Levin, J.
Gary Buschlen lost a .hand, and one of Fannie White’s hands was seriously injured, while they were operating power presses for an outsource contractor employed to produce automobile parts by the Ford Motor Company, in
Buschlen,
and the Chrysler Corporation, in
White.
The outsource contractors, or their workers’ compensation liability insurers, paid Buschlen’s and White’s
medical expenses. The statute provides that workers’ compensation benefits shall be paid for 215 weeks for the loss of a hand, and Buschlen received approximately $15,000.
White, whose injury occurred after the statute was amended to provide for payment of weekly benefits for the "duration of the disability,”
received approximately $52,000, including an amount paid upon redemption.
Except to the extent that payment of the 215-week specific benefit may aggregate an amount in excess of the income lost as a result of loss of a hand, the workers’ compensation act does not compensate for payment for loss of non-vocational use of a hand, the inability to use the hand to drive an automobile or a golf ball, or to touch another person.
The act, however, provides that an injured worker may maintain an action against a person— other than the employer paying workers’ compensation or a fellow employee — who is under a "legal liability” to the injured worker.
Unless there is such a third person under a legal liability to the
injured worker, he has no source of recovery for loss of the non-vocational use of the hand.
The question presented in the instant cases is whether Chrysler and Ford are subject to a legal liability to White and Buschlen as a result of acting negligently in entering into the outsource arrangements with the component parts manufacturers in whose employ White and Buschlen suffered their injury and loss. We hold that the automobile manufacturers were not under such a legal liability.
Recovery is sought on the theories that Chrysler and Ford (i) negligently entrusted the die sets in the power presses to the component parts manufacturers, and (ii) negligently supplied them with chattels (the die sets) dangerous for the intended use.
Negligent entrustment of a die set was considered by this Court in
Fredericks v General Motors Corp,
411 Mich 712; 311 NW2d 725 (1981). In
Fredericks,
as in the instant cases, the automobile manufacturer entered into a contract with the manufacturer of the component part that contemplated the component manufacturer would have a die set made to produce the part according to the specifications of the contract. Although the die set was manufactured by or at the direction of the component manufacturer, title to the die set was deemed, under the terms of the contract, to have vested in the automobile manufacturer so that, if the component manufacturer was unable to continue production, the automobile manufacturer would have a legal right to recover possession of the dies. This would enable the automobile manufacturer to avoid interruption of production of automobiles because of a problem of a component manufacturer. Such a problem occurred in
Fredericks
when a labor dispute closed the component
manufacturer. General Motors acquired possession of the dies and transferred them to Fredericks’ employer. In the instant cases, neither Chrysler nor Ford obtained possession of the dies although, under their contracts with White’s and Buschlen’s employers, they had the right to do so.
In
Fredericks,
this Court concluded that Fredericks failed to demonstrate peculiarities of the component manufacturer sufficient to put General Motors on notice that the component manufacturer was likely to use the die set in an unsafe manner.
Addressing the alternative argument that an unguarded die is unreasonably dangerous, the Court said that because the Michigan Occupational Safety and Health Act imposed on the employer of the worker the obligation to maintain conditions of work that are reasonably safe and healthful for employees
and an unguarded die may be used in a reasonably safe manner in a guarded press, it could not be said as a matter of law that General Motors should have foreseen that the die would be used without guards. We held that an automobile manufacturer did not have an obligation to place guards on a die set or to warn the component manufacturer of hazards attendant in its use. That decision is determinative of Buschlen’s claim that Ford negligently supplied a defective chattel.
_
Workplace safety, at common law and under MIOSHA, is the responsibility of the workers’ employer, of the component manufacturer in the instant cases. There is, however, generally no tort liability for failure to measure up to that responsibility. The employer, as a trade-off for the obligation to secure the payment of workers’ compensation benefits, is relieved of tort liability under the provision of the workers’ compensation act that makes a claim for workers’ compensation the injured worker’s exclusive remedy against the employer.
In
Fredericks
and in the instant cases, the plaintiffs seek to impose tort liability for failure to provide workplace safety by treating the act of contracting for the manufacture of a die set where there is title retention by the automobile manufacturer as imposing on the manufacturer the obligation to provide for job safety in respect to the use of the die set.
While employers of contractors have been held responsible for harm caused to injured workers as well as visitors or pedestrians as a result of defective work on premises,
there is an absence of authority for the imposition of tort liability on an employer for a contractor’s failure to observe workplace safety precautions at a location other
than premises owned by the employer of the contractor.
Imposition of tort liability in the instant cases on the basis of the doctrine of negligent entrustment would require an expansion of that doctrine which heretofore has been applied only where the chattel has been physically entrusted to the incompetent person. The negligent entrustment doctrine was developed in cases where articles, such as guns, were entrusted to children, and automobiles were entrusted to inexperienced drivers.
In
Fredericks,
the die sets were physically transferred by General Motors to Fredericks’ employer.
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Levin, J.
Gary Buschlen lost a .hand, and one of Fannie White’s hands was seriously injured, while they were operating power presses for an outsource contractor employed to produce automobile parts by the Ford Motor Company, in
Buschlen,
and the Chrysler Corporation, in
White.
The outsource contractors, or their workers’ compensation liability insurers, paid Buschlen’s and White’s
medical expenses. The statute provides that workers’ compensation benefits shall be paid for 215 weeks for the loss of a hand, and Buschlen received approximately $15,000.
White, whose injury occurred after the statute was amended to provide for payment of weekly benefits for the "duration of the disability,”
received approximately $52,000, including an amount paid upon redemption.
Except to the extent that payment of the 215-week specific benefit may aggregate an amount in excess of the income lost as a result of loss of a hand, the workers’ compensation act does not compensate for payment for loss of non-vocational use of a hand, the inability to use the hand to drive an automobile or a golf ball, or to touch another person.
The act, however, provides that an injured worker may maintain an action against a person— other than the employer paying workers’ compensation or a fellow employee — who is under a "legal liability” to the injured worker.
Unless there is such a third person under a legal liability to the
injured worker, he has no source of recovery for loss of the non-vocational use of the hand.
The question presented in the instant cases is whether Chrysler and Ford are subject to a legal liability to White and Buschlen as a result of acting negligently in entering into the outsource arrangements with the component parts manufacturers in whose employ White and Buschlen suffered their injury and loss. We hold that the automobile manufacturers were not under such a legal liability.
Recovery is sought on the theories that Chrysler and Ford (i) negligently entrusted the die sets in the power presses to the component parts manufacturers, and (ii) negligently supplied them with chattels (the die sets) dangerous for the intended use.
Negligent entrustment of a die set was considered by this Court in
Fredericks v General Motors Corp,
411 Mich 712; 311 NW2d 725 (1981). In
Fredericks,
as in the instant cases, the automobile manufacturer entered into a contract with the manufacturer of the component part that contemplated the component manufacturer would have a die set made to produce the part according to the specifications of the contract. Although the die set was manufactured by or at the direction of the component manufacturer, title to the die set was deemed, under the terms of the contract, to have vested in the automobile manufacturer so that, if the component manufacturer was unable to continue production, the automobile manufacturer would have a legal right to recover possession of the dies. This would enable the automobile manufacturer to avoid interruption of production of automobiles because of a problem of a component manufacturer. Such a problem occurred in
Fredericks
when a labor dispute closed the component
manufacturer. General Motors acquired possession of the dies and transferred them to Fredericks’ employer. In the instant cases, neither Chrysler nor Ford obtained possession of the dies although, under their contracts with White’s and Buschlen’s employers, they had the right to do so.
In
Fredericks,
this Court concluded that Fredericks failed to demonstrate peculiarities of the component manufacturer sufficient to put General Motors on notice that the component manufacturer was likely to use the die set in an unsafe manner.
Addressing the alternative argument that an unguarded die is unreasonably dangerous, the Court said that because the Michigan Occupational Safety and Health Act imposed on the employer of the worker the obligation to maintain conditions of work that are reasonably safe and healthful for employees
and an unguarded die may be used in a reasonably safe manner in a guarded press, it could not be said as a matter of law that General Motors should have foreseen that the die would be used without guards. We held that an automobile manufacturer did not have an obligation to place guards on a die set or to warn the component manufacturer of hazards attendant in its use. That decision is determinative of Buschlen’s claim that Ford negligently supplied a defective chattel.
_
Workplace safety, at common law and under MIOSHA, is the responsibility of the workers’ employer, of the component manufacturer in the instant cases. There is, however, generally no tort liability for failure to measure up to that responsibility. The employer, as a trade-off for the obligation to secure the payment of workers’ compensation benefits, is relieved of tort liability under the provision of the workers’ compensation act that makes a claim for workers’ compensation the injured worker’s exclusive remedy against the employer.
In
Fredericks
and in the instant cases, the plaintiffs seek to impose tort liability for failure to provide workplace safety by treating the act of contracting for the manufacture of a die set where there is title retention by the automobile manufacturer as imposing on the manufacturer the obligation to provide for job safety in respect to the use of the die set.
While employers of contractors have been held responsible for harm caused to injured workers as well as visitors or pedestrians as a result of defective work on premises,
there is an absence of authority for the imposition of tort liability on an employer for a contractor’s failure to observe workplace safety precautions at a location other
than premises owned by the employer of the contractor.
Imposition of tort liability in the instant cases on the basis of the doctrine of negligent entrustment would require an expansion of that doctrine which heretofore has been applied only where the chattel has been physically entrusted to the incompetent person. The negligent entrustment doctrine was developed in cases where articles, such as guns, were entrusted to children, and automobiles were entrusted to inexperienced drivers.
In
Fredericks,
the die sets were physically transferred by General Motors to Fredericks’ employer. In the instant cases, neither Chrysler nor Ford entrusted the die sets to the component manufacturers. To be sure, the contracts between Chrysler/Ford and the component manufacturers contemplated and, in effect, required them to have die sets manufactured to produce the component parts required by the contracts; however, neither Chrysler nor Ford
”supplie[d]
directly or through a third person” the die sets.
If we were to hold that there was liabil
ity in the instant cases, we would be saying in effect that whenever a contract is entered into contemplating the use of tools, equipment, implements or other chattels to produce a part or a service, the employer of the contractor would be deemed to have supplied the implement.
The doctrine of negligent entrustment concerns the supply of chattels that involve an "unreasonable risk of physical harm to
himself
[the person to whom the chattel is entrusted]
and others
whom the supplier should expect to share in or be endangered by its use.”
A gun entrusted to a child, an automobile entrusted to an inexperienced driver, poses an unreasonable risk of physical harm to the child or inexperienced driver and to others. In the instant cases, there is no suggestion that in entering into the contracts with the component manufacturers, Chrysler and Ford exposed the "entrustee,” the component manufacturer, to a risk of physical harm.
Thus, to permit recovery in the instant cases it would be necessary to eliminate as an element of negligent entrustment that the chattel entrusted is dangerous to the person to whom it is entrusted as well as to others.
Further, in order to make this theory of recovery effective, it would be necessary to impose on the employer of the contractor, Chrysler and Ford
in the instant cases, a duty to make themselves aware of peculiarities of the contractor that would put them on notice of a likelihood that the contractor would use the chattel in an unsafe manner.
Here, as in
Fredericks,
there is no evidence that Chrysler or Ford had "reason to know”
of such a likelihood.
The theory of recovery urged in the instant cases would apply without regard to whether the chattel was inherently dangerous or the contractor was incompetent within the meaning of the negligent-hiring doctrine.
It would impose responsibility where, on reasonable inquiry, the employer of the contractor could have determined that the contractor had not or might not observe reasonable safety precautions for the protection of work
ers in respect to the use of a chattel necessary to perform the work.
Adoption of the proposed theory of recovery would subject employers of contractors to tort liability for the failure of the contractor to observe job safety precautions in respect to the use of tools, equipment, implements, and other chattels. Since tools, equipment, implements and other chattels are used in most production, and their use or misuse is involved in a large number of accidents caused by the failure to observe job safety precautions, adoption of the proposed theory of recovery would radically transform the legal responsibility for job safety. An employer of a contractor would become accountable in a tort action — to be sure on the premise that the employer of the contractor had not made due inquiry concerning the contractor’s job safety program — for the contractor’s failure to observe job safety precautions in respect to the use of chattels in production.
We would not be justified in so transforming the responsibility for the observance of job safety precautions. The common law and the Legislature impose responsibility for job safety on the contractor, not on the employer of the contractor. However, because of the bar of the exclusive remedy provision of the workers’ compensation act, there generally is no tort liability for failure to provide workplace safety. The proposed theory of liability would evolve a special rule for the benefit only of employees of a contractor injured as a result of the use of chattels in production pursuant to an outsource contract. A common-law cause of action should not be evolved solely or primarily to avoid a statutory limitation. We are not persuaded that such a special rule for the benefit only of a discrete class of seriously injured workers is justified.
The concepts of economic reality and enterprise
responsibility cut both in favor of and against imposing liability on the automobile manufacturers. While the automobile manufacturer, by employing component manufacturers, started in motion the events that led to the injuries and loss of hands, the cost of providing workers’ compensation benefits was, presumably, included in the price paid by Chrysler and Ford to the component manufacturers; as a matter of economic reality, Chrysler and Ford paid for the cost of providing the workers’ compensation benefits provided White and Buschlen. On this basis, Professor Larson has argued, and in most jurisdictions the rule is, that the employer of a contractor, subject to the obligation to pay workers’ compensation benefits, may not be held responsible as a third-party defendant in a tort action.
Enterprise responsibility in those jurisdictions means enterprise immunity from tort liability.
The argument seeking to impose tort liability on the employer of a contractor based on economic reality/enterprise responsibility says that the component part manufacturer is not, as a matter of economic reality, sufficiently independent of the automobile manufacturer to free the automobile manufacturer of tort liability in respect to the failure of the component part manufacturer to maintain job safety, but, nevertheless, is sufficiently independent of the automobile manufacturer so that a tort action against the automobile manufacturer is not barred by the exclusive remedy provision.
In this connection, it is noteworthy that the
automobile manufacturer would not be subject to tort liability if it had ordered the dies and produced the parts in its own plants; the automobile manufacturer would have been subject only to the obligation to pay workers’ compensation benefits. Outsourcing does not relieve Chrysler or Ford of tort responsibility that they otherwise would be subject to.
The absence of tort liability or other reparations for loss not covered by workers’ compensation benefits caused by the failure to observe job safety precautions results in the undercompensation of many seriously injured workers. The larger problem of uncompensated loss for industrial injury or disease
remains unresolved, and a solution may be impeded, by allowing a finite number of seriously injured workers to recover for loss not covered by workers’ compensation benefits. This social problem deserves a broader solution than patchwork by this Court.
Reversed in
White
and affirmed in
Buschlen.
Williams, C.J., and Kavanagh, Ryan, Brickley, Cavanagh, and Boyle, JJ., concurred with Levin, J._