OPINION
HOLCOMB, J.,
delivered the opinion of the Court,
in which KELLER, P.J., and MEYERS, PRICE, WOMACK, KEASLER, HERYEY and COCHRAN, JJ., joined.
Texas Penal Code §§ 49.04 and 49.09(b) define felony driving while intoxicated (DWI) as DWI plus two prior intoxication-related convictions. For purposes of proving felony DWI, Texas Penal Code § 49.09(e) bars the State from using intoxication-related convictions that are more than ten years older than the instant offense (“remote convictions”), unless there exists another intoxication related conviction within ten years of the instant offense (“intervening conviction”).1 The Sixth Court of Appeals held that, where the two prior convictions alleged in the indictment are remote, the State must submit evidence of an intervening conviction to the jury, and that without such evidence the State “failed to prove an essential element of felony driving while intoxicated.” Weaver v. State, 56 S.W.3d 896, 899 (Tex.App.Texarkana 2001). The issue in this case is whether the Sixth Court erred. We hold that it did.
The Relevant Facts
On July 24, 2000, a Harris County grand jury indicted appellant, Steven Louis Weaver, for felony driving while intoxicated. See Tex. Pen.Code §§ 49.04, 49.09(b). The indictment alleged that appellant was driving while intoxicated on June 24, 2000, and that he had previously been convicted of the same offense on August 10, 1990, and January 17, 1984. Those prior offenses were actually committed on May 2, 1990, and November 23, 1983, respectively. Appellant entered a plea of not guilty, and the case was tried before a jury.
At trial, during the State’s presentation of its case-in-chief, appellant objected to the admission of the prior DWI convictions alleged in the indictment. The trial court held a hearing on the matter outside the [559]*559presence of the jury. Appellant argued that, pursuant to Texas Penal Code § 49.09(e), the State must allege in the indictment and prove at trial that at least one of the prior DWI convictions used to enhance the offense from a misdemeanor to a felony occurred within ten years of the instant offense. Appellant argued further that since the prior DWI’s alleged in the indictment occurred more than ten years before the instant offense, they were inadmissible for enhancement purposes. In response, the State explained that, in order to comply with § 49.09(e), it planned to introduce evidence of an intervening conviction outside the presence of the jury.2 The State then presented to the court, outside the presence of the jury, evidence that appellant was convicted of DWI on February 17, 1997.3 The trial court then overruled appellant’s objection and denied his subsequent motion for an instructed verdict that was based on the same grounds as his objection.
The jury later found appellant guilty of felony DWI and assessed his punishment at imprisonment for thirty-nine years.
On appeal, appellant reiterated his argument that the prior DWI convictions alleged in the indictment were inadmissible. The Sixth Court of Appeals agreed with appellant and held that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the two prior DWI convictions alleged in the indictment. The court of appeals reasoned that unless one of the two convictions alleged in the indictment occurred within ten years of the instant offense, “the State has not met its burden of proof because it has failed to prove an essential element of felony driving while intoxicated.” Weaver, 56 S.W.3d at 899; see also, Rodriguez v. State, 31 S.W.3d 359, 364 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2000) (an intervening conviction is an element of the offense). We granted the State’s petition for discretionary review to determine whether the court of appeals erred. See Tex.R.App.Proc. 66.3(b).4
In its brief to this Court, the State contends that by requiring the State to submit evidence of an intervening conviction before the jury, the court of appeals effectively held that § 49.09(e) is an element of the offense of felony DWI. The State further argues that: (1) § 49.09(e) is not an element of the offense, (2) § 49.09(e) is an “admissibility statute” that bars remote convictions only when no in[560]*560tervening conviction exists, and (3) offering proof of an intervening conviction in a hearing outside the presence of the jury is sufficient to comply with § 49.09(e).
Analysis
The elements of an offense must be charged in the indictment, submitted to the jury, and proven by the State beyond a reasonable doubt. Jones v. U.S., 526 U.S. 227, 232, 119 S.Ct. 1215, 143 L.Ed.2d 311 (1999); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970). In Texas, an element of an offense is defined as: the forbidden conduct, the required culpability, any required result, and the negation of any exception to the offense. Tex. Pen.Code § 1.07(a)(22).
Texas Penal Code §§ 49.045 and 49.09(b)6 together define the offense of felony driving while intoxicated. In Gibson v. State, 995 S.W.2d 693, 696 (Tex.Crim.App.1999), we explained:
The [two] prior intoxication-related offenses [referred to in § 49.09(b)], whether they are felonies or misdemeanors, serve the purpose of establishing whether the instant offense qualifies as felony driving while intoxicated. The prior intoxication-related offenses are elements of the offense of [felony] driving while intoxicated. They define the offense as a felony and are admitted into evidence as part of the State’s proof of its case-in-chief during the guilt/innocence stage of the trial.
In other words, under our penal statutes, two (or more) prior intoxication-related offenses are specific attendant circumstances that serve to define, in part, the forbidden conduct of the crime of felony driving while intoxicated. See 1 W. La-Fave & A. Scott, Substantive Criminal Law § 1.2(c) (2d. ed.1986) (discussing the fact that the definitions of some offenses require the presence or absence of specific attendant, circumstances). Thus, if a person, such as appellant, commits DWI with the requisite attendant circumstances (i.e., two or more prior intoxication-related offenses), then that person has committed felony DWI.
At the time of appellant’s offense Section 49.09(e)7, however, provided that: [561]*561A conviction may not be used for purposes of enhancement under this section if:
(1) the conviction was a final conviction under Subsection (d) and was for an offense committed more than 10 years before the offense for which the person is being tried was committed; and
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OPINION
HOLCOMB, J.,
delivered the opinion of the Court,
in which KELLER, P.J., and MEYERS, PRICE, WOMACK, KEASLER, HERYEY and COCHRAN, JJ., joined.
Texas Penal Code §§ 49.04 and 49.09(b) define felony driving while intoxicated (DWI) as DWI plus two prior intoxication-related convictions. For purposes of proving felony DWI, Texas Penal Code § 49.09(e) bars the State from using intoxication-related convictions that are more than ten years older than the instant offense (“remote convictions”), unless there exists another intoxication related conviction within ten years of the instant offense (“intervening conviction”).1 The Sixth Court of Appeals held that, where the two prior convictions alleged in the indictment are remote, the State must submit evidence of an intervening conviction to the jury, and that without such evidence the State “failed to prove an essential element of felony driving while intoxicated.” Weaver v. State, 56 S.W.3d 896, 899 (Tex.App.Texarkana 2001). The issue in this case is whether the Sixth Court erred. We hold that it did.
The Relevant Facts
On July 24, 2000, a Harris County grand jury indicted appellant, Steven Louis Weaver, for felony driving while intoxicated. See Tex. Pen.Code §§ 49.04, 49.09(b). The indictment alleged that appellant was driving while intoxicated on June 24, 2000, and that he had previously been convicted of the same offense on August 10, 1990, and January 17, 1984. Those prior offenses were actually committed on May 2, 1990, and November 23, 1983, respectively. Appellant entered a plea of not guilty, and the case was tried before a jury.
At trial, during the State’s presentation of its case-in-chief, appellant objected to the admission of the prior DWI convictions alleged in the indictment. The trial court held a hearing on the matter outside the [559]*559presence of the jury. Appellant argued that, pursuant to Texas Penal Code § 49.09(e), the State must allege in the indictment and prove at trial that at least one of the prior DWI convictions used to enhance the offense from a misdemeanor to a felony occurred within ten years of the instant offense. Appellant argued further that since the prior DWI’s alleged in the indictment occurred more than ten years before the instant offense, they were inadmissible for enhancement purposes. In response, the State explained that, in order to comply with § 49.09(e), it planned to introduce evidence of an intervening conviction outside the presence of the jury.2 The State then presented to the court, outside the presence of the jury, evidence that appellant was convicted of DWI on February 17, 1997.3 The trial court then overruled appellant’s objection and denied his subsequent motion for an instructed verdict that was based on the same grounds as his objection.
The jury later found appellant guilty of felony DWI and assessed his punishment at imprisonment for thirty-nine years.
On appeal, appellant reiterated his argument that the prior DWI convictions alleged in the indictment were inadmissible. The Sixth Court of Appeals agreed with appellant and held that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the two prior DWI convictions alleged in the indictment. The court of appeals reasoned that unless one of the two convictions alleged in the indictment occurred within ten years of the instant offense, “the State has not met its burden of proof because it has failed to prove an essential element of felony driving while intoxicated.” Weaver, 56 S.W.3d at 899; see also, Rodriguez v. State, 31 S.W.3d 359, 364 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2000) (an intervening conviction is an element of the offense). We granted the State’s petition for discretionary review to determine whether the court of appeals erred. See Tex.R.App.Proc. 66.3(b).4
In its brief to this Court, the State contends that by requiring the State to submit evidence of an intervening conviction before the jury, the court of appeals effectively held that § 49.09(e) is an element of the offense of felony DWI. The State further argues that: (1) § 49.09(e) is not an element of the offense, (2) § 49.09(e) is an “admissibility statute” that bars remote convictions only when no in[560]*560tervening conviction exists, and (3) offering proof of an intervening conviction in a hearing outside the presence of the jury is sufficient to comply with § 49.09(e).
Analysis
The elements of an offense must be charged in the indictment, submitted to the jury, and proven by the State beyond a reasonable doubt. Jones v. U.S., 526 U.S. 227, 232, 119 S.Ct. 1215, 143 L.Ed.2d 311 (1999); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970). In Texas, an element of an offense is defined as: the forbidden conduct, the required culpability, any required result, and the negation of any exception to the offense. Tex. Pen.Code § 1.07(a)(22).
Texas Penal Code §§ 49.045 and 49.09(b)6 together define the offense of felony driving while intoxicated. In Gibson v. State, 995 S.W.2d 693, 696 (Tex.Crim.App.1999), we explained:
The [two] prior intoxication-related offenses [referred to in § 49.09(b)], whether they are felonies or misdemeanors, serve the purpose of establishing whether the instant offense qualifies as felony driving while intoxicated. The prior intoxication-related offenses are elements of the offense of [felony] driving while intoxicated. They define the offense as a felony and are admitted into evidence as part of the State’s proof of its case-in-chief during the guilt/innocence stage of the trial.
In other words, under our penal statutes, two (or more) prior intoxication-related offenses are specific attendant circumstances that serve to define, in part, the forbidden conduct of the crime of felony driving while intoxicated. See 1 W. La-Fave & A. Scott, Substantive Criminal Law § 1.2(c) (2d. ed.1986) (discussing the fact that the definitions of some offenses require the presence or absence of specific attendant, circumstances). Thus, if a person, such as appellant, commits DWI with the requisite attendant circumstances (i.e., two or more prior intoxication-related offenses), then that person has committed felony DWI.
At the time of appellant’s offense Section 49.09(e)7, however, provided that: [561]*561A conviction may not be used for purposes of enhancement under this section if:
(1) the conviction was a final conviction under Subsection (d) and was for an offense committed more than 10 years before the offense for which the person is being tried was committed; and
(2) the person has not been convicted of an offense under Section 49.04, 49.05, 49.06, 49.065, 49.07, or 49.08 or any offense relating to operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated committed within 10 years before the date on which the offense for which the person is being tried was committed.
In sum, a prior intoxication-related conviction may not be used as an element of the offense of felony DWI if that prior offense was committed more than ten years before the instant offense, unless there is an intervening intoxication-related conviction. That does not mean that the State, as the court of appeals held, must submit to the jury proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the intervening offense. To so hold would, in essence, create another element of the offense of felony DWI, and § 49.09(e) is not an element of that offense. That is, § 49.09(e) does not describe the forbidden conduct, the required culpability, any required result, nor does it create an exception to the offense.8 See Tex. Pen.Code § 1.07(a)(22). Rather, § 49.09(e) bars the State, in certain circumstances, from proving all of the elements of the offense. In that sense, § 49.09(e) is more akin to a rule of admissibility, as opposed to an element of the offense. Cf. Tex.R. Evid. 609(b) (Providing that, as a general rule, convictions more than ten years old may not be used for impeachment purposes).
In order to charge a person with felony DWI, the State must allege in the indictment that the defendant has been convicted of at least two prior intoxication-related offenses. Where there are more than two prior convictions, the State should usually include in the indictment the two most recent convictions. However, if for some reason the State chooses not to allege the two most recent convictions in the indictment and those two convictions are more than ten years older than the instant offense, the State must comply with § 49.09(e).
Because § 49.09(e) is not an element of the offense, the State need not allege the intervening conviction in the indictment or submit it to the jury. The State must, however, at some point during its case-in-chief, submit proof of the intervening conviction to the trial court.
Here, during its case-in-chief, the State offered evidence of an intervening conviction. A fingerprint identification expert testified, in a hearing outside the presence of the jury, that appellant’s fingerprints matched those contained in the penitentiary packet for the February 17, 1997, DWI conviction. The trial court then, upon the State’s request, admitted the penitentiary packet into the record. This procedure sufficiently complied with the requirements of § 49.09(e). Therefore, the trial court did not err in allowing the State to admit into evidence the prior remote [562]*562DWI’s alleged in the indictment, and the court of appeals erred in holding otherwise.
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
JOHNSON, J., filed a dissenting opinion.