27 28 1 the Fifth Amendment. Bernhardt v. L.A. Cnty., 339 F.3d 920, 925 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Courts 2 have a duty to construe pro se pleadings liberally, including pro se motions as well as 3 complaints.”). 4 As a federal detainee at the time of filing, Plaintiff raises his claim pursuant to 5 Bivens, 403 U.S. 388. “In Bivens, the Supreme Court ‘recognized for the first time an 6 implied right of action for damages against federal officers alleged to have violated a 7 citizen’s constitutional rights.’” Vega v. United States, 881 F.3d 1146, 1152 (9th Cir. 2018) 8 (quoting Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003, 2006 (2017)). Bivens, however, provides a 9 judicially recognized remedy for constitutional violations committed by federal actors only 10 in limited circumstances. Id. Indeed, the Supreme Court has cautioned courts against 11 expanding Bivens rights of action to new contexts beyond those already recognized.4 See 12 Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1857. Most recently, the Court refused to extend Bivens to a Fourth 13 Amendment excessive force claim and a First Amendment retaliation claim against a U.S. 14 Border Patrol agent, “[b]ecause our cases have made clear that, in all but the most unusual 15 circumstances, prescribing a cause of action is a job for Congress, not the courts.” Egbert 16 v. Boule, 142 S. Ct. 1793, 1797, 1800 (2022). But as with Plaintiff’s previous complaints, 17 the Court assumes a Fifth Amendment excessive force claim exists for the purpose of this 18 initial screening. (ECF No. 10 at 4); Self v. Warden, MCC, No. 3:18-cv-1451-LAB-MDD, 19 20 21 3 The Eighth Amendment applies to convicted prisoners, while the Fifth Amendment applies to excessive force claims raised by federal pretrial detainees. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n.16 (1979) (noting 22 that “the Due Process Clause [of the Fifth Amendment]” is applicable to claims of pre-trial detainees 23 because “Eighth Amendment scrutiny is appropriate only after the State has complied with the constitutional guarantees traditionally associated with criminal prosecutions” (quoting United States v. 24 Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 317–18 (1946))). 4 The Supreme Court has expressly recognized only three types of implied causes of action under Bivens: 25 (1) Bivens itself recognized an implied cause of action for violation of the Fourth Amendment’s right against unreasonable searches and seizures; (2) Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979), recognized a 26 claim for gender discrimination in the employment context under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process 27 Clause; and (3) Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980), recognized a claim against prison officials for inadequate medical care in the prison context under the Eighth Amendment. See Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. 28 Ct. 1843, 1854–55 (2017). 1 2019 WL 497731, at *4 n.4 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2019) (assuming on screening that Bivens 2 applies to pretrial detainee medical care claims). 3 Assuming the existence of a Bivens remedy for the purposes of screening, the Court 4 finds Plaintiff’s SAC states a plausible excessive force claim against Defendants sufficient 5 to survive the “low threshold” for proceeding past the sua sponte screening required under 6 § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). See Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1123. To state a claim of excessive 7 force under the Due Process Clause, “a pretrial detainee must [allege] . . . that the force 8 purposely or knowingly used against him was objectively unreasonable.” Kingsley v. 9 Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 396 (2015). Excessively tight shackling may be objectively 10 unreasonable force in some circumstances. See Wall v. Cnty. of Orange, 364 F.3d 1107, 11 1112 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding excessively tight handcuffing that caused permanent nerve 12 damage violated the Fourth Amendment); Gregory v. Adams, No. CIV S-05-1393 FCD 13 EFB P., 2008 WL 486013, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 2008) (finding a triable issue of fact 14 regarding whether tight handcuffing violated the Eighth Amendment when the defendant 15 handcuffed a plaintiff, who was wearing a wrist brace at the time due to his arthritis and 16 tendinitis, despite the plaintiff’s pleas that he was in pain), adopted by 2008 WL 780672 17 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2008). 18 Here, Plaintiff informed Defendants that he had screws in his ankle and complained 19 of pain from the tightness of the metal cuffs. (SAC at 3.) Defendants ignored his pleas to 20 loosen the cuffs and told him to “suck it up.” (Id.) Further, Plaintiff provides documentation 21 of nerve damage resulting from the incident. (Id.; Compl. at 12–13.) These allegations 22 allow the Court to plausibly infer that Defendants use of force was knowing and 23 “objectively unreasonable.” See Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 396. Thus, Court finds that the SAC 24 clears the “low threshold” of sua sponte screening. See Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1123. 25 B. Identifying Doe Defendants for Service 26 At this time, the Court does not find service appropriate for Defendants Doe #1 and 27 Doe #2 because the U.S. Marshal Service (“USMS”) cannot serve a “Doe” defendant. 28 1 Nonetheless, the Court will give Plaintiff another opportunity to identify the defendants. 2 See Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980) (stating that while “the use of 3 ‘John Doe’ to identify a defendant is not favored . . . where the identity of alleged 4 defendants will not be known prior to the filing of a complaint[,] . . . the plaintiff should 5 be given an opportunity . . . to identify the unknown defendants unless it is clear that 6 discovery would not uncover the identities”). Thus, the Court will allow Plaintiff more time 7 to identify the Defendants. If Plaintiff can identify Defendants for service, he should file a 8 motion to substitute the identities of Defendants Doe #1 and Doe #2 in the SAC, which 9 includes the names of Doe #1 and/or Doe #2 and where they may be located. Even if 10 Plaintiff is unable to ascertain Doe Defendants’ complete names and/or a location where 11 they can be found, he should nonetheless endeavor to include enough identifying 12 information to allow for service of process in his motion.5 If the motion to substitute is 13 granted, the Court will direct the USMS to serve Defendants. 14 V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER 15 For the foregoing reasons, the Court: 16 1. FINDS Plaintiff’s SAC satisfies the “low threshold” for proceeding past the 17 sua sponte screening required under § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). 18 2. ORDERS Plaintiff to either: (1) file a motion to amend his SAC to substitute 19 Defendants Marshal Doe #1 and Marshal Doe #2, with their names or, if full names cannot 20 be obtained, sufficient identifying information about Marshal Doe #1 and/or Marshal Doe 21 #2 to allow the USMS to execute service of process on them OR (2) if sufficient identifying 22 23 5 Plaintiff provided some information in his previous pleadings which may assist in identifying the 24 defendants, including the time, date, and location he was shackled, the court to which he was transported, and partial physical descriptions of the defendants. (See FAC at 5.) If Plaintiff is unable to obtain the 25 names of the defendants, he should include in his filing any and all descriptive information he is able to gather, including information contained in previous pleadings. The Court notes Plaintiff is free to seek 26 information available to his appointed defense counsel in his criminal case or from other individuals who 27 may be able to identify the deputy marshals fitting those descriptions and/or who were assigned to transport detainees between MCC and the federal courthouse (in this case, to the courtroom of District 28 Judge William Q. Hayes) on the morning of August 4, 2021. 1 ||information cannot be obtained during the allotted time, file a notice containing a summary 2 || of all efforts Plaintiff made to obtain information regarding the identities of Defendants, 3 || even if those efforts were ultimately futile. Plaintiff must file the motion to amend or notice 4 || with the Court by February 27, 2023. 5 3. NOTIFIES Plaintiff that the failure to comply with this order will result in 6 || dismissal of the unidentified defendants(s) from this action without prejudice for failure to 7 || serve with process pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m). 8 IT IS SO ORDERED. 9 ) 10 || DATED: November 29, 2022 Lin A (Lyohaa 6 11 United States District Judge 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28