OPINION
OVERSTREET, Judge.
In a four count indictment, appellant was charged with one count of capital murder committed during the course of robbery and three counts of attempted capital murder committed during the course of robbery, all alleged to have been committed on or about December 18, 1991 in El Paso County. In July of 1993, appellant was convicted in the 346th District Court of El Paso County of capital murder and of the three counts of attempted capital murder. During the punishment phase the jury affirmatively answered the special issues set forth in Article 37.071, § 2(b)(1)(2), V.A.C.C.P., and negatively answered the special issue set forth in Article 37.071, § 2(e), V.A.C.C.P., whereupon the trial court sentenced appellant to death.1 Direct appeal of that death sentence is automatic. Article 37.071, § 2(h), V.A.C.C.P. On direct appeal, appellant raises five points of error.
Appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence at guili/innocence. However, he does challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury’s affirmative answer to the first special issue. We will first address that point challenging the jury’s answer to the future dangerousness special issue, i.e. whether there was a probability that appellant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society.
I.
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE AT PUNISHMENT
In appellant’s first point of error, he contends that the evidence was insufficient for the jury to return an affirmative answer to the question of future dangerousness. The record reflects that on the evening of December 18, 1991, appellant and a cohort forced their way into the home of a mother with three of her adult children and proceeded to rob them. The decedent, his mother, and one sister were shot. Another sister was shot at, but missed. The decedent died from the gunshot wound to the back of his head. The following is a more detailed recitation of the evidence adduced at trial.
On December 18, 1991 the Murillo family attended a Christmas play to see their cousin perform. At the conclusion of the play the family departed to their mother’s, Myra Concepcion Murillo’s, home for a quick dinner. The mother and her three children, Myra Magdalena, Armando and Lisa, all planned to do some Christmas shopping later that evening. After dinner, Armando was in the family room watching television, Myra Magdalena was readying herself in her bedroom for her shopping trip, and Lisa was in the kitchen. Their mother called out to her children at some point to inquire if any had heard the two men who had knocked at the door. The two men were apparently looking for the “man of the house” and the mother had refused to permit their entrance. After the children informed her they had heard nothing, each returned to his or her previous task.
Moments later Myra Magdalena stepped out into the hallway to encourage her family to hurry up. At that moment, she saw her mother and her brother retreating from the doorway. Her mother was backing up as if [110]*110she was in fear of her life, kind of crouching down, and her brother looked as if he had been hit in the head and just huddled straight into the comer. She testified that within a few seconds, she saw appellant standing to her right, next to her at the entry to her bedroom. Subsequently she saw his cohort. She testified that they both had guns. Lisa testified that she “heard a barging in, just a lot of noise, racket, like somebody kicking wood.” She saw two strangers in the hallway with guns. Appellant’s cohort pointed a gun at Lisa and walked her into the den area.
Appellant and his cohort ordered the four individuals to kneel on the floor and to be quiet. The Murillo’s began to pray. Appellant first demanded money, then jewelry. Throughout these demands, appellant would yell and threaten the family, occasionally pausing to strike Armando with the gun. Recognizing appellant’s cohort as “a very familiar face in the neighborhood,” Myra Magdalena attempted to divert her gaze away from the cohort to prevent being recognized. The four continued to pray as they were asked to remove their jewelry. Finally, appellant asked for the keys to the car parked outside. When Myra Magdalena hesitated in releasing her automobile keys, her sister retrieved them and awkwardly threw them towards appellant. The keys skinned his face and hit the wall. Myra Magdalena testified that appellant’s response was, “[F]uck you, just for that, I was just going to blow him. Now I’m just going to fucking blow you all[.]” She testified that appellant then began shooting.
Appellant shot Armando in the back of the head. Myra Concepcion, upon seeing her son shot, jumped up to comfort Armando. Appellant hooked his arm around her and shot her on the right side of the head. Myra Magdalena testified that appellant had to curve his gun around to aim it properly at her mother’s head before he shot her. Upon being shot in the head at point blank range, Myra Concepcion fell to the floor. Myra Magdalena believed she would be next. As appellant stepped toward her, Myra Magdalena rose and pushed him. The gun discharged and she fell to the ground pretending to be hit. The bullet had missed her. Another shot went off and she heard her sister “gulp.” After the robbers left, Myra Magdalena got up and phoned for help. Armando died from the gunshot wound. The others survived. Appellant was identified as doing the shooting, and as being dominating, doing the most talking and giving the most orders.
Appellant testified at guilt/innocence and at punishment. He steadfastly denied participating in the home invasion and shooting, but rather insisted that he had remained outside, initially sitting in the vehicle but then getting out, while two associates entered the home and committed the offense. He maintained that he did not shoot or kill anybody.
At punishment, neither the State nor appellant presented any psychiatric or psychological testimony. The State did not present any evidence of prior criminal record, unad-judicated offenses, or bad character.2 The State only presented testimony from the decedent’s father, mother, and two sisters. They testified about the effect that the decedent’s death and the others’ injuries was [111]*111having on them. The State also presented exhibits, which were medical records of the two shooting survivors.
Appellant’s mother testified that appellant was bom on June 19, 1973, making him 18-years-old at the time of the offense. Appellant also presented testimony from his sister, and three family friends who had known him for a number of years. They indicated that appellant previously had not exhibited any violence or acts of aggression, and opined that he would follow the rules and regulations of prison society, would take advantage of rehabilitation opportunities, and would not be a future danger if incarcerated for life. Appellant himself testified at punishment and indicated that he could follow prison rules and regulations if incarcerated for life. He also cried on cross-examination, stating that he would not want what had happened to the Murillo’s to happen to anybody, and acknowledging that he also felt bad that he was facing a possible death penalty. He added that “[ejverybody is a victim in this case[,]” including in some instances himself in that he did not agree with the jury’s verdict because he did not do anything wrong besides sitting outside in the truck.
In determining the sufficiency of the jury’s answer to the special issue concerning future dangerousness, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s answer. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, 573 (1979); Johnson v. State, 853 S.W.2d 527, 532 (Tex.Cr.App.1992), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 154, 126 L.Ed.2d 115 (1993). This Court has often cited numerous factors a jury may consider when determining the answer to that special issue. These factors include, but are not limited to:
1. The circumstances of the capital offense, including the defendant’s state of mind and whether he or she was working alone or with other parties;
2. The calculated nature of the defendant’s acts;
3. The forethought and deliberateness exhibited by the crime’s execution;
4. The existence of a prior criminal record, and the severity of the prior crimes;
5. The defendant’s age and personal circumstances at the time of the offense;
6. Whether the defendant was acting under duress or the domination of another at the time of the commission of the offense;
7. Psychiatric evidence; and
8. Character evidence.
See, e.g., Johnson, 853 S.W.2d at 532; Keeton v. State, 724 S.W.2d 58, 61 (Tex.Cr.App.1987). The evidence in this ease, however, was generally limited to the offense itself. Nevertheless, as we noted in Johnson, “No killing exists in a vacuum. The circumstances of the offense, and the events surrounding it may provide greater probative value than any other evidence regarding the probability of future acts of violence.” Johnson, 853 S.W.2d at 532.
In the instant cause, several factors are initially noteworthy. Appellant took the stand during both phases of the trial. During guilt/innocence, he denied participation of the shooting and placed the blame on two other individuals. He insisted that they went inside the house and committed the numerous acts of violence while he remained uninvolved outside. As discussed above, appellant testified at punishment and continued to deny involvement, in spite of the jury’s guilty verdict. A jury could believe that appellant’s testimony illustrated a lack of remorse for the taking of the decedent’s life and the damage he caused to his mother and sister.
However, the most telling evidence during the guilt phase of the trial was the evidence of appellant’s statement just before he killed the decedent. While the family prayed and the mother plead for their lives, testimony indicated that appellant demanded the keys to the car in front of the house, and that when Lisa threw the keys to him and acci-dently hit him, appellant became enraged and said, “[F]uck you, just for that, I was just going to blow him. Now I’m just going to fucking blow you all[.]” This statement demonstrates two disturbing factors. First, the statement depicts a premeditated intention to kill the decedent or the man of the house before he had ever entered the house. Second, it portrays a callous disregard for the value of human life. Apparently, appel[112]*112lant believed that killing more people than he had initially intended would be an appropriate response to Lisa’s action in hitting him with the car keys. Appellant’s actions illustrate a disturbing escalation of violence. Appellant’s response to accidentally having been hit by the keys was to decide to kill the rest of the family. Members of the family were on their knees as appellant attempted to take their lives. Appellant’s disregard for human life is also illustrated by his actions in grabbing the mother as she lunged to help her dying son. As she prayed for his life, appellant seized her head and deliberately positioned the weapon at her head and fired.
Remorselessness and disregard for human life have been considered in determining the sufficiency of the evidence to support a jury finding of probability of committing criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society. See, e.g., Heiselbetz v. State, 906 S.W.2d 500, 507 (Tex.Cr.App.1995); Allridge v. State, 850 S.W.2d 471, 488-89 (Tex.Cr.App.1991), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 101, 126 L.Ed.2d 68 (1993); Williams v. State, 668 S.W.2d 692, 696 (Tex.Cr.App.1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 954, 104 S.Ct. 2161, 80 L.Ed.2d 545 (1984); and Crawford v. State, 617 S.W.2d 925, 933 (Tex.Cr.App.1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 931, 101 S.Ct. 3067, 69 L.Ed.2d 431 (1981). We conclude that the evidence of appellant’s lack of remorse, refusal to accept responsibility for his actions, attempt to place the blame upon others, and specific actions at the Murillo home were sufficient for a rational jury to determine that there was a probability that he would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society. Appellant’s first point of error is overruled.
II.
VICTIM IMPACT EVIDENCE
In his third point of error, appellant claims, “The trial court erred in allowing ‘victim impact’ testimony into evidence during the punishment phase of [his] trial.” The trial court permitted the survivors of the shootings, and the decedent’s father, to testify concerning their injuries and the effect of the incident upon their lives.
Myra Magdalena was questioned, over a continuing objection based upon relevancy and Rule 403 as to any and all impact evidence, about how she felt about strangers after the instant offense. She testified about how close she and her deceased brother had been, like best friends, who had attended high school together and shared common interests. She also testified about her mother as being “forever in a wheelchair” and had to be taken care of by her like a child; i.e. that their roles were reversed, with her being 21-years-old and having a child of her own.
Lisa then testified. When asked what her physical reminders are, she said that every day she sees where the bullet went through her and feels the bullet, which was not removed because it was too dangerous to take out all the pieces surrounding her lung. She also testified about how her mother is a totally different person, being dependent upon a wheelchair, daily medicine for the rest of her life, and other people to bath, dress, and cook for her — “She depends on everybody for everything.” Lisa also testified that she herself hates the night, i.e. that it was very scary with unfamiliar or unexpected noises, or persistent banging or knocking startling her.
After a short competency hearing outside the presence of the jury, the decedent’s mother testified. Before the jury, she testified about the injuries that she received during the course of the instant offense, i.e. the gunshot wound behind her right eye, and still having a portion of her skull missing over the area where she was shot, with the bullet remaining in her brain, which affected her vision. She also testified about having been paralyzed on the left side, only having use of her left arm and having difficulty stretching her fingers out and flexing, and not being able to walk. She also testified about being unable. to work, having been transformed from a businesswoman to “a disabled person[.]” She also said that because of her son being killed, she felt like she was embalmed and had a dead body and felt like she cried inside all the time, and knew that there is no end to her mourning for her son nor her grief. She added that she had been in a [113]*113coma and was unable to attend any of her son’s ceremony/funeral or say goodbye to him.3
The father of the decedent testified about having arrived at the site of the instant offense and seeing a horrible bloody scene, with his son in the hallway, and his daughters and former wife there. He also testified at punishment about how he had been affected by his son’s death:
Well, I miss my boy a lot, and it’s affected me in many ways. It’s just hard to put in words, but I do miss him a lot. And due to this, you know, two men breaking in into the house, kicking in the door and coming in with guns, I guess I’m afraid. I’m afraid for myself and afraid for my family.
He also testified about how his daughters were being very brave and courageous, and how he feels sorry for them, especially at night. He concluded by stating that it was “a very horrible, horrible scene. Bloody, cold[-]blooded murder.”
The State asserts that by failing to object to the testimony of Lisa and the decedent’s father, appellant waived any error as to their testimony, and that by not objecting every time that that type of evidence was presented, he waived the claim even as to the testimony of the other two witnesses to whom he did object.
As noted above, when the first of the witnesses, Myra Magdalena, was questioned, appellant made a continuing objection based upon relevancy and Rule 403 as to any and all impact evidence. Specifically, appellant said, “This is obviously impact evidence that is presented at this time, and I’m objecting to any and all impact evidence.” The trial court responded, ‘Tom* objection to impact evidence is overruled. You’ll have a continuing objection on that. If there is something, though, that calls for another objection at another time — [interruption omitted] — raise that to the Court’s attention.”
Appellant did not renew his continuing objection when Lisa testified. When the decedent’s mother was called to testify, appellant stated, ‘Tour Honor, I would ask that my running objection extend to all witnesses, if they testify to the same type of matter.” The trial court responded, “All right. I note your objection. I’ll grant your running objection on the issue and overrule it.”
This Court has approved the use of a continuing “running” objection; and in fact has specifically stated that there are some situations where such an objection “is not only adequate to preserve error, but actually desirable.” Ethington v. State, 819 S.W.2d 854, 858-59 (Tex.Cr.App.1991). This Court has suggested that it would not be appropriate to allow a running objection to preserve error on a matter referred to by any witness at any during a trial. Goodman v. State, 701 S.W.2d 850, 863 (Tex.Cr.App.1985), rev’d on other grounds, Ex parte Goodman, 816 S.W.2d 383 (Tex.Cr.App.1991). Nevertheless, while this Court has included cautionary admonitions about making running objections, the use of running objections fits within the purview of Tex.R.App.Pro. 52(a)’s requirement of timely and specific trial objections to preserve appellate complaints. As this Court stated in Sattiewhite v. State, 786 S.W.2d 271, 283 (Tex.Cr.App.1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S.Ct. 226, 112 L.Ed.2d 181 (1990), “[t]he purpose of lodging a timely and specific objection is to inform the trial court of the basis of the objection and to give the court an opportunity to rule on the specific objection as the evidence is introduced.” “[A]s long as the running objection constituted a timely objection, stating the specific grounds for the ruling, the movement desired the court to make ... [,] then the error should be deemed preserved by an appellate court.” Id. at 284-85 n. 4. This Court also opined that “there are situations where a running objection, made with the express permission of the trial judge” much more appropriately contributes to the orderly flow of trial than does a redundant and disruptive series of individual objections. Id. The record reflects that appellant was clearly objecting “to any and all impact evi[114]*114dence” as “to all witnesses” testifying to such. The trial court clearly understood such complaint and ruled adversely thereon. We conclude that appellant has preserved his claim for appellate review.
Appellant claims that the testimony was not relevant to any issue at punishment, or if relevant its probative value was substantially outweighed by its danger of unfair prejudice. See Tex.R.Crim.Evid. 402 and 403. We will address each argument in turn.
Article 37.071, § 2(a), V.A.C.C.P., provides that “evidence may be presented by the [S]tate and the defendant or the defendant’s counsel as to any matter that the court deems relevant to sentence[.]” See Mayo v. State, 708 S.W.2d 854, 858 (Tex.Cr.App.1986). A trial court at the penalty stage of a capital murder trial has wide discretion in admitting or excluding evidence. Lane v. State, 822 S.W.2d 35, 41 (Tex.Cr.App.1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 920, 112 S.Ct. 1968, 118 L.Ed.2d 568 (1992); Briddle v. State, 742 S.W.2d 379, 391 (Tex.Cr.App.1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 986, 109 S.Ct. 543, 102 L.Ed.2d 573 (1988).
In Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991), the United States Supreme Court addressed the scope and relevance of so-called victim impact evidence. The Court noted that it was “now of the view that a State may properly conclude that for the jury to assess meaningfully the defendant’s moral culpability and blameworthiness, it should have before it at the sentencing phase evidence of the specific harm caused by the defendant.” Id., 501 U.S. at 825, 111 S.Ct. at 2608, 115 L.Ed.2d at 735. It stated that with regard to the harm that the killing had caused, “there is nothing unfair about allowing the jury to bear in mind that harm at the same time as it considers the mitigating evidence introduced by the defendant.” Id. 501 U.S. at 826, 111 S.Ct. at 2609, 115 L.Ed.2d at 736.
Payne specifically held “that if the State chooses to permit the admission of victim impact evidence and prosecutorial argument on that subject, the Eighth Amendment erects no per se bar.” Id. “A State may legitimately conclude that evidence about the victim and about the impact of the murder on the victim’s family is.relevant to the jury’s decision as to whether or not the death penalty should be imposed.” Id. “There is no reason to treat such evidence differently than other relevant evidence is treated.” Id.
As we stated earlier, Article 37.071, § 2(a), VAC.C.P., provides that evidence may be presented by the litigants “as to any matter that the court deems relevant to sentence!!.]” We also observe that the State is permitted to present jury argument for appellant to receive a sentence of death. Art. 37.071, § 2(a), V.A.C.C.P.
Appellant acknowledges that victim impact testimony may be allowed under Payne, but insists that since such admissibility is couched in terms of relevance, such evidence is inadmissible because it is irrelevant to the special issues. He asserts that “[sjueh evidence can in no way assist the jury in answering any special issue.” Specifically as to the special issues, he insists that “whether the victim is saint or sinner, the victim’s spiritual status can in no way assist a jury in determining whether an accused would commit future criminal acts of violence!!,]” and that “a victim’s spirituality can in no way assist a jury in determining whether appellant actually caused the deceased’s death or that he intended to kill the deceased or another, or that he anticipated that a human life would be taken.” He adds that “the goodness or badness of a victim is not a proper circumstance in determining the personal, moral culpability of the defendant!!,]” and questions whether he should “be damned for killing a saint, while canonized for eliminating a sinner?”
We observe that the term “victim impact evidence” does not appear in the Texas Rules of Criminal Evidence. Our Rules do provide that relevant evidence is generally admissible, while evidence which is not relevant is inadmissible. Tex.R.Crim.Evid. 402. As quoted above, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that in a capital punishment setting, “[a] State may legitimately conclude that evidence about the victim and about the impact of the murder on the victim’s family is relevant to the jury’s decision as to whether or not the death penalty should be imposed!!,]” [115]*115and that “[t]here is no reason to treat such evidence differently than other relevant evidence is treated.” Payne, supra. As noted above, Art. 37.071, § 2(a), V.A.C.C.P., provides that the State may present evidence “as to any matter that the court deems relevant to sentence” and present jury argument for the defendant to receive a sentence of death. Thus, our Texas statutory procedures provide for the admissibility of evidence “relevant to sentence^]”
“ ‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Tex.R.Crim.Evid. 401. At sentencing, pursuant to Art. 37.071 the jury in the instant cause had to answer the statutory special issues which asked:
Is there a probability that the defendant, Tony Ford, would commit criminal acts of violence that would consititue [sic] a continuing threat to society?
Do you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that Tony Ford, the defendant himself, actually caused the death of Armando Murillo, Jr., the deceased, on the occasion in question, or if he did not actually cause deceased’s death, that he intended to kill the deceased or another, or that he anticipated that a human life would be taken?
Taking into consideration all of the evidence, including the circumstances of the offense, the defendant’s character and background, and the personal moral culpability of the defendant, do you find, that there is a sufficient mitigating circumstance or circumstances to warrant that a sentence of life imprisonment rather than a death sentence be imposed?
The jury was also instructed per Article 37.071, § 2(f)(4), V.A.C.C.P., that “mitigating evidence is evidence that a juror might regard as reducing the defendant’s moral blameworthiness.”
Questions of relevance should be left largely to the trial court, and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Moreno v. State, 858 S.W.2d 453, 463 (Tex.Cr.App.1993), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 445, 126 L.Ed.2d 378 (1993) and - U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 1389, 128 L.Ed.2d 63 (1994). In reviewing a trial court’s relevancy decision via the abuse of discretion standard, as long as the trial court’s ruling was at least within the zone of reasonable disagreement, we will not intercede. Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 391 (Tex.Cr.App.1990) (op. on reh’g). We must determine whether in the instant cause, the trial court abused its discretion in determining that the testimony of the decedent’s mother, father, and sisters was “relevant to sentence^]”
In Miller-El v. State, 782 S.W.2d 892, 896 (Tex.Cr.App.1990), in a non-death penalty situation, this Court held that evidence of the degree of injury, even extending into the future, was admissible at punishment because such evidence bore on the defendant’s moral blameworthiness. In that case, this Court specifically noted that the injury actually caused to one of the complainants, paralysis, did not outrun the defendant’s moral culpability, thus the defendant was blameworthy. Id. at 897.
Stavinoha v. State, 808 S.W.2d 76 (Tex.Cr.App.1991), also a non-death penalty situation, involved evidence adduced at punishment about the aggravated sexual assault’s psychological aftereffects on the child complainant and on his mother. We concluded that such evidence “had a bearing on [the defendant’s] personal responsibility and his moral guilt,” and was therefore admissible. Id. at 79.
In the instant cause, the jury was required to answer a special issue which asked about appellant’s “personal moral culpability^]” In answering that issue, the jury’s instructions included language about evidence affecting appellant’s “moral blameworthiness.” Thus, appellant’s moral blameworthiness and culpability was definitely at issue at punishment. See, e.g., Penny v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989).
Based upon the particular testimony-at-issue admitted into evidence at punishment in the instant cause, we are unable to conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in concluding that such testimony was relevant to the punishment issues. In this [116]*116particular ease, we conclude that the trial court’s decision to admit such testimony, presumably as “relevant to sentence,” was at least within the zone of reasonable disagreement.
Appellant also asserts that even if the testimony was even remotely relevant regarding the special issues, the trial court nevertheless abused its discretion in admitting such testimony over his Rule 403 objection. Appellant argues that “such a sight and testimony from a surviving crippled victim could only serve to have a prejudicial effect on the jury, thereby outweighing any probative value it may have in assisting the jury in determining the special issues.” Apparently, appellant is suggesting that a witness who has been crippled during the course of the offense at bar should not be allowed to testify.
Rule 403 provides that relevant evidence “may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice....” After reviewing the record, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in concluding that such testimony’s probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d at 391-93. Accordingly, appellant’s third point of error is overruled.
III.
JURY SELECTION
In his second point of error, appellant asserts that the trial court erred in not allowing him to voir dire the veniremembers regarding the minimum time appellant would have to serve before being eligible for parole. We note that appellant did not make or request to make a bill of exceptions as to what questions he would have asked if he had been allowed. Such a procedure might be useful in determining whether the trial court abused its discretion. We also note that appellant did not make a constitutional (federal or state) deprivation argument, and in fact seemed to agree with the trial court’s tentative decision to include the 35-year parole eligibility instruction in the punishment jury charge but to “keep away from it in voir dire.”
As is permissible, the trial court instructed the jury that the minimum time appellant would serve before being eligible for parole was 35 years.4 However, the litigants were not able to voir dire the potential jurors concerning this subject. Appellant argues that because he had the right to the instruction concerning parole, he should have been able to ask proper questions concerning parole. See Lane v. State, 828 S.W.2d 764, 766 (Tex.Cr.App.1982) (defendant was not permitted to question potential juror upon definition of reasonable doubt).
We must determine whether the trial court abused its discretion and improperly limited appellant’s voir dire. Woolridge v. State, 827 S.W.2d 900, 904 (Tex.Cr.App.1992); Nunfio v. State, 808 S.W.2d 482, 484 (Tex.Cr.App.1991). The propriety of the question to be asked is generally determinative of the issue. Woolridge, 827 S.W.2d at 904; Nunfio, 808 S.W.2d at 484. A question is proper if it seeks to discover a juror’s views on an issue applicable to the case. Woolridge, 827 S.W.2d at 904; Nunfio, 808 S.W.2d at 484. Generally, however, parole is not a proper consideration for the jury in a capital case. Smith v. State, 898 S.W.2d 838, 846-53 (Tex.Cr.App.1995) (plurality opinion) (Overstreet, J., dissenting). Appellant would have been permitted to inquire of potential jurors whether they could ignore parole consequences in their deliberations. Smith, 898 S.W.2d at 852-53; and cases cited therein. Questions concerning the actual number of years, however, are not a proper area of inquiry for veniremembers. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in so limiting appellant’s voir dire. The second point of error is overruled.
IV.
GUILT/INNOCENCE
In his fourth point of error, appellant argues that the trial court failed to [117]*117suppress the in-court identification of him by the Murillo sisters, Lisa and Myra Magdalena. Appellant asserts his in-court identification was tainted by an improper pre-trial identification procedure. In Webb v. State, this Court addressed the nature of pre-trial identification procedures.
A pretrial identification procedure may be so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to mistaken identification that to use that identification at trial would deny the accused due process of law. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967). However, it is the “substantial likelihood of misidentification” that may be engendered by such suggestive procedure that works the deprivation. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 88 S.Ct. 967, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 93 S.Ct. 375, 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972). Thus, if the totality of the circumstances reveals no substantial likelihood of misidentification despite a suggestive pretrial procedure, subsequent identification testimony will be deemed “reliable,” “reliability [being] the linchpin in determining the admissibility of identification testimony.” Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 97 S.Ct. 2243, 53 L.Ed.2d 140 (1977).
To be weighed against the corrupting effect of any suggestive identification procedure in assessing reliability under the totality of the circumstances are the following nonexclusive factors: “The opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the witness’ degree of attention, the accuracy of his prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated at the confrontation, and the time between the crime and the confrontation.” Id., 432 U.S. at 114, 97 S.Ct. at 2253, 53 L.Ed.2d at 154.
Of course, a finding that a challenged pretrial identification procedure was not in fact impermissibly suggestive will obviate the need to assay whether under the circumstances it created a substantial likelihood of misidentification. Williams v. State, 675 S.W.2d 754, 757 (Tex.Cr.App.1984).
Webb v. State, 760 S.W.2d 263, 269 (Tex.Cr.App.1988), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 910, 109 S.Ct. 3202, 105 L.Ed.2d 709 (1989).
Myra Murillo picked appellant’s photograph in a photographic line-up on December 19, 1991. Her sister, Lisa, likewise selected appellant approximately one week later. Appellant asserts the pretrial identification procedure was impermissible based upon the comparison of the description of the perpetrator given by Myra at the time of the offense and appellant’s appearance at trial. Appellant’s assertion does not indicate that the photographic line-up was somehow im-permissibly suggestive, but rather he argues that the individual the sisters identified is not the individual who committed the offense. Absent a showing that the photographic lineup was impermissibly suggestive, the identification procedure used by the police does not violate appellant’s due process rights. Appellant’s fourth point of error is overruled.
In appellant’s fifth point of error, he argues that the trial court erred in failing to suppress a photograph of appellant wearing a long dark coat. The photograph was admitted as State’s exhibit four. Appellant was arrested wearing a long dark coat, similar in description to a coat identified by the eyewitnesses. After his arrest, appellant was photographed wearing the coat. Appellant asserts that his arrest was illegal and therefore the fruits of that illegal seizure, the photograph of the coat, should be suppressed. However, it appears that appellant has waived his claim of error.
“An objection to photographic evidence is waived if the same information contained in the photograph is conveyed to the jury in some other form.” Havard v. State, 800 S.W.2d 195, 205 (Tex.Cr.App.1989); Hughes v. State, 878 S.W.2d 142, 155 (Tex.Cr.App.1992) (opinion on rehearing), cert. denied; — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 2184, 128 L.Ed.2d 902 (1994). Without objection the arresting officer testified that appellant was taken into custody in a long dark coat, the coat itself was admitted into evidence, and the defendant himself testified that he was photographed wearing a long dark coat and that the admitted coat was similar in appearance to his. This evidence is substantially [118]*118the same as the evidence contained in the photograph conveyed to the jury. Appellant has waived error. Appellant’s fifth point of error is overruled.
Having reviewed all of appellant’s points of error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment and sentence.