Wiggins v. Hatch

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
• Decided: October 15, 2025
• Docket: 24-2159
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

Appellate Case: 24-2159 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 10/15/2025 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT October 15, 2025 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court MATTHEW WIGGINS,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. Nos. 24-2159 & 24-2160 (D.C. Nos. 1:21-CV-00670-KWR-DLM & T. HATCH, Warden; FNU MARTIN, Unit 1:22-CV-00279-KWR-DLM) Manager; FNU MONTOYA, Unit (D. N.M.) Manager; H. JARAMILLO, Captain; C. TRUJILLO, Lieutenant; Z. VANDIVER, STIU Sergeant; M. JONES, Sergeant; C. FRAZIER, Disciplinary Officer; D. JACKSON, Sergeant; H. OSORIO, CO; ALISHA TAFOYA LUCERO, Secretary of Corrections; JOHN DOE, Director of Adult Prisons; FNU BOBBIO, Sergeant; FNU LNU; FNU CHAPLAIN; FOOD SERVICE OF SUMMIT; DANIEL SEDILLO; FNU LUCRECIO; GARY MACIAL; ANDREW WAGNER, Disciplinary hearing officer; THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF CORRECTIONS; HEATHER JARAMILLO; FNU LNU, Summit Supervisor; DAVID GONZALEZ, Deputy Warden; JANE or JOHN DOE,

Defendants - Appellees. _________________________________

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined *

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral Appellate Case: 24-2159 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 10/15/2025 Page: 2

_________________________________

Before HOLMES, Chief Judge, TYMKOVICH, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges. _________________________________

Matthew Wiggins, a New Mexico prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the

district court’s partial dismissal and partial grant of summary judgment in his civil

rights action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Exercising jurisdiction under

28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm the district court’s judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

Wiggins filed a pro se civil rights complaint asserting claims under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 in July 2021. He amended that complaint twice before the district court

dismissed the case for a failure to pay the filing fee. The case was reopened after it

became clear that Wiggins’s filing payment had not been processed correctly.

In April 2022, he filed an identical pro se complaint in the same district court.

The court identified deficiencies in both complaints and directed Wiggins to refile

them; he filed amended complaints on both dockets in March 2023, again raising

identical claims. The court consolidated the two identical cases in May 2023.

Wiggins’s operative complaint named multiple defendants. There were two

groups of defendants: the New Mexico Corrections Department (“NMCD”) and its

employees (“NMCD Defendants”), and Food Service of Summit and one of its

employees (“Summit Defendants”). The complaint alleged several causes of action

estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 2 Appellate Case: 24-2159 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 10/15/2025 Page: 3

arising out of various incidents from Wiggins’s incarceration at the NMCD prison

facilities. It included two categories of claims: (1) claims arising out of the prison’s

disciplinary proceedings; and (2) claims arising from alleged religious

discrimination, which included allegations that all defendants failed to provide

Wiggins with appropriate halal meals. Wiggins also requested injunctive relief

against the individual capacity defendants, money damages against the official

capacity defendants, and compensatory damages.

The district court screened the operative complaint and directed the defendants

to file Martinez reports and dispositive motions. 1 The NMCD Defendants filed a

Martinez report, along with a motion to dismiss in part and for partial summary

judgment. The Summit Defendants joined the motion.

A magistrate judge reviewed the report and motions, as well as Wiggins’s

responses to those pleadings, and issued his proposed findings and recommended

disposition (“PFRD”), recommending that the motion to dismiss in part and for

partial summary judgment be granted.

Wiggins filed three documents responding to the PFRD. They did not contain

arguments objecting to the conclusions on the merits of his claims, nor did they point

to specific evidence in support of his claims.

1 A Martinez report is a procedure first approved in Martinez v. Aaron, 570 F.2d 317 (10th Cir. 1978). A district court may “direct prison officials to respond in writing to the [prisoner’s] various allegations, supporting their response by affidavits and copies of internal disciplinary rules and reports. The purpose of the Martinez report is to ascertain whether there is a factual as well as a legal basis for the prisoner’s claims.” Gee v. Estes, 829 F.2d 1005, 1007 (10th Cir. 1987). 3 Appellate Case: 24-2159 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 10/15/2025 Page: 4

The district court adopted the PFRD and granted the motion to dismiss in part

and for partial summary judgment. It determined that Wiggins’s responses to the

PFRD constituted timely filed objections, but held that they were not specific enough

because they were inadequately presented and did not “challeng[e] the PFRD or

explain[] how [the magistrate judge] erred in the PFRD.” R. vol. I at 820. Although

it concluded that Wiggins waived his objections by failing to provide specific

arguments or evidence, the court reviewed them de novo as an alternative basis for its

ruling and determined that they lacked merit or were unsupported by the record. The

court dismissed Wiggins’s discrimination claim as it related to his halal meals for

failure to exhaust administrative remedies. It dismissed the remaining claims for

failure to state a claim and on summary judgment. Wiggins appealed. 2

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The district court dismissed some of the claims for failure to state a claim and

resolved the others on summary judgment. We review both types of rulings de novo.

See McBride v. Deer, 240 F.3d 1287, 1289 (10th Cir. 2001).

III. DISCUSSION

We construe Wiggins’s filings liberally but do not serve as his advocate. Luo

v. Wang, 71 F.4th 1289, 1291 n.1 (10th Cir. 2023). And we have “repeatedly insisted

that pro se parties follow the same rules of procedure that govern other litigants.”

Wiggins filed a notice of appeal in his two consolidated district court cases. 2

This court initially opened two separate appeals but later partially consolidated them for procedural purposes. This Order and Judgment resolves both appeals. 4 Appellate Case: 24-2159 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 10/15/2025 Page: 5

Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005)

(alterations and internal quotation marks omitted).

Wiggins devotes much of his appellate brief to discussing the merits of his

claim regarding the provision of halal meals at the prison. Notably, he does not

reference or challenge the district court’s rulings regarding the merits of the summary

judgment grant or any other claims the district court dismissed. Accordingly, even

under the rules of liberal construction, Wiggins has abandoned any challenge to those

aspects of the district court’s final order on appeal. See Sawyers v. Norton, 962 F.3d

1270, 1286 (10th Cir. 2020) (“Issues not raised in the opening brief are deemed

abandoned or waived . . . [as are] arguments that are inadequately presented . . . .”

(internal quotation marks omitted)). As a result, only his religious discrimination

claim based on the lack of halal meals at the prison is properly before us. In addition

to the challenge to the district court’s final order, Wiggins raises additional

arguments relating to the district court’s handling of his case. Under liberal

construction, Wiggins has not abandoned these challenges, so we will address them

in addition to his religious discrimination claim. See Luo, 71 F.4th at 1291 n.1.

a. Firm Waiver

The district court conducted a de novo review of Wiggins’s pleadings even

though it ruled he had not filed specific objections to the PFRD. While the district

court’s decision to conduct de novo review absent a proper objection does not

preclude application of the firm waiver rule, see Vega v. Suthers, 195 F.3d 573,

579-80 (10th Cir. 1999), we decline to apply the rule to the arguments that Wiggins

5 Appellate Case: 24-2159 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 10/15/2025 Page: 6

does attempt to make on appeal, exercising our discretion to consider them. See

United States v. Walker, 918 F.3d 1134, 1153 (10th Cir. 2019).

b. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

We must discern whether the district court properly dismissed Wiggins’s

religious discrimination claim as to his halal meals for failure to exhaust

administrative remedies. On appeal, Wiggins asserts that he did his best to exhaust

his administrative remedies through the grievance process, and that the defendants

have violated his constitutional rights by refusing to serve him halal meals.

Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”), a prisoner must

exhaust his administrative remedies before he may file a federal action challenging

prison conditions. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Greer v. Dowling, 947 F.3d 1297, 1301

(10th Cir. 2020). “An inmate who begins the grievance process but does not

complete it is barred from pursuing a § 1983 claim under [the] PLRA for failure to

exhaust his administrative remedies.” Jernigan v. Stuchell, 304 F.3d 1030, 1032

(10th Cir. 2002). Exhaustion occurs when an inmate fully complies with prison

grievance procedures; substantial compliance is not enough. See id. The defendants

have the burden of asserting the affirmative defense of failure to exhaust and of

demonstrating that no material fact exists concerning whether the plaintiff exhausted

his administrative remedies. See Tuckel v. Grover, 660 F.3d 1249, 1254 (10th Cir.

2011). Once a defendant shows the plaintiff failed to exhaust, the burden shifts to the

plaintiff to show the remedies were unavailable. Id. Remedies are unavailable when

“prison officials prevent, thwart, or hinder a prisoner’s efforts to avail himself of

6 Appellate Case: 24-2159 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 10/15/2025 Page: 7

[the] administrative remedy.” Id. at 1252 (quoting Little v. Jones, 607 F.3d 1245,

1250 (10th Cir. 2010)).

For New Mexico inmates who assert claims under § 1983 about prison

conditions and the actions of prison employees, the administrative grievance process

consists of:

1. Submission of an informal complaint;

2. Submission of an inmate grievance; and

3. Submission of an appeal after receiving a decision on the previously submitted

grievance.

See R. vol. I at 299.

The Martinez report contained affidavits from prison administrative officers

who reviewed prison records for grievances Wiggins filed concerning his claims,

including the claim relating to his halal meals. According to affidavits from

Grievance Officers Maxine Montoya, Cheryl Frazier, Janine Rodriguez, and Joshua

Sigala, Wiggins filed four inmate grievances complaining that halal meals were not

properly provided to him in November 2016, March 2021, April 2021, and May

2023. All the grievances were denied, but Wiggins did not appeal those denials.

Relying on the materials in the report, the defendants moved for dismissal on

the halal meal claim on exhaustion grounds. They also requested dismissal or

summary judgment on Wiggins’s other claims.

Wiggins replied to the Martinez report, asserting that he did everything he

could to exhaust his claims via NMCD’s grievance process. In support, he attached

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documentation of his inmate financial accounts and pointed to several postage fee

charges as evidence that he submitted appeals for his denied grievances.

The PFRD recommended dismissing Wiggins’s claim relating to his halal

meals as unexhausted. It noted that Wiggins failed to appeal any of his grievances,

and thus did not fully exhaust his available administrative remedies. The PFRD

further noted that, while Wiggins claimed that he attempted to exhaust his

administrative remedies, the evidence he provided only demonstrated that his inmate

account incurred several postage fees and did not show that he specifically appealed

any of the denied grievances. Accordingly, the PFRD recommended that this claim

be dismissed as a matter of law because it was unexhausted.

As stated above, Wiggins filed three pleadings responding to the PFRD.

Relevant here, Wiggins appeared to argue that the reason his claim regarding his

halal meals was unexhausted was because the NMCD Defendants failed to process

his claim.

The district court referenced the magistrate judge’s rejection of that argument

and found that Wiggins did not show that he had exhausted his administrative

remedies concerning the halal food claim in this case. Accordingly, it dismissed the

claim without prejudice.

We find no reversible error in the district court’s determination that Wiggins

failed to properly exhaust his administrative remedies regarding his halal food claim.

On appeal, Wiggins argues that the district court improperly dismissed his claim but

does not point to specific facts or evidence that this conclusion was incorrect. The

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record indicates that Wiggins initiated the grievance process by filing grievances

with the prison, and he states on appeal that he did his best to comply with the

process. However, affidavits from prison officials state that Wiggins never filed

appeals once his grievances were denied, which was a necessary step in the grievance

process. See R. vol. I at 299. And, as noted in the PFRD, the postage charges

Wiggins submitted lack specific details demonstrating he mailed any grievance

appeals.

Because Wiggins failed to appeal any of the grievance denials, he has at best

substantially complied with the administrative grievance process, which isn’t

sufficient. See Jernigan, 304 F.3d at 1032. Nor has Wiggins demonstrated that the

exhaustion process was unavailable to him to circumvent the requirement to fully

exhaust administrative remedies. See Tuckel, 660 F.3d at 1254. Accordingly, the

district court correctly dismissed this claim for a failure to exhaust administrative

remedies.

c. Additional Arguments

Finally, we address additional challenges Wiggins raises on appeal.

He argues that the district court incorrectly stated that he failed to respond to

the defendants’ filings throughout the course of the case, and that this was an

incorrect basis for dismissal and summary judgment. But a review of the record

indicates that Wiggins successfully submitted various pleadings and filings

throughout the duration of the case before the district court, and that the district court

made no dispositive findings based on Wiggins’s failure to respond to the

9 Appellate Case: 24-2159 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 10/15/2025 Page: 10

defendants’ pleadings. To the extent that this argument challenges the district court’s

observation that Wiggins failed to provide specific objections to the PFRD, we

discern no reversible error. The district court fairly concluded that Wiggins did not

specifically object to the conclusions presented in the PFRD. Further, the district

court addressed all of Wiggins’s objections in its final order, despite the firm waiver

rule. We therefore reject this argument.

Wiggins also takes issue with the dismissal of his original complaint for a

failure to pay the filing fee. But the district court cured the improper dismissal upon

discovery that payment had been received. Further, the original complaint is not the

operative complaint in this action, as Wiggins filed several amendments after the

erroneous dismissal. Accordingly, we find no error.

Wiggins reiterates his requests for punitive damages and an injunction against

all defendants for their alleged violations of his constitutional rights. He has not

asserted specific arguments or pointed to evidence in support of these requests. In

any event, the record before us does not support an award of punitive damages or an

injunction. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a

declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable”); Knox v.

Bland, 632 F.3d 1290, 1292 (10th Cir. 2011) (declining to grant injunctive relief

because an inmate did not “show[] that either condition was satisfied”); Searles v.

Van Bebber, 251 F.3d 869, 879 (10th Cir. 2001) (observing that punitive damages are

appropriate when the conduct at issue is “motivated by evil motive or intent, or when

10 Appellate Case: 24-2159 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 10/15/2025 Page: 11

it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others”

(internal quotation marks omitted)).

Lastly, Wiggins argues qualified immunity doesn’t apply to the defendants in

this action. But neither the magistrate judge nor the district court mentioned or relied

on qualified immunity. Therefore, it isn’t relevant to this appeal.

IV. CONCLUSION

We affirm the district court’s final judgment. We grant Wiggins’s motion for

leave to proceed without prepayment of fees and remind him of his obligation to

make partial payments until the filing fee has been paid in full. We deny his motion

to supplement the record on appeal. We also deny his motion for leave to amend his

briefs based on new evidence.

Entered for the Court

Nancy L. Moritz Circuit Judge