Williams v. Roy O Martin L L C

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
• Decided: October 1, 2002
• Docket: 02-30401
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT _______________

m 02-30401 Summary Calendar _______________

ELVIN RAY WILLIAMS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

VERSUS

ROY O. MARTIN LUMBER CO. LLC,

Defendant-Appellee.

_________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana m 01-CV-317 _________________________

September 30, 2002

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, SMITH, and Elvin Williams appeals a summary judgment CLEMENT, Circuit Judges. in favor of his former employer, Roy O. Martin Lumber Co. LLC (“Martin”),1 on JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge:* 1 The caption in Williams’s complaint reads “Elvin Ray Williams versus Roy O. Martin Lum- * Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has ber Co., L.L.C., d.b.a. Colfax Creosoting Co.” determined that this opinion should not be The actual name of the Colfax site is “Colfax published and is not precedent except under the Treating Company.” Williams worked at Martin’s limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. Colfax site, so the parties and the district court 47.5.4. (continued...) Williams’s claim of retaliatory discharge under times in January 2000, none related to his the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), daughters’ health. He twice missed part of the 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. Williams also workday to take his daughters to the dentist. appeals three related procedural orders. We On the same day, he arrived late after taking find no error and affirm. them to school and left early without ex- planation. He also missed a day of work for a I. court appearance. In late January, therefore, Williams worked as a utility laborer for Lindsay and Milazzo again met with Williams Martin from July 1993 to April 2000. He fre- and warned him that further absences or tar- quently missed work, from a few hours to a diness would result in progressive discipline of few days, in part because his daughters suffer a one-day suspension, then a three-day from sickle cell anemia. For most of suspension, then discharge. Williams’s tenure at Martin, his supervisor, Larry Lindsay, tried to accommodate This meeting did little to affect Williams’s Williams’s absences. In particular, Lindsay attendance; he missed work three times in the allowed Williams to used accrued annual leave first two weeks of February. Again, none was to care for his children; if Williams had no related to his daughters’ physical problems. annual leave, Lindsay would allow him to take After the third absence, Lindsay, Milazzo, and unpaid leave. Albert Johnson, the plant manager, met with Williams to discuss these absences and to sus- In December 1999, however, Martin began pend him for one day. to enforce its leave policy more vigorously be- cause of high rates of absenteeism and tardi- Williams then failed to report to work after ness. These new measures fell especially hard his one-day suspension, which promptly on Williams, not only because of his afflicted earned him another meeting on February 25 daughters, but also because Martin suspected with Lindsay, Milazzo, and Johnson; a three- Williams was performing odd jobs for other day suspension; and a warning that future ab- employers on Martin’s time. Lindsay and Guy sences or tardiness would result in discharge. Milazzo, the human resources manager, met Lindsay, Milazzo, and Johnson also asked Wil- with Williams in late December to discuss his liams whether he wanted to apply for FMLA excessive absences and tardiness. Lindsay and leave to care for his children, but Williams Milazzo required Williams to begin accounting specifically declined to request FMLA leave. for every time he missed work, not just the times he missed because of his daughters’ After Williams returned from his affliction. suspension, his attendance improved briefly. Aside from an authorized absence on March 1, Williams nonetheless missed work five to care for his daughters, he did not miss any work during March. He did arrive late for work on April 5, but Martin excused the tar- 1 (...continued) diness at the time because of Williams’s im- often referred to the defendant as “Colfax.” In this proved attendance record in March. appeal, however, the caption refers only to “Roy O. Martin Co. LLC”; we therefore refer to the With no earlier notice, Williams announced defendant as “Martin.”

2 around noon on April 24 that he needed the vorable to the non-moving party, “show that afternoon off to care for his daughters. Lind- there is no genuine issue as to any material say refused to give permission, because he fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 needed Williams for a busy afternoon at the U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986). A dispute about a site. Williams left anyway and did not return, material fact is “genuine” if the evidence so Martin fired him the next day. would permit a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the non-moving party. Id. at 248. II. The court must draw all reasonable inferences Williams filed a complaint with the Equal in favor of the non-moving party. Id. at 255. Employment Opportunity Commission, which did not pursue the investigation but issued a At the same time, not all disputes or all in- right-to-sue letter. Williams then sued Martin, ferences are reasonable, and the court is not asserting claims for retaliatory discharge under obliged to accept mere assertions. Thus, once (1) title VII, (2) 42 U.S.C. § 1981, (3) the the moving party initially has shown “that FMLA, and (4) LA. REV. STAT. ANN. there is an absence of evidence to support the § 23.332. The district court entered a non-moving party’s cause,” Celotex Corp. v. protective order during pre-trial discovery to Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986), the non- restrict discovery of Martin’s employee moving party must produce “specific facts” personnel files to records related to showing a genuine factual issue for trial. FED. absenteeism and FMLA leave. At the pre-trial R. CIV. P. 56(e); Matsushita Elec. Indus. conference, the court confined the questions Corp. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, for trial to the FMLA claim only. 587 (1986). The non-moving party cannot rest on mere conclusional allegations and de- The parties then filed cross-motions for nials, speculation, improbable inferences, un- summary judgment. Just three days before the substantiated assertions, and legalistic court granted Martin’s motion for summary arguments, none of which will substitute for judgment on the FMLA claim, Williams moved specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. to strike certain exhibits attached to Martin’s TIG Ins., 276 F.3d at 759. motion for summary judgment and for sanctions for discovery violations. The court IV. granted Martin’s motion for summary A. judgment and dismissed, as moot, the motion Congress adopted the FMLA “to meet the to strike and for sanctions. needs of families in a manner that accommodates the legitimate interests of III. employers.” Bocalbos v. Nat’l W. Life Ins. We review a summary judgment de novo Co., 162 F.3d 379, 382 (5th Cir. 1998); see and apply the same standards as did the district also 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(1)-(3). “The court. TIG Ins. Co. v. Sedgwick James, 276 enactment of the FMLA was predicated on F.3d 754, 759 (5th Cir. 2002). Summary two fundamental concerns—the needs of the judgment is appropriate only if “the pleadings, American workforce, and the development of depositions, answers to interrogatories, and high-performance organizations.” 29 C.F.R. admissions on file, together with the affidavits, § 825.101(b). if any,” when viewed in the light most fa-

3 The FMLA both gives employees certain B. entitlements and forbids employers from inter- Williams alleges that Martin retaliated for fering with those entitlements.2 Bocalbos, 162 the exercise of FMLA rights. In Chaffin v. F.3d at 383. Among its entitlements, the John H. Carter Co., 179 F.3d 316 (5th Cir. FMLA gives an eligible employee a right to 1999), we held that the McDonnell Douglas twelve weeks of unpaid leave within a twelve- burden-shifting scheme for federal anti- month period to care for a newborn or newly discrimination claims applies to an FMLA adopted child, for a close family member who retaliatory discharge case.3 See McDonnell has a “serious health condition,” or for oneself Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). if one has a “serious health condition.” 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1). An employee may take McDonnell Douglas burden shifting has this leave intermittently if medically necessary. three stages in an FMLA retaliatory discharge 29 U.S.C. § 2612(b)(1). After an employee case. First, the plaintiff must establish a prima returns from FMLA leave, he is entitled to facie case of retaliation by showing that he (1) return to the same or an equivalent job. 29 exercised rights guaranteed by the FMLA and U.S.C. § 2614(a)(1). The FMLA also forbids (2) was discharged (3) as a result of exercising an employer from interfering with the exercise those rights. Bocalbos, 162 F.3d at 383. of these rights and from discriminating among Second, once the plaintiff establishes a prima employees who exercise these rights. 29 facie case, the defendant must articulate a U.S.C. § 2615(a). legitimate and non-retaliatory reason for the discharge. Id. Third, after the defendant of- When an employee needs FMLA leave for fers such a reason, the burden returns to the foreseeable medical treatment for himself or plaintiff to “produce substantial probative evi- family members, he has certain duties to his dence that the proffered reason was not the employer. First, he must make a reasonable true reason . . . and that the real reason was effort to schedule the treatment to avoid undue the plaintiff’s” exercise of FMLA rights. disruption to the employer’s operations. 29 Chaffin, 179 F.3d at 320. The plaintiff cannot U.S.C. § 2612(e)(2)(A). Second, he must succeed merely by showing that the proffered provide the employer with thirty days’ advance reason was pretextual, but must also show that notice of the treatment, or as much notice as retaliation “was the real reason.” Id. practicable if notice cannot be given thirty days in advance. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(e)(2)(B). C.

3 We reserved the question whether McDonnell Douglas burden shifting applies to a claim for de- 2 The FMLA does not apply to all employers or nial of the underlying FMLA benefits. 179 F.3d at employees . For example, the act covers only 319 n.13. For a persuasive explanation why Mc- employers with more than 50 employees, 29 U.S.C. Donnell Douglas burden shifting should not apply § 2611(4), and employees who worked at least to such a claim, see Diaz v. Fort Wayne Foundry 1,250 hours in the last twelve-month period, 29 Corp., 131 F.3d 711 (7th Cir. 1997). Diaz also U.S.C. § 2611(2)(A). The parties, however, do not concludes, however, that “[i]t is not clear what a dispute that the FMLA applies to both Martin and burden-shifting approach could add” to a retali- Williams. ation case. Diaz, 179 F.3d at 713.

4 As the district court did, and as so often purportedly to care for his daughters.5 Against happens with McDonnell Douglas burden this long record of absenteeism and tardiness, shifting, we assume arguendo that Williams Martin has more than satisfied its burden to presented a prima facie case of retaliatory dis- articulate a legitimate and non-retaliatory charge. We therefore concentrate on two reason for discharging Williams. main questions: (1) whether Martin articulated a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the We further agree with the district court that discharge and (2) whether Williams raised a Williams produced no evidence to raise a gen- genuine issue of material fact that any uine issue of material fact that this proffered proffered reason was pretextual and that the reason was pretextual and that Martin really true reason for his discharge was to retaliate discharged him for exercising his FMLA against him for exercising his FMLA rights. rights. Though a scintilla of evidence will not suffice to defeat a motion for summary We agree with the district court that Martin judgment, Williams could not produce even articulated a legitimate and non-retaliatory rea- that. As the district court aptly stated, son for Williams’s discharge, i.e., his habitual “[n]othing in the record suggests that [Martin] and unexcused absences and tardiness. Martin harbored a secret motive to deny Williams[’] notified Williams of the new measures to FMLA rights or to retaliate against him for the enforce its leave policies in late 1999. Nev- assertion of those rights.” ertheless, Martin missed work on eight separate occasions in the first six weeks of To the contrary, Martin seems the very pic- 2000, unrelated to his daughters’ sickle cell ture of a family-friendly employer. Lindsay anemia.4 flexibly allowed Williams to take off work from 1993 through 1999 to care for his Moreover, Williams’s supervisors met with daughters. Martin also gave Williams repeated him on four separate occasions to remind him chances to improve his work attendance before of the need for regular work attendance, to finally discharging him. Williams’s supervisors discipline him for absences, and to warn him even encouraged him to apply for FMLA that future violations would result in leave, but he refused their entreaties. 6 That discharge. Martin then excused Williams’s Martin finally fired Williams after he claimed first absence in April 2000 because of to leave work to care for his daughters cannot Williams’s improved attendance in March refute the overwhelming evidence of his poor 2000, but Martin apparently reached its wits attendance record and Martin’s good faith; end when Williams disobeyed Lindsay’s direct otherwise, an employer could never discharge order not to leave work on April 24, 2000,

5 Williams failed to give reasonable notice to Martin of his need for leave as required by the FMLA. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(e)(2). 4 Williams twice missed work to take his 6 daughters to the dentist, but a dental appointment Martin was anything but a heartless employer. is not a “serious health condition” under the At Martin’s request, Lindsay once bailed Williams FMLA. 26 U.S.C. § 2601(11); see also 29 C.F.R. out of jail after he had been arrested outside of § 825.114(b). work for driving while intoxicated.

5 or even discipline an employee for good These exhibits came from Bass’s personnel reason in proximity to an allegedly protected files. Martin used these five exhibits to act. counter Williams’s claims of racial discrimination. The exhibits show that Martin V. fired Bass, who is white, for a similar record of Williams appeals three procedural orders. absenteeism at roughly the same time it fired He contends that the district court improperly Williams, who is black. entered (1) an order dismissing his motion to strike and for sanctions as moot, (2) a pre-trial Williams complained in his motion, and order limiting the questions for trial to the Martin admits on appeal, that Williams did not FMLA claim, and (3) a protective order receive these documents during the initial restricting discovery of Martin’s employee per- discovery phase before the parties submitted sonnel files. We review each kind of order for their motions for summary judgment. Martin abuse of discretion.7 explains that it failed to produce these documents because of Bass’s unusually A. complicated employment history at Martin.9 Williams filed a motion to strike and for a Martin had hired and released Bass three finding of contempt and sanctions three days times, so Bass had three separate personnel before the district court entered summary files at Martin. Although Williams reviewed judgment. Accordingly, the court dismissed and receive documents from at least one of the motion to strike and for sanctions as moot. these files during discovery, he did not review Williams appeals the dismissal. and receive documents from all three files. Martin attributes this oversight to Williams primarily sought to strike five ex- inadvertence, which Williams does not dispute. hibits related to Samuel Bass’s employment at Martin, which exhibits were attached to The district court did not abuse its Martin’s motion for summary judgment.8 discretion by dismissing the motion as moot. The Bass exhibits did not prejudice Williams, because the court did not cite them in its 7 United States v. $9,041,598.68, 163 F.3d memorandum opinion, nor did it discuss Bass 238, 252 (5th Cir. 1998) (orders on motions to at all. Moreover, it is not as if Martin stood by strike and for sanctions); Rushing v. Kansas City and withheld evidence favorable to Williams. S. Ry., 185 F.3d 436, 509 (5th Cir. 1999) (pre-trial orders); Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics 8 Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 28 F.3d 1388, (...continued) 1394 (5th Cir. 1994) (protective orders). ation and hence has waived his claims on appeal related to these four employees. United States v. 8 Williams also complained about failure to pro- Thibodeaux, 211 F.3d 910, 912 (5th Cir. 2000). duce documents related to Keith McCain, Jared 9 Wittington, Terry Hazelton, and Patrick Clark, Martin did not have an opportunity to respond also employees of Martin. Martin explains, how- to Williams’s motion to strike, because the district ever, that Williams either received or had the op- court dismissed the motion as moot three days after portunity to inspect these documents if they ex- Williams filed it. Martin now responds to the isted. Williams does not controvert this explan- motion in its brief, and Williams does not (continued...) controvert its explanation.

6 The documents, after all, show that Martin did entered it, and we will not hear arguments or not discriminate against black employees who objections not presented to the district court. exercised their FMLA rights. Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1071 n.1 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc). We also note Williams, then, could not have used these that Martin briefed the racial discrimination documents to aid his case. Moreover, he was claims in its motion for summary judgment, so fully aware of Bass’s employment his- the summary judgment can be construed as a torySSWilliams stipulated, before moving for ruling on the racial discrimination claims as summary judgment, that Bass was a white em- well as the FMLA claim. ployee whom Martin fired in early 2000 for excessive absenteeism. C. In the early stages of discovery, Williams Finally, Williams had ample time to examine moved to compel inspection of Martin’s em- these documents or request further discovery ployee personnel files, and Martin moved for after receiving them. Martin filed its motion a protective order. The district court denied for summary judgment, with the Bass exhibits Williams’s motion and entered a protective attached, on January 31, 2002. Williams did order to limit discovery of the personnel files not file his response until March 8, and the to records of absenteeism and FMLA leave. discovery phase was not scheduled to end until Williams argues that this order impeded his April 7. Under these circumstances, any error discovery of relevant facts. was harmless. FED. R. CIV. P. 61; Tagupa v. Bd. of Dirs., 633 F.2d 1309, 1312 (9th Cir. The court did not abuse its discretion. Wil- 1980). liams apparently believes that he had an inviolable right to rummage through these B. files. Not so. Employee personnel files After a pre-trial conference, the district contain much irrelevant but sensitive and court entered an order limiting the questions potentially embarrassing information, for for trial to the FMLA claim. Williams argues example, alimony and child support that this order effectively dismissed his racial garnishment, tax records, and drug test results. discrimination claims without adequate notice Martin understandably wanted to protect its and an opportunity to respond. employees’ privacy rights against needless discovery. The court did not abuse its discretion. Rule 16, FED. R. CIV. P., vests particularly broad Williams asserts that the protective order authority in the district court to manage the prevented him from discovering relevant facts course of litigation with a pre-trial conference about the kinds of leave taken by employees, and order. Barrett v. Atl. Richfield Co., 95 but this information comes within the rubric of F.3d 375, 380 (5th Cir. 1996). The court had “absenteeism” in the order, and the record good reason to limit the questions for trial to shows that he received the information. In the FMLA claim, because the record contains short, the protective order judiciously balanced no evidence whatsoever of racial the privacy rights of Martin’s non-party discrimination. Furthermore, Williams never employees with Williams’s right to relevant objected to the pre-trial order after the court and needed information.

7 AFFIRMED.