Williams v. Dauphin County Prison

• Court: District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
• Decided: June 18, 2020
• Docket: 1:20-cv-00864
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

DALLAS WILLIAMS, : Plaintiff : : No. 1:20-cv-864 v. : : (Judge Rambo) DAUPHIN COUNTY PRISON, : Defendant :

MEMORANDUM On May 28, 2020, pro se Plaintiff Dallas Williams (“Plaintiff”), who is currently incarcerated at the Dauphin County Prison in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania (“DCP”), initiated the above-captioned action by filing a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 naming DCP as the sole Defendant. (Doc. No. 1.) Plaintiff has also filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. No. 2.) Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”),1 the Court will perform its mandatory screening of the complaint. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis and dismiss the complaint with leave to amend. I. BACKGROUND Plaintiff alleges that he has been at DCP for twenty-seven (27) months and has been “denied the chance to go outside the whole time.” (Doc. No. 1 at 2.) He

1 See The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (April 26, 1996). maintains that he had his vitamin D level checked and that his level was a 19.5, indicating a vitamin D deficiency. (Id. at 2-3.) As relief, Plaintiff asks to be moved

to a jail where he can receive “proper vitamin D” and for $150,000.00. (Id. at 3.) He also “would like for other inmates to not have to go through the same bone pains and muscle weakness [he has] been dealing with.” (Id.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD A. Screening and Dismissal of Prisoner Complaints Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, federal district courts must “review . . . a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or

officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). If a complaint “is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,” the Court must dismiss the complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). District courts

have a similar screening obligation with respect to actions filed by prisoners proceeding in forma pauperis and prisoners challenging prison conditions. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (“[T]he court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . is frivolous or malicious [or] fails to state

a claim on which relief may be granted . . . .”); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1) (“The Court shall on its own motion or on the motion of a party dismiss any action brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title . . . by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility if the court is satisfied that the action is frivolous, malicious, [or] fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”).

A complaint is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis either in law or fact. See Mitchell v. Horn, 381 F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989)). When deciding whether a complaint fails to state a claim

on which relief may be granted, district courts apply the standard governing motions to dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See, e.g., Smithson v. Koons, No. 15-01757, 2017 WL 3016165, at *3 (M.D. Pa. June 26, 2017) (“The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim

under § 1915A(b)(1), § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), or § 1997e(c)(1) is the same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”); Mitchell v. Dodrill, 696 F. Supp. 2d 454, 471 (M.D. Pa. 2010)

(explaining that when dismissing a complaint pursuant to § 1915A, “a court employs the motion to dismiss standard set forth under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”). To avoid dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), a civil complaint must set out “sufficient factual matter” to show that its claims are facially plausible. See Ashcroft

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009). The plausibility standard requires more than a mere possibility that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. “[W]here the well-pleaded facts

do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has not ‘show[n]’ – ‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). When evaluating the

plausibility of a complaint, the court accepts as true all factual allegations and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from those allegations, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; In re Ins. Brokerage

Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 314 (3d Cir. 2010). However, the court must not accept legal conclusions as true, and “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” will not survive a motion to dismiss. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007).

Based on this standard, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has identified the following steps that a district court must take when reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion: (1) identify the elements that a plaintiff must

plead to state a claim; (2) identify any conclusory allegations contained in the complaint that are “not entitled” to the assumption of truth; and (3) determine whether any “well-pleaded factual allegations” contained in the complaint “plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” See Santiago v. Warminster Twp.,

629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010). In addition, in the specific context of pro se prisoner litigation, a district court must be mindful that a document filed pro se is “to be liberally construed.” See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). A pro

se complaint, “however inartfully pleaded,” must be held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

B. Claims Filed Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Section 1983 is the vehicle by which private citizens may seek redress for violations of federal constitutional rights committed by state officials. See 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. The statute states, in pertinent part: Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.

Id. “Section 1983 is not a source of substantive rights,” but is merely a means through which “to vindicate violations of federal law committed by state actors.” See Pappas v. City of Lebanon, 331 F. Supp. 2d 311, 315 (M.D. Pa. 2004) (quoting Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284-85 (2002)). To state a cause of action under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) the conduct complained of was committed by persons acting under color of state law; and (2) the conduct violated a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. See Harvey v. Plains Twp. Police Dep’t, 421 F.3d 185, 189 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988)).

Moreover, for a § 1983 claim to survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must sufficiently allege that the defendant was personally involved in the act or acts that the plaintiff claims violated his rights. See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195,

1207 (3d Cir. 1988); Solan v. Ranck, 326 F. App’x 97, 100 (3d Cir. 2009). Therefore, supervisors cannot be liable under § 1983 on the traditional standard of respondeat superior. See Santiago, 629 F.3d at 128. Instead, there are two theories of supervisory liability that are applicable to § 1983 claims: (1) “a supervisor

may be personally liable under § 1983 if he or she participated in violating the plaintiff’s rights, directed others to violate them, or, as the person in charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced in his subordinates’ violations”; and (2) policymakers

may also be liable under § 1983 “if it is shown that such defendants, ‘with deliberate indifference to the consequences, established and maintained a policy, practice or custom which directly caused [the] constitutional harm.’” See A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne Cty. Juvenile Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir. 2004).

III. DISCUSSION A. Plaintiff’s Complaint As an initial matter, Plaintiff’s complaint is deficient because it names DCP

as the sole Defendant. DCP is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983. See Vazquez v. Dauphin Cty. Prison, No. 1:19-cv-217, 2019 WL 2577381, at *3 (M.D. Pa. June 24, 2019) (“Only ‘persons’ are subject to suit under § 1983, and entities

such as the [Dauphin County Prison] do not qualify as persons.’”). For that reason alone, Plaintiff’s complaint is subject to dismissal. As noted above, Plaintiff alleges that he has been denied outdoor recreation

during his twenty-seven (27) months of incarceration at DCP, leading to a vitamin D deficiency. (Doc. No. 1 at 2-3.) The Court construes Plaintiff’s complaint as raising a conditions of confinement claim. The Eighth Amendment governs claims brought by convicted inmates challenging their conditions of confinement, whereas

the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment governs claims brought by pretrial detainees. Hubbard v. Taylor (Hubbard I), 399 F.3d 150, 166 (3d Cir. 2005). Because Plaintiff’s status during his incarceration is not clear from his complaint,

the Court will analyze his claim under both amendments. To establish an Eighth Amendment violation based on conditions of confinement, a prisoner must allege that prison officials’ acts or omissions denied him “the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452

U.S. 337, 347 (1981). He must also allege that those officials acted with deliberate indifference. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994). To establish a Fourteenth Amendment violation, a prisoner must allege that the conditions of

confinement amount to punishment. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 538 (1979). That inquiry generally turns on whether the conditions have a purpose other than punishment and whether the conditions are excessive in relation to that purpose. See

id. at 538-39; Hubbard I, 399 F.3d at 158. In making this assessment, a court should consider the totality of the circumstances. See Hubbard v. Taylor (Hubbard II), 538 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2008); Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 67 (3d Cir. 1996).

The Court recognizes that “meaningful recreation ‘is extremely important to the psychological and physical well-being of . . . inmates.’” Peterkin v. Jeffes, 855 F.2d 1021, 1031 (3d Cir. 1988) (quoting Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 199 (9th Cir. 1979)). Nothing in Plaintiff’s complaint, however, suggests that the inability to

go outside during his incarceration at DCP amounts to punishment. Moreover, given Plaintiff’s failure to name any individual staff members at DCP as defendants, he has not alleged that officials acted with deliberate indifference. Without more, the

Court cannot proceed on Plaintiff’s complaint as pled. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.2

2 While unclear, Plaintiff may also be asserting that he did not receive adequate medical care for his vitamin D deficiency. In the context of deficiencies in medical care, an inmate’s rights are violated under either the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment if a prison official acts with deliberate indifference to an inmate’s serious medical needs. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994); Goode v. Giorla, 643 F. App’x 127, 129 n.3d (3d Cir. 2016). “The official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Plaintiff, however, has not alleged any facts suggesting that he was denied medical care, and, as discussed above, he cannot proceed against DCP, the sole named Defendant. Accordingly, to the extent he raises a claim regarding the denial of adequate medical care, he cannot proceed on such a claim at this time. B. Leave to Amend Courts are cautioned that because of the liberal pleading standard, a plaintiff

should generally be granted leave to amend before dismissing a claim that is merely deficient. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). The federal rules allow for liberal amendments in light of the “principle that the

purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits.” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962) (citations and internal quotations omitted). The Court may deny a motion to amend where there is “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments

previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [or] futility of the amendment.” Id. The Court must also determine that a proposed amendment would be futile if the complaint, as amended, would not

survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. In re NAHC, Inc. Sec. Litig., 306 F.3d 1314, 1332 (3d Cir. 2002). Here, it would be futile to permit Plaintiff to amend his claims against DCP. However, it is neither clear that amendment would be futile, nor is there any basis to believe that amendment would be inequitable, with

respect to Plaintiff’s claims concerning the lack of outdoor recreation and his vitamin D deficiency if he were to assert those claims against individual defendants. Accordingly, Plaintiff will be granted leave to file an amended complaint with

respect to those claims. IV. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant Plaintiff’s motion for leave to

proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. No. 2) and dismiss his complaint (Doc. No. 1) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Plaintiff will be given leave to file an amended complaint with

respect to his claims concerning the lack of outdoor recreation and vitamin D deficiency to the extent he asserts those claims against individual staff members at DCP. An appropriate Order follows.

s/ Sylvia H. Rambo United States District Judge Dated: June 18, 2020