STEINFELD, Judge.
On a clear afternoon of December 19, 1963, a collision occurred on U.S. Highway 25W south of Williamsburg, Kentucky. The black top portion of the road was 27.9 feet in width. Floyd Taylor, Jr., who was killed, was the driver of an automobile which collided with a truck owned by the Webb Transfer Lines, Inc., and operated by James H. Allen. Taylor’s administrator sued the Transfer Lines and Allen and recovered judgment for $75,000.00 against both. They have appealed. We affirm.
Appellants claim that the trial court erred in not directing a verdict in their favor. To consider this argument a statement of facts developed on the jury trial is necessary.
Near the point where the collision occurred U.S. Highway 25W made a long sweeping curve to the left from north to south. Located approximately 50 feet off of the [90]*90pavement and on the west side of the road was Don’s Drive-In Restaurant. Parking areas and driveways existed all around the restaurant building. To the north of Don’s property Old Highway 25 entered U.S. Highway 25W on the west side. Adkins Motel was across U.S. Highway 25W from the restaurant. Savoy Road entered U.S. Highway 25W from the east approximately 400 feet south of the restaurant.
A car facing southwardly was parked south of the restaurant. The occupants, all sitting in the front seat, were Lee Edward Brown on the left side, Henrietta Teague in the middle and Cobey Hoskins on the right side.
Taylor who was alone in his automobile entered the restaurant property somewhere north of the building and circled it. After passing the rear he then drove between the parked car and the south side of the building. Greetings were exchanged with the occupants of the parked car by waving and then he proceeded toward the highway. Testimony is conflicting as to whether his car stopped before reentering the highway. He headed back in a northerly direction. The Webb tractor-trailer which was equipped with dual wheels was hauling 22,000 pounds of tobacco in cloth bags and was traveling southwardly. The car and the truck hit head-on.
Shortly after .the collision the sheriff arrived and found Taylor pinned in the automobile. After assisting others in removing him and sending him to the hospital the sheriff made an investigation including measurements. He testified (Sellers v. Cayce Mill Supply Co., Ky., 349 S.W.2d 677 (1961) ) that there were approximately 40 feet of dual wheel skid marks which led to a point near the debris on the highway and that there were grooves in the highway approximately one or one and one-half inches deep near the end of the skid marks. The sheriff said that all of the skid marks, grooves and debris were in the northbound (Taylor’s) lane. He also said there was a double yellow line on either side of the center of the road and that the debris, and the cut marks in the black top “* * * were approximately 8 feet in the northbound lane from the double yellow line.” The point where the sheriff found the debris was approximately 202 feet from the south side of Don’s Restaurant and approximately 275 feet south of the intersection of Old Highway 25 and U.S. Highway 25W. The distance from the intersection of those two highways to the south side of Don’s Drive-In Restaurant was approximately 477 feet. The truck, with Taylor’s car at its right side, came to rest approximately 80 feet south of the skid marks. The automobile was then facing southwardly.
Robert L. Loudin testified by deposition that he and his wife were traveling north-wardly on their way to Williamsburg, Kentucky; that when they passed the Savoy Road he “ * * * saw a car stopped in front of Don’s Drive-In pull out onto Highway 25 headed north”, and at that time he did not see any other vehicle on the highway. He stated: “Well, he had just got out in the road, when I saw a truck approaching, and then he got on his side of the road and traveled about 100 feet when the truck came over in the southbound lane.” The deposition continued:
“Q. 34 The truck was in the southbound lane, when you first saw it?
A. Yes, but it crossed over into the northbound lane and hit the car.
Q. 35 How far had that car traveled when the truck came over there and the collision occurred?
A. I will say around 100 feet or 125 feet..
Q. 36 Where was that car at the time the truck collided with him?
A. In the northbound lane on Highway 25.
[91]*91Q. 37 How far from the center line in the northbound lane?
A. I couldn’t say that, but he was in the northbound lane.
Q. 38 Did you see any other vehicle going north, or south, there at that time?
A. No.”
He then identified the two vehicles as those driven by Taylor and Allen. A statement taken by an investigator and signed by Loudin was introduced in evidence. It contradicted his testimony and in some respects discredited part of what he said.
Other witnesses for the appellee testified that Taylor was 17 years of age, a good student, in excellent health, that in his spare time he sometimes worked for $3.00 a day and that he performed the usual and customary chores around his residence. They also said that he attended church, had never been in any trouble and that he died as a result of the collision. Appellee rested, whereupon counsel for Webb and Allen moved for a directed verdict which motion was overruled.
James H. Allen testified that he had had years of experience driving the type of vehicle which he was operating on the day of the accident. He said that as he approached the scene where the accident happened he had a view of .4 of a mile; that there was a sweeping curve downgrade until the intersection of Old U.S. Highway 25 and U.S. Highway 25W is reached and then the road had a gradual upgrade in the direction in which he was traveling. He said that he had been going about 35 to 40 miles an hour and that as he was near the intersection of Old U.S. Highway 25 he “ * * * mashed down a little on my accelerator to start up this upgrade”, and that as he approached Don’s Drive-In he was traveling at “Not over forty-five, if that much.” He said he was driving on the right hand side of the highway when he saw a green Plymouth car at the south corner of the drive-in. He said: “He was coming out at a slow speed. It looked like he was waiting for me to come by. When I got within seventy-five or one hundred feet, all at once he came out of there just a flying, and the first glimpse I got of him he was looking back over his right shoulder. * * * Well, the next instant the front of his car went down as if he put on his brakes. When he done that, I cut to the left — the only way I had to miss him, * * *. His car was completely blocking the southbound lane.” He said that somewhere about the center of the truck hit the left front wheel of the car, and that the left front wheel of the car was on the center line of the road; that the car was caught with the truck which carried it right along by the right hand side of the truck until both vehicles went to the truck’s left-hand side of the road and came to a stop. Allen claimed that after the impact he had no control over the steering and no control over the braking power of the truck. The vehicles came to rest straddling the islands in the Adkins Motel driveway about eight feet east of the eastern edge of the paving.
The safety director of the Webb Transfer Lines testified that the trucks owned by that company are carefully examined and in top mechanical condition before they leave on any trip.
Cobey Hoskins, an occupant of the car parked by the restaurant, said that: “I saw him come off the road and come around the building and as he come around, he throwed up his hand and I waved back, and he never did stop as I saw of; and I watched him until the truck hit him”; and that Taylor’s car passed behind the car in which he was sitting. He continued that the front of Taylor’s car “ * * * was about half way on the line in the middle of the road” when the truck and car collided and that the truck “was pretty close” to the Taylor car when he (Cobey) saw it. He said that Taylor was “Kindly angling back down the road, getting back across the line” as it got into the highway.
Henrietta Teague, another occupant of the parked car, said that she first saw the [92]*92Taylor car as “It was circling the drive-in.” Her testimony was substantially the same as that of Hoskins.
The testimony of Lee Edward Brown, the third occupant of the parked car was substantially the same as that of the other two although he estimated that the truck was four or five car lengths north of the place when and where Taylor drove out onto the highway.
One other witness who was some distance away did not see the collision but heard the impact and he said that he looked up and saw the truck when “It was leaving the center of the road, bearing to the left and coming to a stop in front of Adkins Motel.”
Appellants charge that over their objection the court admitted incompetent testimony in two respects. The witness Loudin was asked:
“Q. 69 Now was there anything to prevent this truck from staying on its side of the road and not passing this car without colliding with it?
A. No, sir.”
Counsel for appellants argue that it permitted the witness to draw a conclusion which was the province of the jury. The witness had shortly before described the positions of the two vehicles, their distance apart when he first saw them and the course they took immediately following the collision. From that interrogation and the questions and answers that followed, it appears to us that the jury could not have failed to understand that the question was with respect to objects, if any, in the area. In any event, we do not consider the action of the court to have prejudiced the substantial rights of the litigants.
The sheriff was asked to “tell the jury what statement he (Allen) made, if any, in regard to what speed he made as he went down that hill?” An objection was overruled whereupon the sheriff responded “I don’t remember exactly what he said, but I do remember him saying he was pouring it on. I mentioned to him did he know it was a fifty mile speed zone and he said ‘Yes’. I said, ‘Were you going 60 or more?’ He said T don’t know. I was pouring it on.’” The objection was not renewed at that time and there was no motion to strike the testimony or to admonish the jury that it could be considered only as to the driver as to whom it was admissible. Consolidated Coach Corp. v. Earls’ Adm’r, 263 Ky. 814, 94 S.W.2d 6 (1936). In White v. Com., Ky., 394 S.W.2d 770 (1965) we held:
“In other instances the defendants simply made a blanket objection which the court overruled. The overruling of such objections was proper because the testimony was admissible as against one of the defendants. The court was not required to give an admonition in the absence of a request for it.”
The trial court did not err. Com., Dept. of Highways v. Burns, Ky., 394 S.W.2d 923 (1965).
Appellants complain that when the deposition of Loudin was read to the jury the court excluded a signed statement which Loudin had given to the investigator. Loudin had been interrogated as to the statement and the circumstances under which it was given. This was read to the jury and later the investigator appeared and testified that he had obtained the statement from Loudin and he read it to the jury. Since the jury heard the statement there is no merit to this complaint.
We now meet the issue of whether the court erred in overruling the motion for a directed verdict at the close of the testimony for appellee and repeated at the conclusion of all of the evidence. Appellants contend that this case is controlled by KRS 189.330(7) which provides:
“The driver of a vehicle about to enter or cross a highway from a private road or driveway shall yield the right of way to all vehicles approaching on the highway.”
[93]*93They cite Brumbach v. Day, Ky., 260 S.W.2d 939 (1953), and a number of other cases to support that contention. In Brumbach, Day admitted that “he did not stop his motor scooter during a tour through the service station or before re-entering the highway” and that “he saw no vehicle approaching on the highway”. Brumbach was approaching on his right side of the highway and struck Day from the rear. In Couch v. Hensley, Ky., 305 S.W.2d 765 (1957), the car entered the highway so close to the approaching truck that negligence was obvious. In Manning v. Claxon’s Ex’x, Ky., 283 S.W.2d 704 (1955), the same situation existed as in Couch v. Hensley, supra.
It should be noted that KRS 189.330 (7) directs that when entering or crossing a highway from a private road or driveway the entering vehicle “shall yield the right of way to all vehicles approaching on the highway.” This statute was considered in Thomas v. Dahl, 293 Ky. 808, 170 S.W.2d 337 (1943). We wrote:
“Statutes prescribing the duty to yield the right of way to vehicles on a favored highway do not give the driver thereon the absolute and unqualified right to go ahead. It is a relative preference. The preferred driver has the right to assume, although not with implicit impunity, that the other driver about to enter his path of travel from a private driveway will yield to him; yet there remains the duty at all times to exercise reasonable care to avoid collision with other vehicles, and he cannot ignore their presence or possible presence.”
This rule was reiterated in Harris v. Morris, Ky., 259 S.W.2d 469 (1953), and in Siler v. Williford, Ky., 375 S.W.2d 262 (1964). In Baker v. Case Plumbing Manufacturing Co., Ky., 423 S.W.2d 258 (1968), we said “* * * KRS 189.330(7) has been held in a number of cases not to impose an absolute duty to yield.”
An ordinance of the city and county of Honolulu which directed that a vehicle emerging from a private driveway “ * * * upon entering the roadway shall yield the right of way to all vehicles approaching on said roadway” was considered in State v. Arena, 46 Hawaii 315, 379 P.2d 594 (1963). We subscribe to the following quote from that opinion:
“Though the ordinance then required him to give all vehicles approaching on the highway the privilege of priority in the use thereof, time and space in light of the existing circumstances determine what constituted such priority since, as the definition of right of way indicates, it is only the privilege of immediate priority to use of the highway that the favored vehicle is entitled to. ‘ “Right of way” merely means a preference to one of two vehicles asserting the right of passage at the same place and at approximately the same time.’ Cowan v. Market St. Ry., 8 Cal.App.2d 642, 47 P.2d 752, 754. Under the ordinance he was not required to wait for all approaching vehicles to pass by. His obligation to yield applied only to approaching vehicles that were too close to permit him to complete his turn with safety. ‘The operator of the emerging vehicle is required to yield the right of way only to those who are lawfully approaching and who are so near that such operator cannot safely enter the highway.’ 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 347, p. 811.”
Also see 7 Am.Jur.2d 756, Section 204.
Some of the facts developed show that the truck was a considerable distance away when Taylor entered the highway, therefore, this case must be considered in the light of KRS 189.300 which reads as follows :
“(1) The operator of any vehicle when upon a highway shall travel upon the right side of the highway whenever possible, and unless the left side of the highway is clear of all other traffic or obstructions and presents a clear vision for a distance of at least one hundred and fifty feet ahead.”
[94]*94In Stark’s Adm’x v. Herndon’s Adm’r, 292 Ky. 469, 166 S.W.2d 828 (1942), we said:
“There remains for our determination the question whether proof that Miss Stark was traveling on the wrong side of the highway was sufficient to submit the question of negligence to the jury. This question has been decided many times by this court and the invariable holding has been that proof that the operator of an automobile was traveling on the wrong side of the highway creates a prima facie case of negligent driving, where it results in injury to other users of the highway when on their right side of the road. It then becomes the duty of the defendant, if he would avoid the effect of such prima facie showing, to explain and excuse the fact that his car was on the wrong side of the road. Thronton v. Phillips, 262 Ky. 346, 90 S.W.2d 347; Abel v. Whitehead, 266 Ky. 764, 99 S.W.2d 770. The defendant offered no evidence on this question. We therefore conclude that the nature of the evidence and its prima facie character were sufficient to submit the issue to the jury.”
In Ward v. Music, Ky., 257 S.W.2d 516 (1953), no witness saw the truck hit the child but there was testimony that the truck was being operated at an excessive speed and on the left of the center of the street. The driver testified that he was driving at a reasonable rate of speed on the proper side of the street. The law announced in Herndon was referred to and tacitly approved.
Herndon was again cited in Ellington v. Strader, Ky., 285 S.W.2d 497 (1956), in which appellants’ automobile collided with a cow. The same rule was announced as in Herndon.
In Alpha Construction Company v. Branham, Ky., 337 S.W.2d 790 (1960), plaintiff was injured when the horse he was riding became frightened on the approach of defendant’s truck, bolted across the highway and jammed its head through the cab window of the truck. In referring to Herndon we said:
“Whether this statute is controlling or whether defendant’s driver was required to keep to his right side of the road under the general duty to operate his vehicle in a careful manner (KRS 189.290), we will assume the jury could have found the driver negligent in this respect.”
Gross v. Barrett, Ky., 350 S.W.2d 457 (1961), was a wrongful death action arising out of the collision of a truck and an automobile. We referred to Herndon and said “The fact that Barrett (deceased driver of automobile) was on the wrong side of the road at the time of the collision was prima facie proof of negligence on his part. * * * His administratrix had the burden of proving that his presence on the wrong side was not due to his negligence. The evidence with respect to the tracks of the two vehicles, while it gives some credence to the emergency theory, does not exclude the hypotheses of lack of control or excessive speed.” Myers v. Walker, Ky., 322 S.W.2d 109 (1959), is cited.
Myers v. Walker, supra, arose out of a collision between a westbound automobile and an eastbound automobile which swerved into its path, allegedly because of presence of mud deposited on the highway by coal trucks. The opinion said: “It is admitted that, at the time of the collision, Mrs. Myers’ car was across the center line of the highway in the wrong lane of traffic. Her mere presence there is prima facie proof of negligence on her part and, to sustain her claim of no negligence, she must show by the evidence that her negligence did not put her there. This she undertakes to do by saying that the muddy and slippery condition of the highway was the sole cause of her presence on the wrong side of the highway. In other words, she says she skidded over there and that the skidding was not superinduced by any negligent act on her part. This has been held to be a good defense.” The court continued that there was proof that Mrs. [95]*95Meyers did not skid across the highway, therefore, there was an issue of fact to be determined by the jury.
Jones v. Carr, Ky., 382 S.W.2d 853 (1964), was a suit for injuries sustained by an automobile passenger against the driver of the automobile and a truck owner. The automobile went out of control on an icy highway and collided with the truck. The court said:
“Plaintiff urges that she was entitled to go to the jury because she had made a prima facie case of negligence when it was established defendant Carr was on the wrong side of the road at the time of the collision (citing Herndon and other cases). Defendant Carr maintains that since the basic cause of the accident was the skidding of her automobile, this is a complete defense. In the light of the foregoing discussion, we must reject this view.”
The “foregoing discussion” related to the nature of the occurrences, substantial evidence and the inferences to be drawn. We said: “It must be resolved by the jury unless other circumstances (and fair inferences to be drawn from them) so clearly support or overcome the inference of negligence that reasonable minds could not differ about the ultimate conclusion.” Jones v. Carr, supra.
The rule is that when a collision occurs on the defendant’s left side of the road, there is a prima facie case of negligence. The obligation to go forward and to explain the reason for being on the wrong side of the road passes to the defendant. If the explanation is so clear and convincing and all the circumstances and fair inferences that could be drawn from them show that the reason for being on the wrong side of the road was completely unrelated to any negligence of the defendant, then the defendant is entitled to win by directed verdict, but if the reasons, circumstances or the inferences are not that clear then the jury must determine the question. For a discussion of some of the cases we have cited and the applicable rules see Thompson et al. v. Mills, Adm’r, Ky., 432 S.W.2d 448 (1968).
The testimony of the sheriff and other evidence introduced was sufficient so that the jury could conclude that the accident happened on the left side of the road in the direction in which the truck was traveling and that it occurred approximately 200 feet north of the point where Taylor entered the highway.
The jury had much more before it than the deposition of Loudin and the statement he gave to the investigator. There was substantial evidence to support the claim of the administrator. National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Forkner, 219 Ky. 119, 292 S.W. 765 (1932). The explanation Allen made for his failure to be on the right side pursuant to KRS 189.300(1) was not so conclusive as to deny the jury the right to pass upon the question of negligence. Thompson v. Mills, Adm’r, supra. We held in Cross v. Clark, 308 Ky. 18, 213 S.W.2d 443 (1948) that a jury may believe any of the witnesses in whole or in part.
Appellants argue that the verdict is flagrantly contrary to the evidence and they cite Wilson v. Wilson, 174 Ky. 771, 193 S.W. 7 (1917); Cloninger v. Commonwealth, 191 Ky. 841, 231 S.W. 535 (1921) and Coney Island Co. v. Brown, 290 Ky. 750, 162 S.W.2d 785 (1942). Appellee responds by referring us to Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Parks’ Adm’r, 154 Ky. 269, 157 S.W. 27 (1913); Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Curtis’ Adm’r, 233 Ky. 276, 25 S.W.2d 398 (1929) and Webb v. Adams, 302 Ky. 335, 194 S.W.2d 515 (1945). With the conflicting evidence before it the jury was the trier of the facts. Crawford v. Alexander, Ky., 259 S.W.2d 476 (1953) and Com., Dept. of Highways v. Stocker, Ky., 423 S.W.2d 510 (1968). There were no natural or physical facts which so conflicted with the testimony as to make it incredible. There was sufficient evidence of probative value to support the verdict, and it is not flagrantly contrary to the evidence.
[96]*96 Finally it is argued that the verdict was excessive. Appellants concede that Fields v. Baker, Ky., 329 S.W.2d 376 (1959); Koch v. Stone, Ky., 332 S.W.2d 529 (1960) and Slusher v. Miracle, Ky., 382 S.W.2d 867 (1964) announced the law to be that the facts in each case must be considered in determining whether or not the verdict was excessive. They argue that the verdict at first blush appears to be the result of bias, passion and prejudice and that a new trial should be granted and they cite Commercial Carriers, Inc. v. Matracia, Ky., 311 S.W.2d 565 (1958); Fields v. Baker, supra, and Koch v. Stone, supra.
Appellee responds by pointing out that Floyd Taylor, Jr., was a healthy 17 year old boy who was a good high school student, and an industrious, occasional wage earner with a life expectancy of 52.30 years. After drawing certain distinctions between the cases cited by appellants and the facts before us appellee refers us to Cuniffe’s Ex’x v. Johnson, 279 Ky. 663, 132 S.W.2d 47 (1939); Fisher Equipment Co. v. West, Ky., 365 S.W.2d 319 (1962) and Cassidy v. Quisenberry, Ky., 346 S.W.2d 304 (1961), and a number of other cases, some of which took into consideration the radical change in the purchasing power of money and the cost of living. In Fisher Equipment Co. v. West, supra, the deceased was 29 years of age at the time of his death. He had a life expectancy of 41.29 years and the jury awarded his estate $125,708.00 which we held was not excessive. In Krohmer v. Dahl, 145 Mont. 491, 402 P.2d 979 (1965), the court refused to set aside an $85,000.00 award to the estate of an 18 year old college freshman who died as a result of negligence. There is nothing to indicate that the award in the case now before us was “so large and disproportionate to the probable loss to the estate as to strike us at first blush as being a result of passion and prejudice on the part of the jury * * * Fisher Equipment Co. v. West, supra.
The judgment is affirmed.
All concur except MONTGOMERY, C. J., and OSBORNE, J., who dissent.