Wieda v. American Box Board Co.

72 N.W.2d 13, 343 Mich. 182, 1955 Mich. LEXIS 312

• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Decided: October 3, 1955
• Docket: Docket 17, Calendar 46,225
• Status: Published

Opinions

Carr, C. J.

It does not appear that any material facts in this case are in dispute. On February 15, 1952, and for several years prior thereto, plaintiff whs employed by defendant as a turbine operator. He was on said date 39 years of age. His employment was concerned with the operation of a steam turbine which generated electricity for the use of defendant’s plant. Said turbine was located on 2 floors, or levels, of the building in which it was placed, separated by a set of metal stairs comprising 26 steps. He was required each hour to make a tour of inspection of the equipment to ascertain if it was operating properly, such tour requiring approximately 5 minutes. Otherwise he observed certain gauges and meters in the furtherance of the same general purpose.

In connection with his work plaintiff was furnished a list of specific instructions as to what should be done in case of a power shortage. It appears from his testimony that 1 such shortage had occurred when he was on duty prior to February 15, 1952. The employer had also caused drills to be carried out by employees connected with the operation of the turbine, the purpose being to' prepare each one concerned with reference to the course to be followed in event of the occurrence of a power shortage.

On the date mentioned plaintiff began work at 10 o’clock in the evening. Approximately an hour later, while in the washroom, he heard a noise that caused him' to hurry up the stairs to the second floor. He then" discovered that the voltage was out of control. From' then on it appears that he followed the instructions that had been given- to him, taking each step as directed and without any uncertainty on his part as to what it was necessary to do. In the course of his operations another employee, who was plaintiff’s superior in the plant, came to his aid. They finally succeeded in getting the equipment working and were Advised by another employee that they might turn on an auxiliary switch, which operation resulted in the receipt of electric current from the Consumers Power Company.' The turbine was then' started. The entire operation consumed approximately 45 minutes.

In-endeavoring to restore the turbine to its normal functioning plaintiff hurried, or ran as he testified, up and down the stairs referred to at least 6 times. His instructions did not specifically require him to run, but apparently he was anxious to restore the equipment under his supervision to its normal operation as soon as possible. At one time during the 45-minute period referred to he experienced a dizzy feeling, which he testified passed away as the result of his shaking his head. After the situation had been corrected, however, he again experienced dizziness, and he was taken to the first-aid room of the plant and then to a hospital where he remained for approximately 10 hours. Thereafter he returned to his home and remained in bed for a period of about 3 weeks.

On April 28,1952, as found by the workmen’s compensation commission, he was employed by defendant as a first-aid attendant, which position he held until September 12th, following, when he was laid off. His application to the workmen’s compensation commission for hearing and adjustment of his claim for compensation recited the occurrence on February 15, 1952, as above indicated. Following a hearing before a deputy commissioner an award of compensation was made which, on appeal to the commission, was set aside. On leave granted by this Court, plaintiff has appealed.

The physician who attended plaintiff on the occasion in question was called as a witness in his behalf, testifying that plaintiff had suffered a heart attack referred to as a coronary infarction or coronary occlusion. He summarized his diagnosis of plaintiff’s trouble as follows:

“This particular type of infarction that he had, in my opinion was this: That his circulation, his coronary circulation, was sufficient to take care of the needs of his heart under ordinary conditions. There was probably — must have been — -narrowing of the lumen, that is, of the hole in the blood vessel, and this sudden exertion made the heart demand more blood and it couldn’t get it. Consequently he had an ischemia present in the heart muscle due to the fact that that particular part of the blood vessel didn’t give the heart muscle enough blood, and that developed into the infarction.”

The witness further indicated in his testimony, in accordance with the above-quoted statement, that plaintiff on the 15th of February, 1952, did not have a normal heart, and that the coronary thrombosis or occlusion that he then had indicated such fact. It thus appears that there was testimony before the deputy commissioner indicating that there was a pre-existing heart condition apparently unknown to plaintiff. Undoubtedly his activity during the 45-minute period following the power failure aggravated this condition and brought about the heart attack.

Plaintiff bases his claim for compensation on part 2 of the workmen’s compensation law.

* It is urged, in substance, that the power failure was a fortuitous event, that it resulted in plaintiff’s disability, and that the compensation commission was in error in declining to award him compensation. The primary question at issue is whether the statute may properly be interpreted as covering the factual situation presented on this record. It is apparent that the failure of the turbine to function properly was not the result of an accident in the ordinary acceptance of that term. Such failure had occurred on prior occasions and once, at. least, when plaintiff was on duty. The conducting of drills in order to prepare defendant’s employees concerned in the operation of the turbine for any such occurrence, and the giving of specific instructions as to each step to be followed in remedying the situation, must be regarded as indicating that power shortages wére anticipated by the employer and said employees. The loss of power on the occasion in question may not be regarded as accidental or fortuitous.

It must be borne in mind also that plaintiff’s disability did not result directly from the power short-' age or from any accidental occurrence in the course of or arising out of his employment. Rather, his unfortunate condition was brought about by his own acts during the 45-minute period following the development of the power shortage. His running up and down stairs was actuated by his own desire to restore the operation of the turbine as soon as possible. A conclusion that there was an accidental occurrence bringing about the heart attack may not be predicated, under the facts here involved, on the fact that his exertions in conjunction with the preexisting heart condition brought about the result. In Robbins v. Original Gas Engine Co., 191 Mich 122, 128, it was said in referring to the distinction to be observed between the means by which an injury is produced and the result of the producing cause or causes:

“It is not sufficient that there be an unusual and unanticipated result; the means must be accidental— involuntary and unintended. There must, too, be some proximate connection between accidental means and the injurious result.”

The foregoing statement was quoted by this Court in the recent decision in Nichols v. Central Crate & Box Company, 340 Mich 232, 235. See, also, Kutschmar v. Briggs Manufacturing Co., 197 Mich 146, 150 (LRA1918B, 1133).

In United States Mutual Accident Association v. Barry, 131 US 100, 121 (9 S Ct 755, 33 L ed 60) the court, in construing an insurance policy,- said:

“If a result is such as follows from ordinary means, voluntarily employed, in a not unusual or unexpected way, it cannot be called a result effected by accidental means; but that if, in the act which precedes the injury, something unforeseen, unexpected, unusual occurs which produces the injury, then the injury has resulted through accidental means.”

In the instant case, as above pointed out, there was nothing in the occurrence preceding plaintiff’s acts that resulted in his disability that was unforeseen or unexpected. On the contrary, power shortages were anticipated and arrangements made to deal with them in a proper and methodical manner when they occurred. An unfortunáte result may not be given the retroactive effect of making a particular event or happening accidental in nature which was not of such character when it took place.

This Court has repeatedly considered eases involving situations analogous to that in the case at bar. In Hagopian v. City of Highland Park, 313 Mich 608, it was held that an employee engaged in lifting cans containing rubbish and who suffered an acute heart ailment was not entitled to compensation, said ailment being an ordinary disease of life to which the public generally is exposed and from which plaintiff had suffered prior to the attack on which his claim was based. As in the case at bar, it was not argued that the heart condition was an occupational disease. Likewise, as here, there was no accident. In O’Neil v. W. R. Spencer Grocer Co., 316 Mich 320, dependents of an employee of the defendant company sought to recover compensation because of his death which was claimed to have resulted from undue exertion on his part in operating his automobile in heavy snow. There was no showing of an accident in which the employee was involved. In holding that the statute did not authorize the payment of compensation under the facts, it was said (p 324):

. “In- our opinion, plaintiffs have failed "to supply competent evidence of the fact that deceased received an-injury from an accident growing out of and in the course of his employment. Nor can it he said that the death of Mr. O’Neil was caused from a disease due to causes and conditions which are characteristic of and peculiar to the business of the employer and which arises out of and in the course of the employment. The record substantiates the claim that deceased’s death w.as due to a disease of life to which the public in general is exposed.”

.In Kasarewski v. Hupp Motor Car Corp., 315 Mich 225, 232, it was held that the aggravation of a previously-existing nonoccupational disease is not compensable under part 2 of the workmen’s compensation law unless the aggravating injury is accidental, in character. See, also, Mooney v. Copper Range Railroad Company, 318 Mich 120. In the case at bar it is not disputed that plaintiff was suffering from a pre-existing heart condition. Under the interpretation of the statute- recognized in the cited, cases and in. other decisions of like character, he is not entitled to compensation unless his injury was the result of an accident. However, there is no proof - in this record on which to base a conclusion that, plaintiff sustained an injury by accidental means.

In May v. A. H. Powell Lumber Company, 335 Mich 420, the claim for compensation was presented, by dependents of Victor May who was an employee of the Powell Lumber Company. On the day prior to his death he operated a bulldozer which did not function properly. In consequence fumes and smoke resulted from oil splashed over the motor. This, caused the employee .to cough and gag, and apparently such effects of inhaling the fumes persisted, during the evening and night. The next morning at approximately 4 o’clock his death occurred from a. heart condition. Medical testimony disclosed that.. he was in fact suffering from' an advanced coronary condition of a serious nature of which he apparently had no knowledge. It was held that the death of the employee had not been brought about by accidental means aggravating the existing ailment, and that, in consequence, the provisions of part 2 of the work-' men’s compensation law, under which the claim was filed, could not be construed as authorizing compensation.

In denying compensation in the instant case the-commission relied specifically on McGregor v. Conservation Department, 338 Mich 93. There the plain-, tiff employee had a pre-existing arteriosclerosis. He was employed by the defendant as a fire warden. On the 11th of May, 1950, following exertion on his part in fighting fires, he suffered a coronary thrombosis, and later sought compensation for the resulting disability. Citing with approval the decision in Hagopian v. City of Highland Park, supra, it was held that such disability was noncompensable. The plaintiff’s claim was first filed under part 2 of the compensation law and subsequently amended to cover claims under part 2 and part 7, in the alternative. The award of the compensation commission was based on part 7, it being concluded that plaintiff’s injury was not brought about by accidental means. In the case at bar there is no basis for any claim that plaintiff’s disability resulted from conditions characteristic of and peculiar to his employment.

Among other cases, counsel for plaintiff rely on LaVeck v. Parke, Davis & Co., 190 Mich 604. In that case the employee suffered a cerebral hemorrhage, resulting in paralysis, while working in a room heated to a high temperature. An award of compensa-' tion was made on the theory that the hemorrhage was an accidental occurrence, and this Court affirmed on the ground that such finding was supported by testimony. Counsel also cite Schlange v. Briggs Manufacturing Co., 326 Mich 552. There this Court affirmed an award of compensation, it appearing from the record that plaintiff employee, while engaged in the performance of his duties, was thrown or jerked against a machine that he was operating, and that at the time he felt a sharp pain in his chest. It was not disputed that such happening was accidental.

Each case arising under the workmen’s compensation law must he determined on the basis of the particular facts involved and in accordance with pertinent statutory provisions. We are bound by such provisions and must interpret them in accordance with the apparent legislative intent. The facts in the case at bar are not in dispute and, in consequence, the question is, as before indicated, whether the statute entitles plaintiff to compensation on the theory that his disability resulted from an occurrence accidental in nature. We cannot so find. The principles followed in the decisions above cited, particularly the McGregor Case, are controlling. It is, we think, unnecessary to cite other decisions in accord therewith. The workmen’s compensation commission was correct in so holding.

The order from which the appeal has been taken is affirmed, with costs to appellee.

Butzel, Sharpe, Boyles, Beid, Dethmers, and Kelly, JJ., concurred with Carr, C. J.

PA 1912 (1st Ex Sess), No 10, as amended (CL 1948, §411.1 et seq. [Stat Ann 1950 Rev and Stat Ann 1951 Cum Supp § 17.141 et seq.~\).