IN THE TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-16-00137-CR
WILL ROBERT CLAUD STEINMANN, Appellant v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
From the 13th District Court Navarro County, Texas Trial Court No. D35282-CR
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Will Robert Claud Steinmann was convicted of Indecency with a Child and
sentenced to 13 years in prison. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.11(a)(1) (West 2014).
Because there is no reversible error, but also because the parties agree to reform the trial
court’s judgment, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed as reformed.
BACKGROUND
Steinmann lived with Heather and her daughter, H.P. One morning, Steinmann woke up Heather to tell her he was having a dream about touching H.P. and found
himself actually touching H.P. H.P. confirmed that Steinmann inappropriately touched
her. After the police were contacted, an interview of H.P. was scheduled at the child
advocacy center. Steinmann encouraged Heather to have H.P. blame someone else for
the incident. On the way to the interview, Heather told H.P. to lie about who touched
her, which H.P. did. When Heather’s mother discovered what happened, she called the
police to schedule another interview of H.P. At this interview, H.P. revealed Steinmann
had touched her.
JAIL CALL RECORDING
Steinmann first complains that the trial court erred in admitting State’s Exhibit 2,
a recording of a jail call between Heather and Steinmann. On appeal, Steinmann
specifically contends that the parts of the conversation regarding Heather’s troubles with
her mother were irrelevant and hearsay and the probative value of those statements were
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. At trial, Steinmann
specifically pointed out parts of the call that were objectionable to him, and those
objectionable portions were redacted from the recording. Although he still objected to
the admission of the recording, after the redactions, Steinmann did not specifically point
out any other portions of the call that were objectionable.
On this record, we hold that Steinmann's trial objections were insufficient to
preserve any error in the admission of any portion of the jail call recording because, after
Steinmann v. State Page 2 the redactions, Steinmann’s objections did not specifically point out which portions of the
recording were inadmissible. See Whitaker v. State, 286 S.W.3d 355, 369 (Tex. Crim. App.
2009). While it might be conceded that Steinmann's objections sufficiently stated the
grounds for the objections, they did not specifically identify what portions of the
recording to which the stated objections applied. Hernandez v. State, 599 S.W.2d 614, 617
(Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (op. on reh'g).
When, as in this case, an exhibit contains both admissible and inadmissible
evidence, the objection must specifically refer to the challenged material to apprise the
trial court of the precise objection. Sonnier v. State, 913 S.W.2d 511, 518 (Tex. Crim. App.
1995). The trial court should never be required to sift through challenged evidence to
segregate admissible evidence from excludable evidence. Jones v. State, 843 S.W.2d 487,
492 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992), abrogated on other grounds by Maxwell v. State, 48 S.W.3d
196 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). In those instances where an exhibit contains both admissible
and inadmissible evidence, a trial court may "safely admit it all or exclude it all, and the
losing party, no matter who he is, will be made to suffer on appeal the consequences of
his insufficiently specific offer or objection." Id.; In re M.P., 220 S.W.3d 99, 114 (Tex.
App.—Waco 2007, pet. denied).
Accordingly, Steinmann has not preserved anything for our review, and his first
issue is overruled.
Steinmann v. State Page 3 ADMISSION OF PHOTOGRAPH
In his second issue, Steinman contends the trial court erred in admitting a
photograph from a Facebook page because it was not properly authenticated.
Authentication is a condition precedent to admissibility of evidence. Tienda v.
State, 358 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); see TEX. R. EVID. 901(a). The trial court
decides the threshold question whether the proponent has supplied sufficient evidence
to support a reasonable jury determination that the proffered evidence is authentic.
Tienda, 358 S.W.3d at 638. The trial court need not be persuaded that the proffered item
of evidence is authentic; rather, it must only decide whether the proponent has supplied
facts sufficient to support a reasonable jury determination that the evidence is authentic.
Id.
We review a trial court's ruling on the preliminary question of admissibility for an
abuse of discretion. Id. We will not interfere with a ruling that a jury could reasonably
find the proffered evidence is authentic if the ruling is within the zone of reasonable
disagreement. Id.
To authenticate a photograph, there is no requirement that the individual
authenticating the photograph was the photographer or was present when the
photograph was taken or developed. Hughes v. State, 878 S.W.2d 142, 155 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1993) (op. on reh’g). All that is required is testimony that the photograph accurately
represents the person, object, or scene depicted in the photograph. See Huffman v. State,
Steinmann v. State Page 4 746 S.W.2d 212, 222 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988); Quinonez-Saa v. State, 860 S.W.2d 704, 706
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993). An objection to photographic evidence is waived
if the same information contained in the photograph is conveyed to the jury in some other
form. Ford v. State, 919 S.W.2d 107, 117 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).
Dr. Randy Smith was retained by the State to perform a forensic assessment of
Steinmann to determine a possible explanation for the offense. After the defense rested,
the State called Smith to testify. During the course of Smith’s testimony, the State sought
to offer a photograph taken allegedly from Steinmann’s Facebook page. Steinmann
objected to the photograph’s introduction on the basis of improper authentication, among
other reasons.1 After the photograph was admitted, Smith described the photograph as
depicting Steinmann and H.P. in a “boyfriend/girlfriend” pose and flashing a gang sign
to show solidarity, which, to Smith, suggested an inappropriate relationship between a
parent and child.
Immediately prior to the introduction of the photograph, the State introduced
Smith’s written assessment of Steinmann. In the report, Smith stated that he saw a
photograph on Steinmann’s Facebook page which showed Steinmann “in repose with his
step-daughter enveloped in the crook of his arm.” When reviewing the admitted
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IN THE TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-16-00137-CR
WILL ROBERT CLAUD STEINMANN, Appellant v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
From the 13th District Court Navarro County, Texas Trial Court No. D35282-CR
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Will Robert Claud Steinmann was convicted of Indecency with a Child and
sentenced to 13 years in prison. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.11(a)(1) (West 2014).
Because there is no reversible error, but also because the parties agree to reform the trial
court’s judgment, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed as reformed.
BACKGROUND
Steinmann lived with Heather and her daughter, H.P. One morning, Steinmann woke up Heather to tell her he was having a dream about touching H.P. and found
himself actually touching H.P. H.P. confirmed that Steinmann inappropriately touched
her. After the police were contacted, an interview of H.P. was scheduled at the child
advocacy center. Steinmann encouraged Heather to have H.P. blame someone else for
the incident. On the way to the interview, Heather told H.P. to lie about who touched
her, which H.P. did. When Heather’s mother discovered what happened, she called the
police to schedule another interview of H.P. At this interview, H.P. revealed Steinmann
had touched her.
JAIL CALL RECORDING
Steinmann first complains that the trial court erred in admitting State’s Exhibit 2,
a recording of a jail call between Heather and Steinmann. On appeal, Steinmann
specifically contends that the parts of the conversation regarding Heather’s troubles with
her mother were irrelevant and hearsay and the probative value of those statements were
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. At trial, Steinmann
specifically pointed out parts of the call that were objectionable to him, and those
objectionable portions were redacted from the recording. Although he still objected to
the admission of the recording, after the redactions, Steinmann did not specifically point
out any other portions of the call that were objectionable.
On this record, we hold that Steinmann's trial objections were insufficient to
preserve any error in the admission of any portion of the jail call recording because, after
Steinmann v. State Page 2 the redactions, Steinmann’s objections did not specifically point out which portions of the
recording were inadmissible. See Whitaker v. State, 286 S.W.3d 355, 369 (Tex. Crim. App.
2009). While it might be conceded that Steinmann's objections sufficiently stated the
grounds for the objections, they did not specifically identify what portions of the
recording to which the stated objections applied. Hernandez v. State, 599 S.W.2d 614, 617
(Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (op. on reh'g).
When, as in this case, an exhibit contains both admissible and inadmissible
evidence, the objection must specifically refer to the challenged material to apprise the
trial court of the precise objection. Sonnier v. State, 913 S.W.2d 511, 518 (Tex. Crim. App.
1995). The trial court should never be required to sift through challenged evidence to
segregate admissible evidence from excludable evidence. Jones v. State, 843 S.W.2d 487,
492 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992), abrogated on other grounds by Maxwell v. State, 48 S.W.3d
196 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). In those instances where an exhibit contains both admissible
and inadmissible evidence, a trial court may "safely admit it all or exclude it all, and the
losing party, no matter who he is, will be made to suffer on appeal the consequences of
his insufficiently specific offer or objection." Id.; In re M.P., 220 S.W.3d 99, 114 (Tex.
App.—Waco 2007, pet. denied).
Accordingly, Steinmann has not preserved anything for our review, and his first
issue is overruled.
Steinmann v. State Page 3 ADMISSION OF PHOTOGRAPH
In his second issue, Steinman contends the trial court erred in admitting a
photograph from a Facebook page because it was not properly authenticated.
Authentication is a condition precedent to admissibility of evidence. Tienda v.
State, 358 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); see TEX. R. EVID. 901(a). The trial court
decides the threshold question whether the proponent has supplied sufficient evidence
to support a reasonable jury determination that the proffered evidence is authentic.
Tienda, 358 S.W.3d at 638. The trial court need not be persuaded that the proffered item
of evidence is authentic; rather, it must only decide whether the proponent has supplied
facts sufficient to support a reasonable jury determination that the evidence is authentic.
Id.
We review a trial court's ruling on the preliminary question of admissibility for an
abuse of discretion. Id. We will not interfere with a ruling that a jury could reasonably
find the proffered evidence is authentic if the ruling is within the zone of reasonable
disagreement. Id.
To authenticate a photograph, there is no requirement that the individual
authenticating the photograph was the photographer or was present when the
photograph was taken or developed. Hughes v. State, 878 S.W.2d 142, 155 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1993) (op. on reh’g). All that is required is testimony that the photograph accurately
represents the person, object, or scene depicted in the photograph. See Huffman v. State,
Steinmann v. State Page 4 746 S.W.2d 212, 222 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988); Quinonez-Saa v. State, 860 S.W.2d 704, 706
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993). An objection to photographic evidence is waived
if the same information contained in the photograph is conveyed to the jury in some other
form. Ford v. State, 919 S.W.2d 107, 117 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).
Dr. Randy Smith was retained by the State to perform a forensic assessment of
Steinmann to determine a possible explanation for the offense. After the defense rested,
the State called Smith to testify. During the course of Smith’s testimony, the State sought
to offer a photograph taken allegedly from Steinmann’s Facebook page. Steinmann
objected to the photograph’s introduction on the basis of improper authentication, among
other reasons.1 After the photograph was admitted, Smith described the photograph as
depicting Steinmann and H.P. in a “boyfriend/girlfriend” pose and flashing a gang sign
to show solidarity, which, to Smith, suggested an inappropriate relationship between a
parent and child.
Immediately prior to the introduction of the photograph, the State introduced
Smith’s written assessment of Steinmann. In the report, Smith stated that he saw a
photograph on Steinmann’s Facebook page which showed Steinmann “in repose with his
step-daughter enveloped in the crook of his arm.” When reviewing the admitted
photograph, it is clear that Smith was referring to the same photograph in his report.
1 The other reasons are not discussed by Steinmann on appeal.
Steinmann v. State Page 5 While Steinman made other general objections to the report, he did not object to the
portion of the report describing the photograph from Facebook. Thus, Steinmann’s
objection to the introduction of the photograph into evidence is waived because the
information contained in it was conveyed to the jury by Smith’s report.
Steinmann’s second issue is overruled.
HEARSAY
Steinmann next argues that the trial court erred when it overruled Steinmann’s
hearsay objection during Detective Jason Earles’s testimony. Specifically, Steinmann
complains that the following testimony was hearsay and that the trial court should have
sustained his hearsay objection:
She said that she had stopped. Her mother was driving the vehicle to the CAC, when they left the … school, and they stopped at a gas station …. [Heather] said that her and her daughter, [H.P.], went inside the gas station in to the bathroom, where [Heather] sat on the toilet and [H.P.] faced the stall door. [Heather] then indicated that she had influenced her daughter to protect her daddy. And –
However, Steinmann only objected that this answer was narrative, which the trial court
sustained.2 Steinmann’s complaint on appeal does not comport with the objection made
at trial and has not been preserved for our review. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1; Wilson v. State,
71 S.W.3d 346, 349 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). Accordingly, Steinmann’s third issue is
2 Earlier, the State asked Earles about a conversation with Heather as to why she and H.P. were late to the first interview. As Earles was beginning to answer, Steinmann objected as to hearsay. Steinmann did not ask for a running objection as to whatever the remainder of Earles’s answer would be.
Steinmann v. State Page 6 overruled.
CLERICAL MISTAKES
In his fourth and fifth issues, Steinman contends the trial court's judgment is
incorrect and must be modified to reflect the correct section of the Texas Penal Code of
which he was found to have been convicted3 and to reflect the correct date the judgment
was entered. These deficiencies appear to be clerical mistakes, not errors; nevertheless,
the State agrees the judgment should be modified.
We have the authority to correct and reform a judgment when we have the
necessary data and information to do so. See Banks v. State, 708 S.W.2d 460, 462 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1986); Asberry v. State, 813 S.W.2d 526, 529 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1991, pet. ref'd).
Accordingly, we reform the trial court’s judgment as agreed by the parties to reflect:
1. the date the judgment was entered is 4/7/2016; and
2. the statute for the offense is 21.11(a)(1) Penal Code.
Steinmann’s fourth and fifth issues are overruled.4
3 We have held many times, most recently in March of this year, that statutory penal provisions are not required by the Code of Criminal Procedure to be included in the judgment. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.01, Sec. 1(13) (West 2006); Sabedra v. State, No. 10-16-00033-CR, 2017 Tex. App. LEXIS 2241, at *6 (App.—Waco Mar. 15, 2017).
4 As we have said before, rather than an appeal, we note that a more efficient manner of making this type of change may be a motion for modification or motion for judgment nunc pro tunc, depending on the timing of the discovery of the issues, filed in the trial court. Kerr v. State, No. 10-15-00113-CR, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 12082, at *2 n.3 (Tex. App.—Waco Nov. 9, 2016, no pet.) (not designated for publication).
Steinmann v. State Page 7 CONCLUSION
Having overruled each of Steinmann’s issues on appeal but also having reformed
the trial court’s judgment, we affirm the trial court’s judgment as reformed.
TOM GRAY Chief Justice
Before Chief Justice Gray, Justice Davis, and Justice Scoggins Affirmed as reformed Opinion delivered and filed June 14, 2017 Do not publish [CR25]
Steinmann v. State Page 8