Ghrist v. Chrysler Corp.

547 N.W.2d 272, 451 Mich. 242

• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Decided: May 1, 1996
• Docket: 98862, Calendar No. 2
• Status: Published

Opinions

Levin, J.

The question presented is whether the manufacturer of a die is subject to liability for injuries resulting from the defective design and manufacture of the die.

The circuit court concluded that, except under limited circumstances, the manufacturer of a die is not subject to liability for product defects and granted Chrysler Corporation’s and Jeep Eagle Corporation’s motion for summary disposition.

The Court of Appeals, relying on Fredericks v General Motors Corp, 411 Mich 712; 311 NW2d 725 (1981), and White v Chrysler Corp, 421 Mich 192; 364 NW2d 619 (1984), affirmed. We reverse and remand for trial.

i

Plaintiff Gordon Ghrist was working as an employee of Aetna Enterprises on May 1, 1989, when his right hand became caught in a die. The die, which Ghrist alleges was designed and manufactured by Chrysler/Jeep Eagle, was fitted by Chrysler/Jeep Eagle with T-shaped “kickers” designed to help eject parts made in the die. Ghrist asserts that the injury occurred when he reached into the press area to remove a part, and the kicker descended unexpectedly. The effect was to pinch his right hand and thereby cause injury.¹

Ghrist filed this action, alleging that Chrysler/Jeep Eagle had negligently designed and manufactured the die, negligently failed to test the die, and breached express and implied warranties.

The complaint alleges that the “kickers” on the die created dangerous pinch points even when used properly.² The complaint further alleged that the T-shaped nature of the kickers was not essential to the die’s function and that the die could have been designed with safer kickers without any corresponding decrease in utility. In granting summary disposition, the judge said that “[a]bsent evidence that a die press manufacturer knows or has specific reason to know that the original purchaser will use a die press unsafely, it has no duty to provide safety devices not ordered by the purchaser . . . .”

The Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished per curiam opinion on January 26, 1994.³ Agreeing with the circuit judge, the Court of Appeals said that “ [i]t is implicit under Fredericks and White that there is no cause of action for negligent design and manufacture of a die.”⁴

n

In Fredericks and White, this Court considered whether an employee who was injured while working with a die that had been installed in an unguarded press, could maintain an action against the owner of the die who had purchased the die from the manufacturer and had loaned it to the plaintiffs employer.

The plaintiffs in both cases asserted that the dies should have been guarded, and sought to recover under two legal theories. One was negligent entrustment. In Fredericks, recovery also was sought on the ground that an unguarded die is so unreasonably dangerous as to be defective for purposes of a products liability action. Similarly, the plaintiffs in White sought recovery on the ground that defendants Chrysler and Ford had “negligently supplied [the plaintiffs employer] with chattels (the die sets) dangerous for the intended use.”⁵

This Court denied recovery in both cases on both claims. With respect to the claim that the die was defective as delivered by General Motors, this Court in Fredericks said that in light of each employer’s statutorily mandated duty to maintain safe working conditions, it could not “hold as a matter of law that it was foreseeable to defendant that the product it supplied would be used in an unsafe manner rendering it defective.”⁶ (Emphasis added.) The plaintiffs’ negligent supply claim was also rejected in White on similar grounds.

In contrast with Fredericks and White, where the defendants loaned the die to plaintiffs’ employer, Ghrist alleges that Chrysler/Jeep Eagle was the manufacturer and designer of the die that caused his injury. Chrysler/Jeep Eagle argues that a distinction between an allegation of negligent design and manufacture and one of negligent supply is not cognizable at law.⁷

m

The law of products liability imposes greater responsibility on one who manufactures and designs a chattel than on one who merely supplies it. See 2 Restatement Torts, 2d, § 388, p 300;⁸ Bevard v Ajax Mfg Co, 473 F Supp 35, 38-39 (ED Mich, 1979); Seasword v Hilti, Inc (After Remand), 449 Mich 542, 545-547; 537 NW2d 221 (1995). The manufacturer is especially knowledgeable about a product’s capabilities and limitations and the foreseeability of harm. Further, the manufacturer is in the best position to effectuate needed safety-related improvements. Because the manufacturer possesses both this knowledge and power, it is uniquely susceptible to the incentive structure built into the negligence standard and, as a result, is more likely to actually implement needed changes.⁹ Moreover, by putting the product into the stream of commerce, the manufacturer impliedly promises that the product is safe for its intended and all reasonably foreseeable uses.

A manufacturer has a duty to design its product to eliminate “any unreasonable risk of foreseeable injury.” Prentis v Yale Mfg Co, 421 Mich 670, 693; 365 NW2d 176 (1984). While this Court accepts that a die, standing alone, is an inert object only capable of causing injury when teamed with a working press, this in itself does not insulate die manufacturers from liability under all circumstances.¹⁰

Like any other product manufacturer, a manufacturer of a die “is liable for negligence in the manufacture or sale of any product which may reasonably be expected to be capable of substantial harm if it is defective.” Prosser & Keeton, Torts (5th ed), § 96, p 683; Prentis, supra at 691.¹¹ A die manufacturer is similarly liable under a breach of warranty theory if it supplies a defective product that causes injury. Piercefield v Remington Arms Co, 375 Mich 85, 96; 133 NW2d 129 (1965); Smith v E R Squibb & Sons, 405 Mich 79, 89; 273 NW2d 476 (1979).¹²

IV

Ghrist’s breach of warranty and negligence claims thus turn on whether the die was defective. “A product is defective if it is not reasonably safe for its foreseeable uses.” Fredericks, supra at 720. This definition of “defective” is not limited to manufacturing defects, but also includes design defects. Prentis, supra at 683-684; Scott v Allen Bradley Co, 139 Mich App 665, 670; 362 NW2d 734 (1984); Johnson v Chrysler Corp, 74 Mich App 532, 537; 254 NW2d 569 (1977).

We are obliged, for purposes of this motion for summary disposition, to accept the facts as pleaded by Ghrist as true.¹³

Ghrist alleges that Chrysler/Jeep Eagle’s inclusion of the T-shaped kicker on its die created hazardous pinch points, thereby rendering the die defective.¹⁴ He also contends that his injuries were caused by this defect and were foreseeable, given the relationship between the claimed defect and the ordinary use of the press. Ghrist thereby stated a claim on which relief can be granted.¹⁵

v

Chrysler/Jeep Eagle asserts that summary disposition was proper because it was not legally possible to foresee that the die would be used by Ghrist’s employer in an unsafe manner because Ghrist’s employer was required, under the Michigan Occupational Safety and Health Act, to “[f]umish to each employee, employment and a place of employment which is free from recognized hazards that are causing, or are likely to cause, death or serious physical harm to the employee.”¹⁶ Although an employer has a statutorily imposed duty to make the workplace safe for its employees, MIOSHA does not abrogate the general duty of a manufacturer to exercise the degree of care necessary in the design and manufacture of a product to avoid all reasonably foreseeable injuries. “The public interest in assuring that safety devices are installed demands more from the manufacturer than to permit him to leave such a critical phase of his manufacturing process to the haphazard conduct of the ultimate purchaser.” Bexiga v Havir Mfg Corp, 60 NJ 402, 410; 290 A2d 281 (1972).

Were this Court to hold otherwise, manufacturers would be free to rely on MIOSHA as a shield and to manufacture products girded with only the bare minimum of safety features. Responsibility for safety would shift from the party most able to provide it in the least expensive and highest quality form and would rest solely on the shoulders of the comparatively ignorant party, the employer. Such a scenario harkens back to the pre-MacPherson v Buick Motor Co¹⁷ period when caveat emptor ruled the day and all risk of liability was transferred along with the goods being purchased.

Chrysler/Jeep Eagle’s position also runs contrary to the clearly expressed intent of the Legislature in enacting MIOSHA, which provides:

Nothing in this act shall be construed to supersede or in any manner affect any workers’ compensation law, or to enlarge or diminish or affect in any other manner the common law or statutory rights, duties, or liabilities of employers and employees under any law with respect to injuries, diseases, or death of employees arising out of, or in the course of, employment. [MCL 408.1002(2); MSA 17.50(2)(2) (emphasis added).]

The foregoing provision illustrates that, policy considerations aside, the mandates of miosha do not invalidate a common-law cause of action against a third party that would otherwise be maintainable without regard to the employer’s obligations to the employee.¹⁸

VI

We hold that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the circuit court’s grant of Chrysler/Jeep Eagle’s motion for summary disposition. Ghrist made out a facially valid claim on which relief can be granted. Whether the die that caused Ghrist’s injury was defectively designed is a question of fact for the jury to decide.

Reversed and remanded for trial.

Brickley, C.J., and Cavanagh, Boyle, and Mallett, JJ., concurred with Levin, J.

1 As a result of this injury, Ghrist’s right index finger had to be amputated.

2 The purpose of a kicker is to lift the part off the press after it has been stamped. After this has occurred, the kicker is supposed to retract into the die. Because a T-shaped kicker contains a horizontal cross member, a pinch point is created when the kicker retracts into the die at the top of the t.

3 The Court of Appeals held that summary disposition was more properly granted under MCR 2.116(C)(8), than 2.116(C)(10), but found the error to be harmless.

4 Docket No. 143681, p 2.

5 421 Mich 197.

6 411 Mich 720-721.

7 See Villar v E W Bliss Co, 134 Mich App 116; 350 NW2d 920 (1984) (relying on Fredericks to resolve the issue of manufacturer liability in favor of the defendant); Davis v Link, Inc, 195 Mich App 70; 489 NW2d 103 (1992).

8 The Restatement provides at 300:

There are other rules [of law] which impose upon the suppliers of chattels additional duties because of the purpose for which or the manner in which the chattels are supplied or because the chattel has been made by them or put out as their product. [Emphasis added.]

One of these “other rules” is set forth in § 398, p 336:

A manufacturer of a chattel made under a plan or design which makes it dangerous for the uses for which it is manufactured is subject to liability to others whom he should expect to use the chattel or to be endangered by its probable use for physical harm caused by his failure to exercise reasonable care in the adoption of a safe plan or design.

9 As the Court of Appeals noted in Seasword, supra at 613-614, “a primary purpose of products liability law [is] to encourage the design of safer products and thereby reduce the incidence of injuries.” See also Prentis v Yale Mfg Co, 421 Mich 670, 689-690; 365 NW2d 176 (1984); Wade, On product “design defects” and their actionability, 33 Vand L R 551, 569 (1980).

10 The Court of Appeals said that “where there is evidence presented of the manufacturer’s knowledge of unsafe use, or that unsafe use is foreseeable, liability is not precluded.” Shipman v Fontaine Truck Equipment Co, 184 Mich App 706, 713; 459 NW2d 30 (1990).

11 See also Elsasser v American Motors Corp, 81 Mich App 379, 384; 265 NW2d 339 (1978).

12 See also Johnson v Chrysler Corp, 74 Mich App 532, 537; 254 NW2d 569 (1977).

13 Wade v Dep’t of Corrections, 439 Mich 158, 162-163; 483 NW2d 26 (1992).

It is not the province of this Court to resolve issues of fact. This is no less true where the inquiry is whether the product suffers from a design defect. That task is within the province of the jury. Gregory v Cincinnati Inc, 450 Mich 1, 6; 538 NW2d 325 (1995); Detroit & Milwaukee R Co v Van Steinburg, 17 Mich 99, 120-121 (1868).

14 Ghrist and Chrysler/Jeep Eagle are not in agreement concerning the nature of Ghrist’s allegations. Ghrist contends that he asserted that the die is defective in itself because it uses horizontal kickers. Chrysler/Jeep Eagle contends that this is just artful complaint drafting and that Ghrist’s allegations are nothing more than the failure-to-guard issue raised in Fredericks and White.

We do not accept either interpretation of the complaint as definitive, but merely conclude that any issue in this regard need not be reached at this time.

15 We note that, in contrast to this case, when this Court addressed the issues raised in Fredericks and White, a trial on the merits had already been held and a full evidentiary record had been developed.

16 MCL 408.1011; MSA 17.50(11).

17 217 NY 382; 111 NE 1050 (1916).

18 Chrysler/Jeep Eagle also urges this Court to dismiss Ghrist’s complaint on the ground that his case has now become moot. Chrysler/Jeep Eagle contends that dismissal is warranted because Ghrist recently entered into a settlement agreement with Auto-Die, Inc. This agreement, asserts Chrysler/Jeep Eagle, evidences that Auto-Die was in fact the manufacturer of the die, and, as a result, Chrysler/Jeep Eagle cannot be held liable for Ghrist’s injuries.

While Chrysler/Jeep Eagle appears correct in noting that a settlement was reached, the agreement’s implications should be considered by the trial court on remand.