Brickley, C.J., and Levin, J.
i
RIZA v DELRAY BAKING CO
Halil Riza was employed at the Delray Baking Company until his last day of work, January 1, 1971. It was subsequently determined that Mr. Riza had a continuing psychiatric disability.
[138]*138The plaintiff filed the current action on December 29, 1981, claiming to be totally and permanently disabled. On December 4, 1984, his wife filed a petition requesting reimbursement for nursing and attendant care services she had been providing for the plaintiff. After a hearing, Magistrate Lanita Haith held that the plaintiff was not totally and permanently disabled. The magistrate did not address the request for reimbursement from Mrs. Riza.
The plaintiff appealed, and the wcab reversed. 1991 WCABO 1535. The wcab found the plaintiff to be totally and permanently disabled, and ordered the defendant to reimburse Mrs. Riza for all nursing and attendant care provided for the plaintiff from December 1, 1983, to July 30, 1985. After July 30, 1985, however, the board limited the award to compensation for fifty-six hours of work by Mrs. Riza per week, citing § 315(1) of the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act, an amendment that came into effect on that date. The amendment provides, in relevant part:
Attendant or nursing care shall not be ordered in excess of 56 hours per week if such care is to be provided by the employee’s spouse, brother, sister, child, parent, or any combination of these persons. [MCL 418.315(1); MSA 17.237(315(1).]
The wcab held that the statute applied to all payments made after its effective date.
Both the plaintiff and the defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals. That Court reversed the decision of the wcab and held that the fifty-six-hour limitation in § 315(1) must be applied retroactively. The statutory language, "shall not be ordered,” was found to be indicative of a legislative intent to apply the statute to all injuries for which [139]*139compensation was ordered after the effective date of the statute, regardless of the injury date. 200 Mich App 169; 504 NW2d 193 (1993). We subsequently granted leave to appeal. 448 Mich 852 (1995).
MULLINS v FRANK H WILSON CO
Mr. Charles Mullins worked for the Frank H. Wilson Company until February 16, 1984, when he was forced to quit because of several severe heart and lung conditions. Mr. Mullins filed a petition for hearing with the wcab on March 5, 1984. The hearing referee, Steven C. Washington, found him to be disabled and entitled to an open award of benefits.
The referee also found that the plaintiff was entitled to be reimbursed for the nursing and attendant care services provided by his wife and daughter. Benefits were awarded for nursing care from February 17, 1984, onward. After July 30, 1985, however, the referee limited the number of compensable hours for such services to fifty-six a week under § 315(1). The referee awarded the plaintiff a compensation rate based on the rate, $7 an hour, that would be charged by an agency that provided home care, and stated that the yearly rate of compensation would be, "subject to cost-of-living increases.”
Both the plaintiff and the defendant appealed the referee’s decision. The plaintiff argued that the fifty-six-hour limitation did not apply to him because his injury occurred before July 30, 1985. The defendant argued that the fifty-six-hour limitation should have been applied retroactively to the time of the plaintiff’s injury. It also contended that the plaintiff should only have been awarded compensation equivalent to the going rate for an [140]*140independently hired nurse’s aid, rather than the rate charged by an agency, and that the cost-of-living increases awarded by the referee were inappropriate.
The wcab affirmed in part and reversed in part. The board held that § 315(1) did not apply to Mr. Mullins. Hence, the referee’s decision to limit reimbursement for nursing and attendant care to fifty-six hours a week after July 30, 1985, was reversed. The board affirmed the referee’s decision to award compensation at the rate of $7 an hour, but held that the cost-of-living increases were "unenforceable and without any method by which to compute said cost-of-living increases . . . .” 1991 WCABO 331, 340.
Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Court held that the fifty-six hour a week limitation on compensation for nursing and attendant care imposed by § 315(1) should not apply to the plaintiff, because Mr. Mullins was injured before the effective date of the statute. Retroactive application of the amendment was inappropriate because it affected a substantive right. The Court also affirmed the wcab’s refusal to enforce the cost-of-living increases awarded in the referee’s opinion, and reversed the wcab’s decision to award the plaintiff the $7 an hour rate charged by home care agencies. Unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued December 9, 1992 (Docket No. 139268). Both parties appealed to this Court, and we granted leave in an unlimited order.1 448 Mich 852 (1995)._
[141]*141
SOKOLEK v GENERAL MOTORS CORP
Janet Sokolek was an employee of General Motors Corporation. Ms. Sokolek suffered an injury to her back while at work on April 16, 1980. She petitioned for worker’s compensation benefits and received an open award in November, 1981.
On October 14, 1985, Ms. Sokolek filed a petition to obtain compensation for nursing and attendant care provided by her husband. The magistrate found that the plaintiff was entitled to compensation, and the defendant appealed the decision to the wcab. Gm argued that the magistrate had erred in not applying §381(3) of the wdca, the "one-year-back rule.” Like §315(1), the one-year-back rule applying to nursing and attendant care became effective on July 30, 1985. The amendment provides:
Payment for nursing or attendant care shall not be made for any period which is more than 1 year before the date an application for a hearing is filed with the bureau. [MCL 418.381(3); MSA 17.287(381)(3).]
The wcab found that the amendment did not apply to injuries that occurred before July 30, 1985. It thereby affirmed the decision of the magistrate.
The Court of Appeals denied the defendant’s application for leave to appeal. Unpublished order, entered July 1, 1992 (Docket No. 146817). The defendant then appealed to this Court. We also denied leave initially, but on the defendant’s motion for rehearing, we remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for consideration as on leave granted the defendant’s claim that § 381(3) applied to these facts. 442 Mich 924 (1993). On remand, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the [142]*142wcab. 206 Mich App 31; 520 NW2d 668 (1994). The defendant again appealed to this Court, and we granted leave. 447 Mich 1048 (1994).
ii
1985 PA 103 added the following sentence to § 315 of the Worker’s Compensation Act:
Attendant or nursing care shall not be ordered in excess of 56 hours per week if such care is to be provided by the employee’s spouse, brother, sister, child, parent, or any combination of these persons.[2]
Act 103 added the following sentence to § 381:
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Brickley, C.J., and Levin, J.
i
RIZA v DELRAY BAKING CO
Halil Riza was employed at the Delray Baking Company until his last day of work, January 1, 1971. It was subsequently determined that Mr. Riza had a continuing psychiatric disability.
[138]*138The plaintiff filed the current action on December 29, 1981, claiming to be totally and permanently disabled. On December 4, 1984, his wife filed a petition requesting reimbursement for nursing and attendant care services she had been providing for the plaintiff. After a hearing, Magistrate Lanita Haith held that the plaintiff was not totally and permanently disabled. The magistrate did not address the request for reimbursement from Mrs. Riza.
The plaintiff appealed, and the wcab reversed. 1991 WCABO 1535. The wcab found the plaintiff to be totally and permanently disabled, and ordered the defendant to reimburse Mrs. Riza for all nursing and attendant care provided for the plaintiff from December 1, 1983, to July 30, 1985. After July 30, 1985, however, the board limited the award to compensation for fifty-six hours of work by Mrs. Riza per week, citing § 315(1) of the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act, an amendment that came into effect on that date. The amendment provides, in relevant part:
Attendant or nursing care shall not be ordered in excess of 56 hours per week if such care is to be provided by the employee’s spouse, brother, sister, child, parent, or any combination of these persons. [MCL 418.315(1); MSA 17.237(315(1).]
The wcab held that the statute applied to all payments made after its effective date.
Both the plaintiff and the defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals. That Court reversed the decision of the wcab and held that the fifty-six-hour limitation in § 315(1) must be applied retroactively. The statutory language, "shall not be ordered,” was found to be indicative of a legislative intent to apply the statute to all injuries for which [139]*139compensation was ordered after the effective date of the statute, regardless of the injury date. 200 Mich App 169; 504 NW2d 193 (1993). We subsequently granted leave to appeal. 448 Mich 852 (1995).
MULLINS v FRANK H WILSON CO
Mr. Charles Mullins worked for the Frank H. Wilson Company until February 16, 1984, when he was forced to quit because of several severe heart and lung conditions. Mr. Mullins filed a petition for hearing with the wcab on March 5, 1984. The hearing referee, Steven C. Washington, found him to be disabled and entitled to an open award of benefits.
The referee also found that the plaintiff was entitled to be reimbursed for the nursing and attendant care services provided by his wife and daughter. Benefits were awarded for nursing care from February 17, 1984, onward. After July 30, 1985, however, the referee limited the number of compensable hours for such services to fifty-six a week under § 315(1). The referee awarded the plaintiff a compensation rate based on the rate, $7 an hour, that would be charged by an agency that provided home care, and stated that the yearly rate of compensation would be, "subject to cost-of-living increases.”
Both the plaintiff and the defendant appealed the referee’s decision. The plaintiff argued that the fifty-six-hour limitation did not apply to him because his injury occurred before July 30, 1985. The defendant argued that the fifty-six-hour limitation should have been applied retroactively to the time of the plaintiff’s injury. It also contended that the plaintiff should only have been awarded compensation equivalent to the going rate for an [140]*140independently hired nurse’s aid, rather than the rate charged by an agency, and that the cost-of-living increases awarded by the referee were inappropriate.
The wcab affirmed in part and reversed in part. The board held that § 315(1) did not apply to Mr. Mullins. Hence, the referee’s decision to limit reimbursement for nursing and attendant care to fifty-six hours a week after July 30, 1985, was reversed. The board affirmed the referee’s decision to award compensation at the rate of $7 an hour, but held that the cost-of-living increases were "unenforceable and without any method by which to compute said cost-of-living increases . . . .” 1991 WCABO 331, 340.
Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Court held that the fifty-six hour a week limitation on compensation for nursing and attendant care imposed by § 315(1) should not apply to the plaintiff, because Mr. Mullins was injured before the effective date of the statute. Retroactive application of the amendment was inappropriate because it affected a substantive right. The Court also affirmed the wcab’s refusal to enforce the cost-of-living increases awarded in the referee’s opinion, and reversed the wcab’s decision to award the plaintiff the $7 an hour rate charged by home care agencies. Unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued December 9, 1992 (Docket No. 139268). Both parties appealed to this Court, and we granted leave in an unlimited order.1 448 Mich 852 (1995)._
[141]*141
SOKOLEK v GENERAL MOTORS CORP
Janet Sokolek was an employee of General Motors Corporation. Ms. Sokolek suffered an injury to her back while at work on April 16, 1980. She petitioned for worker’s compensation benefits and received an open award in November, 1981.
On October 14, 1985, Ms. Sokolek filed a petition to obtain compensation for nursing and attendant care provided by her husband. The magistrate found that the plaintiff was entitled to compensation, and the defendant appealed the decision to the wcab. Gm argued that the magistrate had erred in not applying §381(3) of the wdca, the "one-year-back rule.” Like §315(1), the one-year-back rule applying to nursing and attendant care became effective on July 30, 1985. The amendment provides:
Payment for nursing or attendant care shall not be made for any period which is more than 1 year before the date an application for a hearing is filed with the bureau. [MCL 418.381(3); MSA 17.287(381)(3).]
The wcab found that the amendment did not apply to injuries that occurred before July 30, 1985. It thereby affirmed the decision of the magistrate.
The Court of Appeals denied the defendant’s application for leave to appeal. Unpublished order, entered July 1, 1992 (Docket No. 146817). The defendant then appealed to this Court. We also denied leave initially, but on the defendant’s motion for rehearing, we remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for consideration as on leave granted the defendant’s claim that § 381(3) applied to these facts. 442 Mich 924 (1993). On remand, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the [142]*142wcab. 206 Mich App 31; 520 NW2d 668 (1994). The defendant again appealed to this Court, and we granted leave. 447 Mich 1048 (1994).
ii
1985 PA 103 added the following sentence to § 315 of the Worker’s Compensation Act:
Attendant or nursing care shall not be ordered in excess of 56 hours per week if such care is to be provided by the employee’s spouse, brother, sister, child, parent, or any combination of these persons.[2]
Act 103 added the following sentence to § 381:
Payment for nursing or attendant care shall not be made for any period which is more than 1 year before the date an application for a hearing is filed with the bureau.[3]
The question presented is whether these provisions, limiting the amount of medical benefits payable by an employer or its insurer in respect to an injured worker, apply retroactively in respect to injuries suffered before the July 30, 1985, effective date of Act 103, or apply prospectively.
Cognizant of the fact that the decision in these cases overrules, sub silentio, prior decisions of this Court, we hold that, although the workers in the instant cases were injured before July 30, 1985, these provisions apply to all services rendered on and after the July 30, 1985, effective date. Thus, in Riza and Mullins services rendered before July 30, 1985, are compensable without regard to the fifty-six hour a week limitation, and services rendered on and after July 30, 1985, are subject to [143]*143the fifty-six hour a week limitation. In Sokolek, the one-year-back limitation is not effective regarding nursing or attendant care services rendered before July 30, 1985, with the result that Ms. Sokolek, who filed on October 14, 1985, within a few months and hence within one year of the July 30 effective date of Act 103, may recover for all services rendered through October 14, 1985.
Worker’s compensation benefits are a form of income maintenance for persons whose wage-earning capacity has been suspended or terminated. Franks v White Pine Copper Div, 422 Mich 636, 654; 375 NW2d 715 (1985). In Lahti v Fosterling, 357 Mich 578; 99 NW2d 490 (1959), this Court held that the Legislature could increase medical benefits effective retroactively to include persons injured before the effective date of the amendatory act. Similarly, the Legislature may, as here, reduce medical benefits.4
Absent something in the language or in the history of Act 103 that would justify , the conclusion that the Legislature did not intend that these amendments would become effective with respect to weekly benefit periods commencing on and after the July 30, 1985, effective date, without regard to whether the injury or disability occurred before that date, we hold that these amendments are effective with respect to weekly benefit periods commencing on and after July 30, 1985, whether or not the injury or disability occurred before that date.5
III
A
Two issues appealed in Mullins v Frank H Wil[144]*144son Co remain to be decided. We granted the plaintiff’s application to appeal the Court of Appeals determination that he was entitled to be compensated for the attendant care of his wife only at the rate charged by a nurse’s aid hired independently, rather than at the rate paid to an agency for such a service. We also agreed to decide the propriety of the hearing referee’s award of cost-of-living increases, which was reversed by the wcab and the Court of Appeals as, "unenforceable.”
At the hearing before the referee, the only testimony concerning the appropriate rate of compensation for home health care was that of the plaintiff’s expert, Karen Hoffner. Ms. Hoffner testified that hiring a "homemaker companion” through a nursing agency would cost between $7 and $7.25 an hour. She also testified that a homemaker companion could be hired independent of such an agency, and that this would cost $3.75 an hour. This lower rate also apparently approximates the amount a homemaker companion would be paid if that person worked for a nursing agency. The difference in price, about $3.25 an hour, is taken by the agency, presumably to pay for overhead costs and for profit.
The statutory provision at issue provides:
The employer shall furnish, or cause to be furnished, to an employee who receives a personal injury arising out of and in the course of employment, reasonable medical, surgical, and hospital services and medicines, or other attendance or treatment recognized by the Jaws of this state as legal, when they are needed. [MCL 418.315(1); MSA 17.237(315)(1).]
The term, "reasonable,” refers not only to the services to be performed, but to the compensation [145]*145to be paid to the provider of such services. Kosiel v Arrow Liquors Corp, 446 Mich 374, 383; 521 NW2d 531 (1994).
The defendant argues that there is no reason why the plaintiff’s wife should receive the extra money that an agency charges to address administrative costs. Although we agree that this argument is logically compelling, we hold that what level of compensation is reasonable is a factual determination for the magistrate to decide.
This is in accord with our decision in Kosiel. In that case we held that a magistrate could order a certain level of compensation, "until the further order” from the board, allowing a possible revision in the compensation rate at an unspecified point in the future. Id. at 382. We reasoned in part that the magistrate was following the dictates of the statute, by including a temporal aspect in the determination of what reasonable compensation was. The factual nature of the issue of reasonable compensation was implicit in this decision. Id. at 382-383.
Moreover, the magistrate is in a better position than an appellate court to make this determination. The record before us on appeal is limited, and it is difficult for us to know whether it would be appropriate to award at least part of the extra expense required to hire a home companion from a nursing agency. Many considerations may be necessary to make such a determination.
For example, the cost of minimal benefits and social security contributions may be included in the higher hourly rate paid to a nursing agency,• and it may be necessary to provide similar benefits to an independent companion, over and above a standard salary. Nursing agencies may also pay to provide training to their employees above and beyond the abilities of an independent companion, [146]*146training that may be necessary to care for the plaintiff. In short, this is a multifaceted factual issue, involving the various types of in-home care available, the duties performed by them, their customary billing and payment practices, and the type of services being performed by the plaintiff’s wife. Brown v Eller Outdoor Advertising Co, 139 Mich App 7, 10; 360 NW2d 322 (1984).
The magistrate did not provide an explanation for his finding that the plaintiff should be compensated for his wife’s attendant care at the rate charged by a home nursing agency. We believe the record to be devoid of sufficient information to make such a finding. We therefore remand this portion of the case to the magistrate, to determine what compensation is reasonable under these facts.
B
The hearing referee awarded the plaintiff’s compensation, "subject to cost-of-living increases.” The wcab held that this provision of the award was, "unenforceable,” and the Court of Appeals affirmed. We find that our opinion in Kosiel, supra, also controls the resolution of this issue.
In Kosiel, the magistrate ordered a certain level of compensation, "until the further order of the Department.” We stated that the order
did not represent a final determination of the value of nursing services for the duration of plaintiff’s life; rather, it contemplated the need to adjust the amount at some point in the future in response to such changes as increases or decreases in wage rates or inflation.
Like the statutory standard, the order provides the necessary flexibility to allow a future determi[147]*147nation or "reasonableness” in keeping with the humanitarian objectives that underlie the wdca. [Id. at 381-383.]
Obviously, then, a magistrate is empowered to award cost-of-living increases at a time after a nonfinal determination when such increases are appropriate.
We find that the hearing referee’s order in this case served the same permissible purpose as the order in Kosiel, to allow the plaintiff’s award to evolve as conditions changed. Admittedly, the order in this case is more troublesome, because it provided an award that was not specific or determinable by some set formula. Because this type of award is permissible, however, we think it best to remand this aspect of the case to the magistrate, as part of the determination of what compensation is reasonable in this case. We feel that it would be inequitable, as well as contrary to the spirit of our reasoning in Kosiel, to hold that the services of the plaintiff’s wife must be compensated at a level found to be appropriate in 1985. The Court of Appeals may or may not be correct in its assessment that $3.75 an hour was fair compensation for attendant care a decade ago, but there is little doubt that this figure, well under the current minimum wage, is no longer adequate.
Sokolek affirmed.
Riza reversed.
Mullins affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Mallett, J., concurred with Brickley, C.J., and Levin, J.