Williams v. Feldman

District Court, D. Nevada·Decided January 3, 2023·No. 2:22-cv-01675·Unknown

Opinion

JEWELL WILLIAMS, et al., Case No.: 2:22-cv-01675-APG-NJK

Plaintiffs Order (1) Granting the Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss, and (2) Denying the v. Plaintiffs’ Pending Motions

CARMELA FELDMAN, et al., [ECF Nos. 10, 14, 19, 21, 29, 37, 42, 45]

Defendants

The plaintiffs filed this lawsuit pro se, seemingly alleging that some of them were wrongfully evicted from the residence they were leasing. ECF Nos. 2 and 8. They later filed a “Complaint for Deprivation of Rights,” which is filled with nonsensical, quasi-legal jargon and requests some type of “birth certificates of participation or beneficial interest” and “custody without restriction to natural person acting absolute Trustee to” a Michigan State file. ECF No. 9 at 5-6. In total, the plaintiffs have filed three versions of a complaint, each of which adds parties and claims. This violates Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 15(a)(1) and (2), which allow a party to amend a pleading once; beyond that requires the permission of the court or the other parties. Because the Plaintiffs are proceeding pro se and I am dismissing the complaints, I will overlook this violation for now. The plaintiffs also moved for a preliminary injunction and a writ of attachment to restore them to occupancy of their residence and to force the defendants to secure the personal property that was removed from the residence. ECF Nos. 10, 45. Trying my best to liberally construe the complaints and motions, I interpret this case as an appeal of the Nevada state court’s eviction order. See, e.g., ECF No. 9 at 6 (The Plaintiffs demand “all Defendant(s) be ordered restoration and restitution for trespasses detailed in [their] Complaint” and motions.). The defendants include Atlas NV, LLC (the property manager that allegedly sought the eviction) and various local government entities and officials involved in the eviction process. The defendants now move to dismiss the case.1 ECF Nos. 14, 29, 37. The NLV Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 14)

The North Las Vegas Police Dept. and North Las Vegas Detention Center (NLV Defendants) move to dismiss because they are not legal entities that can be sued. ECF No. 14. The plaintiffs offer nothing to rebut that. See ECF No. 20. The Supreme Court of Nevada has ruled that a department of a municipal government cannot be sued in its own name. Wayment v. Holmes, 912 P.2d 816, 819 (Nev. 1996); see also Schneider v. Elko Cnty. Sheriff’s Dept., 17 F. Supp. 2d 1162, 1165 (D. Nev. 1998) (“under Nevada law the [Elko County] Sheriff’s Department lacks the capacity to be sued”). The North Las Vegas Police Dept. is not an independent legal entity that can be sued. And the North Las Vegas Detention Center is a building, not an entity. I therefore dismiss both of these defendants with prejudice, as the plaintiffs cannot maintain an action against them.

Defendant Atlas NV, LLC’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 29) Atlas NV, LLC is allegedly the property manager that orchestrated the plaintiffs’ wrongful eviction from the leased premises. The plaintiffs “request Atlas NV, LLC and all Defendant(s) be ordered restoration and restitution for trespasses detailed in [their] Complaint” and motions. ECF No. 9 at 6. The plaintiffs thus seek to overturn the state court’s eviction order and be restored to the premises. This relief is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

1 All of the defendants assert that they have not been properly served under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The plaintiffs have been granted extra time to show proof of service. ECF No. 44. Because this extension has not yet expired, and because I am dismissing the complaint for other reasons, I will not address the service issues in this order. “[U]nder what has come to be known as the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, lower federal courts are precluded from exercising appellate jurisdiction over final state-court judgments.” Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 463 (2006). Thus, the plaintiffs cannot appeal to this federal court to overturn the state court’s eviction order. Although the plaintiffs claim they “are in no

way attempting to seek [this federal] Court to reverse the judgment declared by the North Las Vegas Township Justice Court,” they request “a proper Judgment that will be used to support the recourse of the Order for Summary Eviction and Criminal Complaint initiated by the State of Nevada for Unlawful Reentry.” ECF No. 33 at 25. That is an appeal of the state court eviction order, which is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The relief the Plaintiffs seek must come from the state court. The Supreme Court of the United States has “warned that the lower courts have at times extended Rooker-Feldman far beyond the contours of the Rooker and Feldman cases . . . .” Lance, 546 U.S. at 464 (simplified). While the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is directly applicable here to bar the plaintiffs’ lawsuit, I will also analyze Atlas’ other grounds for dismissal out of an

abundance of caution. First, even liberally interpreting the complaints in favor of the plaintiffs, this court cannot exercise jurisdiction over this case. This court has two bases for jurisdiction: diversity of citizenship or a federal question. Diversity jurisdiction does not exist here because the plaintiffs and at least some of the defendants are Nevada residents. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (diversity jurisdiction exists when the parties are citizens of different states). Federal question jurisdiction does not exist because the plaintiffs’ complaints assert no federal statute or Constitutional provision as a basis for their claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question jurisdiction exists for “actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States”). The plaintiffs refer to federal statutes and the Constitution in their opposition to Atlas’ motion. ECF No. 33 at 6, 15-21. But those provisions are not mentioned in the complaints, and referring to them in opposition to the motion does not save it. Thus, this court lacks jurisdiction over this case. Even if jurisdiction exists, Atlas correctly points out that plaintiffs Aujene Jecole

Whorton, Isaiah Demoss, and Natasha Demoss lack standing to bring claims because they do not allege they were parties to the lease of the premises or otherwise had a protectible property interest in the residence. Gunny v. Allstate Ins. Co., 830 P.2d 1335, 1335–36 (Nev. 1992) (plaintiff lacked standing to sue because he had no contractual relationship with the defendant). Finally, the plaintiffs’ complaints (construing all three together) are confusing and fail to clearly state a claim for relief. The second amended complaint (ECF No. 9) is rife with gibberish and quasi-legal jargon that makes no sense. It is unclear what claims the plaintiffs are trying to assert, how each of the defendants injured the plaintiffs, and what damages are sought. Thus, I will dismiss the complaint. But because it may be possible for the plaintiffs to assert a claim over which this court would have jurisdiction, I will grant them leave to file another amended

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