Williams v. Pfiefer

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedJune 11, 2019
Docket1:19-cv-05016
StatusUnknown

This text of Williams v. Pfiefer (Williams v. Pfiefer) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Williams v. Pfiefer, (S.D.N.Y. 2019).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK LESTER WILLIAMS, Plaintiff, 19-CV-5016 (LLS) -against- ORDER TO AMEND JOSH PFEIFER, Defendant. LOUIS L. STANTON, United States District Judge: Plaintiff, appearing pro se, brings this action under the Court’s federal question jurisdiction, alleging that Defendant violated his rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. By order dated June 4, 2019, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within sixty days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint, or portion thereof, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474-75 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. A complaint states a claim for relief if the claim is plausible. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To review a complaint for plausibility, the Court accepts all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draws all reasonable inferences in the pleader’s favor. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). But the Court need not accept “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially legal conclusions. Id. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id BACKGROUND Plaintiff Lester Williams resides in the Bronx. Defendant, Josh Pfeifer, is Plaintiff’s landlord, and resides in Brooklyn. Plaintiff accuses Defendant of committing an “illegal

lockout,” and he seeks $5 million in damages. (ECF No. 2 ¶¶ III, IV.) Plaintiff asserts the following facts. In March 2017, Plaintiff was “awakened by a marshal,” who “began to change the locks” on Plaintiff’s apartment, and Plaintiff called the police. The police stopped “the movers and the marshal was nowhere to be found.” Plaintiff left to go to work, but upon his return, he discovered that the apartment “was cleaned out,” and his possessions were in a garbage truck. The eviction was unlawful, in part because Plaintiff’s name was not on the paperwork. Plaintiff called the police again, but none of his “explanations were being heard as [he] was already locked out of the apartment.” Plaintiff refused to leave, and an unknown person beat him so badly that he was hospitalized for five days. Plaintiff alleges that the person who assaulted him worked for Defendant. (Id. at 10.) Plaintiff went to the “tenant and landlord court” on 167th Street, but the clerk’s office supervisor “ripped up” Plaintiff’s paperwork and sent him to the court on 161st Street and Grand Concourse. A judge there stated that “she will not rule over another judge that [Plaintiff] was to

be a John Doe and told [him] to go to 60 Centre St.” As I proceeded the process I was told that I had to wait for a judge signature that was in a trial for 2 days. The secretary in the court said leave your paperwork and she’ll call me when the judge signs my paperwork, the two days passed by and I called the secretary, who apologized but told me they had lost my paperwork. I am no longer seeking incompetence at 60 Centre Street I have been now Seeking Justice at 500 Pearl Street. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that he “was on the phone with the special investigations unit reporting the problems of the police harassing and using Scare Tactics,” and that he was advised to “go down to their office and make the report,” but that he did not do so because he was “so scared to go due to [his] fear of the police.” (Id.) Plaintiff researched the apartment building on Acris.nyc.gov, and found that Veronica Guerrero had been appointed as referee “in the NYC registry,” and her address was shown to be 2777 Broadway. When Plaintiff went to that address, however, he was told that Guerrero “works at the clerk’s office” in the court on 167th Street. But the “only person working there by that name is the supervisor of the tenant landlord court Clerk’s Office Veronica Johnson.” (Id.) According to Plaintiff, Defendant and the courts are “in Cahoots and helping violate federal laws,” including the National Bank Act of 1863. (Id. at 11.) Plaintiff claims that “[b]anks cannot own property, so how did Mr. Pfeifer obtain this property, by some referee that does not exist by the name of Veronica Guerrero at the office of 2777 Broadway the office.” (Id.) DISCUSSION Because Plaintiff asserts that Defendant violated his constitutionally protected rights, the Court liberally construes the complaint as arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. A claim for relief under § 1983 must allege facts showing that each defendant acted under the color of a state “statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Private parties are therefore

not generally liable under the statute. Sykes v. Bank of America, 723 F.3d 399, 406 (2d Cir. 2013) (citing Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001)); see also Ciambriello v. Cnty. of Nassau, 292 F.3d 307, 323 (2d Cir. 2002) (“[T]he United States Constitution regulates only the Government, not private parties.”). The sole Defendant in this case is a private party who does not work for any state or other government body. Therefore, Plaintiff has not stated a claim against this defendant under § 1983. Moreover, the facts alleged do not give rise to any other federal claims.

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Bluebook (online)
Williams v. Pfiefer, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/williams-v-pfiefer-nysd-2019.