[Cite as Weihe v. JP Morgan Chase Natl. Assn., 2025-Ohio-3308.]
COURT OF APPEALS RICHLAND COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
CATHERINE WIEHE, ET AL. : JUDGES: : Hon. William B. Hoffman, P.J. Plaintiffs-Appellants : Hon. Andrew J. King, J. : Hon. Robert G. Montgomery, J. -vs- : : JP MORGAN CHASE BANK : Case No. 25CA16 NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, ET AL. : : Defendants-Appellees : OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 23 CV 0257
JUDGMENT: Affirmed
DATE OF JUDGMENT: September 12, 2025
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiffs-Appellants For Defendants-Appellees
MICHAEL L. INSCORE SARAH M. BENOIT 3 North Main Street 41 South High Street Suite 703 Suite 1800 Mansfield, OH 44902-1741 Columbus, OH 43215-6106
DAVID N. HARING 99 Park Avenue West Suite B Mansfield, OH 44902 King, J.
{¶ 1} Plaintiffs-Appellants, Catherine Wiehe, Joan Cowdery, and Michael Gesing,
appeal the February 19, 2025 judgment entries of the Court of Common Pleas of Richland
County, Ohio, denying their motion to strike and granting summary judgment to
Defendants-Appellees, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., Barbara Walker-Cox, and Ronald
Cox. We affirm the trial court.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
{¶ 2} Joan Bunsey and appellee Barbara Walker-Cox were sisters and the aunts
of appellants. Two additional sisters who predeceased Bunsey were the mothers of
appellants. Walker-Cox is married to Ronald Cox and they reside in Las Vegas, Nevada.
{¶ 3} Bunsey never married and had no children. She lived in New York City. In
2019, at the approximate age of 83, her health started to decline rapidly. Her nieces,
Wiehe and Cowdery, traveled to New York to help care for her. In 2021, Bunsey moved
into an assisted living facility in Mansfield, Ohio. Appellants provided care to Bunsey,
visiting her, running errands for her, and transporting her to appointments.
{¶ 4} At some point, Wiehe asked Walker-Cox to help Bunsey with her finances,
specifically, opening a bank account in Ohio. On March 4, 2022, Cowdery took Bunsey
to the local Chase Bank to open checking and savings accounts. They met with bank
manager Adam Siringer. Bunsey indicated she wanted to open accounts and transfer
her New York funds into the accounts and have her retirement income directly deposited
therein. She expressed the desire to have Walker-Cox on the accounts. Cowdery helped
Bunsey operate the computer mouse to point and click on the digital forms. Walker-Cox was listed as a "customer to be added later." Bunsey elected to receive electronic copies
of the documents.
{¶ 5} On March 10, 2022, Walker-Cox went to a Chase Bank in Las Vegas to add
herself to the accounts as instructed by Bunsey. By June 2022, over $1 million was added
to the accounts.
{¶ 6} On August 18, 2022, Bunsey and Walker-Cox went to the local Chase Bank
in Ohio to add beneficiaries to the account. They met with Danielle Horvath. Appellants
were added to the accounts as payable on death ("POD") beneficiaries.
{¶ 7} Bunsey passed away on May 3, 2023, at the age of 86. On May 11, 2023,
Walker-Cox met with Siringer at Chase Bank. She removed Bunsey from the account
and added her husband as a joint owner.
{¶ 8} On May 24, 2023, appellants filed a complaint against appellees alleging
conversion, interference with contract, and breach of contract. Appellants also sought
declaratory judgment. Appellants filed an amended complaint on August 15, 2023, and
a second amended complaint on November 20, 2023, adding a claim for
reformation/rescission. Appellants alleged they were the rightful owners of the monies in
the accounts.
{¶ 9} On October 7, and 9, 2024, appellees filed separate motions for summary
judgment. Both motions had attached exhibits and affidavits. On November 1, 2024,
appellants filed a motion to strike portions of the affidavits of Walker-Cox and Siringer,
arguing some of the averments lacked foundation, conflicted with deposition testimony,
and were speculative. Walker-Cox filed a reply with a supplemental affidavit on November 18, 2024. By judgment entries filed February 19, 2025, the trial court denied
the motion to strike and granted the motions for summary judgment.
{¶ 10} Appellants filed an appeal with the following assignments of error:
I
{¶ 11} "THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN WEIGHING THE EVIDENCE AND
MAKING FACTUAL FINDINGS THAT THE DECEDENT, JOAN BUNSEY,
ACKNOWLEDGED RECEIPT OF THE DEPOSIT ACCOUNT AGREEMENT ON MARCH
4, 2022, INTENTIONALLY ADDED BARBARA WALKER-COX AS A JOINT OWNER
WITH RIGHTS OF SURVIVORSHIP, AND ELECTRONICALLY SIGNED A NEW
SIGNATURE CARD ON AUGUST 18, 2022."
II
{¶ 12} "THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN GRANTING THE
MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF DEFENDANT JPMORGAN CHASE BANK,
N.A., AND DEFENDANTS BARBARA WALKER-COX AND RONALD COX."
III
{¶ 13} "THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN OVERRULING
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO STRIKE IN PART AFFIDAVIT AVERMENTS OF BARBARA
WALKER-COX AND ADAM SIRINGER."
{¶ 14} For ease of discussion, we will address the last assignment of error first.
{¶ 15} In their third assignment of error, appellants claim the trial court erred in
overruling their motion to strike parts of the affidavits of Walker-Cox and Siringer. We
disagree. {¶ 16} This court has consistently reviewed decisions on motions to strike affidavits
within the context of summary judgment proceedings under an abuse of discretion
standard. Lakeview Loan Servicing, LLC v. Adegunju, 2025-Ohio-2019, ¶ 19 (5th Dist.);
Campagna-McGuffin v. Diva Gymnastics Academy, Inc., 2022-Ohio-3885, ¶ 20 (5th
Dist.); Curtis v. Schmid, 2008-Ohio-5239, ¶ 17 (5th Dist.). "Abuse of discretion" means
an attitude that is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable. Huffman v. Hair Surgeon,
Inc., 19 Ohio St.3d 83, 87 (1985). Most instances of abuse of discretion will result in
decisions that are simply unreasonable, rather than decisions that are unconscionable or
arbitrary. AAAA Enterprises, Inc. v. River Place Community Urban Redevelopment Corp.,
50 Ohio St.3d 157, 161 (1990). An unreasonable decision is one backed by no sound
reasoning process which would support that decision. Id. "It is not enough that the
reviewing court, were it deciding the issue de novo, would not have found that reasoning
process to be persuasive, perhaps in view of countervailing reasoning processes that
would support a contrary result." Id.
{¶ 17} Under Civ.R. 56(E), "[s]upporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on
personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and
shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated in the
affidavit." "If an affidavit of a movant for summary judgment is inconsistent with the
movant's former deposition testimony, summary judgment may not be granted in the
movant's favor." Byrd v. Smith, 2006-Ohio-3455, ¶ 26, citing Turner v. Turner, 67 Ohio
St.3d 337 (1993).
{¶ 18} In their motion to strike, appellants argued portions of the affidavits of
Walker-Cox and Siringer lacked foundation as to Bunsey's state of mind, conflicted with their deposition testimony, and contained speculative statements; therefore, the affidavits
amounted to sham affidavits.
{¶ 19} The trial court conducted a detailed analysis and denied the motion.
Judgment Entry filed February 9, 2025. We do not find the trial court abused its discretion
in its decision.
Walker-Cox Affidavit
{¶ 20} Appellants argue Walker-Cox's affidavit was more specific than her
deposition testimony. Appellants point out in her deposition, Walker-Cox testified Bunsey
wanted her "on the account with her" without elaboration. But in her affidavit, Walker-Cox
averred Bunsey wanted her on the account as a joint owner with rights of survivorship
and it was their mutual "understanding and agreement that whoever passed away first,
the survivor would take full ownership of the accounts." Appellants' Brief at 28.
Appellants argue because Walker-Cox failed to explain why her testimony changed, her
averments should have been stricken. Id.
{¶ 21} The trial court found Walker-Cox's deposition testimony was not
inconsistent with her affidavit. Judgment Entry filed February 9, 2025. The trial court
found when Walker-Cox was asked if she could recall any conversation with Bunsey
about the type of account she had opened, Walker-Cox testified Bunsey wanted a "joint
ownership account." Walker-Cox depo. at 23. Walker-Cox then confirmed that she
recalled Bunsey specifically using those words, "joint ownership account." Id. The trial
court noted it did not consider this testimony for the truth of the matter asserted.
{¶ 22} On the issue of the mutual understanding as to the surviving sister taking
full ownership of the accounts, the trial court found Walker-Cox's statement "is her opinion, that is rationally based on her perception of her interactions" with Bunsey and
Chase Bank which is permitted under Evid.R. 701 ("If the witness is not testifying as an
expert, the witness' testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those
opinions or inferences which are (1) rationally based on the perception of the witness and
(2) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness' testimony or the determination of a fact
in issue").
{¶ 23} In reviewing both Walker-Cox's affidavit and deposition testimony, we
cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in not finding an inconsistency.
Siringer Affidavit
{¶ 24} Appellants argue Siringer's affidavit goes well beyond his deposition. They
argue in his affidavit, Siringer averred he was never told Bunsey wanted Walker-Cox to
be a cosigner with no ownership rights and she did not want Walker-Cox to receive the
monies in the accounts upon her death; none of this was mentioned in his deposition
wherein he repeatedly stated he did not recall specific conversations. Appellants' Brief at
28. Appellants also argue Siringer averred he turned his computer screen toward Bunsey
and explained the process to her, contrary to his deposition testimony of no recollection.
Id.
{¶ 25} Chase Bank argues Siringer's affidavit provided "supporting detail and
clarification to his prior deposition testimony" and explains the account-opening process,
Siringer's routine practice in opening accounts, and his interaction with Bunsey. Chase
Bank's Brief at 29. Chase Bank argues during Siringer's deposition, appellants' counsel
did not pursue much of the supplemental information contained in his affidavit. Id. {¶ 26} The trial court reviewed Siringer's affidavit and deposition "in their entirety"
and found the affidavit "merely supplements his earlier sworn testimony." In reviewing
both Siringer's affidavit and deposition testimony, we cannot say the trial court abused its
discretion in so finding.
{¶ 27} Upon review, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
appellants' motion to strike.
{¶ 28} Assignment of Error III is denied.
I, II
{¶ 29} In their first and second assignments of error, appellants claim the trial court
erred in granting summary judgment to appellees. We disagree.
{¶ 30} Summary judgment motions are to be resolved in light of the dictates of
Civ.R. 56. Regarding summary judgment, the Supreme Court stated the following in State
ex rel. Zimmerman v. Tompkins, 75 Ohio St.3d 447, 448 (1996):
Civ.R. 56(C) provides that before summary judgment may be
granted, it must be determined that (1) no genuine issue as to any material
fact remains to be litigated, (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law, and (3) it appears from the evidence that reasonable minds
can come to but one conclusion, and viewing such evidence most strongly
in favor of the nonmoving party, that conclusion is adverse to the party
against whom the motion for summary judgment is made. State ex. rel.
Parsons v. Fleming (1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 509, 511, 628 N.E.2d 1377, 1379, citing Temple v. Wean United, Inc. (1977), 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327, 4 O.O.3d
466, 472, 364 N.E.2d 267, 274.
{¶ 31} In Leech v. Schumaker, 2015-Ohio-4444, ¶ 13 (5th Dist.), this court
explained the following:
It is well established the party seeking summary judgment bears the
burden of demonstrating that no issues of material fact exist for trial.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett (1986), 477 U.S. 317, 330, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91
L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The standard for granting summary judgment is
delineated in Dresher v. Burt (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 280 at 293: " * * * a party
seeking summary judgment, on the ground that the nonmoving party cannot
prove its case, bears the initial burden of informing the trial court of the basis
for the motion, and identifying those portions of the record that demonstrate
the absence of a genuine issue of material fact on the essential element(s)
of the nonmoving party's claims. The moving party cannot discharge its
initial burden under Civ.R. 56 simply by making a conclusory assertion the
nonmoving party has no evidence to prove its case. Rather, the moving
party must be able to specifically point to some evidence of the type listed
in Civ.R. 56(C) which affirmatively demonstrates the nonmoving party has
no evidence to support the nonmoving party's claims. If the moving party
fails to satisfy its initial burden, the motion for summary judgment must be
denied. However, if the moving party has satisfied its initial burden, the nonmoving party then has a reciprocal burden outlined in Civ.R. 56(E) to
set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial and, if the
nonmovant does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall
be entered against the nonmoving party." The record on
summary judgment must be viewed in the light most favorable to the
opposing party. Williams v. First United Church of Christ (1974), 37 Ohio
St.2d 150.
{¶ 32} As an appellate court reviewing summary judgment motions, we stand in
place of the trial court and review the issues de novo, under the same standards and
evidence as the trial court. Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105 (1996).
{¶ 33} In their second amended complaint, appellants alleged claims for
conversion, interference with contract, and breach of contract, and sought declaratory
judgment and reformation/rescission. In a lengthy analysis, the trial court found Bunsey
and Walker-Cox were joint owners with rights of survivorship on the accounts, and found
no genuine issues of material facts to exist. We agree with the trial court's determination.
{¶ 34} Appellants argue the trial court erred in finding Bunsey acknowledged
receipt of the Deposit Account Agreement signed on March 4, 2022, intentionally added
Walker-Cox as a joint owner with rights of survivorship, and electronically signed a new
signature card on August 18, 2022, to add payable on death beneficiaries. Appellants
argue genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether Bunsey wanted to add Walker-
Cox as merely a signer on the accounts and not as an owner, let alone a joint owner with
rights of survivorship. {¶ 35} On March 4, 2022, decedent Bunsey, accompanied by appellant Cowdery,
met with bank manager Siringer at Chase Bank to open a checking and savings account.
Siringer testified Bunsey wanted her sister, appellee Walker-Cox, who lived in Las Vegas,
to be added to the accounts. Siringer depo. at 18. Prior to coming in for the appointment,
Bunsey spoke to Siringer over the telephone and indicated she wanted to add her sister
to the accounts. Id. at 9-10, 12, 52-53. Siringer described Bunsey as "sharp," "direct,"
"organized," and "savvy." Id. at 8, 9, 15, 54. Bunsey wanted to get online to create a
user ID and password so she could pay bills online. Id. at 15-16. Siringer opened the
accounts with "customer to be added later," naming Walker-Cox as that customer. Id. at
18. Bunsey "signed" the signature card with "click to sign," whereby the customer uses
the computer mouse to click and her name under "electronic signature" "pops up." Id. at
27; Plaintiff's Exhibit 4. Siringer explained during the click and sign process, Bunsey first
had to decide whether to receive electronic or paper documents (she chose electronic).
Id. at 28, 34; Plaintiff's Exhibit 8. Then several pages would appear going through her
personal information, the deposit account agreements, banking services, fees, debit card
coverage, and then the signature card. Id. at 28-29. Siringer recalled Bunsey being "good
with the computer" and never indicating she did not understand what he was saying or
what was going on. Id. at 31, 54. Siringer explained "all our joint accounts are rights with
survivorship." Id. at 39. Siringer did not recall having a specific conversation with Bunsey
about joint accounts, but normal procedure would be to explain that joint accounts would
have rights of survivorship and that means "if something happens to you, it's her account;
something happens to her, you know, it's still obviously your account, is how I explained
it every time." Id. at 53. In his affidavit, Siringer averred Bunsey never indicated that "she only wanted her sister to be added as a cosigner to the accounts, with no ownership
rights. Additionally, Ms. Bunsey never told me that she did not want the funds in the
accounts to go to her sister upon her death." See Siringer Affidavit, attached to Chase
Bank's October 7, 2024 Motion for Summary Judgment as Exhibit F. Siringer stated he
routinely explains to every customer opening a joint account the details of what a joint
account is, namely, "if one joint account holder passes away, the account funds are then
owned solely by the surviving joint account holder." Id.
{¶ 36} Appellant Cowdery testified she accompanied Bunsey to Chase Bank on
March 4, 2022. Cowdery depo. at 34. Cowdery's understanding was that Bunsey was
going to consolidate her assets in one place and add Walker-Cox as a co-signer so she
could sign checks. Id. at 35. Cowdery recalled Siringer and Bunsey discussing putting
Walker-Cox on the accounts so "in the event of an emergency, [she] could write checks
to pay any bills." Id. at 43. Cowdery did not recall any discussions on joint account owner
or what would happen to the funds in the event of Bunsey's death. Id. at 44-45, 60, 76.
Cowdery had to help steady Bunsey's hand on the mouse to click the boxes on the
electronic form. Id. at 45-46. Bunsey or Cowdery never asked for any paper copies of
the forms. Id. at 47. Cowdery never had a reason to believe Bunsey was mentally
impaired; she was confident that Bunsey understood what she was doing. Id. at 23, 47,
54, 71-72. Cowdery agreed by signing the Deposit Account Agreement with her
electronic signature, Bunsey agreed to be bound by the terms of the agreement. Id. at
79. In her affidavit filed November 1, 2024, Cowdery averred there was no discussion
about the options of accounts Bunsey could open. {¶ 37} Appellee Walker-Cox testified Bunsey called her and told her to go to a
Chase Bank in Las Vegas to be placed on her bank accounts. Walker-Cox depo. at 17,
21. Walker-Cox did not recall the actual words, but stated Bunsey "wanted a joint
ownership account." Id. at 17, 23. Walker-Cox recalled Bunsey using those words. Id.
at 23. Walker-Cox believed Bunsey wanted her on the accounts as a joint owner for the
same reason Bunsey was on her accounts after she became a widow: "We were sisters.
I was the closest thing to her." Id. at 99. Bunsey and Walker-Cox discussed if Bunsey
died first, the funds would belong to Walker-Cox. Id. at 101. Bunsey told Walker-Cox
she did not want appellants on the accounts as joint account holders. Id. at 101. Walker-
Cox went to a Las Vegas branch and met with bank employee Lindi (Behnke) Foldvary
to execute the electronic forms to be added to the accounts. Id. at 31, 33. Walker-Cox
was told if Bunsey died first, she would have to bring the death certificate to the bank and
Bunsey's name would be removed and the accounts would belong to her. Id. at 34, 102.
She believed the accounts were as much hers as they were Bunsey's. Id. at 47.
Together, Bunsey and Walker-Cox chose and added POD beneficiaries (appellants
herein) to the accounts during an August bank appointment in Ohio. Id. at 45-47, 104.
Walker-Cox understood the beneficiaries would come into play if both she and Bunsey
were deceased. Id. at 50-51, 106. During the bank meeting to add the POD beneficiaries,
they were told if Bunsey died first, her name would be removed from the account and the
funds would belong to Walker-Cox; Bunsey did not question or object to that information.
Id. at 105. Walker-Cox agreed Bunsey was not mentally impaired in any way and was
very sharp. Id. at 79. {¶ 38} Chase Bank employee Foldvary testified she was aware that at Chase
Bank, joint accounts were all rights of survivorship accounts; there were no such things
as courtesy signer accounts or joint accounts without rights of survivorship. Foldvary
depo. at 13-14.
{¶ 39} Appellant Gesing agreed Bunsey was competent and sharp, "one of the
smartest people I know . . . [n]o qualifiers." Gesing depo. at 14. Appellant Wiehe agreed
Bunsey was "pretty sharp" when she wanted to be involved in the conversation. Wiehe
depo. at 20.
{¶ 40} The March 4, 2022 personal electronic signature card Bunsey signed
indicated the accounts were "individual" with a notation, "Customers to be added later:
Barbara A. Walker-Cox, Exp. 04/03/2022." See Exhibit 3, attached to Chase Bank's
October 7, 2024 Motion for Summary Judgment. The March 10, 2022 personal electronic
signature card Walker-Cox signed, at the direction of Bunsey, changed the account from
an individual account to a joint account. See Exhibit 4, attached to Chase Bank's October
7, 2024 Motion for Summary Judgment. It was explained that the accounts could not be
listed as joint accounts until the preauthorized joint account owner, in this case, Walker-
Cox, "presents to a Chase branch in person and is officially added to the account." See
Affidavit of Chad T. Miller, attached to Chase Bank's October 7, 2024 Motion for Summary
Judgment as Exhibit G. The August 18, 2022 personal electronic signature card Bunsey
and Walker-Cox both signed changed the account to "Joint - POD" and listed the account
title as Bunsey or Walker-Cox and listed appellants as PODs. See Exhibit 5, attached to
Chase Bank's October 7, 2024 Motion for Summary Judgment. {¶ 41} In their affidavits, all appellants averred they never heard Bunsey say to
anyone that she wanted Walker-Cox to be the owner of her accounts upon her passing.
But that does not mean that was not Bunsey's intention. In fact, Bunsey's actions belie
the argument that she intended appellants to inherit the funds upon her passing. It is
undisputed that Bunsey was not mentally impaired and was "sharp." She contacted
Siringer and informed him over the telephone and in person that she wanted Walker-Cox
on the accounts with her. She signed the electronic signature line indicating she was in
receipt of the Deposit Account Agreement and was bound by the terms and conditions
contained therein. The agreement includes definitions of joint accounts and POD
accounts, and states: "When two or more people are listed as owners of a personal
account, the account is a 'joint account' and each owner is a 'joint owner.' Each joint
owner has complete control over all of the funds in the account." See Section II(A)(2) of
the Deposit Account Agreement attached to Chase's October 7, 2024 Motion for
Summary Judgment as Exhibit 2. The section further states: "Except as otherwise stated
in this paragraph, a joint account has rights of survivorship unless you clearly indicate on
the signature card and in the account title that the account is created without these rights."
Id. Bunsey did not elect to have a joint account without rights of survivorship. She called
Walker-Cox and told her to go to her local Chase Bank and add herself to the accounts.
Thereafter, she and Walker-Cox added appellants as PODs, again, signing by electronic
signature with the Deposit Account Agreement attached which stated: "If a joint account
also contains a "payable on death" or "in trust for" designation, the account always
includes a right of survivorship and is payable to the beneficiary only upon the death of the last surviving owner." Id. On two separate occasions, Bunsey affirmed by signature
what she was doing.
{¶ 42} Even if Bunsey did not read the contents of the Direct Account Agreement
she acknowledged receiving, a "contract is interpreted by its plain meaning, even if one
of the parties fails to read the contract" and the "creation of a joint and survivorship
account is a contractual arrangement between the bank and the depositors." (Citations
omitted.) Kopp v. Bank One, NA, 2003-Ohio-64, ¶ 17 (11th Dist.). The Supreme Court
has held:
1. The survivorship rights under a joint and survivorship account of
the co-party or co-parties to the sums remaining on deposit at the death of
the depositor may not be defeated by extrinsic evidence that the decedent
did not intend to create in such surviving party or parties a present interest
in the account during the decedent's lifetime.
2. The opening of a joint and survivorship account in the absence of
fraud, duress, undue influence or lack of capacity on the part of the
decedent is conclusive evidence of his or her intention to transfer to the
surviving party or parties a survivorship interest in the balance remaining in
the account at his or her death.
Wright v. Bloom, 69 Ohio St.3d 596, paragraphs one and two of the syllabus. {¶ 43} Bunsey's action of signing the two signature cards is evidence of her intent
to form a joint account with rights of survivorship with Walker-Cox with appellants as
PODs. Chase Bank complied with R.C. 1109.05 which states: "At the time of opening a
deposit account, a bank shall provide the depositor a statement containing the existing
terms and conditions of the deposit contract. The statement may be set forth on the
depositor's signature card, which card may be electronic or in writing." And upon
Bunsey's death, Chase Bank complied with R.C. 1109.07(A) which states: "When a
deposit is made in the name of two or more persons, payable to either or the survivor, the
bank may pay all of the deposit, any part of the deposit, or any interest earned on the
deposit, to either of the named persons, or the guardian of the estate of either of the
named persons, whether or not the other person is living."
{¶ 44} As the trial court aptly reasoned in granting the motions for summary
judgment, we also do not find any material facts to exist on appellants' claims in their
second amended complaint. In addition, we find there is no real controversy or justiciable
controversy between the parties for a declaratory judgment, and there is nothing in the
record to support reformation or rescission of the agreement.
{¶ 45} Upon review, we do not find the trial court erred in granting summary
judgment to appellees.
{¶ 46} Assignments of Error I and II are denied. {¶ 47} The judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Richland County, Ohio is
hereby affirmed.
By: King, J.
Hoffman, P.J. and
Montgomery, J. concur.