Western Glass Co. v. Schmertz Wire-Glass Co.

185 F. 788, 1911 U.S. App. LEXIS 4050
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
DecidedJanuary 3, 1911
DocketNos. 1,682 and 1,683
StatusPublished
Cited by14 cases

This text of 185 F. 788 (Western Glass Co. v. Schmertz Wire-Glass Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Western Glass Co. v. Schmertz Wire-Glass Co., 185 F. 788, 1911 U.S. App. LEXIS 4050 (7th Cir. 1911).

Opinion

BAKER, Circuit Judge (after stating the facts as above).

1. In Appert v. Brownsville Co. (C. C.) 144 Fed. 117, and in Schmertz Wire-Glass Co. v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. (C. C.) 168 Fed. 73, the history of the issuance of the Schmertz patents in obedience to an order of the Circuit Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania in a proceeding under section 4915, Rev. St. (U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3392), is given. Appellant, a stranger to the proceeding and not entering the wire-glass field until a considerable time after the patents were issued, contends that irregularities, and alleged omissions in procedure, and collusion between parties resulting in imposition on the court, render the order and the consequent issuance of the patents void. Circuit Judge Buffington, who made the order, has found against the contention twice. In the record before us we are inclined to think there is nothing that should lead us to find otherwise. But we do not rest upon this ground, for -we believe that appellant is not entitled to present the assignment. Gandy v. Marble, 122 U. S. 432, 7 Sup. Ct. 1290, 30 L. Ed. 1223, decides that a proceeding under section 4915 “is in fact and necessarily a part of the application for a patent.” A patent is the government’s signed and sealed grant of a monopoly. Under the Constitution, Congress could have provided for the grant of monopolies to inventors against which the-citizen could set up no defenses. Congress named certain permissible defenses, of which fraud and collusion in following the application to issuance is not one. Therefore a patent procured by fraud and collusion or by illegal procedure can be attacked only by the government. Mowry v. Whitney, 14 Wall. 439, 20 L. Ed. 858; Mahn v. Harwood, 112 U. S. 354, 5 Sup. Ct. 174, 6 Sup. Ct. 451, 28 L. Ed. 665; Ry. Register Mfg. Co. v. North Hudson C. R. Co. (C. C.) 23 Fed. 593; U. S. v. Am. Bell Telephone Co., 128 U. S. 315, 9 Sup. Ct. 90, 32 L. Ed. 450 ; Id., 159 U. S. 555, 16 Sup. Ct. 69, 40 L. Ed. 255; Id., 167 U. S. 224, 17 Sup. Ct. 809, 42 L. Ed. 144.

-2. In the course of the interference proceedings Appert was awarded priority twice; Schmertz, three times. Since the Schmertz patents issued, the defense that Appert was prior has been made in court at least six times, and there has never been a denial of Schmertz’s priority. Even if it -were permissible to ascribe to Appert an earlier date than January 12, 1894, when his French patent issued (section -1-923 [page 3396] ; Parker v. Appert, 75 Off. Gaz. 1201), appellant would fail. The evidence satisfies us that in the summer of 1893 Schmertz had fully conceived, made drawings of, and disclosed, his invention. This was before Appert ever thought of the matter, so far as the record shows. Prior to January 12, 1891, Schmertz was engaged in making a machine with which to practice his invention, and on January 16, 1894, he produced merchantable wire glass.

3. There is a distinction between abandonment of an invention and abandonment of an application. Western Electric Co. v. Sperry Co., 58 Fed. 186, 7 C. C. A. 164. Abandonment of the invention was not pleaded. Abandonment of an invention being a question of intent (International Co. v. Kellogg Co., 171 Fed. 651, 96 C. C. A. 395), appellant, if it had pleaded the defense, would have had the burden of proving clearly that Schmertz and his successors in interest had [792]*792such an intent. Nothing in the record satisfies us that the defense could be maintained.

The question of abandonment of an application arises under section 4.894 (page 3384), which provides that a failure to prosecute an application within two years after any action thereon shall be regarded as an abandonment of the application “unless it be shown to the satisfaction of the Commissioner of Patents that such delay was unavoidable.” In a proceeding under section 4915 the exception would mean “unless it be shown to the satisfaction of the Circuit Court having the matter in charge that such delay was unavoidable.” Appellant insists that the delay for more than two years in the Circuit Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania was not unavoidable. To present such a contention collaterally constitutes a kind of attack upon the validity of the patent, which, for reasons already stated, cannot be permitted. The review of the question of abandonment of an application in Gandy v. Marble, 122 U. S. 432, 7 Sup. Ct. 1290, 30 L. Ed. 1223, was on a direct appeal in a proceeding under section 4915.

4. Prior practice, patents and publications are, quite elaborately discussed in Schmertz Wire-Glass Co. v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. (C. C., W. D. Pa.) 168 Fed. 73; Schmertz Wire-Glass Co. v. Highland Glass Co. (C. C., W. D. Pa.) 178 Fed. 945; Highland Glass Co. v. Schmertz Wire-Glass Co. (3d Circuit) 178 Fed. 949, 102 C. C. A. 316; and in the opinion of the Circuit Court in the present cases, 178 Fed. 977.

Prior practice was of two kinds — single layer and double layer or “sandwich.” Sandwich was the earlier. The first attempts consisted of putting into a mold a layer of molten glass, then the wire fabric,, then another layer of molten glass, and subjecting the whole to pressure. When the roller process of making sheets of glass came in, the practice followed of rolling a layer of glass, putting upon it the wire fabric, and rolling thereon a top layer of glass. The single layer practice, dating from 1892, consisted in rolling a layer of glass, imbedding a wire mesh therein by means of a corrugated roller, and then pressing a smooth roller over the surface to close the furrows.

In Streator Cathedral Glass Co. v. Wire-Glass Co. (7th Circuit) 97 Fed. 950, 38 C. C. A. 573, wherein the Shuman patents were sustained, the published art relating to single-pour wire-glass is reviewed. As Schmertz’s process and apparatus have to do with two-pour wire-glass, it is manifest that' the single-pour method is neither anticipatory nor limiting.

Prior patents and publications respecting the sandwich method, passing for the moment British patent No. 1,715 of 1874 to Plyatt, are no more illuminative than the above-stated practice.

Before considering Hyatt, it may be well to have in mind the development of wire-glass in the world of industry and commerce. In the ante-Schmertz sandwich method there were three steps, separately taken. The cooling of the first layer before the sandwich could be finished prevented the making of large sheets. What small plates were made were apt to split at the fabric line. At most, the small panes were fit only for skylights and the like. Shuman turned his back on the sandwich method, and by his one-pour process made large [793]*793sheets that were clear and polishable, and therefore usuable in windows, elevator ways, partitions, and the like, where a fireproof, transparent (not merely translucent) wall was desired. This was the first real impress upon industry and commerce. In the Streator Case, supra, Mr.

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Bluebook (online)
185 F. 788, 1911 U.S. App. LEXIS 4050, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/western-glass-co-v-schmertz-wire-glass-co-ca7-1911.