PROCEDURAL HISTORY/ISSUES
This is an intermediate appeal which poses a question of first impression for this Court. James Weisbeck (Weisbeck) brought suit against Dr. James Hess (Hess), sole owner of Mountain Plains Counseling Center, alleging professional negligence.
[364]*364During discovery, Weisbeck requested that Hess produce a list of his patients from the previous seven years. Weisbeck also sought the right to depose Tom Terry, Hess’ personal counselor. Hess refused both requests on numerous grounds, including the claim that compliance would violate psychologist-patient privilege.
On October 1, 1998, the trial court issued an Order requiring Hess to turn over his client lists to the court where they would be kept sealed until further order. Permission was also given by the trial court to depose Terry with admissibility of his testimony to be determined at a later date. Hess responded by applying for an intermediate appeal, granted by this Court on October 29, 1993. We address the following issues:
I. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by ordering Hess to divulge his list of patients? We hold that it did.
II. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in allowing Weisbeck to depose Hess’ counselor? We hold that it did.
Because the trial court’s order would require an improper violation of privileged medical confidentiality, we reverse said order.
FACTS
During November 1986, Weisbeek’s wife of 12 years, Cindy, began counseling sessions with Hess, a licensed psychologist and psychology professor at Black Hills State University (BHSU). Although Weisbeck occasionally received counseling, Hess contends their meetings were only in conjunction with Cindy’s counseling. After June 1987, when Cindy began seeing other counselors at Mountain Plains, Hess purportedly never professionally counseled her again. However, that following September, Hess hired her as a part-time secretary.
Weisbeck discovered an envelope containing concert tickets with a poem signed, “Love, Jim,” in October 1988. Cindy expressed to her husband that Hess was in love with her. Thereafter, she terminated her employment with Mountain Plains. Five months later, Weisbeck found a love letter from Hess to Cindy wherein Hess expressed a lifelong commitment to her. Hess has since admitted to having sexual relations with Cindy diming 1989. All of this having occurred while Cindy and Weisbeck were still married. However, the two divorced in 1990. That same year, Hess, who was also married during these events, divorced his third wife and began consulting with social worker Tom Terry about Hess’ involvement with a former patient.
Alleging breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and seduction, Weisbeck filed a complaint in June 1992 against Hess and Mountain Plains seeking compensatory and punitive damages for Hess’ romantic relationship with Cindy, which may have begun while Cindy was under Hess’ direct professional care. During discovery, Weisbeck requested a list of Hess’ clients from both his private practice and at BHSU over the previous seven years. He also sought to depose Terry about Hess’ relationship with Cindy. Hess maintains that he did not begin his relationship with Cindy until 20 months after their counseling sessions ended and refuses to produce the requested information asserting that it is protected privileged information. The trial court granted Weisbeck’s motion to compel. Hess appeals.
DECISION
I. Hess’.'patient list is privileged.
Essentially, this case requires this Court to conceptualize and decide issues on the scope of discovery, doctor-patient privilege, and rights of individuals not party to this litigation.
It is settled law that “[a]ll relevant matters are discoverable unless privileged.” Kaarup v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins., 436 N.W.2d 17, 20 (S.D.1989). Challengers to a trial court’s evidentiary rulings must prove an abuse of discretion. Stormo v. Strong, 469 N.W.2d 816, 820 (S.D.1991). See Aberle v. Ringhausen, 494 N.W.2d 179, 182-83 (S.D.1992) (applying an abuse of discretion standard in reviewing orders regarding discovery). By contending that the discovery order violates a confidential privilege, Hess [365]*365basically raises a question of statutory interpretation. Construction of a statute is a question of law and is, therefore, fully reviewable without deference to the decision of the trial court. Reid v. Huron Bd. of Educ., 449 N.W.2d 240, 242 (S.D.1989).
Pursuant to SDCL 19-13-7, “[a] patient has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communications made for the purpose of diagnosis or treatment of his physical, mental or emotional condition[.]” It is understood, per SDCL 19-13-8, that the patient’s psychotherapist at the time of the communication has the authority to claim the privilege but only on behalf of the patient. According to SDCL 19-13-6(4):
A communication is “confidential” if not intended to be disclosed to third persons, except persons present to further the interest of patient in the consultation, examination, or interview, persons reasonably necessary for the transmission of the communication, or persons who are participating in the diagnosis and treatment under the direction of the physician or psychotherapist, including members of the patient’s family.
Hess asserts such communication embodies his list of patients who, in the course of seeking his care, divulge private and personal information. See SDCL 36-27A-38 (the confidential relations and communications between a licensed psychologist and a person consulting him in his professional capacity are confidential). Writing for the majority in Hogue v. Massa, 80 S.D. 319, 123 N.W.2d 131, 133 (1963), Supreme Court Judge Alex Rentto stated that South Dakota has “a longstanding public policy to encourage uninhibited communication between a physician and his patient.” To compel disclosure of a psychotherapy patient’s identity, is to directly harm her privacy interests. This harm is exacerbated by the stigma that society often attaches to mental illness. Scull v. Superior Court, 206 Cal.App.3d 784, 254 Cal.Rptr. 24, 26 (1988). If a patient knows that the privilege is fraught with exceptions, she is hable to withhold information or avoid therapy altogether. 2 Scott N. Stone & Robert K. Taylor, Testimonial Privileges § 7.02 (2d ed. 1993).
Weisbeck wants the list so he can question Hess’ former female patients to bolster his claim that his marriage fell victim to Hess’ (alleged) usual ploy of taking advantage of vulnerable female patients. However, this discovery fishing expedition does not provide the facts or rationale necessary to violate the privacy of uninterested parties.
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PROCEDURAL HISTORY/ISSUES
This is an intermediate appeal which poses a question of first impression for this Court. James Weisbeck (Weisbeck) brought suit against Dr. James Hess (Hess), sole owner of Mountain Plains Counseling Center, alleging professional negligence.
[364]*364During discovery, Weisbeck requested that Hess produce a list of his patients from the previous seven years. Weisbeck also sought the right to depose Tom Terry, Hess’ personal counselor. Hess refused both requests on numerous grounds, including the claim that compliance would violate psychologist-patient privilege.
On October 1, 1998, the trial court issued an Order requiring Hess to turn over his client lists to the court where they would be kept sealed until further order. Permission was also given by the trial court to depose Terry with admissibility of his testimony to be determined at a later date. Hess responded by applying for an intermediate appeal, granted by this Court on October 29, 1993. We address the following issues:
I. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by ordering Hess to divulge his list of patients? We hold that it did.
II. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in allowing Weisbeck to depose Hess’ counselor? We hold that it did.
Because the trial court’s order would require an improper violation of privileged medical confidentiality, we reverse said order.
FACTS
During November 1986, Weisbeek’s wife of 12 years, Cindy, began counseling sessions with Hess, a licensed psychologist and psychology professor at Black Hills State University (BHSU). Although Weisbeck occasionally received counseling, Hess contends their meetings were only in conjunction with Cindy’s counseling. After June 1987, when Cindy began seeing other counselors at Mountain Plains, Hess purportedly never professionally counseled her again. However, that following September, Hess hired her as a part-time secretary.
Weisbeck discovered an envelope containing concert tickets with a poem signed, “Love, Jim,” in October 1988. Cindy expressed to her husband that Hess was in love with her. Thereafter, she terminated her employment with Mountain Plains. Five months later, Weisbeck found a love letter from Hess to Cindy wherein Hess expressed a lifelong commitment to her. Hess has since admitted to having sexual relations with Cindy diming 1989. All of this having occurred while Cindy and Weisbeck were still married. However, the two divorced in 1990. That same year, Hess, who was also married during these events, divorced his third wife and began consulting with social worker Tom Terry about Hess’ involvement with a former patient.
Alleging breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and seduction, Weisbeck filed a complaint in June 1992 against Hess and Mountain Plains seeking compensatory and punitive damages for Hess’ romantic relationship with Cindy, which may have begun while Cindy was under Hess’ direct professional care. During discovery, Weisbeck requested a list of Hess’ clients from both his private practice and at BHSU over the previous seven years. He also sought to depose Terry about Hess’ relationship with Cindy. Hess maintains that he did not begin his relationship with Cindy until 20 months after their counseling sessions ended and refuses to produce the requested information asserting that it is protected privileged information. The trial court granted Weisbeck’s motion to compel. Hess appeals.
DECISION
I. Hess’.'patient list is privileged.
Essentially, this case requires this Court to conceptualize and decide issues on the scope of discovery, doctor-patient privilege, and rights of individuals not party to this litigation.
It is settled law that “[a]ll relevant matters are discoverable unless privileged.” Kaarup v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins., 436 N.W.2d 17, 20 (S.D.1989). Challengers to a trial court’s evidentiary rulings must prove an abuse of discretion. Stormo v. Strong, 469 N.W.2d 816, 820 (S.D.1991). See Aberle v. Ringhausen, 494 N.W.2d 179, 182-83 (S.D.1992) (applying an abuse of discretion standard in reviewing orders regarding discovery). By contending that the discovery order violates a confidential privilege, Hess [365]*365basically raises a question of statutory interpretation. Construction of a statute is a question of law and is, therefore, fully reviewable without deference to the decision of the trial court. Reid v. Huron Bd. of Educ., 449 N.W.2d 240, 242 (S.D.1989).
Pursuant to SDCL 19-13-7, “[a] patient has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communications made for the purpose of diagnosis or treatment of his physical, mental or emotional condition[.]” It is understood, per SDCL 19-13-8, that the patient’s psychotherapist at the time of the communication has the authority to claim the privilege but only on behalf of the patient. According to SDCL 19-13-6(4):
A communication is “confidential” if not intended to be disclosed to third persons, except persons present to further the interest of patient in the consultation, examination, or interview, persons reasonably necessary for the transmission of the communication, or persons who are participating in the diagnosis and treatment under the direction of the physician or psychotherapist, including members of the patient’s family.
Hess asserts such communication embodies his list of patients who, in the course of seeking his care, divulge private and personal information. See SDCL 36-27A-38 (the confidential relations and communications between a licensed psychologist and a person consulting him in his professional capacity are confidential). Writing for the majority in Hogue v. Massa, 80 S.D. 319, 123 N.W.2d 131, 133 (1963), Supreme Court Judge Alex Rentto stated that South Dakota has “a longstanding public policy to encourage uninhibited communication between a physician and his patient.” To compel disclosure of a psychotherapy patient’s identity, is to directly harm her privacy interests. This harm is exacerbated by the stigma that society often attaches to mental illness. Scull v. Superior Court, 206 Cal.App.3d 784, 254 Cal.Rptr. 24, 26 (1988). If a patient knows that the privilege is fraught with exceptions, she is hable to withhold information or avoid therapy altogether. 2 Scott N. Stone & Robert K. Taylor, Testimonial Privileges § 7.02 (2d ed. 1993).
Weisbeck wants the list so he can question Hess’ former female patients to bolster his claim that his marriage fell victim to Hess’ (alleged) usual ploy of taking advantage of vulnerable female patients. However, this discovery fishing expedition does not provide the facts or rationale necessary to violate the privacy of uninterested parties. Releasing the names of these clients would directly discourage uninhibited communication, due to Weisbeck’s mere suspicion that such information may possibly contain relevant evidence. This plan is not “reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” SDCL 15-6-26(b)(l). Nor is it enough to set aside the privilege. 23 Am. Jur.2d, Depositions & Discovery § 250 (1983).
Patients will be further damaged when they learn that seeking psychotherapy can unnecessarily become a matter of public record. Albeit the trial court has ordered the list “kept sealed until further order by the Court,” it logically remains that such a command does not truly protect. In truth, the list is “sealed” while in Hess’ confidential possession. However, the only way the list can serve Weisbeck’s discovery interests is by revealing the names. Alas, the privilege has been nullified by the trial court. Schechet v. Kesten, 372 Mich. 346, 126 N.W.2d 718, 720 (1964). Simply put, the trial court’s ruling defeats the purpose behind the privilege.
Weisbeck’s authorities state that the physician-patient privilege is analogous to the psychotherapist-patient privilege. Not necessarily so. As one commentator has noted, “a person in psychotherapy, by and large, visits his psychiatrist with the same secrecy that a man goes to a bawdy house.” Scull, 254 Cal.Rptr. at 26 (quoting Slovenko, Psychiatry and a Second Look at the Medical Privilege, 6 Wayne L.Rev. 175, 188, n. 46 (I960)). “A physical ailment may be treated by a doctor whom the patient does not trust, but if a psychologist or psychiatrist does not have the patient’s trust, the therapist cannot treat the patient.” Bond v. District Court, 682 P.2d 33, 38 (Colo.1984) (citing Taylor v. Unit[366]*366ed States, 222 F.2d 398, 401 (D.C.Cir.1955)). When an individual makes the courageous choice to seek help, confidentiality begins. This Court should not discourage such courage. The privilege covers that information “which is necessary and proper to enable him to perform his duty or act in his professional capacity[.]” 97 C.J.S. Witnesses § 295 (1957). It may extend to include those communications made by a patient which tends to blacken her character. Id. Thus, the privilege should cover any form of communication made as a part of the therapeutic relationship. Testimonial PRIVILEGES at § 7.10. Hence, therapy mandates name confidentiality.
A similar discovery request arose with In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d 632 (6th Cir.1983), where two psychotherapists were allegedly involved in a fraudulent billing scheme. During its discourse on the privilege, the court recited Report No. 45, Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry 92 (1960) quoted in Advisory Committee’s Notes to Proposed Rules, 56 F.R.D. 183 at 242:
Among physicians, the psychiatrist has a special need to maintain confidentiality. His capacity to help his patients is completely dependent upon their willingness and ability to talk freely. This makes it difficult if not impossible for him to function without being able to assure his patients of confidentiality and, indeed, privileged communication. Where there may be exceptions to this general rule ..., there is wide agreement that confidentiality is a sine qua non for successful psychiatric treatment. The relationship may well be likened to that of the priest-penitent or the lawyer-client. Psychiatrists not only explore the very depths of their patients’ conscious, but their unconscious feelings and attitudes as well. Therapeutic effectiveness necessitates going beyond a patient’s awareness and, in order to do this, it must be possible to communicate freely. A threat to secrecy blocks successful treatment.
Zuniga, 714 F.2d at 638. Although the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals did not permit use of the privilege under its facts, the court did hold that the scope of the privilege must be considered on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 639.
With the “case-by-case basis” in mind, we consider the anonymous patients whose identities are at risk herein. For example, a woman who may have been the victim of sexual abuse as a child may not confront the problem for years but may wish to eventually do so with the utmost privacy. By practical reason, one may assume the potential damage to this woman should one day a stranger come to her door to interrogate her about possible sexual liaisons between her and her mental health counselor. Other less intrusive means, by skillful counsel, may be employed, to learn if Hess is taking advantage of his female patients’ vulnerability. Concerning such privacy in this case, the psychotherapist should not be compelled to reveal his patients’ names. Boddy v. Parker, 45 A.D.2d 1000, 358 N.Y.S.2d 218 (1974); Scull, 254 Cal.Rptr. at 28. We hold under the abuse of discretion scope of review, the trial court abused its discretion.
II. Hess’ sessions with Terry qualify as privileged communications.
It is not enough that Weisbeek seeks the names of those who have revealed their innermost personal thoughts, he also desires to further violate the privilege by requesting the innermost personal thoughts which Hess divulged to his own counselor, Tom Terry. The trial court complied, issuing the following order, which stated in pertinent part:
ORDERED, that Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Production of Documents is granted, with the following understandings and stipulations: ...
3. That it is the Court’s determinations that contacts by Dr. Hess to Tom Terry are discoverable and that Plaintiffs counsel may take the deposition of Tom Terry, pursuant to notice to Robert Van Norman, counsel for Dr. Hess;
4. Counsel for the Plaintiff may inquire of Tom Terry regarding the content of the visits between Dr. Hess and Tom Terry, including but not limited to, the discussions regarding Cindy Weisbeek. It is further understood that the Court has not determined whether these discussions are ad[367]*367missible in trial. Such determination shall be made at a later date.
Weisbeck believes that Terry may have coun-selled Hess about Cindy and that Hess should stop dating her because of professional ethics. Gleaning the record herein, it is apparent that Weisbeck is also hopeful that Terry, via the counseling sessions, has knowledge of other women who Hess allegedly victimized. Regardless of what was revealed during counseling, Weisbeck is, once again, merely fishing. In the same manner that a patient’s sessions with a psychotherapist are deemed privileged, this state recognizes the right to privacy between clients and social workers. SDCL 36-26-30(2) provides:
No licensed certified social worker, social worker, or social work associate or his employee may disclose any information he may have acquired from persons consulting him in his professional capacity that was necessary to enable him to render services in his professional capacity to those persons except:
⅜ ⅜ ⅝ ⅜ ⅝ ⅜
(2) That a licensed certified social worker, licensed social worker, or licensed social work associate shall not be required to treat as confidential a communication that reveals the contemplation of a crime or a harmful act.
Weisbeck argues that Hess’ “romantic” relationship with Cindy, which began during the patient-client sessions according to Weis-beck, was a harmful act, and, therefore, Hess’ discussions with his social worker regarding this relationship and any other relationships with former patients fall within the 36-26-30(2) exception. There are no South Dakota statutes or cases addressing whether a psychotherapist’s sexual involvement with a former patient constitutes a harmful, tor-tious, or even criminal act. (After this tort action had been filed, the South Dakota Legislature, in 1993, enacted a set of statutes criminalizing sexual contact or sexual penetration between a psychotherapist and current patients.) For guidance, we turn to the Ethical Principles of Psychologists, published by the American Psychological Association (APA), a scientific and professional society of psychologists. At the time psychologist Hess began his relationship with Cindy, the APA ethical code warned its colleagues against exploiting trust and dependency and against sexual intimacies with clients. However, the ethical code contained no express prohibition on sexual contact between psychologists and former patients. Not long after Weisbeck filed his complaint in this matter, the APA amended § 4.07 of its ethical code to read in part:
Psychologists do not engage in sexual intimacies with a former therapy patient or client for at least two years after cessation or termination of professional services.
American Psychological Association, Inc., Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct 9 (1992).
Hess asserts that his pre-amendment relationship began 20 months after cessation of his professional services. From her therapy with Hess to her employment with Hess to her intimate relationship with Hess, Cindy maintained continuous contact with Hess. As has been alleged, this certainly created much opportunity for Hess to exploit Cindy’s trust and dependency. It also established an appearance of impropriety. Although Hess’ actions can certainly be defined as unethical now, neither the APA rules nor our statutes forbade his relationship with Cindy in 1989. Hence, engaging in a sexual relationship with a former patient does constitute a departure from good and accepted psychiatric practice but was not specifically recognized as a harmful act by pre-1989 standards set out by Hess’ profession or our legislature. Hence, he was in compliance with the only “law” applicable at the time.
Furthermore, SDCL 36-26-30(2) does not require Terry to treat information concerning the contemplation of a harmful act as confidential
Recall, the privilege lies with the client, not the counselor. Its scope is determined by balancing the interests protected by shielding the information sought with those interests advanced by disclosure. Zuniga, 714 F.2d at 639-40; Scull, 254 Cal.Rptr. at 27. It is not our intention to validate Hess’ actions, whatever they may be; rather, this Court seeks to protect the sanctity of the privilege. As such, the trial court’s ruling was clearly against reason and evidence and was an abuse of discretion. Cody v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 502 N.W.2d 558, 565 (S.D.1998).
Reversed.
MILLER, C.J., and SABERS, J., concur in part and concur in result in part.
WUEST and AMUNDSON, JJ., dissent.
KONENKAMP, J., not having been a member of the Court at the time this case was submitted, did not participate.
This author's writing does not discourage social workers from revealing the truth. Despite the concerns of Chief Justice Miller’s writing, this opinion (particularly the corresponding sentence to this footnote) freely permits social workers to report the harmful acts or crimes of their patients.