White v. General Motors Corp.

429 N.W.2d 576, 431 Mich. 387

• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Decided: September 27, 1988
• Docket: 79194, (Calendar No. 4)
• Status: Published

Opinions

Riley, C.J.

In this case, we are asked to decide whether MCL 418.373(1); MSA 17.237(373)(1)¹ of the Workers’ Disability Compensation Act has retroactive application. We would hold that § 373 affects substantive rights and, thus, applies prospectively to those employees injured on or after January 1, 1982, the amendment’s effective date. Accordingly, we would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the decision of the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff White was employed for thirty-seven years by defendant. On March 31, 1980, plaintiff retired under defendant’s "thirty and out” nondisability, early retirement plan. On May 29, 1980, plaintiff filed a claim with the Workers’ Compensation Bureau, alleging that he was disabled as of the date of his early retirement by chronic bronchitis and pulmonary emphysema, arising out of prolonged exposure to dust, smoke, paint, and other irritants. The hearing referee, finding that plaintiff had a work-incurred disability and had retired early because of his respiratory condition, awarded plaintiff weekly benefits effective from his retirement date, payable until further notice from the bureau. Defendant appealed to the wcab, arguing that plaintiff was not disabled.

While the case was pending before the wcab, the Michigan Legislature enacted 1980 PA 357, effective January 1, 1982. MCL 418.373; MSA 17.237(373), which provides:

(1) An employee who terminates active employment and is receiving nondisability pension or retirement benefits under either a private or governmental pension or retirement program, including old-age benefits under the social security act, 42 USC 301 to 1397f, that was paid by or on behalf of an employer from whom weekly benefits under this act are sought shall be presumed not to have a loss of earnings or earning capacity as the result of a compensable injury or disease under either this chapter or chapter 4. This presumption may be rebutted only by a preponderance of the evidence that the employee is unable, because of a work related disability, to perform work suitable to the employee’s qualifications, including training or experience. This standard of disability supersedes other applicable standards used to determine disability under either this chapter or chapter 4.

(2) This section shall not be construed as a bar to an employee receiving medical benefits under section 315 upon the establishment of a causal relationship between the employee’s work and the need for medical treatment. [Emphasis added.]

On May 2, 1986, the wcab affirmed the referee’s award and declined to apply the presumption set forth in §373, stating that defendant was not entitled to assert §373(1) because it concerned substantive rights and that the Legislature intended the amendment to apply prospectively to employees injured after its effective date.

The Court of Appeals remanded the action to the wcab to be reconsidered in light of Wojciechowski v General Motors Corp, 151 Mich App 399; 390 NW2d 727 (1986).

This Court then granted leave to appeal, limited to the issue whether § 373 of 1980 PA 357 should be given retrospective application. 428 Mich 873 (1987).

II. ANALYSIS

This Court has addressed the issue of retroactive versus prospective application of amendments of the wdca in several recent cases. First, in Selk v Detroit Plastic Products, 419 Mich 1, 9; 345 NW2d 184 (1984), we stated that as a general rule, "statutes are presumed to operate prospectively unless the contrary intent is clearly manifested.” A year later, in Franks v White Pine Copper Div, 422 Mich 636; 375 NW2d 715 (1985), this Court recognized an exception to the general rule for statutes which are remedial or procedural in nature. Most recently, in Hurd v Ford Motor Co, 423 Mich 531, 534; 377 NW2d 300 (1985), this Court considered another provision of the same public act, § 301(2), and concluded that it "was enacted to invalidate this Court’s decision in Deziel v Difco Laboratories, Inc (After Remand), 403 Mich 1; 268 NW2d 1 (1978), thus effecting a substantial change in the law and that the provisions of this amendment have prospective application.”

A

It is against this backdrop that this Court must examine § 373. Defendant characterizes § 373 as procedural.² However, careful analysis of this section reveals that it is not procedural. Section 373(1) provides in pertinent part:

An employee who terminates active employment and is receiving nondisability pension or retirement benefits . . . shall be presumed not to have a loss of earnings or earning capacity as the result of a compensable injury or disease under either this chapter or chapter 4. This presumption may be rebutted only by a preponderance of the evidence that the employee is unable, because of a work related disability, to perform work suitable to the employee’s qualifications, including training or experience. [Emphasis added.]

Relying upon the language highlighted above, defendant argues that § 373 creates a rebuttable presumption of law and is, therefore, procedural in nature. However, Michigan law specifically provides:

The function of a presumption is solely to place the burden of producing evidence on the opposing party.

"It is a procedural device which allows a person relying on the presumption to avoid a directed verdict, and it permits that person a directed verdict if the opposing party fails to introduce evidence rebutting the presumption.” [McKinstry v Valley Obstetrics-Gynecology Clinic, PC, 428 Mich 167, 180; 405 NW2d 88 (1987) (quoting Widmayer v Leonard, 422 Mich 280, 289; 373 NW2d 538 [1985]).]

Section 373 does not shift the claimant’s burden of producing evidence. Therefore, it does not create a "presumption.” Rather, we conclude that the "presumption” language in § 373 merely classifies those persons entitled to benefits under § 373.

B

In reiterating the general rule that statutes which affect substantive rights should be applied prospectively, the Hurd Court noted that prior to enactment of § 301(2),³ the eligibility of an employee with a mental disorder for workers’ compensation was determined by the "honest perception” standards set forth in Deziel, supra. Section 301(2) changed the standard of disability;⁴ thus, the Court concluded that the change affected substantive rights of the employee. Emphasizing the fact that the Legislature had not indicated whether § 301(2) should be applied retrospectively, the Hurd Court held that the amendment must be applied prospectively for injuries occurring on or after January 1, 1982. We find Hurd indistinguishable. As the Hurd Court stated:

"In accordance with the rule applicable to original acts, it is presumed that provisions added by the amendment affecting substantive rights are intended to operate prospectively. Provisions added by the amendment that affect substantive rights will not be construed to apply to transactions and events completed prior to its enactment unless the legislature has expressed its intent to that effect or such intent is clearly implied by the language of the amendment or by the circumstances surrounding its enactment.” [Hurd, supra at 535.]

Similarly, in the present case, prior to enactment of § 373, a claimant need only prove an impairment of wage-earning capacity within his field of employment. Kaarto v Calumet & Hecla, Inc, 367 Mich 128; 116 NW2d 225 (1962). Section 373 changed this standard.* ***⁵ Specifically, § 373 provides that "[t]his standard of disability supersedes other applicable standards used to determine disability under either this chapter or chapter 4.” The effect of § 373 on claimants is similar to the effect on claimants under § 301(2) in Hurd. Both §§ 301(2) and 373(1) changed a standard of disability. Thus, in accordance with Hurd, § 373 should be applied prospectively for injuries occurring on or after January 1, 1982, the effective date of the statute.

Cases relied upon by defendant are distinguishable from Hurd and the present case. The statutory amendment in Selk, supra, affected the amount of interest an individual was entitled to receive after it was already determined that compensation was due. As we noted in Franks, supra, "[i]n Selk, we found the interest rate on overdue compensation payments related to a remedy or mode of procedure and was 'but an incident and not the essence of a right or liability.’ ” Franks, supra at 672. Unlike the provision in Selk, § 373 involves the question whether a retired employee has a substantive right to compensation under § 373, thus directly affecting the essence of his right, and not merely calculating the amount of compensation which he may eventually receive.

Similarly, in Karl v Bryant Air Conditioning, 416 Mich 558; 331 NW2d 456 (1982), this Court held that the newly enacted comparative negligence statute⁶ applied retroactively to a pending products liability action. However, actions under the wdca are, by their very nature, different than products liability actions.⁷_

C

Defendant argues that even if § 373 is substantive, it is remedial and, therefore, should be applied retroactively. While we agree that the wdca is remedial, in the broad sense, we believe that such a characterization of the act, as a whole, provides no further insight into whether this particular amendment should be applied retroactively or prospectively.

It is well recognized that the wdca, as a whole, is remedial legislation. McAvoy v H B Sherman Co, 401 Mich 419, 457; 258 NW2d 414 (1977); Van Dorpel v Haven-Busch Co, 350 Mich 135, 154; 85 NW2d 97 (1957); DeKind v Gale Mfg Co, 125 Mich App 598, 609; 337 NW2d 252 (1983). Therefore, characterization of a wdca provision as remedial should not be dispositive. Otherwise, any statutory amendment of the wdca could be characterized as remedial and applied retroactively.

The problem with this broad meaning of "remedial” has been explained as follows:

Generally, remedial statutes are those which provide a remedy, or improve or facilitate remedies already existing for the enforcement of rights and the redress of injuries. They also include statutes intended for the correction of defects, mistakes and omissions in the civil institutions and the administration of the state.

Every statute that makes any change in the existing body of law, excluding only those enactments which merely restate or codify prior law, can be said to "remedy” some flaw in the prior law or some social evil. The mere fact that a statute is characterized as "remedial,” therefore, is of little value in statutory construction unless the term "remedial” has for this purpose a more discriminate meaning. [3 Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction (4th ed), § 60.02, p 60.]

At times, Michigan cases have used the broad meaning of "remedial” to apply arguably substantive amendments to the wdca retrospectively. See, e.g., Lahti v Fosterling, 357 Mich 578, 588; 99 NW2d 490 (1959) (retroactively applying 1955 PA 250, repealing a two-year maximum on medical and hospital expenses); Spencer v Clark Twp, 142 Mich App 63; 368 NW2d 897 (1985) (retroactively applying the provisions of 1980 PA 357, § 1, allowing volunteer ambulance drivers to obtain benefits as if a county, city or village employee at the maximum rate). However, in this context, we prefer the narrower meaning, in which "[t]he term 'remedial’ is often employed to describe legislation which is procedural in nature, i.e., it does not affect substantive rights.” 3 Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction (4th ed), § 60.02, p 60. See, e.g., Rookledge v Garwood, 340 Mich 444; 65 NW2d 785 (1954) (applying retroactively the 1952 PA 155 provision allowing an injured worker to proceed in tort against a defendant tortfeasor) and Selk, supra (applying retroactively the 1981 PA 194 provision increasing the amount of interest on a workers’ compensation award from five to twelve percent).⁸ As we have previously noted, § 373 is substantive in nature. We, therefore, conclude that, in this context, it is not remedial and the statute should be applied prospectively.

D

We also find it significant that the Legislature omitted any reference to the retroactivity of § 373. For example, in Selk, the Court noted that the Legislature made no reference to the retroactivity of 1981 PA 194 and, in fact, provided a specific future date for its application. In resolving the retroactivity issue, the Court reasoned:

When one carefully examines how the Legislature utilizes effective dates, however, it is clear that we have accorded that respect which is properly due.

Effective dates are inserted by the Legislature in all kinds of statutes. When it wishes to address the question of retroactivity, the Legislature has specifically done so in addition to providing for an effective date.

For example, when the Legislature passed the new rule for a claim and delivery action, in 1976 PA 79, it provided in enactment §2 that "[t]his amendatory act shall apply to all actions pending or commenced on or after the effective date of this act.” Enactment § 3 of the same statute provided: "This amendatory act shall take effect July 1, 1975.” Because the Legislature in connection with other statutes in enactment sections has specifically addressed retroactivity in addition to providing an effective date, we are unable to agree that the mere insertion of an effective date, standing alone, is dispositive of the prospective/retroactive effect of 1981 PA 194. [Selk, supra at 35, n 2.]

Therefore, we are persuaded that providing a specific, future effective date and omitting any reference to retroactivity supports our holding that § 373 is prospective in application.

III. CONCLUSION

We would hold that Hurd controls in the present case. Section 373 should apply prospectively only for injuries occurring on or after January 1, 1982, the effective date of the statute. Thus, we would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the decision of the wcab.

Cavanagh and Boyle, JJ., concurred with Riley, C.J.

1 The Legislature enacted 1980 PA 357, including § 373, as an amendment of the Workers’ Disability Compensation Act of 1969. See MCL 418.101 et seq.; MSA 17.237(101) et seq.

2 The dissent relies upon a quote from an article written by Justice Moody. Although the dissent properly asserts that the procedural-substantive dichotomy is often difficult to distinguish, the passage addresses retroactivity in a criminal case. In fact, later in the article, Justice Moody specifically discusses the differences between retroactivity in criminal and civil cases:

In the civil area, the cases reflect both greater consistency in result and more severe limitations upon retrospective reach. In a sense, this can be explained by the fact that in civil cases, the range of alternatives is narrower than in the criminal arena; concepts such as res judicata and statutes of limitation operate to cut off the backward effect of law-changing decisions. Thus, the full retroactivity occasionally accorded in criminal cases is essentially unknown in civil litigation .... [Moody, Retroactive application of law-changing decisions in Michigan, 28 Wayne L R 439, 483-484 (1982).]

3 MCL 418.301(2); MSA 17.237(301X2) was also enacted as part of 1980 PA 357.

4 Section 301(2) provides:

Mental disabilities and conditions of the aging process, including but not limited to heart and cardiovascular conditions, shall be compensable if contributed to or aggravated or accelerated by the employment in a significant manner. Mental disabilities shall be compensable when arising out of actual events of employment, not unfounded perceptions thereof. [MCL 418.301(2); MSA 17.237(301X2).]

5 Section 373 requires a claimant to prove he or she is eligible for compensation benefits by showing "the employee is unable, because of a work related disability, to perform work suitable to the employee’s qualifications, including training or experience.”

6 See MCL 600.2949 et seq.; MSA 27A.2949 et seq.

7 Assuming, however, that Karl is applicable in this case, it is more closely related to Selk than to the present case. In Karl, the jury returned a special verdict in favor of plaintiff for $52,000, finding that the manufacturer had breached its implied warranty. The factfinder also determined that the plaintiff was ninety-five percent negligent. While Karl was pending in the trial court, the Legislature enacted the comparative negligence statute which provided for its immediate effect. On appeal, the Karl Court held that the statute should be applied retroactively, stating that "[wjhile the total damages which plaintiff could have received were significantly reduced by [the statute], plaintiff’s cause of action was not legally barred or taken away.” Karl, supra at 577. Like the statute in Selk, the amendment in Karl was "not a matter of substance going to the individual’s right to compensation.” Franks, supra at 672. Thus, the Karl holding might be explained by the distinction drawn between the "amount” of benefits and the "entitlement” to benefits. Karl, supra at 577. This Court has recognized the distinction drawn between "amount” of benefits and "entitlement” to benefits in workers’ compensation cases involving a claimant’s earning capacity. See Leskinen v MESC, 398 Mich 501, 508-509; 247 NW2d 808 (1976). See also Medacco v Campbell, Wyant & Cannon Foundry Co, 48 Mich App 217, 226; 210 NW2d 360 (1973). Similarly, we also recognize that Karl might be explained because it has both remedial and procedural aspects. See Douglas v Robbins & Meyers, Inc, 505 F Supp 765 (WD Mich, 1980).

8 Alternatively, Sands indicates that "remedial” may be limited to "legislation which is not penal or criminal in nature.” 3 Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction (4th ed), § 60.02, p 60. In the context of construing an amendment of the wdca as either retroactive or prospective, we find this meaning to be of no more value than the general meaning outlined by Sands. However, we note that it may have some value in distinguishing statutes which must be strictly construed. See 3 Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction (4th ed), § 60.01, pp 55-56.