1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 IAN WEBB, Case No. 22-cv-07221-BLF
8 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S 9 v. MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM DISCOVERY ORDER 10 REJOICE DELIVERS LLC, et al., Re: ECF No. 60 Defendants. 11
12 13 Presently before the Court is Plaintiff Ian Webb’s (“Plaintiff”) Motion for Relief from 14 Discovery Order (the “Motion”). ECF No. 60. Plaintiff requests that the Court set aside the Order 15 Denying Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Discovery (the “Discovery Order”), ECF No. 57, issued by 16 Magistrate Judge Cousins on June 13, 2023. Id. at 1. Defendants Amazon Logistics, Inc., 17 Amazon.com Services, LLC (together, “Amazon”), and Rejoice Delivers LLC (“Rejoice Delivers” 18 and, with Amazon, “Defendants”) oppose the Motion. ECF No. 68. 19 The Motion was originally set for hearing on January 18, 2024. See ECF No. 64. On 20 August 2, 2023, the Court vacated the hearing and informed the parties that the Motion would be 21 taken under submission upon the filing of Defendants’ opposition. Id. at 1. For the following 22 reasons, the Court DENIES the Motion. 23 I. BACKGROUND 24 Plaintiff brought a putative class action against Defendants in California state court for 25 violations of California’s labor laws. First Am. Class Action Compl. (“FAC”), ECF No. 1-2. 26 Rejoice Delivers answered the FAC in state court, see ECF No. 1-5, and Amazon then removed 27 the case to federal court, see Not. of Removal, ECF No. 1, at 2. 1 Class Claims, and Dismiss or Stay Action (the “Motion for Arbitration”). Mot. for Arb., ECF No. 2 36. Amazon joined the Motion for Arbitration, which is set for hearing on September 7, 2023. 3 Joinder, ECF No. 37; see also Order Striking Joinder in Part, ECF No. 38. In the Motion for 4 Arbitration, Defendants argue that the Federal Arbitration Act (the “FAA”) governs an arbitration 5 agreement signed by Plaintiff, and that the FAA’s exemption for certain transportation workers, 6 see 9 U.S.C. § 1 (“FAA § 1”), does not apply to Plaintiff. Mot. for Arb. 3–7. 7 On June 27, 2023, Plaintiff filed a discovery letter brief moving to compel discovery that 8 Plaintiff asserted was “relevant and necessary to establish [the FAA § 1] exemption” in his 9 opposition to the Motion for Arbitration. Discovery Letter Brief, ECF No. 41, at 1. Defendants 10 opposed Plaintiff’s motion to compel discovery. See ECF Nos. 49, 50. Judge Cousins heard oral 11 argument on the discovery dispute on July 12, 2023. See ECF No. 56. 12 Judge Cousins issued the Discovery Order the day after hearing, in which he noted the 13 Supreme Court’s recent explanation that the FAA § 1 analysis turns on a worker’s job duties, 14 rather than the employer’s general business. See Discovery Order 2 (citing Sw. Airlines Co. v. 15 Saxon, 142 S. Ct. 1783, 1788 (2022)). Accordingly, Judge Cousins held that Plaintiff’s document 16 requests and discovery topics—which sought information on (1) the “chain of transportation of the 17 Amazon packages delivered by Webb and the putative class members” and (2) the “alleged joint 18 employer relationship between Amazon and [Rejoice Delivery],” id. at 2–3—were “vastly 19 overbroad, irrelevant, disproportionate, and burdensome” because Plaintiff did not need broad- 20 ranging discovery to address the FAA § 1 “inquiry [that] is properly focused on what work 21 [Plaintiff] does, not what [Defendants] do generally,” id. at 3. Judge Cousins also held that 22 Plaintiff had failed to show why the “joint employer relationship” information was relevant to the 23 Motion for Arbitration (as opposed to a later stage of the case), and noted the Court’s 24 disappointment with Plaintiff’s insufficient meet and confer and dismay at Plaintiff’s “failure to 25 propose any concrete compromises at the hearing to narrow the discovery requests.” Id. at 4. The 26 Discovery Order “easily denied in its entirety” Plaintiff’s motion to compel discovery. Id. 27 Plaintiff filed his opposition to the Motion for Arbitration on July 20, 2023, see ECF No. 1 II. LEGAL STANDARD 2 A district court must defer to “[a] non-dispositive order entered by a magistrate . . . unless 3 it is ‘clearly erroneous or contrary to law.’” Grimes v. City & County of San Francisco, 951 F.2d 4 236, 241 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a), 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A)). The clear error 5 standard applies to a magistrate judge’s factual determinations, and the magistrate’s legal 6 conclusions are reviewed for whether they are contrary to law. See, e.g., Perry v. 7 Schwarzenegger, 268 F.R.D. 344, 348 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (citing United States v. McConney, 728 8 F.2d 1195, 1200–1201 (9th Cir.1984), overruled on other grounds by Estate of Merchant v. CIR, 9 947 F.2d 1390 (9th Cir.1991)). “Pretrial orders of a magistrate under [§] 636(b)(1)(A) . . . are not 10 subject to de novo determination.” Grimes, 951 F.2d at 241 (quoting Merritt v. Int’l Bhd. of 11 Boilermakers, 649 F.2d 1013, 1014 (5th Cir. 1981)). 12 III. DISCUSSION 13 Plaintiff argues that the Discovery Order erred in the following four ways: (1) failing to 14 apply the correct legal standard for the FAA § 1 exemption; (2) mischaracterizing the breadth of 15 Plaintiff’s discovery requests and Plaintiff’s meet and confer; (3) finding Plaintiff’s deposition 16 topics disproportionate and burdensome; and (4) finding the discovery sought irrelevant. Mot. 3– 17 5. Plaintiff asserts that each of these errors is a matter of law. Id. Plaintiff also requests that it be 18 “granted discovery related to Defendants’ [Motion for Arbitration]” “to the extent necessary to 19 hear Defendants’ motion on a full evidentiary record.” Id. at 5. 20 A. Legal Standard for FAA § 1 Analysis 21 The Federal Arbitration Act exempts from its purview “contracts of employment of 22 seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate 23 commerce.” 9 U.S.C. § 1. Plaintiff first contends that the Discovery Order “erroneously states 24 that Saxon ‘reject[ed] an industrywide approach to assess the [] exemption.’” Mot. 3 (citing 25 Discovery Order 2:14–17, 3:20–24). As noted by Defendants, the Discovery Order’s statement is 26 not erroneous—in fact, it restates nearly verbatim the Supreme Court’s phrasing in Saxon. 27 Compare Saxon, 142 S. Ct. at 1788 (“The Court of Appeals rejected Saxon’s industrywide 1 Court rejected the ‘industrywide approach’ argued by Saxon.”). 2 Plaintiff next argues that the Discovery Order was counter to the legal standard described 3 in the Ninth Circuit’s later-issued decision in Carmona Mendoza v. Domino’s Pizza, LLC. Mot. 3. 4 In making this argument, Plaintiff appears to have read the Discovery Order as holding that 5 “evidence relating to the interstate transportation of the packages actually delivered by the putative 6 class members,” as informed by the business of the employer, is wholly irrelevant to the FAA § 1 7 analysis. See id. Such a holding would indeed be incorrect. Both Carmona and Saxon describe, 8 though briefly, the business of the employer to establish the FAA § 1 requirement that interstate or 9 foreign commerce be at issue. See Saxon, 142 S. Ct.
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1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 IAN WEBB, Case No. 22-cv-07221-BLF
8 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S 9 v. MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM DISCOVERY ORDER 10 REJOICE DELIVERS LLC, et al., Re: ECF No. 60 Defendants. 11
12 13 Presently before the Court is Plaintiff Ian Webb’s (“Plaintiff”) Motion for Relief from 14 Discovery Order (the “Motion”). ECF No. 60. Plaintiff requests that the Court set aside the Order 15 Denying Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Discovery (the “Discovery Order”), ECF No. 57, issued by 16 Magistrate Judge Cousins on June 13, 2023. Id. at 1. Defendants Amazon Logistics, Inc., 17 Amazon.com Services, LLC (together, “Amazon”), and Rejoice Delivers LLC (“Rejoice Delivers” 18 and, with Amazon, “Defendants”) oppose the Motion. ECF No. 68. 19 The Motion was originally set for hearing on January 18, 2024. See ECF No. 64. On 20 August 2, 2023, the Court vacated the hearing and informed the parties that the Motion would be 21 taken under submission upon the filing of Defendants’ opposition. Id. at 1. For the following 22 reasons, the Court DENIES the Motion. 23 I. BACKGROUND 24 Plaintiff brought a putative class action against Defendants in California state court for 25 violations of California’s labor laws. First Am. Class Action Compl. (“FAC”), ECF No. 1-2. 26 Rejoice Delivers answered the FAC in state court, see ECF No. 1-5, and Amazon then removed 27 the case to federal court, see Not. of Removal, ECF No. 1, at 2. 1 Class Claims, and Dismiss or Stay Action (the “Motion for Arbitration”). Mot. for Arb., ECF No. 2 36. Amazon joined the Motion for Arbitration, which is set for hearing on September 7, 2023. 3 Joinder, ECF No. 37; see also Order Striking Joinder in Part, ECF No. 38. In the Motion for 4 Arbitration, Defendants argue that the Federal Arbitration Act (the “FAA”) governs an arbitration 5 agreement signed by Plaintiff, and that the FAA’s exemption for certain transportation workers, 6 see 9 U.S.C. § 1 (“FAA § 1”), does not apply to Plaintiff. Mot. for Arb. 3–7. 7 On June 27, 2023, Plaintiff filed a discovery letter brief moving to compel discovery that 8 Plaintiff asserted was “relevant and necessary to establish [the FAA § 1] exemption” in his 9 opposition to the Motion for Arbitration. Discovery Letter Brief, ECF No. 41, at 1. Defendants 10 opposed Plaintiff’s motion to compel discovery. See ECF Nos. 49, 50. Judge Cousins heard oral 11 argument on the discovery dispute on July 12, 2023. See ECF No. 56. 12 Judge Cousins issued the Discovery Order the day after hearing, in which he noted the 13 Supreme Court’s recent explanation that the FAA § 1 analysis turns on a worker’s job duties, 14 rather than the employer’s general business. See Discovery Order 2 (citing Sw. Airlines Co. v. 15 Saxon, 142 S. Ct. 1783, 1788 (2022)). Accordingly, Judge Cousins held that Plaintiff’s document 16 requests and discovery topics—which sought information on (1) the “chain of transportation of the 17 Amazon packages delivered by Webb and the putative class members” and (2) the “alleged joint 18 employer relationship between Amazon and [Rejoice Delivery],” id. at 2–3—were “vastly 19 overbroad, irrelevant, disproportionate, and burdensome” because Plaintiff did not need broad- 20 ranging discovery to address the FAA § 1 “inquiry [that] is properly focused on what work 21 [Plaintiff] does, not what [Defendants] do generally,” id. at 3. Judge Cousins also held that 22 Plaintiff had failed to show why the “joint employer relationship” information was relevant to the 23 Motion for Arbitration (as opposed to a later stage of the case), and noted the Court’s 24 disappointment with Plaintiff’s insufficient meet and confer and dismay at Plaintiff’s “failure to 25 propose any concrete compromises at the hearing to narrow the discovery requests.” Id. at 4. The 26 Discovery Order “easily denied in its entirety” Plaintiff’s motion to compel discovery. Id. 27 Plaintiff filed his opposition to the Motion for Arbitration on July 20, 2023, see ECF No. 1 II. LEGAL STANDARD 2 A district court must defer to “[a] non-dispositive order entered by a magistrate . . . unless 3 it is ‘clearly erroneous or contrary to law.’” Grimes v. City & County of San Francisco, 951 F.2d 4 236, 241 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a), 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A)). The clear error 5 standard applies to a magistrate judge’s factual determinations, and the magistrate’s legal 6 conclusions are reviewed for whether they are contrary to law. See, e.g., Perry v. 7 Schwarzenegger, 268 F.R.D. 344, 348 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (citing United States v. McConney, 728 8 F.2d 1195, 1200–1201 (9th Cir.1984), overruled on other grounds by Estate of Merchant v. CIR, 9 947 F.2d 1390 (9th Cir.1991)). “Pretrial orders of a magistrate under [§] 636(b)(1)(A) . . . are not 10 subject to de novo determination.” Grimes, 951 F.2d at 241 (quoting Merritt v. Int’l Bhd. of 11 Boilermakers, 649 F.2d 1013, 1014 (5th Cir. 1981)). 12 III. DISCUSSION 13 Plaintiff argues that the Discovery Order erred in the following four ways: (1) failing to 14 apply the correct legal standard for the FAA § 1 exemption; (2) mischaracterizing the breadth of 15 Plaintiff’s discovery requests and Plaintiff’s meet and confer; (3) finding Plaintiff’s deposition 16 topics disproportionate and burdensome; and (4) finding the discovery sought irrelevant. Mot. 3– 17 5. Plaintiff asserts that each of these errors is a matter of law. Id. Plaintiff also requests that it be 18 “granted discovery related to Defendants’ [Motion for Arbitration]” “to the extent necessary to 19 hear Defendants’ motion on a full evidentiary record.” Id. at 5. 20 A. Legal Standard for FAA § 1 Analysis 21 The Federal Arbitration Act exempts from its purview “contracts of employment of 22 seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate 23 commerce.” 9 U.S.C. § 1. Plaintiff first contends that the Discovery Order “erroneously states 24 that Saxon ‘reject[ed] an industrywide approach to assess the [] exemption.’” Mot. 3 (citing 25 Discovery Order 2:14–17, 3:20–24). As noted by Defendants, the Discovery Order’s statement is 26 not erroneous—in fact, it restates nearly verbatim the Supreme Court’s phrasing in Saxon. 27 Compare Saxon, 142 S. Ct. at 1788 (“The Court of Appeals rejected Saxon’s industrywide 1 Court rejected the ‘industrywide approach’ argued by Saxon.”). 2 Plaintiff next argues that the Discovery Order was counter to the legal standard described 3 in the Ninth Circuit’s later-issued decision in Carmona Mendoza v. Domino’s Pizza, LLC. Mot. 3. 4 In making this argument, Plaintiff appears to have read the Discovery Order as holding that 5 “evidence relating to the interstate transportation of the packages actually delivered by the putative 6 class members,” as informed by the business of the employer, is wholly irrelevant to the FAA § 1 7 analysis. See id. Such a holding would indeed be incorrect. Both Carmona and Saxon describe, 8 though briefly, the business of the employer to establish the FAA § 1 requirement that interstate or 9 foreign commerce be at issue. See Saxon, 142 S. Ct. at 1787 (“In 2019, Southwest [Airlines] 10 carried the baggage of over 162 million passengers to domestic and international destinations.”); 11 Carmona, 73 F.4th 1135, 1136 (9th Cir. 2023) (“As relevant to this case, Domino’s buys [] 12 ingredients from suppliers outside of California, and they are then delivered to Domino’s Southern 13 California Supply Chain Center.”). Accordingly, there must be some threshold showing, informed 14 by the business of the employer, that the worker’s actions under analysis are in fact part of a chain 15 of commerce in which goods cross state or country boundaries. With this standard in mind, the 16 Court turns to the Discovery Order. 17 The Discovery Order states that FAA § 1 requires that workers be “engaged in foreign or 18 interstate commerce”; notes the Supreme Court’s finding in Saxon that the employer operated 19 “planes traveling in interstate commerce” and the Court’s “rejection of an industrywide approach 20 to assess the FAA [§] 1 exemption”; and emphasizes that the “inquiry is properly focused on what 21 work [Plaintiff] does.” Discovery Order 2–3. The Court finds no error in these statements. See 22 Carmona, 73 F.4th at 1137 (stating that the “central inquiry” of the post-Saxon FAA § 1 analysis 23 “what the relevant class of workers actually did”); id. at 1138 (finding its pre-Saxon reasoning 24 consistent with the standard articulated in Saxon because “[a]lthough we noted that the ‘nature of 25 the business for which a class of workers performed their activities’ was a ‘critical factor’ in the 26 [FAA] § 1 analysis, [] we in the end focused heavily on what the class of workers to which the 27 plaintiffs belonged actually did”) (emphasis added). However, to the extent the Discovery Order 1 whether the goods traverse state or foreign boundaries, the Court now turns to consider whether a 2 clearer articulation of the standard engenders a different result. 3 B. Breadth, Proportionality, and Relevance 4 The Discovery Order provides a representative example of Plaintiff’s discovery requests 5 indicating that Plaintiff sought all documents showing the addresses of origin for packages 6 delivered for Defendants by Rejoice Delivers drivers in California from August 9, 2018, to the 7 present. Discovery Order 3. Plaintiff does not contest the characterization of this request as being 8 representative. See generally Mot. Expressly considering that the general business of the 9 employer provides context for the actual duties of the affected class of workers, the Court finds the 10 Discovery Order correctly concluded that the requested discovery was vastly overbroad and not 11 proportional. See Discovery Order 3. Plaintiff requested such a granular level of discovery— 12 “every fish in the Pacific Ocean from the last five years,” id.—that even a representative sample of 13 his requests, see Mot. 3, is not in accordance with the standard articulated by the Supreme Court in 14 Saxon and applied by the Ninth Circuit in Carmona. By contrast, both cases describe in a single 15 sentence how the employer’s business generally involved goods crossing state lines. See Saxon, 16 142 S. Ct. at 1787; Carmona, 73 F.4th at 1136. Thus, although the business of the employer is 17 relevant to showing interstate commerce is at issue under FAA § 1, there was no error in the 18 Discovery Order’s finding that Plaintiff’s discovery requests were overbroad and disproportionate. 19 C. Meet and Confer 20 Plaintiff argues that the Discovery Order “erred regarding . . . Plaintiff’s Meet and Confer.” 21 Mot. 3. The Discovery Order’s only statement regarding Plaintiff’s meet and confer was its note 22 that it was “disappointed by [Plaintiff’s] meet and confer before the motion.” Discovery Order 4. 23 Plaintiff also appears to contest the Discovery Order’s statement that Plaintiff “fail[ed] to propose 24 any concrete compromises at the hearing to narrow the discovery requests” by stating that Plaintiff 25 had offered compromises prior to filing the motion to compel. Mot. 3. Plaintiff also states he 26 could not provide “specific quantities” at the hearing because an overall production estimate was 27 necessary to determine a sample size. Id. 1 granted with respect to them. See Discovery Order 3 (“The fundamental problem is that [Plaintiff] 2 || has disregarded the Supreme Court’s rejection of an industrywide approach to assess the FAA 3 Section 1 exemption.”) (citation omitted). Additionally, the Discovery Order’s brief references to 4 || the meet and confer and lack of concrete compromises do not constitute a holding or legal 5 conclusion. At best, they are factual determinations, and Plaintiff has not shown a clear error in 6 || these statements. 7 || IV. ORDER 8 For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's Motion for Relief from Discovery 9 Order. If at the hearing on the Motion for Arbitration it becomes clear that further limited 10 || discovery is necessary for the Court to determine the FAA § | exemption, Plaintiff may renew his 11 request.
13 IT IS SO ORDERED. 14 Dated: August 21, 2023
fAabinfedan 5 B TH LABSON FREEMAN nited States District Judge 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28