KILEY, Circuit Judge.
Welsh Company sued for a declaration that defendant’s patent, No. 2,848,040, was invalid and not infringed by a baby chair manufactured by Welsh. Cher-nivsky counterclaimed, charging infringement. The district court found the patent valid but not infringed, entered judgment accordingly, and this appeal followed. We think the court’s judgment is right as to validity and erroneous as to infringement.
The patented article in suit is an infant seating device consisting of a base member and a back rest member formed of spring wire. These parts are so adapted that they may be disconnected for storing and shipping. The union of the two parts is by means of sleeves on the ends of the back rest member into which the extremities of the base member are inserted. Comprising the third component of the structure is the seat, which consists of a fabric bag or envelope which slips over the back rest member. When so installed there is a fullness at the bottom of the fabric forming a pocket-like dip which receives the baby’s buttocks. A cloth belt, loosely attached to each side of the back frame, is fastened to the fabric, at the front, to prevent the infant from falling out, and at the center of the belt extending downward to the bottom of the fabric is attached another cloth belt to separate the legs of the infant. The back frame is U-shaped, with the arc at the top having the function of pulling the fabric into a safe resting place at the center for the baby’s head.
Chernivsky, while claiming that his and the Welsh chairs are equal for all practical purposes, admits that because the words of his claim 1 do not read upon the Welsh chair, a showing of infringement requires application of the doctrine of equivalents.
The decision below was that Cher-nivsky’s patent monopoly was restricted to a narrow improvement over the prior art and that every feature of the accused device of Welsh “embodies elements all known in the prior art,” but does not include the frictional locking feature “so vital” to the patent in suit. The court refused to apply the doctrine of equivalents in favor of Chernivsky and against the Welsh device, on the ground that Cher-nivsky had narrowed his claims to the locking feature in order to meet the examiner’s objections and thus, under the doctrine of file wrapper estoppel, is precluded from expanding his claims by the doctrine of equivalents to cover the elements surrendered by amendment.
We shall examine the facts with respect to infringement before considering the effect of file wrapper estoppel on Cher-nivsky’s claim to equivalence. Cherniv-sky argues that Welsh duplicated, with “trivial changes,” the “desirable features” of his patent to avoid the language of claim 1, but that there is infringement since both devices “do the same work in substantially the same way, and accomplish substantially the same result * * Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. [588]*588Winters, 280 U.S. 30, 42, 50 S.Ct. 9, 13, 74 L.Ed. 147 (1929). On oral argument before this court counsel for Welsh admitted that Welsh knew of the Cherniv-sky patent and attempted to design around it.
The rear cross-bar of the Welsh base is slightly lower than and exceeds slightly in width the base of Chernivsky’s; the sides of both bases are slightly off parallel from back to front, the Welsh slightly outward and the Chernivsky slightly inward; the sides of the Welsh base are a little longer than those of the Chernivsky base; the bends at the ends of the sides on the Welsh base are shorter than those on the Chernivsky base and turn forward, while Chernivsky’s flare outwardly without the forward turn; the Welsh sides turn upward at a slightly wider angle than Cher-nivsky’s so that the sides of the Welsh back frame are in a more upright line than Chernivsky’s, resulting in a less backwardly inclined whole.
The sides of the base frames, in both chairs, must be sprung inwardly in order to fit the extremities of the base into the sleeve extremities of the back frame. The base extremities of the Welsh device are from a front view substantially perpendicular to the plane of the base, while the extremities of the Chernivsky base angle inwardly. The tips of the extremities of the Chernivsky base then flare outwardly. The result of this outward turn at the tips of the Chernivsky base extremities is a tighter spring fit between the base and back frames. This is the “frictional locking” device referred to by the district court.
The bases of both devices are designed to give stability. The Chernivsky device accomplishes this through the rear crossbar and the comparatively extensive outward flaring of the front ends of the base to compensate for the comparatively narrower chair. The Welsh device compensates for lack of outward flaring front ends by having its cross-bar at the rear of the base wider and the sides extending outward toward the front so that they are several inches longer than the Chernivsky sides before turning inward, and at the point where they begin to turn the base of the Welsh device is about four inches wider than the Chernivsky base. The resting points of contact are slightly different, but in sum are about equal. The Chernivsky connection between the base and back frame is tighter and holds together — at least when not occupied — better than the Welsh device.
As we have stated, the back frames of both chairs are slightly outward from parallel as they reach toward their extremities, and the backward incline of the Chernivsky device is greater, occupied or not. The top of the back frame in the Chernivsky device is a broad curve resulting, when the chair is occupied, in a depression in the center of the fabric to accommodate the baby’s head and maintain it in a safe center place. The top of the back of the Welsh device is not curved, but it is a cross piece which extends backwardly from each side to form a shallow V. When the chair is occupied this has the same result as the Cherniv-sky back frame.
We conclude that the Welsh device does accomplish the same result as the patented device by substantially the same means and that it is the equivalent thereof. Independent Pneumatic Tool Co. v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 194 F.2d 945 (7th Cir.1952).
The question now is whether there is any room in the present case for application of the doctrine of equivalents, in view of the file wrapper estoppel doctrine. Because the district court’s findings on the issue of file wrapper estoppel were based solely on documentary evidence, all of which is before us, those findings have not the same degree of finality which ordinarily attaches to findings of fact under Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Taylor-Reed Corp. v. Mennen Food Products Co., 324 F.2d 108, 111 (7th Cir.1963). We hold that the district court’s finding that Chernivsky narrowed his claim to the so-called “frictional locking device” is clearly erroneous and this finding was in part induced by an erroneous application of the law. It must therefore be set aside.
[589]*589Chernivsky originally filed ten claims, the first two of which, as amended, are set out in the margin.1
2
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KILEY, Circuit Judge.
Welsh Company sued for a declaration that defendant’s patent, No. 2,848,040, was invalid and not infringed by a baby chair manufactured by Welsh. Cher-nivsky counterclaimed, charging infringement. The district court found the patent valid but not infringed, entered judgment accordingly, and this appeal followed. We think the court’s judgment is right as to validity and erroneous as to infringement.
The patented article in suit is an infant seating device consisting of a base member and a back rest member formed of spring wire. These parts are so adapted that they may be disconnected for storing and shipping. The union of the two parts is by means of sleeves on the ends of the back rest member into which the extremities of the base member are inserted. Comprising the third component of the structure is the seat, which consists of a fabric bag or envelope which slips over the back rest member. When so installed there is a fullness at the bottom of the fabric forming a pocket-like dip which receives the baby’s buttocks. A cloth belt, loosely attached to each side of the back frame, is fastened to the fabric, at the front, to prevent the infant from falling out, and at the center of the belt extending downward to the bottom of the fabric is attached another cloth belt to separate the legs of the infant. The back frame is U-shaped, with the arc at the top having the function of pulling the fabric into a safe resting place at the center for the baby’s head.
Chernivsky, while claiming that his and the Welsh chairs are equal for all practical purposes, admits that because the words of his claim 1 do not read upon the Welsh chair, a showing of infringement requires application of the doctrine of equivalents.
The decision below was that Cher-nivsky’s patent monopoly was restricted to a narrow improvement over the prior art and that every feature of the accused device of Welsh “embodies elements all known in the prior art,” but does not include the frictional locking feature “so vital” to the patent in suit. The court refused to apply the doctrine of equivalents in favor of Chernivsky and against the Welsh device, on the ground that Cher-nivsky had narrowed his claims to the locking feature in order to meet the examiner’s objections and thus, under the doctrine of file wrapper estoppel, is precluded from expanding his claims by the doctrine of equivalents to cover the elements surrendered by amendment.
We shall examine the facts with respect to infringement before considering the effect of file wrapper estoppel on Cher-nivsky’s claim to equivalence. Cherniv-sky argues that Welsh duplicated, with “trivial changes,” the “desirable features” of his patent to avoid the language of claim 1, but that there is infringement since both devices “do the same work in substantially the same way, and accomplish substantially the same result * * Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. [588]*588Winters, 280 U.S. 30, 42, 50 S.Ct. 9, 13, 74 L.Ed. 147 (1929). On oral argument before this court counsel for Welsh admitted that Welsh knew of the Cherniv-sky patent and attempted to design around it.
The rear cross-bar of the Welsh base is slightly lower than and exceeds slightly in width the base of Chernivsky’s; the sides of both bases are slightly off parallel from back to front, the Welsh slightly outward and the Chernivsky slightly inward; the sides of the Welsh base are a little longer than those of the Chernivsky base; the bends at the ends of the sides on the Welsh base are shorter than those on the Chernivsky base and turn forward, while Chernivsky’s flare outwardly without the forward turn; the Welsh sides turn upward at a slightly wider angle than Cher-nivsky’s so that the sides of the Welsh back frame are in a more upright line than Chernivsky’s, resulting in a less backwardly inclined whole.
The sides of the base frames, in both chairs, must be sprung inwardly in order to fit the extremities of the base into the sleeve extremities of the back frame. The base extremities of the Welsh device are from a front view substantially perpendicular to the plane of the base, while the extremities of the Chernivsky base angle inwardly. The tips of the extremities of the Chernivsky base then flare outwardly. The result of this outward turn at the tips of the Chernivsky base extremities is a tighter spring fit between the base and back frames. This is the “frictional locking” device referred to by the district court.
The bases of both devices are designed to give stability. The Chernivsky device accomplishes this through the rear crossbar and the comparatively extensive outward flaring of the front ends of the base to compensate for the comparatively narrower chair. The Welsh device compensates for lack of outward flaring front ends by having its cross-bar at the rear of the base wider and the sides extending outward toward the front so that they are several inches longer than the Chernivsky sides before turning inward, and at the point where they begin to turn the base of the Welsh device is about four inches wider than the Chernivsky base. The resting points of contact are slightly different, but in sum are about equal. The Chernivsky connection between the base and back frame is tighter and holds together — at least when not occupied — better than the Welsh device.
As we have stated, the back frames of both chairs are slightly outward from parallel as they reach toward their extremities, and the backward incline of the Chernivsky device is greater, occupied or not. The top of the back frame in the Chernivsky device is a broad curve resulting, when the chair is occupied, in a depression in the center of the fabric to accommodate the baby’s head and maintain it in a safe center place. The top of the back of the Welsh device is not curved, but it is a cross piece which extends backwardly from each side to form a shallow V. When the chair is occupied this has the same result as the Cherniv-sky back frame.
We conclude that the Welsh device does accomplish the same result as the patented device by substantially the same means and that it is the equivalent thereof. Independent Pneumatic Tool Co. v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 194 F.2d 945 (7th Cir.1952).
The question now is whether there is any room in the present case for application of the doctrine of equivalents, in view of the file wrapper estoppel doctrine. Because the district court’s findings on the issue of file wrapper estoppel were based solely on documentary evidence, all of which is before us, those findings have not the same degree of finality which ordinarily attaches to findings of fact under Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Taylor-Reed Corp. v. Mennen Food Products Co., 324 F.2d 108, 111 (7th Cir.1963). We hold that the district court’s finding that Chernivsky narrowed his claim to the so-called “frictional locking device” is clearly erroneous and this finding was in part induced by an erroneous application of the law. It must therefore be set aside.
[589]*589Chernivsky originally filed ten claims, the first two of which, as amended, are set out in the margin.1
2Because of rejections by the examiner on the basis of cited prior art, Chernivsky twice amended, and finally cancelled, these claims and substituted for them new claims 1, 2 and 3. After a conference with the examiner the patent issued on the claims. No claim of infringement is made with respect to claim 2, and claim 3 depends upon claim 1, which is set out in the margin.3
It can be seen that patent claim 1 is essentially an amendment of original claim 2, and that as granted claim 1 is broader, rather than narrower, than original claim 2. Original claim 2 described the extremities of the ends of the base as “flaring slightly outward out of line with the hollow extremities of the back rest,” while patent claim 1 describes these extremities only as “inclined slightly out of line with the said hollow extremities.” The meaning of the term “extremities of the ends” here becomes important. This term is used twice in patent claim 1, preceded the second time by the word “said.” A normal reading of the claim, therefore, would attribute the same meaning to the term in both instances. The first use of the term occurs in the following phrase: “ * * * having front ends with angular return bends extending outwardly and downwardly to form two front legs and the extremities of the ends extending upwardly and tilted backwardly * * *”
Reading the description against the Cher-nivsky chair makes it clear that the term in question refers to the entire segment of the base to which the back is attached. It must, then, have that same meaning in the second reference, and the phrase does not, as Welsh would have us read it, refer only to the outwardly bent tips of those segments. Patent claim 2 3 also contains the term “said extremities of the ends of the base,” but there it is conjoined with “flare slightly outward” and does refer to the tips of the segments in question. The term “extremities of the ends” was used ambiguously, but we have resolved the ambiguity in what appears to us to be the most reasonable manner and one which is consistent with the presumption of the validity of the patent. If the term in [590]*590claim 1 meant only the bent tips, then claim 2 would be practically redundant and superfluous.
In “remarks” filed with the substituted claims Chernivsky’s attorney stated that “the applicant is not attempting to claim broadly any arm or other member which may be sprung into engagement with another. * * * ” Both Welsh and the district court took this statement as indicating that Chernivsky was limiting his claim solely to the “frictional locking” device. The context of the patent and file wrapper shows, however, that the claim was not actually narrowed and that the statement in question was meant to indicate only that the springing action was claimed as part of the combination of parts which make up the Chernivsky patent.
The district court’s findings and conclusion on the issue of file wrapper estop-pel were closely related to, and dependent upon, its findings as to the prior art. The court stated that
“[I]n view of the narrow construction defendant necessarily placed on his claims in the Patent Office to distinguish them from the prior art, his claims do not cover the alleged infringing device which in each and every feature thereof embodies elements all known in the prior art.”
In support of this conclusion the court cited the case of Standard Mirror Co. v. H. W. Brown, Inc., 113 F.2d 379 (7th Cir. 1940), where it was held that where a patent “depends for its novelty over the prior art upon a single limited feature of construction, the claims cannot be expanded by any doctrine of equivalents to cover a device which lacks that single essential feature.” The Standard Mirror case, however, and the cases which follow it, Jacwil Mfrs. v. Batesville Casket Co., 311 F.2d 38 (7th Cir.1962), cert. denied 372 U.S. 942, 83 S.Ct. 937, 9 L.Ed. 2d 968 (1963); Fife Mfg. Co. v. Stanford Engineering Co., 299 F.2d 223. (7th Cir. 1962); Lewis v. Avco Mfg. Corp., 228 F.2d 919 (7th Cir.1956); have in common a fact which distinguishes them from the case at hand. In those cases the patented device contained only a single, limited improvement over a preexisting device in the prior art, and a broader construction of the claims than that allowed by the court would have rendered the patent invalid on the prior art. In the case before us, on the other hand, there was no single device in the prior art which embodied, except for the coupling device, all of the elements of the Chernivsky device.
We think the root of the district court’s error was in considering Chernivsky’s claim 1, upon which his claims 2 and 3 rest, against the prior art piece by piece instead of considering the device totally, without properly applying the well-established principle that a combination of old elements in a manner that is unobvious to one skilled in the trade and which produces a new and useful result may be patented. Expanded Metal Co. v. Bradford, 214 U.S. 366, 381, 29 S. Ct. 652, 53 L.Ed. 1034 (1909); Loom Co. v. Higgins, 105 U.S. (15 Otto) 580, 591, 26 L.Ed. 1177 (1881); Kaakinen v. Peelers Co., 301 F.2d 170 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 371 U.S. 823, 83 S.Ct. 40, 9 L.Ed. 2d 62 (1962); Anderson Co. v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 265 F.2d 755 (7th Cir. 1959); Brown v. Brock, 240 F.2d 723 (4th Cir.1957); Weller Mfg. Co. v. Wen Products, Inc., 231 F.2d 795 (7th Cir. 1956); Blaw-Knox Co. v. I. D. Lain Co., 230 F.2d 373 (7th Cir.1956). Since a combination of old elements alone may be enough to constitute a patentable device, the addition of a new element to the combination should not, as the district court seemed to conclude, result in a limitation of the claims to the new element.
Considering the prior art discussed by the district court, we think the Pribil patent did not read on Chernivsky’s, considered as a whole, since, among other things, in the Pribil device the infant lies down; the Blackledge patent’s back rest does not accommodate small infants; Brown resembles Chernivsky’s patent more closely, but has not the latter’s detachable light base and back frames nor the resiliency; and Oullette has not the light detachable base and back frames nor the resiliency.
[591]*591Each of the patents contains one or more elements which are substantially similar to Chernivsky’s. But there was no combination of parts into any whole which is substantially similar to the patent in suit. Presumably Chernivsky, observing the prior art, drew ideas from the various devices and conceived the idea of a novel, useful and unobvious baby support which met a social need. This synthesis of ideas into a composite creation does not permit a competitor to separate this composite into the old elements that went into it and by slight modifications of each element avoid infringement by omitting the novel element from its imitating device.
We agree with the district court’s conclusion that the commercial success achieved by Chemivsky’s baby support with only modest promotion and the fact that still another competitor copied it in virtually every detail, while not sufficient of itself to establish the validity of the patent, Jungersen v. Ostby & Barton Co., 335 U.S. 560, 567, 69 S.Ct. 269, 93 L.Ed. 235 (1949), does support the inference that the device was unobvious and filled a need. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Ray-O-Vac Co., 321 U.S. 275, 279, 64 S.Ct. 593, 88 L.Ed. 721 (1944) ; H. W. Gossard Co. v. J. C. Penney Co., 304 F.2d 515 (7th Cir.1962). Our difference with the district court is, of course, only over the scope of the patent. We think the inference is justified that such commercial success was not achieved solely because of the novel locking device, but because of the combination of all of the elements which comprised this new and useful whole.
For the reasons given, the judgment of the district court as to infringement is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed herein.
Reversed and remanded.