SHERRI B. SULLIVAN, P.J.
Introduction
St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company (Insurer) appeals the summary judgment entered in favor of Melba Wilkes (Wilkes) and Rodney Butler (Butler) (collectively Plaintiffs) on their claim for equitable garnishment of a homeowner’s insurance policy issued to Derrick Warren (Warren) by Insurer. We affirm.
Factual and Procedural Background
In 1991, Warren and Wilkes began a personal relationship. When they met, Wilkes already had two children, Rhonda and Rhoneshia Butler (collectively Decedents), who were then approximately fifteen months old and six months old, respectively. Butler was Decedents’ father. By 1993, Warren and Wilkes had two children of their own.
Prior to 1996, Wilkes (with her four children) and Warren lived in separate residences. In 1996, Warren bought a house. Shortly thereafter, Warren, Wilkes, and the four children moved into this house. In March 1996, Warren obtained a homeowner’s insurance policy for the house from Insurer. Warren is the only “named insured” on the policy.
On November 27, 1997, all four children were left in the home with Wilkes’s uncle while Warren and Wilkes went out. A fire broke out, tragically killing all four children.
The homeowner’s insurance policy was in effect on the date of the fire. Under the “household exclusion,” the policy excludes personal liability coverage for bodily injury to any insured under the policy, including residents of the named insured’s household who are under the age of twenty-one and in the care of the named insured.
In May 1998, Wilkes filed a wrongful death lawsuit against Warren in the Circuit Court of St. Louis County. Butler joined in this lawsuit in August 1999. Plaintiffs claimed that Decedents’ deaths were caused by Warren’s negligence in leaving the stove on before leaving the house with Wilkes. Warren sought defense and indemnity under his homeowner’s insurance policy. Insurer defended Warren under a reservation of rights.
[119]*119In December 1998, Insurer filed a declaratory judgment action against Warren in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. Insurer asserted that the household exclusion in Warren’s policy barred coverage for Decedents’ deaths because they were “insureds” under the policy as residents of Warren’s household who were under the age of twenty-one and in the care of Warren.
In March 1999, Warren terminated the attorney Insurer retained for his defense and hired his own counsel. Later in March, Warren and Wilkes entered into an Agreement pursuant to Section 537.065.1 Under the Agreement, Warren admitted liability for Decedents’ deaths and Wilkes agreed to limit any recovery on the wrongful death lawsuit to the proceeds of Warren’s homeowner’s insurance policy.
In May 1999, one of Insurer’s attorneys contacted Wilkes’s counsel to discuss the declaratory judgment action pending in federal court. Insurer’s attorney informed Wilkes’s counsel that Insurer would not object if Wilkes sought to intervene in the action. Wilkes’s counsel indicated that he had no intention of intervening in the action. Although Insurer could have joined Wilkes as a party in the federal action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 19, Insurer chose not to do so.
In August 1999, the trial court held a hearing on damages and fault in Plaintiffs’ wrongful death lawsuit. Warren waived his right to a jury trial and to cross-examine witnesses. The trial court found that Warren was at fault for Decedents’ deaths. The trial court entered a judgment in Plaintiffs’ favor and against Warren in the amount of $800,000 for each of Decedents’ deaths.
Later in August 1999, Insurer and Warren filed cross-motions for summary judgment in the declaratory judgment action pending in federal court. In November 1999, the district court granted Insurer’s motion, holding that Decedents were “insureds” within the meaning of the household exclusion in Warren’s homeowner’s insurance policy. Accordingly, the district court held that the policy provided no coverage to Warren for Plaintiffs’ wrongful death judgment.
In April 2000, pursuant to Section 379.200, Plaintiffs filed the underlying equitable garnishment action against Insurer and Warren. Plaintiffs sought to satisfy the wrongful death judgment against Warren from the proceeds of his homeowner’s insurance policy. Insurer moved for summary judgment based on the federal declaratory judgment entered in November 1999. Insurer argued that Plaintiffs’ claims were barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel because Plaintiffs’ rights were derivative of Warren’s under the policy, and the district court had held that the household exclusion barred coverage. Plaintiffs filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, arguing that collateral estoppel did not apply because they were not parties to the federal action and were not in privity with Warren. Plaintiffs further claimed that coverage existed under the policy to satisfy their wrongful death judgment against Warren.
In July 2001, the trial court denied Insurer’s motion and granted Plaintiffs’ motion. The court entered summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs and against Insurer in the amount of $300,000, the per occurrence limit of coverage under Warren’s homeowner’s insurance policy. Insurer appeals from this summary judgment.
[120]*120
Standard of Review
This Court reviews summary judgment essentially de novo because the propriety of summary judgment is purely an issue of law. ITT Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Mid-Am. Marine Supply Corp., 854 S.W.2d 371, 376 (Mo. banc 1993). The record is reviewed in the light most favorable to the party against whom judgment was entered, and that party is given the benefit of all reasonable inferences from the record. Id Evidence presented in support of the motion is taken as true unless contradicted by the non-moving party’s response to the motion. Id The moving party bears the burden of proving that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law and that no genuine issues of material fact exist. Id at 382. A genuine issue exists where the record contains competent materials which evidence two plausible, but contradictory, accounts of essential facts. Id A genuine issue is not an argumentative, imaginary, or frivolous dispute. Id
Claimants, such as Plaintiffs, must establish that there is no genuine dispute as to those material facts upon which they would have had the burden of persuasion at trial. Id. at 381. Additionally, where the defendant has raised an affirmative defense, a claimant’s right to judgment depends as much on the non-viability of that affirmative defense as it does on the viability of the claimant’s claim. Id A claimant moving for summary judgment in the face of an affirmative defense must also establish that the affirmative defense fails as a matter of law. Id The claimant may defeat an affirmative defense by establishing that any one of the facts necessary to support the defense is absent. Id
Discussion
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SHERRI B. SULLIVAN, P.J.
Introduction
St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company (Insurer) appeals the summary judgment entered in favor of Melba Wilkes (Wilkes) and Rodney Butler (Butler) (collectively Plaintiffs) on their claim for equitable garnishment of a homeowner’s insurance policy issued to Derrick Warren (Warren) by Insurer. We affirm.
Factual and Procedural Background
In 1991, Warren and Wilkes began a personal relationship. When they met, Wilkes already had two children, Rhonda and Rhoneshia Butler (collectively Decedents), who were then approximately fifteen months old and six months old, respectively. Butler was Decedents’ father. By 1993, Warren and Wilkes had two children of their own.
Prior to 1996, Wilkes (with her four children) and Warren lived in separate residences. In 1996, Warren bought a house. Shortly thereafter, Warren, Wilkes, and the four children moved into this house. In March 1996, Warren obtained a homeowner’s insurance policy for the house from Insurer. Warren is the only “named insured” on the policy.
On November 27, 1997, all four children were left in the home with Wilkes’s uncle while Warren and Wilkes went out. A fire broke out, tragically killing all four children.
The homeowner’s insurance policy was in effect on the date of the fire. Under the “household exclusion,” the policy excludes personal liability coverage for bodily injury to any insured under the policy, including residents of the named insured’s household who are under the age of twenty-one and in the care of the named insured.
In May 1998, Wilkes filed a wrongful death lawsuit against Warren in the Circuit Court of St. Louis County. Butler joined in this lawsuit in August 1999. Plaintiffs claimed that Decedents’ deaths were caused by Warren’s negligence in leaving the stove on before leaving the house with Wilkes. Warren sought defense and indemnity under his homeowner’s insurance policy. Insurer defended Warren under a reservation of rights.
[119]*119In December 1998, Insurer filed a declaratory judgment action against Warren in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. Insurer asserted that the household exclusion in Warren’s policy barred coverage for Decedents’ deaths because they were “insureds” under the policy as residents of Warren’s household who were under the age of twenty-one and in the care of Warren.
In March 1999, Warren terminated the attorney Insurer retained for his defense and hired his own counsel. Later in March, Warren and Wilkes entered into an Agreement pursuant to Section 537.065.1 Under the Agreement, Warren admitted liability for Decedents’ deaths and Wilkes agreed to limit any recovery on the wrongful death lawsuit to the proceeds of Warren’s homeowner’s insurance policy.
In May 1999, one of Insurer’s attorneys contacted Wilkes’s counsel to discuss the declaratory judgment action pending in federal court. Insurer’s attorney informed Wilkes’s counsel that Insurer would not object if Wilkes sought to intervene in the action. Wilkes’s counsel indicated that he had no intention of intervening in the action. Although Insurer could have joined Wilkes as a party in the federal action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 19, Insurer chose not to do so.
In August 1999, the trial court held a hearing on damages and fault in Plaintiffs’ wrongful death lawsuit. Warren waived his right to a jury trial and to cross-examine witnesses. The trial court found that Warren was at fault for Decedents’ deaths. The trial court entered a judgment in Plaintiffs’ favor and against Warren in the amount of $800,000 for each of Decedents’ deaths.
Later in August 1999, Insurer and Warren filed cross-motions for summary judgment in the declaratory judgment action pending in federal court. In November 1999, the district court granted Insurer’s motion, holding that Decedents were “insureds” within the meaning of the household exclusion in Warren’s homeowner’s insurance policy. Accordingly, the district court held that the policy provided no coverage to Warren for Plaintiffs’ wrongful death judgment.
In April 2000, pursuant to Section 379.200, Plaintiffs filed the underlying equitable garnishment action against Insurer and Warren. Plaintiffs sought to satisfy the wrongful death judgment against Warren from the proceeds of his homeowner’s insurance policy. Insurer moved for summary judgment based on the federal declaratory judgment entered in November 1999. Insurer argued that Plaintiffs’ claims were barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel because Plaintiffs’ rights were derivative of Warren’s under the policy, and the district court had held that the household exclusion barred coverage. Plaintiffs filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, arguing that collateral estoppel did not apply because they were not parties to the federal action and were not in privity with Warren. Plaintiffs further claimed that coverage existed under the policy to satisfy their wrongful death judgment against Warren.
In July 2001, the trial court denied Insurer’s motion and granted Plaintiffs’ motion. The court entered summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs and against Insurer in the amount of $300,000, the per occurrence limit of coverage under Warren’s homeowner’s insurance policy. Insurer appeals from this summary judgment.
[120]*120
Standard of Review
This Court reviews summary judgment essentially de novo because the propriety of summary judgment is purely an issue of law. ITT Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Mid-Am. Marine Supply Corp., 854 S.W.2d 371, 376 (Mo. banc 1993). The record is reviewed in the light most favorable to the party against whom judgment was entered, and that party is given the benefit of all reasonable inferences from the record. Id Evidence presented in support of the motion is taken as true unless contradicted by the non-moving party’s response to the motion. Id The moving party bears the burden of proving that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law and that no genuine issues of material fact exist. Id at 382. A genuine issue exists where the record contains competent materials which evidence two plausible, but contradictory, accounts of essential facts. Id A genuine issue is not an argumentative, imaginary, or frivolous dispute. Id
Claimants, such as Plaintiffs, must establish that there is no genuine dispute as to those material facts upon which they would have had the burden of persuasion at trial. Id. at 381. Additionally, where the defendant has raised an affirmative defense, a claimant’s right to judgment depends as much on the non-viability of that affirmative defense as it does on the viability of the claimant’s claim. Id A claimant moving for summary judgment in the face of an affirmative defense must also establish that the affirmative defense fails as a matter of law. Id The claimant may defeat an affirmative defense by establishing that any one of the facts necessary to support the defense is absent. Id
Discussion
In its point on appeal, Insurer argues that the trial court erred in entering summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs on the existence of coverage under Warren’s homeowner’s insurance policy because the doctrine of collateral estoppel bars Plaintiffs’ claim. Insurer maintains that the federal declaratory judgment precludes Plaintiffs’ claim in the equitable garnishment action.
[^2 — 4] Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, precludes the same parties, or those in privity with the parties, from relit-igating issues that have been previously litigated. Major v. Frontenac Industries, Inc., 968 S.W.2d 758, 761 (Mo.App. E.D.1998). In deciding whether the application of collateral estoppel is proper, we consider the following four factors: (1) whether the issue in the present case is identical to the issue decided in the prior adjudication; (2) whether the prior adjudication resulted in a judgment on the merits; (3) whether the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party, or was in privity with a party, to the prior adjudication; and (4) whether the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior adjudication. Cox v. Steck, 992 S.W.2d 221, 224 (Mo.App. E.D.1999). Collateral estoppel will not be applied where to do so would be inequitable. James v. Paul, 49 S.W.3d 678, 683 (Mo. banc 2001). Fairness is the overriding consideration. Cox, 992 S.W.2d at 224. Each case must be analyzed on its own facts. James, 49 S.W.3d at 683.
The first consideration factor for the application of collateral estoppel is whether the issue in the present case is identical to the issue decided in the prior adjudication. Plaintiffs concede that this factor weighs in favor of the application of collateral estoppel.
The second consideration factor for the application of collateral estoppel is whether the prior adjudication resulted in [121]*121a judgment on the merits. A judgment on the merits is one rendered when it is determined which party is in the right after argument and investigation, as distinguished from a judgment rendered upon some preliminary or technical point, or by default, and without trial. Hayes v. United Fire & Cas. Co., 3 S.W.3d 853, 856 (Mo.App. E.D.1999). Where there is a question of whether a previous decision went to the merits of the case, no preclu-sive effect is given to the earlier decision. Id. The district court attached a twelve-page memorandum to its Order entering judgment for Insurer and against Warren on the merits of Insurer’s complaint for declaratory judgment. The memorandum reflects consideration of the parties’ arguments regarding the coverage issue and the district court’s reasoning for its resolution of the issue. We find that this factor weighs in favor of the application of collateral estoppel.
The third consideration factor for the application of collateral estoppel is whether the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party, or was in privity with a party, to the prior adjudication. For collateral estoppel purposes, parties are in privity when the interests of the nonparty are so closely related to the interests of the party that the nonparty can be fairly considered to have had his or her day in court. Cox, 992 S.W.2d at 224. Privity is not established simply because the parties are interested in the same question or in proving or disproving the same state of facts. Id.
Plaintiffs were not parties to the declaratory judgment action. Insurer and Warren were the only parties. Insurer argues that Plaintiffs were in privity with Warren. Insurer cites James to support its argument. As part of a privity analysis in James, the Court stated that a “judgment creditor stands in the shoes of the insured and has rights no greater and no less than the insured’s rights would have been if the insured paid the judgment and then sought reimbursement from the insurer.” Id. at 683. The Court then concluded that the judgment creditor, whose claim was derivative of the insured’s contractual rights, was in privity with the insured. Id. at 684.
Although the language in James suggests that privity would exist here, James is premised on very different facts. For example, in James, the insurer sought to apply collateral estoppel in a garnishment action based upon the insured’s plea of guilty in a prior criminal case. The insured pleaded guilty to first-degree assault, establishing that his actions were intentional. The insured’s homeowner’s insurance policy excluded coverage for intentional acts. The criminal conviction foreclosed the insured and any party claiming through him from asserting that his conduct was not intentional. Id. at 689.
In comparison, Insurer seeks the application of collateral estoppel based upon a declaratory judgment finding no coverage under Warren’s homeowner’s insurance policy. However, Warren never admitted that Decedents were “in his care,” which would have excluded coverage under the household exclusion in the policy and upon which the district court’s finding was based.
Additionally, in James, the insured made an agreement with the third party that if the third party was unsuccessful in the garnishment action against the insurer, the insured would pay the third party an additional sum of money. Id. at 681. In comparison, Warren faced no additional obligation to Wilkes under the Agreement if she were unsuccessful in the equitable garnishment action against Insurer.
Insurer also cites State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Allen, 744 S.W.2d 782 [122]*122(Mo. banc 1988), to support its privity argument. However, Allen is distinguishable from the present case. In Allen, the insurer brought a declaratory judgment action against all known claimants. Id. at 786. The issue of privity arose in relation to the admission of evidence. Id. In fact, the Court stated:
It is prudent for the insurer to include all claimants in its suit, because the insured may not pursue his rights diligently, and the claimants have every right to labor in support of his coverage.
Id.
Even if the language in James constrains us to find that Plaintiffs were in privity with Warren and thus that the third factor weighs in favor of the application of collateral estoppel, we nonetheless conclude that the equitable considerations under the fourth factor weigh strongly against the application of collateral estop-pel.
The fourth consideration factor for the application of collateral estoppel is whether the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior adjudication. In deciding this factor, we consider the following additional four factors: (1) did the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted have a strong incentive to litigate the prior adjudication; (2) does the second forum afford the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted procedural opportunities not available in the first action; (3) is the prior judgment, upon which collateral estoppel is based, inconsistent with one or more prior judgments; and (4) was the forum in the first action substantially inconvenient to the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted. St. Louis Univ. v. Hesselberg Drug Co., 35 S.W.3d 451, 455-456 (Mo. App. E.D.2000).
Plaintiffs were not parties to the federal declaratory judgment action. Even if they were in privity with Warren, Warren did not have as strong an incentive to litigate the prior adjudication as would have Plaintiffs. Although the Agreement between Wilkes and Warren required Warren “to do such further acts consistence (sic) with the intent and purpose of this Agreement,” the Agreement protects Warren from personal liability for any judgment Wilkes obtained against Warren. The Agreement limits any recovery to insurance proceeds. Thus, whereas a finding of no coverage under Warren’s policy would not significantly impact Warren, such a finding would significantly impact Plaintiffs because they would receive no compensation. We find it difficult to expect that Warren could adequately represent the interests of Plaintiffs under such an arrangement. The outcome of the declaratory judgment action had no practical effect on Warren, yet it had every practical effect on Plaintiffs. Thus, because any recovery by Plaintiffs would be limited to insurance proceeds, they had a greater incentive than Warren to litigate the coverage issue. Plaintiffs have the right to an opportunity to diligently pursue coverage.
Additionally, although Wilkes may have had an opportunity to participate in the declaratory judgment action by intervening under FRCP 24, she chose not to participate in that forum.2 In fact, Insurer waited until beyond the date allowed for permissive intervention to notify Wilkes’s counsel. It nonetheless remains that Insurer did not attempt to join Plaintiffs in the action under FRCP 19, although In[123]*123surer obviously was aware of Plaintiffs’ interest in the action. We find guidance in the following:
Joinder as a party, rather than knowledge of a lawsuit and an opportunity to intervene, is the method by which potential parties are subjected to the jurisdiction of the court and bound by a judgment or decree. The parties to a lawsuit presumably know better than anyone else the nature and scope of relief sought in the action, and at whose expense such relief might be granted. It makes sense, therefore, to place on them a burden of bringing in additional parties where such a step is indicated, rather than placing on potential additional parties a duty to intervene when they acquire knowledge of the lawsuit. The linchpin of the ‘impermissible collateral attack’ doctrine — the attribution of preclusive effect to a failure to intervene — is therefore quite inconsistent with Rule 19 and Rule 24.
Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 765, 109 S.Ct. 2180, 104 L.Ed.2d 885 (1989). Accordingly, we find that the fourth factor weighs strongly against the application of collateral estoppel.
Under the facts of this case, fairness requires us to conclude that the application of collateral estoppel is not proper. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in finding that the federal declaratory judgment does not preclude Plaintiffs’ claim in the equitable garnishment action. Insurer’s point on appeal is denied.
Conclusion
The trial court found the existence of coverage under Warren’s homeowner’s insurance policy and Insurer does not allege error in this finding. Accordingly, the summary judgment entered in favor of Plaintiffs and against Insurer is affirmed.
LAWRENCE E. MOONEY, J., concurs.
LAWRENCE G. CRAHAN, J., dissents in a separate opinion.