Wayte v. United States

470 U.S. 598, 105 S. Ct. 1524, 84 L. Ed. 2d 547, 1985 U.S. LEXIS 71, 53 U.S.L.W. 4319

• Court: Supreme Court of the United States
• Decided: March 19, 1985
• Docket: 83-1292
• Status: Published

Opinions

Justice Powell

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The question presented is whether a passive enforcement policy under which the Government prosecutes only those who report themselves as having violated the law, or who are reported by others, violates the First and Fifth Amendments.

I — I

On July 2, 1980, pursuant to his authority under § 3 of the Military Selective Service Act, 62 Stat. 605, as amended, 50 U. S. C. App. §453,¹ the President issued Presidential Proclamation No. 4771, 3 CFR 82 (1981). This Proclamation directed male citizens and certain male residents born during 1960 to register with the Selective Service System during the week of July 21, 1980. Petitioner fell within that class but did not register. Instead, he wrote several letters to Government officials, including the President, stating that he had not registered and did not intend to do so.²

Petitioner’s letters were added to a Selective Service file of young men who advised that they had failed to register or who were reported by others as having failed to register. For reasons we discuss, infra, at 612-613, Selective Service adopted a policy of passive enforcement under which it would investigate and prosecute only the cases of nonregistration contained in this file. In furtherance of this policy, Selective Service sent a letter on June 17, 1981, to each reported violator who had not registered and for whom it had an address. The letter explained the duty to register, stated that Selective Service had information that the person was required to register but had not done so, requested that he either comply with the law by filling out an enclosed registration card or explain why he was not subject to registration, and warned that a violation could result in criminal prosecution and specified penalties. Petitioner received a copy of this letter but did not respond.

On July 20, 1981, Selective Service transmitted to the Department of Justice, for investigation and potential prosecution, the names of petitioner and 133 other young men identified under its passive enforcement system — all of whom had not registered in response to the Service’s June letter. At two later dates, it referred the names of 152 more young men similarly identified. After screening out the names of those who appeared not to be in the class required to register, the Department of Justice referred the remaining names to the Federal Bureau of Investigation for additional inquiry and to the United States Attorneys for the districts in which the nonregistrants resided. Petitioner’s name was one of those referred.

Pursuant to Department of Justice policy, those referred were not immediately prosecuted. Instead, the appropriate United States Attorney was required to notify identified non-registrants by registered mail that, unless they registered within a specified time, prosecution would be considered. In addition, an FBI agent was usually sent to interview the nonregistrant before prosecution was instituted. This effort to persuade nonregistrants to change their minds became known as the “beg” policy. Under it, young men who registered late were not prosecuted, while those who never registered were investigated further by the Government. Pursuant to the “beg” policy, the United States Attorney for the Central District of California sent petitioner a letter on October 15, 1981, urging him to register or face possible prosecution. Again petitioner failed to respond.

On December 9, 1981, the Department of Justice instructed all United States Attorneys not to begin seeking indictments against nonregistrants until further notice. On January 7, 1982, the President announced a grace period to afford nonregistrants a further opportunity to register without penalty. This grace period extended until February 28, 1982. Petitioner still did not register.

Over the next few months, the Department decided to begin prosecuting those young men who, despite the grace period and “beg” policy, continued to refuse to register. It recognized that under the passive enforcement system those prosecuted were “liable to be vocal proponents of non-registration” or persons “with religious or moral objections.” Memorandum of March 17, 1982, from Lawrence Lippe, Chief, General Litigation and Legal Advice Section, Criminal Division, Department of Justice, to D. Lowell Jensen, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, App. 301. It also recognized that prosecutions would “undoubtedly result in allegations that the [case was] brought in retribution for the nonregistrant’s exercise of his first amendment rights.” Ibid. The Department was advised, however, that Selective Service could not develop a more “active” enforcement system for quite some time. See infra, at 613. Because of this, the Department decided to begin seeking indictments under the passive system without further delay. On May 21, 1982, United States Attorneys were notified to begin prosecution of nonregistrants. On June 28, 1982, FBI agents interviewed petitioner, and he continued to refuse to register. Accordingly, on July 22, 1982, an indictment was returned against him for knowingly and willfully failing to register with the Selective Service in violation of §§3 and 12(a) of the Military Selective Service Act, 62 Stat. 605 and 622, as amended, 50 U. S. C. App. §§453 and 462(a). This was one of the first indictments returned against any individual under the passive policy.

I — I HH

Petitioner moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground of selective prosecution. He contended that he and the other indicted nonregistrants³ were “vocal” opponents of the registration program who had been impermissibly targeted (out of an estimated 674,000 nonregistrants⁴) for prosecution on the basis of their exercise of First Amendment rights. After a hearing, the District Court for the Central District of California granted petitioner’s broad request for discovery and directed the Government to produce certain documents and make certain officials available to testify. The Government produced some documents and agreed to make some Government officials available but, citing executive privilege, it withheld other documents and testimony. On October 29, 1982, the District Court ordered the Government to produce the disputed documents and witness. The Government declined to comply and on November 5, 1982, asked the District Court to dismiss the indictment in order to allow an appeal challenging the discovery order. Petitioner asked for dismissal on several grounds, including discriminatory prosecution.

On November 15, 1982, the District Court dismissed the indictment on the ground that the Government had failed to rebut petitioner’s prima facie case of selective prosecution.⁵ Following precedents of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the District Court found that in order to establish a prima facie case petitioner had to prove that (i) others similarly situated generally had not been prosecuted for conduct similar to petitioner’s and (ii) the Government’s discriminatory selection was based on impermissible grounds such as race, religion, or exercise of First Amendment rights. 549 F. Supp. 1376, 1380 (1982). Petitioner satisfied the first requirement, the District Court held, because he had shown that all those prosecuted were “vocal” nonregistrants⁶ and because “[t]he inference is strong that the Government could have located non-vocal non-registrants, but chose not to.” Id., at 1381. The District Court found the second requirement satisfied for three reasons. First, the passive enforcement program was “ ‘inherently suspect’ ” because “ ‘it focuse[d] upon the vocal offender . . . [and was] vulnerable to the charge that those chosen for prosecution [were] being punished for their expression of ideas, a constitutionally protected right.’” Ibid., quoting United States v. Steele, 461 (CA9 1972). Second, the Government’s awareness that a disproportionate number of vocal nonregis-trants would be prosecuted under the passive enforcement system indicated that petitioner was prosecuted because of his exercise of First Amendment rights. 549 F. Supp., at 1382. Finally, the involvement of high Government officials in the prosecution decisions “strongly suggested] impermissible selective prosecution.” Id., at 1383. The District Court then held that the Government had failed to rebut the prima facie case.

The Court of Appeals reversed. 710 F. 2d 1385 (CA9 1983). Applying the same test, it found the first requirement satisfied but not the second. The first was satisfied by petitioner’s showing that out of the estimated 674,000 nonregis-trants the 13 indicted had all been vocal nonregistrants. Id., at 1387. As to the second requirement, the Court of Appeals held that petitioner had to show that the Government focused its investigation on him because of his protest activities. Ibid. Petitioner’s evidence, however, showed only that the Government was aware that the passive enforcement system would result in prosecutions primarily of two types of men — religious and moral objectors and vocal objectors — and that the Government recognized that the latter type would probably make claims of selective prosecution. Finding no evidence of impermissible governmental motivation, the court held that the District Court’s finding of a prima facie case of selective prosecution was clearly erroneous. Id., at 1388. The Court of Appeals also found two legitimate explanations for the Government’s passive enforcement system: (i) the identities of nonreported nonregistrants were not known, and (ii) nonregistrants who expressed their refusal to register made clear their willful violation of the law.⁷

Recognizing both the importance of the question presented and a division in the Circuits,⁸ we granted certiorari on the question of selective prosecution. 467 U. S. 1214 (1984). We now affirm.

In our criminal justice system, the Government retains “broad discretion” as to whom to prosecute. United States v. Goodwin, 457 U. S. 368, 380, n. 11 (1982); accord, Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U. S. 238, 248 (1980). “[S]o long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion.” Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U. S. 357, 364 (1978). This broad discretion rests largely on the recognition that the decision to prosecute is particularly ill-suited to judicial review. Such factors as the strength of the case, the prosecution’s general deterrence value, the Government’s enforcement priorities, and the case’s relationship to the Government’s overall enforcement plan are not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are competent to undertake. Judicial supervision in this area, moreover, entails systemic costs of particular concern. Examining the basis of a prosecution delays the criminal proceeding, threatens to chill law enforcement by subjecting the prosecutor’s motives and decisionmaking to outside inquiry, and may undermine pros-ecutorial effectiveness by revealing the Government’s enforcement policy. All these are substantial concerns that make the courts properly hesitant to examine the decision whether to prosecute.

As we have noted in a slightly different context, however, although prosecutorial discretion is broad, it is not “ ‘unfettered.’ Selectivity in the enforcement of criminal laws is ... subject to constitutional constraints.” United States v. Batchelder, 442 U. S. 114, 125 (1979) (footnote omitted). In particular, the decision to prosecute may not be “‘deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification,”’ Bordenkircher v. Hayes, supra, at 364, quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368 U. S. 448, 456 (1962), including the exercise of protected statutory and constitutional rights, see United States v. Goodwin, supra, at 372.

It is appropriate to judge selective prosecution claims according to ordinary equal protection standards.⁹ See Oyler v. Boles, supra. Under our prior cases, these standards require petitioner to show both that the passive enforcement system had a discriminatory effect and that it was motivated by a discriminatory purpose.¹⁰ Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U. S. 256 (1979); Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U. S. 252 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229 (1976). All petitioner has shown here is that those eventually prosecuted, along with many not prosecuted, reported themselves as having violated the law. He has not shown that the enforcement policy selected nonregistrants for prosecution on the basis of their speech. Indeed, he could not have done so given the way the “beg” policy was carried out. The Government did not prosecute those who reported themselves but later registered. Nor did it prosecute those who protested registration but did not report themselves or were not reported by others. In fact, the Government did not even investigate those who wrote letters to Selective Service criticizing registration unless their letters stated affirmatively that they had refused to comply with the law. Affidavit of Edward A. Frankie, Special Assistant to the Director of Selective Service for Compliance, App. 635. The Government, on the other hand, did prosecute people who reported themselves or were reported by others but who did not publicly protest. These facts demonstrate that the Government treated all reported nonregistrants similarly. It did not subject vocal nonregistrants to any special burden. Indeed, those prosecuted in effect selected themselves for prosecution by refusing to register after being reported and warned by the Government.

Even if the passive policy had a discriminatory effect, petitioner has not shown that the Government intended such a result. The evidence he presented demonstrated only that the Government was aware that the passive enforcement policy would result in prosecution of vocal objectors and that they would probably make selective prosecution claims. As we have noted, however: “ ‘Discriminatory purpose’ . . . implies more than . . . intent as awareness of consequences. It implies that the decisionmaker . . . selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.” Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, supra, at 279 (footnotes and citations omitted). In the present case, petitioner has not shown that the Government prosecuted him because of his protest activities. Absent such a showing, his claim of selective prosecution fails.

I — I <1

Petitioner also challenges the passive enforcement policy directly on First Amendment grounds.¹¹ In particular, he claims that “[e]ven though the [Government’s passive] enforcement policy did not overtly punish protected speech as such, it inevitably created a content-based regulatory system with a concomitantly disparate, content-based impact on non-registrants.” ¹² Brief for Petitioner 23. This Court has held that when, as here, “‘speech’ and ‘nonspeech’ elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms.” United States v. O’Brien, 391 U. S. 367, 376 (1968). Government regulation is justified

“if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.” Id., at 377.

Accord, Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U. S. 20, 32 (1984); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U. S. 396, 413 (1974). In the present case, neither the first nor third condition is disputed.

There can be no doubt that the passive enforcement policy meets the second condition. Few interests can be more compelling than a nation’s need to ensure its own security. It is well to remember that freedom as we know it has been suppressed in many countries. Unless a society has the capability and will to defend itself from the aggressions of others, constitutional protections of any sort have little meaning. Recognizing this fact, the Framers listed “pro-vid[ing] for the common defence,” U. S. Const., Preamble, as a motivating purpose for the Constitution and granted Congress the power to “provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States,” Art. I, §8, cl. 1. See also The Federalist Nos. 4, 24, and 25. This Court, moreover, has long held that the power “to raise and support armies ... is broad and sweeping,” United States v. O’Brien, supra, at 377; accord, Lichter v. United States, 334 U. S. 742, 755-758 (1948); Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U. S. 366 (1918), and that the “power ... to classify and conscript manpower for military service is ‘beyond question,’” United States v. O’Brien, supra, at 377, quoting Lichter v. United States, supra, at 756; accord, Selective Draft Law Cases, supra. With these principles in mind, the three reasons the Government offers in defense of this particular enforcement policy are sufficiently compelling to satisfy the second O’Brien requirement — as to either those who reported themselves or those who were reported by others.

First, by relying on reports of nonregistration, the Government was able to identify and prosecute violators without further delay. Although it still was necessary to investigate those reported to make sure that they were required to register and had not, the Government did not have to search actively for the names of these likely violators. Such a search would have been difficult and costly at that time. Indeed, it would be a costly step in any “active” prosecution system involving thousands of nonregistrants. The passive enforcement program thus promoted prosecutorial efficiency. Second, the letters written to Selective Service provided strong, perhaps conclusive evidence of the nonregistrant’s intent not to comply — one of the elements of the offense.¹³ Third, prosecuting visible nonregistrants was thought to be an effective way to promote general deterrence, especially since failing to proceed against publicly known offenders would encourage others to violate the law.

The passive enforcement policy also meets the final requirement of the O’Brien test, for it placed no more limitation on speech than was necessary to ensure registration for the national defense. Passive enforcement not only did not subject “vocal” nonregistrants to any special burden, supra, at 609-610, but also was intended to be only an interim enforcement system. Although Selective Service was engaged in developing an active enforcement program when it investigated petitioner, it had by then found no practicable way of obtaining the names and current addresses of likely non-registrants.¹⁴ Eventually, it obtained them by matching state driver’s license records with Social Security files. It took some time, however, to obtain the necessary authorizations and to set up this system. Passive enforcement was the only effective interim solution available to carry out the Government’s compelling interest.

We think it important to note as a final matter how far the implications of petitioner’s First Amendment argument would extend. Strictly speaking, his argument does not concern passive enforcement but self-reporting. The concerns he identifies would apply to all nonregistrants who report themselves even if the Selective Service engaged only in active enforcement. For example, a nonregistrant who wrote a letter informing Selective Service of his failure to register could, when prosecuted under an active system, claim that the Selective Service was prosecuting him only because of his “protest.” Just as in this case, he could have some justification for believing that his letter had focused inquiry upon him. Prosecution in either context would equally “burden” his exercise of First Amendment rights. Under the petitioner’s view, then, the Government could not constitutionally prosecute a self-reporter — even in an active enforcement system — unless perhaps it could prove that it would have prosecuted him without his letter. On principle, such a view would allow any criminal to obtain immunity from prosecution simply by reporting himself and claiming that he did so in order to “protest” the law. The First Amendment confers no such immunity from prosecution.

y

We conclude that the Government’s passive enforcement system together with its “beg” policy violated neither the First nor Fifth Amendment. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

It is so ordered.

1 Section 3 provides in pertinent part:

“[I]t shall be the duty of every male citizen of the United States, and every other male person residing in the United States, who, on the day or days fixed for the first or any subsequent registration, is between the ages of eighteen and twenty-six, to present himself for and submit to registration at such time or times and place or places, and in such manner, as shall be determined by proclamation of the President and by rules and regulations prescribed hereunder.”

The United States requires only that young men register for military service while most other major countries of the world require actual service. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1983-1984 (1983); see Selective Service System v. Minnesota Public Service Research Group, 468 U. S. 841, 860, n. 2 (1984) (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).

2 On August 4, 1980, for example, petitioner wrote to both the President and the Selective Service System. In his letter to the President, he stated:

“I decided to obey my conscience rather than your law. I did not register for your draft. I will never register for your draft. Nor will I ever cooperate with yours or any other military system, despite the laws I might break or the consequences which may befall me.” App. 714.

In his letter to the Selective Service System, he similarly stated: “I have not registered for the draft. I plan never to register. I realize the possible consequences of my action, and I accept them.” Id., at 716.

Six months later, petitioner sent a second letter to Selective Service:

“Last August I wrote to inform you of my intention not to register for the draft. Well, I did not register, and still plan never to do so, but thus far I have received no reply to my letter, much less any news about your much-threatened prosecutions.

“I must interpret your silence as meaning that you are too busy or disorganized to respond to letters or keep track of us draft-age youth. So I will keep you posted of my whereabouts.” Id., at 710.

He also stated that, although he would “be traveling the nation.. . encouraging resistance and spreading the word about peace and disarmament,” he could be reached at his home address in Pasadena, California. Id., at 710-711.

3 The record indicates that only 13 of the 286 young men Selective Service referred to the Department of Justice had been indicted at the time the District Court considered this case. As of March 31, 1984, three more men had been indicted. The approximately 270 not indicted either registered, were found not to be subject to registration requirements, could not be found, or were under continuing investigation. The record does not indicate how many fell into each category.

4 On July 28, 1982, Selective Service stated that 8,365,000 young men had registered out of the estimated 9,039,000 who were required to do so. Selective Service Prosecutions: Oversight Hearing before the Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 10 (1982). This amounted to a nonregistration rate of approximately 7.5 percent.

5 The District Court also decided various statutory and regulatory claims. In particular, it held that Presidential Proclamation No. 4771 had been improperly promulgated and dismissed the indictment on this ground as well. 549 F. Supp. 1376, 1391 (1982). The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed this particular holding and affirmed the District Court’s rejection of the remaining regulatory claims. 710 F. 2d 1385, 1388-1389 (1983). Only the constitutional claim is now at issue.

We do not decide the issue the dissent sees as central to this case: “whether Wayte has earned the right to discover Government documents relevant to his claim of selective prosecution.” Post, at 614-615. Even if there were substance to this discovery issue, it was neither raised in the petition for certiorari, briefed on the merits, nor raised at oral argument. Wayte has simply not asserted such a claim before this Court.

6 This term is misleading insofar as it suggests that all those indicted had made public statements opposing registration. In some cases, the only statement made by the nonregistrant prior to indictment was hisjetter to the Government declaring his refusal to register.

7 One judge dissented on the ground that the passive enforcement system represented a “deliberate policy. . . designed to punish only those, who had communicated their violation of the law to others.” 710 F. 2d, at 1389 (Schroeder, J., dissenting). Finding “an enforcement procedure focusing solely upon vocal offenders . . . inherently suspect,” id., at 1390, she would have shifted the burden of persuasion on discriminatory intent to the Government.

8 Compare United States v. Eklund, 733 F. 2d 1287 (CA8 1984) (en banc) (upholding criminal conviction under passive enforcement scheme), cert, pending, No. 83-1959, with United States v. Schmucker, 721 F. 2d 1046 (CA6 1983) (ordering hearing on selective prosecution claim), cert. pending, No. 83-2035.

9 Although the Fifth Amendment, unlike the Fourteenth, does not contain an equal protection clause, it does contain an equal protection component. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U. S. 497, 499 (1954). “[Our] approach to Fifth Amendment equal protection claims has . . . been precisely the same as to equal protection claims under the Fourteenth Amendment.” Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U. S. 636, 638, n. 2 (1975).

10 A showing of discriminatory intent is not necessary when the equal protection claim is based on an overtly discriminatory classification. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303 (1880). No such claim is presented here, for petitioner cannot argue that the passive policy discriminated on its face.

The dissent argues that Wayte made a nonfrivolous showing of all three elements of a prima facie case as established in the context of grand jury selection. Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U. S. 482, 494-495 (1977). Neither the parties nor the courts below, however, discussed the prima facie ease in these terms. Rather, they used the phrase to refer to whether Wayte had made a showing, which, if unrebutted, would directly establish discriminatory effect and purpose. Even applying standards from the grand jury selection context, however, we believe that Wayte has failed to establish a prima facie case. For example, although the dissent describes the first element as merely whether the individual “is a member of a recognizable, distinct class,” post, at 626, it is clear for reasons we discuss, infra, at this page and 610, that Wayte has not established the first element as actually defined by Castaneda: whether the individual is a member of an “identifiable group” that is “a recognizable, distinct class, singled out for different treatment under the laws, as mitten or as applied.” 430 U. S., at 494 (emphasis added). For these same reasons, we believe Wayte has failed to establish the other Castaneda elements, particularly the third. Furthermore, even assuming that Wayte did make out this kind of prima facie ease, the “beg” policy would rebut it.

The dissent also argues that Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 (1886), would have been decided differently under the approach we take today. Post, at 630-631. This misunderstanding stems from its belief that “the Government intentionally discriminated in defining the pool of potential proseeutees” in this case. Post, at 630. This premise, however, mistakes the facts. The prosecution pool consisted of all reported nonregistrants, not just “vocal” nonregistrants, and there is no evidence of Government intent to prosecute individuals because of their exercise of First Amendment rights.

11 Petitioner alleges that the passive enforcement policy violated both his right to free speech and his right to petition. Because he does not argue that it burdened each right differently, we view these claims as essentially the same. Although the right to petition and the right to free speech are separate guarantees, they are related and generally subject to the same constitutional analysis. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U. S. 886, 911-915 (1982).

12 As an initial matter, we note doubt that petitioner has demonstrated injury to his First Amendment rights. The Government’s “beg” policy removed most, if not all, of any burden passive enforcement placed on free expression. Because of this policy, nonregistrants could protest registration and still avoid any danger of prosecution. By simply registering after they had reported themselves to the Selective Service, nonregistrants satisfied their obligation and could thereafter continue to protest registration. No matter how strong their protest, registration immunized them from prosecution. Strictly speaking, then, the passive enforcement system penalized continued violation of the Military Selective Service Act, not speech. The only right it burdened was the asserted “right” not to register, a “right” without foundation either in the Constitution or the history of our country. See Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U. S. 366 (1918).

13 Section 12(a) of the Military Selective Service Act, 62 Stat. 622, as amended, 50 U. S. C. App. § 462(a), provides that a criminal nonregistrant must “evad[e] or refus[e]” to register. For conviction, the courts have uniformly required the Government to prove that the failure to register was knowing. E. g., United States v. Boucher, 509 F. 2d 991 (CA8 1975); United States v. Rabb, 394 F. 2d 230 (CA3 1968). Neither party contests this requirement here.

14 Selective Service had tried to use Social Security records but found that the addresses there were hopelessly stale. And under the law, 26 U. S. C. § 6103, it could gain no useful access to Internal Revenue Service records — the only other recognized federal source of generally accurate information.