Williams, Jr. v. City of New York

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedJanuary 13, 2025
Docket1:24-cv-08075
StatusUnknown

This text of Williams, Jr. v. City of New York (Williams, Jr. v. City of New York) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Williams, Jr. v. City of New York, (S.D.N.Y. 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ALEXANDER WILLIAMS JR., Petitioner, 24-CV-8075 (LTS) -against- ORDER TO AMEND CITY OF NEW YORK, Respondent. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Petitioner, who is currently incarcerated at Sing Sing Correctional Facility, brings this pro se application challenging the execution of his sentence. Specifically, he argues that time spent in pretrial detention at Rikers Island was credited to his earlier 2013 sentence, rather than his current 2018 sentence. He seeks to have “his 15 month[s] of time served . . . returned to him.” (ECF 2 at 16.) These claims were originally included in a civil rights complaint, and District Judge Philip M. Halpern directed that Petitioner’s claims challenging the execution of sentence be severed and opened as a separate action. Williams v. New York State, No. 24-CV-4285 (PMH) (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2024) (ECF 7). This new action was opened on the docket on October 24, 2024, and the Court then directed Petitioner either to pay the filing fee or to submit an in forma pauperis (IFP) application. By order dated December 16, 2024, the Court granted Petitioner’s request to proceed in forma pauperis. As set forth below, the Court construes this application as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and directs Petitioner, within 60 days, to file an amended petition demonstrating exhaustion of his state court remedies. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus on “behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, the Court has the authority to review and dismiss a

§ 2254 petition without ordering a responsive pleading from the state, “[i]f it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court.” Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, Rule 4; see Acosta v. Artuz, 221 F.3d 117, 123 (2d Cir. 2000). The Court is obliged, however, to construe pro se pleadings liberally and interpret them “to raise the strongest arguments they suggest.” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original); see Green v. United States, 260 F.3d 78, 83 (2d Cir. 2001). BACKGROUND The following allegations are drawn from the petition. On March 14, 2018, while on post-release supervision (PRS) for a 2013 conviction, Petitioner was charged with a “cold case murder,” for an incident that had occurred on June 27, 2011.1 (ECF 1 at 3.) The New York State

Division of Parole did not charge Petitioner with a violation of PRS in connection with this arrest, because it was based on an incident in 2011, before he was on PRS. (Id.) Petitioner was in the custody of the New York City Department of Correction (DOC) from March 14, 2018, to September 8, 2023, when he was transferred to state prison to serve his current term of 25 years’ to life imprisonment. (Id. at 28.)

1 Petitioner states that, at the time of his arrest in 2018, he was serving a sentence of 4 1/2 years’ incarceration, plus three years’ post-release supervision, for his 2013 conviction. Petitioner attaches a DOC letter stating that, of the time that Plaintiff had been detained in DOC custody on Rikers Island, 410 days had been “claimed by NYS DOCCS toward [Plaintiff’s] previous sentence served under DIN#13A1666.” (ECF 2 at 28.) The DOC states that it relied on N.Y. State Penal Law § 70.30(3), which provides that a jail-time certificate cannot

include time credited against the maximum term of a previous sentence or post-release supervision. The DOC letter indicates that additional questions should be addressed to the NYS DOCCS Office of Sentencing Review. Petitioner contends that the City of New York has a policy or custom of “taking” time served, without notice or an opportunity to be heard, allegedly in violation of his right to Due Process. DISCUSSION I. Recharacterization as a Section 2254 petition Petitioner challenges the execution of his state sentence, and the Court therefore concludes that this application should be construed as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Cook v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 321 F.3d 274, 278–79 (2d Cir. 2003). If Petitioner does not wish to pursue relief under Section 2254, he may notify the Court in

writing within 60 days that he wishes to withdraw the application. Id. at 282. II. Exhaustion of State Court Remedies A state prisoner must exhaust all available state remedies before filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under Section 2254. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b); see Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 510 (1982). This exhaustion doctrine means that the state courts must be given the first opportunity to review constitutional errors associated with Petitioner’s confinement. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 844-45 (1999). A petitioner may satisfy the exhaustion requirement by fairly presenting his claims through a state’s established appellate review process. Id. “A petitioner has ‘fairly presented’ his claim only if he has ‘informed the state court of both the factual and legal premises of the claim he asserts in federal court.’” Dorsey v. Kelly, 112 F.3d 50, 52 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoting Daye v. Attorney General, 696 F.2d 186, 191 (2d Cir. 1982)). To exhaust his claims based on the execution of his sentence, Petitioner must first challenge the decision administratively with DOCCS, and then file in state court a petition under

Article 78 of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules. See, e.g., Wells v. Annucci, No. 19-CV- 3841 (LLS), 2019 WL 2209226, at *3 (S.D.N.Y., May 21, 2019) (holding that to “exhaust the execution of a sentence, after challenging the decision administratively with DOCCS, Petitioner must file an Article 78 petition under New York Civil Practice Law and Rules.” (citing Velez v. Annucci, No. 10-CV-1485 (JKS), 2014 WL 316748, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2014)); Castro v. Rivera, 69 A.D.3d 1000, 1000, (2010) (converting habeas corpus proceeding challenging sentence computation to an Article 78 proceeding).2 In order to fully exhaust state court review, Petitioner must then appeal any adverse ruling on the Article 78 petition to the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division. See Wells, 2019 WL 2209226, at *3; Castro, 69 A.D.3d at 1000. Should the Appellate Division affirm the decision, Petitioner must then seek leave to

appeal from the New York Court of Appeals.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Coppedge v. United States
369 U.S. 438 (Supreme Court, 1962)
Rose v. Lundy
455 U.S. 509 (Supreme Court, 1982)
O'Sullivan v. Boerckel
526 U.S. 838 (Supreme Court, 1999)
Bottom v. Goord
756 N.E.2d 55 (New York Court of Appeals, 2001)
Castro v. Rivera
69 A.D.3d 1000 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2010)
People ex rel. Gonzalez v. Smith
104 A.D.2d 725 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1984)
Acosta v. Artuz
221 F.3d 117 (Second Circuit, 2000)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Williams, Jr. v. City of New York, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/williams-jr-v-city-of-new-york-nysd-2025.