GIVENS, J.
—The plaintiff, Goldendale Mining Company, engaged in the mining business in this state, with its principal place of business at Bovill, is an employer of labor under, and carries insurance with the State Fund in compliance with, the Workmen’s Compensation Act, C. S., chap. 236.
July 1, 1931, this plaintiff entered into a contract
under C. S., sec. 6230, with plaintiff, Western Hospital Association,
which maintains and operates medical and surgical hospitals in the state, for the care and treatment of sick and injured persons under contract with employers of labor.
The Industrial Accident Board refused to approve the contract above mentioned, in the following order or decision:
“The Industrial Accident Board decided that in the future it did not intend to approve any hospital contracts that contained the provision the instant one does, namely, that the party of the first part
“ ‘Will deduct, withhold and collect the sum of $1 ... . of each and every one of its employees .... who is employed in any of the occupations and territories hereinbefore mentioned for a period of more than
3
days in any
calendar month, and the sum of 50
é
from the earnings of such employee who is so employed
3
days or less in any calendar month.
'
“In lieu of this provision the Board prefers and will approve contracts that contain the following provision:
“ ‘Will deduct, withhold and collect from the earnings of each and every of its employees who shall elect to receive the benefits of this agreement and medical, surgical and hospital attention provided for and who is employed in any of the occupations and territories hereinbefore mentioned, the sum of |1 per calendar month or any fraction of a month, ten (10) days or over; for a fraction of a month less than ten (10) days such deduction shall be ten cents for
each day that the employee has been employed in the service of the party of the second part in any of its occupations and territories, ’ .etc.
“If you will insert that provision in the proposed hospital contract, the Board will be glad to approve your contract.”
If the contract were approved by the Board, the employer would be allowed a credit of twenty-five per cent on the regular premium charged under, and by reason of the Idaho State Insurance Fund Manual of Rules, Classifications and Premium Rates, effective January 1, 1930, Rule IV, Hospital Contracts:
“Hospital contracts shall be approved by the Industrial Accident Board of the State of Idaho prior to any reduction in basic premium rates on account thereof.
“1. A reduction of twenty-five per cent (25%) of the basic premium rate shall be allowed in all cases where no separate rate is quoted for use in connection with risks carrying hospital contracts.”
The present writ of mandate was sued out by plaintiffs to compel the Industrial Accident Board to approve the hospital contract between the two plaintiffs, thus giving the employer the advantage of the rule of the State Insurance Fund above quoted, on the theory that C. S., sec. 6230,
gave the board jurisdiction over the contract only, as to services to be rendered to employees thereunder, and to limit rates to $1 per month except in certain circumstances mentioned in said section.
Defendants contend that C. S., secs. 6222 and 6273, give the board authority to pass upon all phases of the contract; hence, to approve or disapprove it.
The nib of the controversy is as to the payment of the hospital fee, thus stated by plaintiffs:
“Under the contract .... the employer collects from the employee, who makes the waiver, 50⅜⅝ from the workman’s
wages for the first 3 days of the employment, and if he works more than 3 days, he retains the further sum of 50⅜5, making a total of $1.00 per calendar month for hospital service, and, in addition to this, the employer pays the Association one half the sum that the employee pays. The Board now proposes that this method of payment shall be so changed that the employer shall- collect 10⅜5 per day from each employee for the first 10 days of his service each calendar month, instead of collecting it within the first 4 days as provided for in the existing contracts.”
Plaintiffs also urge many practical reasons why the Board’s requirement would be detrimental to the employer and the hospital contractor. If, however, the Board has no jurisdiction, these considerations are immaterial; if, on the other hand, the Board does have jurisdiction, they are matters for the Board to consider in exercising its discretion, and the question here must be determined on what authority the statutes give the Board; not whether the Board has unwisely exercised that discretion, for no complaint is herein made that the Board has abused its discretion, but that it possesses no right to exercise any discretion, except as specifically set forth in C. S., sec. 6230.
C. S., sec. 6222,
does not cover C. S., see. 6230, because it applies only to systems of compensation or benefits “in lieu of the compensation provided by this chapter.”
The state board contends that services under a hospital contract are a part of, and included within, compensation.
It is doubtful if this contention is sound in view of the sections particularly pertaining thereto, but conceding it is, the hospital contracts contemplated by C. S., sec. 62'30, and the one under consideration in particular, are not “in lieu of the compensation provided” in the chapter on workmen’s compensation, but are within the chapter. What regulatory and supervisory powers the Board are given over such extra-statutory systems of compensation by C. S., sec. 6222, we need not, therefore, herein determine.
C. S., sec. 6273,
is the only section of the act providing for an appeal from any decision of the Board. An appeal was entertained in
Johnson v. A. C. White Lumber Co.,
37 Ida. 617, 217 Pac. 979, from a decision of the Board concerning C. S., sec. 6229, and though it is not indicated in the decision that any question thereto was raised, in effect, C. S., sec. 6273, was thereby considered applicable to decisions of the Board on matters other than awards for compensation mentioned in the part of the act designated “Procedure Before The Board.” (C. S., sees. 6261-6275.)
If C. S., see. 6273, applies to C. S., sec. 6229, as to appeals, it applies likewise to C. S., sec. 6230.' If it applies to C. S., sec.
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GIVENS, J.
—The plaintiff, Goldendale Mining Company, engaged in the mining business in this state, with its principal place of business at Bovill, is an employer of labor under, and carries insurance with the State Fund in compliance with, the Workmen’s Compensation Act, C. S., chap. 236.
July 1, 1931, this plaintiff entered into a contract
under C. S., sec. 6230, with plaintiff, Western Hospital Association,
which maintains and operates medical and surgical hospitals in the state, for the care and treatment of sick and injured persons under contract with employers of labor.
The Industrial Accident Board refused to approve the contract above mentioned, in the following order or decision:
“The Industrial Accident Board decided that in the future it did not intend to approve any hospital contracts that contained the provision the instant one does, namely, that the party of the first part
“ ‘Will deduct, withhold and collect the sum of $1 ... . of each and every one of its employees .... who is employed in any of the occupations and territories hereinbefore mentioned for a period of more than
3
days in any
calendar month, and the sum of 50
é
from the earnings of such employee who is so employed
3
days or less in any calendar month.
'
“In lieu of this provision the Board prefers and will approve contracts that contain the following provision:
“ ‘Will deduct, withhold and collect from the earnings of each and every of its employees who shall elect to receive the benefits of this agreement and medical, surgical and hospital attention provided for and who is employed in any of the occupations and territories hereinbefore mentioned, the sum of |1 per calendar month or any fraction of a month, ten (10) days or over; for a fraction of a month less than ten (10) days such deduction shall be ten cents for
each day that the employee has been employed in the service of the party of the second part in any of its occupations and territories, ’ .etc.
“If you will insert that provision in the proposed hospital contract, the Board will be glad to approve your contract.”
If the contract were approved by the Board, the employer would be allowed a credit of twenty-five per cent on the regular premium charged under, and by reason of the Idaho State Insurance Fund Manual of Rules, Classifications and Premium Rates, effective January 1, 1930, Rule IV, Hospital Contracts:
“Hospital contracts shall be approved by the Industrial Accident Board of the State of Idaho prior to any reduction in basic premium rates on account thereof.
“1. A reduction of twenty-five per cent (25%) of the basic premium rate shall be allowed in all cases where no separate rate is quoted for use in connection with risks carrying hospital contracts.”
The present writ of mandate was sued out by plaintiffs to compel the Industrial Accident Board to approve the hospital contract between the two plaintiffs, thus giving the employer the advantage of the rule of the State Insurance Fund above quoted, on the theory that C. S., sec. 6230,
gave the board jurisdiction over the contract only, as to services to be rendered to employees thereunder, and to limit rates to $1 per month except in certain circumstances mentioned in said section.
Defendants contend that C. S., secs. 6222 and 6273, give the board authority to pass upon all phases of the contract; hence, to approve or disapprove it.
The nib of the controversy is as to the payment of the hospital fee, thus stated by plaintiffs:
“Under the contract .... the employer collects from the employee, who makes the waiver, 50⅜⅝ from the workman’s
wages for the first 3 days of the employment, and if he works more than 3 days, he retains the further sum of 50⅜5, making a total of $1.00 per calendar month for hospital service, and, in addition to this, the employer pays the Association one half the sum that the employee pays. The Board now proposes that this method of payment shall be so changed that the employer shall- collect 10⅜5 per day from each employee for the first 10 days of his service each calendar month, instead of collecting it within the first 4 days as provided for in the existing contracts.”
Plaintiffs also urge many practical reasons why the Board’s requirement would be detrimental to the employer and the hospital contractor. If, however, the Board has no jurisdiction, these considerations are immaterial; if, on the other hand, the Board does have jurisdiction, they are matters for the Board to consider in exercising its discretion, and the question here must be determined on what authority the statutes give the Board; not whether the Board has unwisely exercised that discretion, for no complaint is herein made that the Board has abused its discretion, but that it possesses no right to exercise any discretion, except as specifically set forth in C. S., sec. 6230.
C. S., sec. 6222,
does not cover C. S., see. 6230, because it applies only to systems of compensation or benefits “in lieu of the compensation provided by this chapter.”
The state board contends that services under a hospital contract are a part of, and included within, compensation.
It is doubtful if this contention is sound in view of the sections particularly pertaining thereto, but conceding it is, the hospital contracts contemplated by C. S., sec. 62'30, and the one under consideration in particular, are not “in lieu of the compensation provided” in the chapter on workmen’s compensation, but are within the chapter. What regulatory and supervisory powers the Board are given over such extra-statutory systems of compensation by C. S., sec. 6222, we need not, therefore, herein determine.
C. S., sec. 6273,
is the only section of the act providing for an appeal from any decision of the Board. An appeal was entertained in
Johnson v. A. C. White Lumber Co.,
37 Ida. 617, 217 Pac. 979, from a decision of the Board concerning C. S., sec. 6229, and though it is not indicated in the decision that any question thereto was raised, in effect, C. S., sec. 6273, was thereby considered applicable to decisions of the Board on matters other than awards for compensation mentioned in the part of the act designated “Procedure Before The Board.” (C. S., sees. 6261-6275.)
If C. S., see. 6273, applies to C. S., sec. 6229, as to appeals, it applies likewise to C. S., sec. 6230.' If it applies to C. S., sec. 6230, as to appeals, why do not all of its provisions apply to C. S., sec. 6230?
C. S., sec. 6273, is entirely inclusive, and says:
“All questions arising under this chapter, if not settled by agreement of the parties interested therein, with the
approval of the board, shall, except as otherwise herein provided, be determined by the board.”
The question involved here is one “arising under this chapter,” and not outside; hence, though settled by agreement of the parties,
vide
the contract, and no employee complains herein, since not approved by the board, it must be determined and approved, or as hereafter shown, rejected by the board. Being a question under the chapter, it falls within the contemplation of C. S., sec. 6273.
“Approve” is defined as follows: “to commend; be satisfied with.” (Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, 3d Rev. 223.) “To confirm, ratify, sanction, or consent to some act or thing done by another.” (1 Words & Phrases, 3d ser., 545, citing
Board of Education of City of Hutchinson v. Reno Community High School,
124 Kan. 175, 257 Pac. 957, 959.) “To sanction officially; to ratify; to confirm.” (Words & Phrases, 2d ser., 260, citing
Long v. Needham,
37 Mont. 408, 96 Pac. 731, 733.) “'To pronounce good; think or judge well of; admit the propriety or excellence of; be pleased with; commend; and as used in Pol. Code, § 17, providing that all contracts made by the state furnishing board must be ‘approved’ by the Governor or State Treasurer, means more than merely ministerial approval. They must exercise judicial discretion.” (1 Words & Phrases, 475, citing
State v. Smith,
23 Mont. 44, 57 Pac. 449.) “To regard of comment upon as worthy of acceptance, commendation or favorable attention; form or express a favorable judgment concerning; treat, receive or present with favor.” (Funk & Wagnalls New Standard Dictionary.)
“Determine” is defined: “To reach a definite purpose concerning; form the intention of doing or not doing; resolve; decide.” (Funk & Wagnalls New Standard Dictionary.) “To fix or settle definitely; make specific or certain; to decide the state or character of; to fix the form or character of; to shape; to prescribe imperatively; to regulate; to settle; to decide.” (3 Words & Phrases, 2038, citing
People v. Ham,
32 Misc. Rep. 517, 66 N. Y. Supp. 264, 266.)
From the definitions, it is apparent the Board is given jurisdiction by C. S., sec. 6273, to pass upon these contracts, not only as to the fee not exceeding $1 per month, and the services to be rendered, but also the feature involved herein.
The argument that C. S., sec. 6273, applies only to “agreements” is answered by the fact that the collectively and wholly inclusive term “all questions” is used in C. S., sec. 6273, and that the legislature did not intend C. S., sec. 6273, to be restricted to or by C. S., sec. 6262, since hospital contracts are nominated “agreements” in C. S., sec. 6230, and again so recognized in C. S., sec. 6230A, 1921 Sess. Laws, 476.
Having jurisdiction to approve or determine, the Board may reject.
(Key v. Board of Education of Granville County,
170 N. C. 123, 86 S. E. 1002;
Fuller v. Board of University and School Lands,
21 N. D. 212, 129 N. W. 1029;
Melton v. Cherokee Oil & Gas Co.,
67 Okl. 247, 170 Pac. 691;
Coker v. Watson,
132 Okl. 199, 252 Pac. 829, 833.)
The Board did not exceed its jurisdiction, and the writ is therefore quashed. Costs to defendants.
Lee, C. J., and Budge, Varian and McNaughton, JJ., concur.
Petition for rehearing denied.