HUG, Circuit Judge:
This is an action brought by the appellant, William Fisher, alleging that the City of Tucson, Arizona violated section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 in failing to hire him as an industrial electronics technician. Section 503 mandates that “[a]ny contract in excess of $2,500 entered into by any Federal department or agency . . . contain a provision requiring that, in employing persons to carry out such contract the party contracting with the United States shall take affirmative action to employ and advance in employment qualified handicapped individuals.” 29 U.S.C. § 793(a).1 Fisher, who suffers from a physical handicap, argues that the City of Tucson violated section 503, first by discriminating against him on the basis of his handicap, and second by failing to fulfill its contractual obligation to take affirmative action to employ qualified handicapped individuals.
Section 503 does not expressly provide that its provisions may be enforced through a private right of action. Rather, the statute provides that a handicapped individual who believes that a government contractor has failed to comply with its provisions may file a complaint with the Department of Labor. 29 U.S.C. § 793(b).2 The district court, finding that an implied private right of action did not exist under section 503, dismissed Fisher’s complaint for failure to state a claim. Thus the sole issue before us on appeal is whether we may find an implied right of action in section 503. Because we find insufficient legislative intent to create a private right of action to enforce the mandates of section 503, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
I
Facts
For purposes of this appeal, we must assume the truth of the facts alleged in Fisher’s amended complaint. The complaint states that Fisher has considerable educational and practical experience in the field of electronics. He received the highest score on a civil service test administered by the City of Tucson (the “City”) for the position of “industrial electronics technician 1, ” and was subsequently invited, with two other persons, to a final interview. During his interview, Fisher told officials that he had a lower back injury, for which treat-[863]*863merit was required. One of the other applicants was hired. The complaint states that Fisher was told that he was denied employment due to his physical disability. Fisher claims that he is well-qualified for the job and physically capable of performing it.
Shortly thereafter, Fisher filed a complaint with the Department of Labor (“DOL”). The DOL investigated the complaint and determined that Fisher was a “handicapped individual” within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 706(7) and that the City was a federal contractor within the definition of section 503, but that the City had not violated section 503 in refusing to hire Fisher. The DOL determined that no further action on Fisher’s complaint was warranted.3 Fisher then instituted this proceeding.
II
Analysis
The Supreme Court has stated that four factors are relevant in determining whether a private right of action may be implied to enforce the provisions of a statute which does not expressly provide such a right:
First, is the plaintiff “one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted,” — that is, does the statute create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one? Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff? And finally, is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern of the States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law?
Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78, 95 S.Ct. 2080, 2088, 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975) (citations omitted). In a more recent case, the Court has emphasized that in applying the Cort v. Ash analysis, the ultimate issue remains “whether Congress intended to create a private right of action.” State of California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 293, 101 S.Ct. 1775, 1779, 68 L.Ed.2d 101, 107 (1981). It cannot be overemphasized that the “ultimate question is one of congressional intent, not one of whether this Court thinks that it can improve upon the statutory scheme that Congress enacted into law.” Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 578, 99 S.Ct. 2479, 2490, 61 L.Ed.2d 82 (1979). We examine the Cort v. Ash factors, then, in an attempt to determine from the statute and the circumstances surrounding its enactment whether Congress intended to create a private right of action.
A. Is the plaintiff one for whose benefit the statute was enacted?
In California v. Sierra Club, the Court emphasized that the first Cort v. Ash factor requires not only a consideration of whether the plaintiff is a member of the class for whose benefit the statute was enacted, but also whether “Congress intended to confer federal rights upon those beneficiaries.” 451 U.S. at 294, 101 S.Ct. at 1779, 68 L.Ed.2d at 108. Otherwise, the Court stated, any crime victim “would be deemed an especial beneficiary of the criminal statute’s proscription.” Id. 451 U.S. at 294, 101 S.Ct. at 1779, at 107.
In Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 611 F.2d 1074 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 889, 101 S.Ct. 246, 66 L.Ed.2d 115 (1980), in which a divided panel of the Fifth Circuit concluded that section 503 does not create a private right of action, the court found that the statute did not confer a right in favor of handicapped individuals. Id. at 1079-80. While we agree with the Fifth Circuit’s ultimate conclusion that section 503 does not create a private right of action, we do find that the statute creates a federal right on behalf of the protected class. Clearly the statute was intended to benefit handicapped persons. The statute also provides that any handicapped individual who be[864]*864lieves that a contractor is not in compliance with his contract may file a complaint with the DOL, which has investigatory and enforcement powers. 29 U.S.C. § 793(b).4 It seems apparent that Congress did intend to confer some federal rights on handicapped individuals. However, the fact that these rights were conferred on handicapped individuals does not necessarily lead us to conclude that Congress intended to create a private right of action to enforce them. To the contrary, Congress could well have intended to limit the exercise of these rights to the context of the administrative enforcement scheme.
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HUG, Circuit Judge:
This is an action brought by the appellant, William Fisher, alleging that the City of Tucson, Arizona violated section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 in failing to hire him as an industrial electronics technician. Section 503 mandates that “[a]ny contract in excess of $2,500 entered into by any Federal department or agency . . . contain a provision requiring that, in employing persons to carry out such contract the party contracting with the United States shall take affirmative action to employ and advance in employment qualified handicapped individuals.” 29 U.S.C. § 793(a).1 Fisher, who suffers from a physical handicap, argues that the City of Tucson violated section 503, first by discriminating against him on the basis of his handicap, and second by failing to fulfill its contractual obligation to take affirmative action to employ qualified handicapped individuals.
Section 503 does not expressly provide that its provisions may be enforced through a private right of action. Rather, the statute provides that a handicapped individual who believes that a government contractor has failed to comply with its provisions may file a complaint with the Department of Labor. 29 U.S.C. § 793(b).2 The district court, finding that an implied private right of action did not exist under section 503, dismissed Fisher’s complaint for failure to state a claim. Thus the sole issue before us on appeal is whether we may find an implied right of action in section 503. Because we find insufficient legislative intent to create a private right of action to enforce the mandates of section 503, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
I
Facts
For purposes of this appeal, we must assume the truth of the facts alleged in Fisher’s amended complaint. The complaint states that Fisher has considerable educational and practical experience in the field of electronics. He received the highest score on a civil service test administered by the City of Tucson (the “City”) for the position of “industrial electronics technician 1, ” and was subsequently invited, with two other persons, to a final interview. During his interview, Fisher told officials that he had a lower back injury, for which treat-[863]*863merit was required. One of the other applicants was hired. The complaint states that Fisher was told that he was denied employment due to his physical disability. Fisher claims that he is well-qualified for the job and physically capable of performing it.
Shortly thereafter, Fisher filed a complaint with the Department of Labor (“DOL”). The DOL investigated the complaint and determined that Fisher was a “handicapped individual” within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 706(7) and that the City was a federal contractor within the definition of section 503, but that the City had not violated section 503 in refusing to hire Fisher. The DOL determined that no further action on Fisher’s complaint was warranted.3 Fisher then instituted this proceeding.
II
Analysis
The Supreme Court has stated that four factors are relevant in determining whether a private right of action may be implied to enforce the provisions of a statute which does not expressly provide such a right:
First, is the plaintiff “one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted,” — that is, does the statute create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one? Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff? And finally, is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern of the States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law?
Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78, 95 S.Ct. 2080, 2088, 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975) (citations omitted). In a more recent case, the Court has emphasized that in applying the Cort v. Ash analysis, the ultimate issue remains “whether Congress intended to create a private right of action.” State of California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 293, 101 S.Ct. 1775, 1779, 68 L.Ed.2d 101, 107 (1981). It cannot be overemphasized that the “ultimate question is one of congressional intent, not one of whether this Court thinks that it can improve upon the statutory scheme that Congress enacted into law.” Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 578, 99 S.Ct. 2479, 2490, 61 L.Ed.2d 82 (1979). We examine the Cort v. Ash factors, then, in an attempt to determine from the statute and the circumstances surrounding its enactment whether Congress intended to create a private right of action.
A. Is the plaintiff one for whose benefit the statute was enacted?
In California v. Sierra Club, the Court emphasized that the first Cort v. Ash factor requires not only a consideration of whether the plaintiff is a member of the class for whose benefit the statute was enacted, but also whether “Congress intended to confer federal rights upon those beneficiaries.” 451 U.S. at 294, 101 S.Ct. at 1779, 68 L.Ed.2d at 108. Otherwise, the Court stated, any crime victim “would be deemed an especial beneficiary of the criminal statute’s proscription.” Id. 451 U.S. at 294, 101 S.Ct. at 1779, at 107.
In Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 611 F.2d 1074 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 889, 101 S.Ct. 246, 66 L.Ed.2d 115 (1980), in which a divided panel of the Fifth Circuit concluded that section 503 does not create a private right of action, the court found that the statute did not confer a right in favor of handicapped individuals. Id. at 1079-80. While we agree with the Fifth Circuit’s ultimate conclusion that section 503 does not create a private right of action, we do find that the statute creates a federal right on behalf of the protected class. Clearly the statute was intended to benefit handicapped persons. The statute also provides that any handicapped individual who be[864]*864lieves that a contractor is not in compliance with his contract may file a complaint with the DOL, which has investigatory and enforcement powers. 29 U.S.C. § 793(b).4 It seems apparent that Congress did intend to confer some federal rights on handicapped individuals. However, the fact that these rights were conferred on handicapped individuals does not necessarily lead us to conclude that Congress intended to create a private right of action to enforce them. To the contrary, Congress could well have intended to limit the exercise of these rights to the context of the administrative enforcement scheme. The question whether Congress did so limit the exercise of these rights is resolved through an examination of the second and third Cort v. Ash factors.
B. Expressions of Legislative Intent
1. The Statute
In attempting to determine whether Congress created a private right of action under Section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act, it is helpful to compare it to section 504 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794,5 which has been held to imply a private right of action. Kling v. County of Los Angeles, 633 F.2d 876 (9th Cir. 1980). Section 503 does not, on its face, prohibit discrimination against handicapped persons. Rather, it requires that certain employers who contract with the federal government take affirmative action to employ and promote qualified handicapped individuals. Section 504 of the Act, on the other hand, specifically prohibits discrimination against handicapped individuals in any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance.
To the extent that section 503 does not expressly prohibit discrimination against the handicapped, it is unlike both section 504 and Title IX, which the Supreme Court found in Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 99 S.Ct. 1946, 60 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), to have created an implied right of action. Significantly, the Court stated in Cannon that “[t]here would be far less reason to infer a private remedy in favor of individual persons if Congress, instead of drafting Title IX with an unmistakable focus on the benefited class, had written it simply as a ban on discriminatory conduct by recipients of federal funds- or as a prohibition against the disbursement of public funds to educational institutions engaged in discriminatory practices.” Id. at 690-93, 99 5. Ct. at 1954-56 (footnote omitted). While Cannon does not require us to find this consideration determinative in the instant case, clearly section 503, unlike section 504, is similar to the hypothetical statutes distinguished from Title IX by the Court in Cannon.
A consideration of perhaps even greater significance here is that Congress has not expressly made discrimination against handicapped individuals unlawful in section 503, but rather has mandated that contractors discriminate in favor of handicapped individuals by implementing affirmative action programs. It is no doubt true that the affirmative action requirement impliedly mandates that contractors not discriminate against the handicapped. In addition, regulations promulgated pursuant to section 503 require that the contractor agree not to discriminate against handicapped persons.6 At the same time, the affirmative action [865]*865requirement reflects congressional concern for the class, rather than the individual. The administrative remedy provision provides support for this interpretation in specifying that when a handicapped person believes that a contractor is not in compliance with the provision of his contract relating to the employment of handicapped individuals, he or she may file a complaint with the DOL. The Department presumably would then investigate the contractor to determine whether an adequate affirmative action program is in force. It would be going substantially further for us to conclude that an individual may file a private action to force a contractor to discriminate in his favor.
For example, in this case Fisher has complained both that he has been discriminated against and that the City is not in compliance with the affirmative action clause. It is unclear how we might find an implied right of action to enforce the nondiscrimination component of section 503, and not find the same right to enforce the affirmative action component, especially in light of the fact that discrimination is not even expressly prohibited by the statute. We are aware of no situation in which Congress has expressly created a private right of action in favor of individuals to enforce an affirmative action law. It seems to us we would be venturing too far into the legislative domain to find that Congress created such a right by implication. In addition, in the absence of congressional guidance, many questions regarding such a right of action are unanswered. Would the aggrieved party sue the contractor for failing to implement a program, or the United States for failing to adequately supervise the contractor? Would the individual seek personal relief or, instead, a court order that the affirmative action plan be implemented? Finally, the plain language of the statute reflects that Congress left the supervision of contract compliance with the DOL.7 These factors all lead to the conclusion that Congress did not intend to create a private right of action to enforce section 503.
2. Legislative History
A review of the pertinent legislative history of section 503 leaves us unable to conclude that Congress intended to create a private right of action. As is noted in both the majority and dissenting opinions in Rogers v. Frito-Lay, there was very little discussion of section 503 at the time of the statute’s enactment. Most of the debate at that time was focused on the spending provisions relating to other sections of the Act, although Senator Cranston did introduce a statement by Senator Humphrey to the effect that he believed that sections 503 and 504 would accomplish what he had earlier sought to achieve through amendments to Titles VI and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 118 Cong.Rec. 32310 (1972).
Congress amended the Act in 1974, but the amendment dealt principally with the definition of a handicapped individual, and did not relate to the substance of section 503 or 504. There was discussion in a conference report of the manner and means of the enforcement of these sections, although the primary was on section 504. See S.Conf.Rep. No. 93-1270, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 25-28 (1974). The report states that section 504 was patterned after Titles VI and IX, and that section 504 created a private right of action. In the same report, it is stated that sections 503 and 504 are to be administered in such a way that a consistent, uniform and effective federal approach to discrimination against the handicapped could result. In addition, Senator Stafford stated on the floor of the Senate that it was the intent of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare that the enforce[866]*866ment of sections 503 and 504 would be similar to that under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act and Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972. 120 Cong.Rec. 30551 (1974).
We find none of these statements decisive regarding section 503, however. A consistent, uniform approach to discrimination does not require that the statute be enforced through a private right of action. Similarly, the statement that the enforcement of sections 503 and 504 should be “similar to” that under Titles VI and IX falls short of giving a clear indication that a private remedy was intended.
In 1978 Congress gave a clear expression of its assumption that it had created a private right of action in enacting section 503 five years earlier through the addition of a new section, section 505, which provided that a prevailing party would be awarded attorney’s fees, at the trial court’s discretion, in any action to enforce the chapter. The Senate report specifically refers to the applicability of section 505 to section 503. S.Rep.No. 95-890, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1978), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1978, p. 7312. Senator Bayh and Senator Cranston both stated that it was their understanding that private suits were authorized under all of Title V. 124 Cong.Rec. S 15593 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1978).
As acknowledged by both the majority and dissenting opinions in Rogers v. Frito-Lay, the 1978 amendment and the circumstances surrounding its enactment give no evidence of congressional intent to amend section 503 to create a private right of action, but rather reflect Congress’s understanding or assumption that a private right of action had been created in 1973. The fact that many of those persons involved in enacting section 505 held this view lends credence to their interpretation of the statute.
However, while the interpretation of an Act of an earlier Congress by a later one “does shed some light on the intent of the enacting Congress,” it is clear that the interpretation “is not by any means dispositive.” Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 299-300, 99 S.Ct. 1705, 1716, 60 L.Ed.2d 208 (1979). While we give weight to the 1978 amendment, we do not find that it compels us to conclude that a private right of action was created when the statute was originally enacted. The' 1978 amendment and the circumstances surrounding its enactment are the only clear indications that a private right of action does exist under section 503. There is no other legislative history which clearly supports that conclusion. Notably absent is any indication that Congress intended to launch into a new area by providing a private right of action to enforce an affirmative action law. Nor is there an indication of how such a right would be enforced. Taken together, the express language of the statute and the legislative history surrounding the Act and its subsequent amendments lead us to conclude that Congress did not intend to create a private right of action when it enacted section 503.
C. Is a private remedy consistent with the underlying purpose of the legislative scheme?
In his dissent in Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Judge Goldberg argued that a private remedy would complement the administrative enforcement scheme. In support of his position, he cited the Department of Labor’s position that section 503 does imply a private right of action, and that the prospect of litigation would have the effect of promoting rather than hindering the Department’s enforcement efforts. 611 F.2d at 1102-1107. The majority in Rogers, on the other hand, found that “the provision of an express administrative remedy . . . creates at least some basis to conclude that a private right of action would be inconsistent with the purposes of the legislative scheme.” Id. at 1084.
In determining whether a private right of action would be consistent with the legislative scheme we consider both the presence of the administrative enforcement mechanism and the nature of section 503’s mandate: that contractors undertake affirmative action to employ and promote handi[867]*867capped individuals. We believe it is reasonable to conclude that Congress intended to leave the supervision of the affirmative action programs to the DOL. As we discussed above, it is unclear what role an individual would have in seeking to enforce the affirmative action provision in a private suit.
For example, in this case Fisher brought his suit after the Department found he was not qualified for the position with the City. Were we to find a private right of action implied in section 503, we would not be reviewing the agency determination. Rather, on remand, the district court presumably would have to hear evidence regarding both Fisher’s claim that he was discriminated against and his assertion that the City has failed to implement an affirmative action program. The first inquiry would constitute a duplication of the Department’s already-completed investigation; we question whether that result was intended by Congress. The second inquiry would require us to review the City’s affirmative action plan. Again, it seems reasonable to us that Congress meant what it said in enacting the statute — that this investigatory function was left to the Department. We thus conclude that a private right of action is inconsistent with the scheme provided by Congress. It is not the function of the court to consider whether the current enforcement mechanism is the best method to effectuate the purposes of the Act; our function is to determine the intent of Congress.
D. Is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law?
This area is clearly one of federal concern. Since the civil war, individual rights have been a primary concern of the federal government.
Ill
Conclusion
In summary, in determining whether Congress intended to create a private right of action, we have employed the framework of analysis suggested by the Supreme Court in Cort v. Ash. We find that in enacting section 503, Congress did intend to create federal rights on behalf of handicapped individuals and that the rights of the handicapped are properly the concern of the federal government. These findings are not determinative, however, regarding the question of whether Congress intended to provide a private right of action to enforce section 503, for they would be equally consistent with the conclusion that Congress meant to provide only the administrative enforcement scheme. Indeed, a consideration of the other two Cort v. Ash factors leads us to conclude that Congress did not intend to create a private right of action.
The statute does not, on its face, prohibit discrimination. Instead, it requires that contractors implement affirmative action programs. Further, Congress has provided an administrative enforcement scheme with which the exercise of a private right of action might well conflict. Finally, we are unable to discern a clear indication in the legislative history that Congress intended to create a private right of action. Under these circumstances, we decline to imply what Congress failed to expressly provide.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.