MAGILL, Circuit Judge.
William E. Roe appeals the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration’s (Commissioner) decision denying him disability benefits. Roe contends that the administrative law judge (ALJ) improperly failed to precisely state Roe’s mental condition when posing a hypothetical question to a vocational expert. We disagree and affirm.
I.
Roe was bom on November 14, 1941, in Davenport, Iowa. He attended school until eighth grade when he was expelled. Roe completed his General Equivalency Diploma while in the navy. Following his military service, Roe worked in a variety of jobs.
On June 11, 1990, at the age of forty-eight years, Roe filed applications under the Social Security Act for supplemental security income, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1383d, and disability insurance benefits, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-433. Roe claimed he became disabled on August 2, 1989, due to chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, asthma, a degenerative knee condition, and high blood pressure. The Commissioner initially denied Roe disability benefits on August 1, 1990. On March 29, 1994, after several administrative appeals, Roe had a second hearing before an ALJ.
[674]*674The ALJ evaluated Roe’s claim according to the five-step analysis prescribed by the Social Security Regulations. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b)-(f) (1990).1 At step four, the ALJ determines the nature of Roe’s past relevant work and evaluates whether Roe is capable of performing this work in light of his residual functional capacity. If the claimant is found to be sufficiently able to perform any of his past relevant work, he is not considered to be disabled and, therefore, ineligible for benefits. See Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 471, 106 S.Ct. 2022, 2025, 90 L.Ed.2d 462 (1986).
In determining whether Roe could perform his past relevant work, the ALJ considered work that Roe had performed over the past fifteen years that lasted long enough for Roe to learn to do the work and that constituted a substantial gainful activity. See Nimick v. Secretary of Health & Human Serv., 887 F.2d 864, 866 n. 3 (8th Cir.1989). Under this criteria, Roe’s past relevant work included positions as a garbage collector, a garbage collection driver, a janitor, a product assembler, a security guard, a yard worker, and a wooden toy assembler. Admin. Tr. at 15.
The ALJ also considered Roe’s residual functional capacity which is defined as “what [the claimant] can still do despite [his] limitations.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a) (1990). Assessing Roe’s residual functional capacity requires the ALJ to consider all of the relevant evidence to determine the claimant’s ability to meet certain mental, physical, sensory, and other demands of a job. Id. Based on the medical and psychological testimony presented at the hearing, as well as the testimony of Roe and his wife, the ALJ concluded that Roe possessed the residual functional capacity to:
perform work-related activities except for work involving lifting and carrying more than 20 pounds occasionally or 10 pounds frequently; standing or walking for more than one hour at a time; repetitive stooping, squatting, kneeling, crawling, or climbing; exposure to concentrations of dust, fumes, smoke, or extremes of heat, humidity, or cold; work which is very complex or technical in nature, though he can perform more than simple, routine, repetitive tasks which do not rely on written instruction or material; work which requires constant, close attention to detail; work which does not provide for occasional supervision; or work which must be performed faster than at a regular work pace.
Admin. Tr. at 27.
The ALJ posed a hypothetical question2 incorporating these limitations to a vocational [675]*675expert (VE), who responded that such an individual would be able to work as a janitor or as a security guard. Id. at 227. Based on the VE’s response and the other evidence presented at the hearing,3 the ALJ held that Roe was capable of past relevant work as a janitor or as a security guard.
Roe then sought review by the SSA Appeals Council, which was denied, leaving the ALJ’s decision as the final decision of the Commissioner. On August 19, 1994, Roe filed a complaint against the Commissioner in United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa. After briefing, the district court affirmed the Commissioner’s decision to deny Roe benefits. Roe now appeals.
II.
On appeal, Roe makes two arguments concerning the hypothetical question. First, Roe argues that the hypothetical failed to precisely state all of Roe’s relevant conditions and, therefore, the response elicited from the VE cannot be considered substantial evidence. Roe also argues that, given the particular phrasing of the ALJ’s hypothetical question, the VE could only answer in the affirmative.
In reviewing the decision of the ALJ, we must affirm if it is supported by substantial evidence based on the record as a whole. Smith v. Shalala, 31 F.3d 715, 717 (8th Cir.1994); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence “is less than a preponderance, but enough so that a reasonable mind might find it adequate to support the conclusion.” Oberst v. Shalala, 2 F.3d 249, 250 (8th Cir.1993). Thus, “[w]e do not reweigh the evidence or review the factual record de novo.” Naber v. Shalala, 22 F.3d 186, 188 (8th Cir.1994). Rather, “‘if it is possible to draw two inconsistent positions from the evidence and one of those positions represents the agency’s findings, we must affirm the decision.’ ” Oberst, 2 F.3d at 250 (quoting Robinson v. Sullivan, 956 F.2d 836, 838 (8th Cir.1992)).
Testimony from a VE based on a properly-phrased hypothetical question constitutes substantial evidence. See Cruze v. Chater, 85 F.3d 1320, 1323 (8th Cir.1996); cf. Hinchey v. Shalala, 29 F.3d 428
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MAGILL, Circuit Judge.
William E. Roe appeals the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration’s (Commissioner) decision denying him disability benefits. Roe contends that the administrative law judge (ALJ) improperly failed to precisely state Roe’s mental condition when posing a hypothetical question to a vocational expert. We disagree and affirm.
I.
Roe was bom on November 14, 1941, in Davenport, Iowa. He attended school until eighth grade when he was expelled. Roe completed his General Equivalency Diploma while in the navy. Following his military service, Roe worked in a variety of jobs.
On June 11, 1990, at the age of forty-eight years, Roe filed applications under the Social Security Act for supplemental security income, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1383d, and disability insurance benefits, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-433. Roe claimed he became disabled on August 2, 1989, due to chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, asthma, a degenerative knee condition, and high blood pressure. The Commissioner initially denied Roe disability benefits on August 1, 1990. On March 29, 1994, after several administrative appeals, Roe had a second hearing before an ALJ.
[674]*674The ALJ evaluated Roe’s claim according to the five-step analysis prescribed by the Social Security Regulations. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b)-(f) (1990).1 At step four, the ALJ determines the nature of Roe’s past relevant work and evaluates whether Roe is capable of performing this work in light of his residual functional capacity. If the claimant is found to be sufficiently able to perform any of his past relevant work, he is not considered to be disabled and, therefore, ineligible for benefits. See Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 471, 106 S.Ct. 2022, 2025, 90 L.Ed.2d 462 (1986).
In determining whether Roe could perform his past relevant work, the ALJ considered work that Roe had performed over the past fifteen years that lasted long enough for Roe to learn to do the work and that constituted a substantial gainful activity. See Nimick v. Secretary of Health & Human Serv., 887 F.2d 864, 866 n. 3 (8th Cir.1989). Under this criteria, Roe’s past relevant work included positions as a garbage collector, a garbage collection driver, a janitor, a product assembler, a security guard, a yard worker, and a wooden toy assembler. Admin. Tr. at 15.
The ALJ also considered Roe’s residual functional capacity which is defined as “what [the claimant] can still do despite [his] limitations.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a) (1990). Assessing Roe’s residual functional capacity requires the ALJ to consider all of the relevant evidence to determine the claimant’s ability to meet certain mental, physical, sensory, and other demands of a job. Id. Based on the medical and psychological testimony presented at the hearing, as well as the testimony of Roe and his wife, the ALJ concluded that Roe possessed the residual functional capacity to:
perform work-related activities except for work involving lifting and carrying more than 20 pounds occasionally or 10 pounds frequently; standing or walking for more than one hour at a time; repetitive stooping, squatting, kneeling, crawling, or climbing; exposure to concentrations of dust, fumes, smoke, or extremes of heat, humidity, or cold; work which is very complex or technical in nature, though he can perform more than simple, routine, repetitive tasks which do not rely on written instruction or material; work which requires constant, close attention to detail; work which does not provide for occasional supervision; or work which must be performed faster than at a regular work pace.
Admin. Tr. at 27.
The ALJ posed a hypothetical question2 incorporating these limitations to a vocational [675]*675expert (VE), who responded that such an individual would be able to work as a janitor or as a security guard. Id. at 227. Based on the VE’s response and the other evidence presented at the hearing,3 the ALJ held that Roe was capable of past relevant work as a janitor or as a security guard.
Roe then sought review by the SSA Appeals Council, which was denied, leaving the ALJ’s decision as the final decision of the Commissioner. On August 19, 1994, Roe filed a complaint against the Commissioner in United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa. After briefing, the district court affirmed the Commissioner’s decision to deny Roe benefits. Roe now appeals.
II.
On appeal, Roe makes two arguments concerning the hypothetical question. First, Roe argues that the hypothetical failed to precisely state all of Roe’s relevant conditions and, therefore, the response elicited from the VE cannot be considered substantial evidence. Roe also argues that, given the particular phrasing of the ALJ’s hypothetical question, the VE could only answer in the affirmative.
In reviewing the decision of the ALJ, we must affirm if it is supported by substantial evidence based on the record as a whole. Smith v. Shalala, 31 F.3d 715, 717 (8th Cir.1994); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence “is less than a preponderance, but enough so that a reasonable mind might find it adequate to support the conclusion.” Oberst v. Shalala, 2 F.3d 249, 250 (8th Cir.1993). Thus, “[w]e do not reweigh the evidence or review the factual record de novo.” Naber v. Shalala, 22 F.3d 186, 188 (8th Cir.1994). Rather, “‘if it is possible to draw two inconsistent positions from the evidence and one of those positions represents the agency’s findings, we must affirm the decision.’ ” Oberst, 2 F.3d at 250 (quoting Robinson v. Sullivan, 956 F.2d 836, 838 (8th Cir.1992)).
Testimony from a VE based on a properly-phrased hypothetical question constitutes substantial evidence. See Cruze v. Chater, 85 F.3d 1320, 1323 (8th Cir.1996); cf. Hinchey v. Shalala, 29 F.3d 428, 432 (8th Cir.1994) (when hypothetical question does not encompass all relevant impairments, VE’s testimony does not constitute substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s decision). The ALJ’s hypothetical question needs to “include only those impairments that the ALJ finds are substantially supported by the record as a whole.” Id. (citing Stout v. Shalala, 988 F.2d 853, 855 (8th Cir.1993)); see also Morse v. Shalala, 32 F.3d 1228, 1230 (8th Cir.1994). The testimony of a VE is required only when the claimant carries his initial burden of showing that he is incapable of performing past relevant work and the claimant has a nonexertional injury. Johnston v. Shalala, 42 F.3d 448, 452 (8th Cir.1994).
A.
The ALJ-found that Roe has several mental deficiencies. Admin. Tr. at 37. Roe has a remote history of bipolar disorder 4 marked by terms of hospitalization in 1971 and in 1978. Admin. Tr. at 27. He has dyslexia, which precludes his employment in jobs re[676]*676quiring use of written instructions or record of verbal or numeric information. He also has a somatoform disorder characterized by an unrealistic interpretation of physical signs and sensations associated with the preoccupation that he has a serious disease or injury.5 Admin. Tr. at 23-24.
As a result of these mental deficiencies, the ALJ found that Roe has two functional limitations. First, he often has deficiencies of concentration, persistence, or pace resulting in a failure to complete tasks in a timely manner. Second, Roe has experienced one or two episodes of deterioration or decom-pensation in work or work-like settings which cause him to withdraw from that situation or to experience exacerbated signs or symptoms. Admin. Tr. at 37.
In the hypothetical question at issue, the ALJ described Roe’s residual functional capacity to the VE and asked whether this level of impairment precluded the claimant from performing all of his previous jobs. Roe argues that in describing his residual functional capacity, the ALJ did not include all of Roe’s limitations. Roe notes that while the ALJ found that Roe often had deficiencies of concentration, persistence, or pace, the ALJ’s hypothetical failed to include these limitations.6 This omission, according to Roe, constitutes reversible error. We disagree.
The point of the hypothetical question is to clearly present to the VE a set of limitations that mirror those of the claimant. See Hogg v. Shalala, 45 F.3d 276, 279 (8th Cir.1995). While the hypothetical question must set forth all the claimant’s impairments, see Roberts v. Heckler, 783 F.2d 110,112 (8th Cir.1985), it need not use specific diagnostic or symptomatic terms where other descriptive terms can adequately define the claimant’s impairments. For example, the ALJ’s hypothetical does not state that Roe suffers from “patellofemoral chondromalacia.” Rather, it states that he suffers from “degenerative changes of the knees” which preclude him from “standing or walking for more than one hour at a time.” By eschewing the medical term for the descriptive term, the ALJ made a clearer statement of the limitations caused by Roe’s weak knees.
? the ALJ’s hypothetical question does not include the phrase “deficiencies of concentration, persistence, or pace,” it does explicitly state both the mental conditions that cause these deficiencies and the concrete consequences that flow from them. The hypothetical states that the individual has “bipolar affective disorder, low average intelligence, developmental dyslexia, history of conversion reaction, and medically determinable disorders.” It is precisely because Roe has a bipolar affective disorder, developmental dyslexia, and a history of conversion reaction that he has problems with his “concentration, persistence, or pace.” The hypothetical also states the practical ramifications that flow from his problem with “concentration, persistence, or pace.” According to the hypothetical, the individual is not capable of work “requiring constant, close attention to [677]*677detail,” that he requires “occasional supervision,” and that he is not capable of work “at more than a regular pace.”7 These phrases capture the concrete consequences of Roe’s “deficiencies of concentration, persistence, and pace” and sufficiently present Roe’s disabilities to the VE.
B.
Roe also argues that the ALJ’s hypothetical question was phrased in such a way that the VE could give but one answer. In the hypothetical, the ALJ stated that “he is not able to do very complex or technical work, but is able to do more than simple, routine, repetitive work.” Roe argues that the assumption that he is able to do more than simple, routine, repetitive work “led the ALJ to effectively ask the vocational expert that, assuming Mr. Roe could work, could he work?” Reply Br. at 4.
We disagree. The phrase that Roe has picked out from the hypothetical refers to the type of work that Roe is mentally capable of performing. But to say that Roe is mentally capable of a certain level of work is not to direct the VE to find that, overall, Roe has the ability to perform a job. The word “work” is not synonymous with “job.” The hypothetical leaves it to the VE to determine whether, in light of Roe’s physical and mental abilities, he can perform any job he previously held.
C.
Construing Roe’s claim more generally to argue that the ALJ understated the severity of Roe’s physical and mental deficiencies, we also disagree. There is substantial evidence that. indicates that Roe was quite capable of performing a past relevant job.
In 1991, Dr. Timothy J. Murphy conducted psychological evaluations of Roe. Dr. Murphy concluded that while Roe had mental limitations, he was capable of performing fairly simple tasks and understanding, remembering, and carrying out simple instructions and procedures. Later, in 1992, Dr. Nils Varney performed a second psychological evaluation of Roe. The conclusions were similar. Roe was only moderately limited in his ability to sustain an ordinary routine without special supervision, work in coordination with or proximity to others without undue distraction, accept instruction and respond appropriately to criticism, and get along with coworkers.
Aside from his mental deficiencies, Roe has a number of physical infirmities. Roe has a mild degenerative knee condition for which physicians recommended that he avoid standing for prolonged periods as well as squatting, kneeling, climbing, and heavy lifting. Roe also has mild bronchial asthma which he has controlled by using a bronchial dialator, quitting smoking, and avoiding environmental irritants. Roe has also been diagnosed with hypertension which has been successfully treated with medication.
More telling than a chronicle of Roe’s various ailments are his actual activities, which are incongruous with his contention that he cannot work. Since his declared date of disability, Roe has worked at a lumber yard installing dry wall, at a machine and tool company where his duties included inventorying merchandise and using a hack saw cutter, and at a cleaning service where he was responsible for vacuuming and trash disposal. Roe testified that currently he spends the majority of his time woodworking. As the ALJ noted, this hobby requires him to adhere to a self-imposed work schedule and concentrate enough to draw and cut patterns and assemble the product. Admin. Tr. at 12. Roe testified that he could work eight hours a day, five days a week on his woodworking projects, but would have problems with his output level. Id. at 195. In addition to his woodworking, Roe does housework, including washing the dishes, hanging out the laundry, taking out the trash, and odd repair jobs. He shovels snow and mows his lawn as well [678]*678as the lawns of ten other residents of his trailer park..
This evidence, especially the fact that Roe maintains a very active schedule, is ample support for the ALJ’s determination that Roe is able to perform past relevant work as a janitor or a security guard and should not receive disability benefits.8 See Cruze, 85 F.3d at 1324-26 (evidence of hobbies and other daily activities demonstrates that claimant was not disabled); cf. Harris v. Secretary of DHHS, 959 F.2d 723, 726 (8th Cir.1992) (although evidence of daily activities does not, in and of itself, constitute substantial evidence, they may be considered by the ALJ).
III.
In sum, we hold that the ALJ’s decision that Roe is not disabled and can return to his past relevant work is supported by substantial evidence found in the record as a whole. We reject Roe’s argument that the hypothetical question posed to the VE by the ALJ was flawed.