Wayfield v. Town of Tisbury

Opinion

USCA1 Opinion

November 29, 1993     [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

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No. 93-1535

DAVID WAYFIELD,

                                Plaintiff, Appellant,

                                          v.

                                   TOWN OF TISBURY,

                                 Defendant, Appellee.
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                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                    [Hon. Walter Jay Skinner, U.S. District Judge]
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                                        Before

                                 Cyr, Circuit Judge,
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                            Bownes, Senior Circuit Judge,
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                              and Boudin, Circuit Judge.
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               David Wayfield on brief pro se.
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               Tracie L. Longman and Roche, Carens & DeGiacomo on brief for
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          appellee.

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Per Curiam.   Appellant David Wayfield alleges  that the
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            Town  of  Tisbury,  in  conjunction   with  numerous  private

            parties,  deprived  him  of  his  constitutional   rights  in

            violation  of 42 U.S.C.   1983.  After the defendants filed a

            motion to  dismiss the  entire complaint,  Wayfield moved  to

            amend his original complaint.   This motion was denied by the

            district court on the ground that the amended complaint would

            also be subject to dismissal.  Wayfield appeals the dismissal

            of his  civil rights action.   With one exception,  we affirm

            the dismissal of Wayfield's claims.

                 In  dismissing  Wayfield's  civil  rights  claims,   the

            district court  seems to  rely in part  on the  doctrine that

            civil  rights  complaints  must   be  pled  with   heightened

            particularity.   See Dartmouth  Review v.  Dartmouth College,
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            889  F.2d 13, 16 (1st Cir. 1989).  However, the Supreme Court

            has  recently cautioned that  civil rights  claims are  to be

            subject only  to normal standards of pleading.  Leatherman v.
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            Tarrant County  Narcotics Intelligence  & Coordination  Unit,
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            113 S.Ct.  1160,  1163  (1993).    The  proper  standard  for

            assessing  the  adequacy  of the  instant  complaint  then is

            whether, accepting  the factual allegations in  the complaint

            as  true,  and  construing  these facts  in  the  light  most

            favorable  to the  plaintiff, the  pleading  shows any  facts

            which  could entitle plaintiff to  relief.  See, e.g., Gooley
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            v.   Mobil  Oil Corp.,  851 F.2d  513, 514  (1st Cir.  1988).
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Moreover, as a pro se plaintiff, Wayfield is entitled to have
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            his  complaint "liberally construed."  Estelle v. Gamble, 429
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            U.S. 97, 106 (1976).

                 Even  under   this  more  generous   standard,  most  of

            Wayfield's causes of action are subject to dismissal  for the

            reasons stated in the district court opinion, dated March 29,

            1993.  However, we find that the amended complaint, liberally

            construed, does state a  cause of action under section  1983.

            We  therefore  reverse   the  district   court's  denial   of

            Wayfield's  motion  to  amend his  complaint  and  vacate the

            dismissal order in part.

                 According  to  his amended  complaint,  on December  14,

            1990,  Wayfield went  to the  Vineyard  Haven Public  Library

            where  he spoke with the Library Director, defendant Marjorie

            Convery,  and  attempted  to persuade  her  to  stock several

            "revisionist" books  and periodicals.   Ms.  Convery did  not

            respond and  "seemed very angry  but controlled."   Within an

            hour, Wayfield was falsely accused by Ms. Convery of stealing

            a menorah from  the library.  When he refused  her request to

            open   his  shoulder  bag   to  be  searched,   Wayfield  was

            "assaulted" by Convery.   On December 18, Wayfield received a

            certified  letter from  Convery informing  him  that "[a]s  a

            result of the disruptive incident that occurred on Saturday .

            . . your presence on the property  or in the building will no

            longer  be permitted."   On December 20,  he received another

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letter  dated December 19,  1990, from the  Board of Trustees

            for the Vineyard  Haven Public Library, announcing  that, due

            to the "disruptive incident," he was banned from the  library

            until April 2, 1991.   After Wayfield returned to the library

            in January  1991,  he  was  charged with  trespassing.    The

            charges  were eventually  dropped.   Wayfield  admits to  the

            existence of a disturbance but alleges that he was the victim

            of an  illegal assault by  Convery.  He further  alleges that

            the ban  imposed upon him was due  not to any disturbance but

            was in retaliation for his political views.

                 To state a  cause of action  under 42  U.S.C.   1983,  a

            plaintiff   must  allege   sufficient  facts  to   support  a

            determination  "(i) that the  conduct complained of  has been

            committed under  color  of  state  law, and  (ii)  that  [the

            alleged] conduct  worked a  denial of  rights secured by  the

            Constitution or  laws  of the  United States."   Chongris  v.
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            Board of Appeals,  811 F.2d 36, 40 (1st  Cir.), cert. denied,
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            483  U.S. 1021 (1987). Liberally construing the complaint and

            accepting its allegations as true, we find that the complaint

            states a  cause of action under 42  U.S.C.   1983 against Ms.

            Convery.  First,  as evidenced by her letter  of December 18,

            1990,  banning   Wayfield  from  the  library,   Ms.  Convery

            purported to act  under the color of state  law.  Second, the

            banning  of Wayfield  because of  his  political views  would

            appear to be  a violation of his constitutional  rights.  Cf.
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Nestor Colon Medina  & Sucesores, Inc. v. Custodio,  964 F.2d
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            32,  40  (1st  Cir.  1992)  (denial of  land  use  permit  in

            unjustifiable retaliation for  expression of political  views

            constitutes a first amendment violation).  

                 [While  a]  State or  its  instrumentality may,  of

                 course,  regulate the use of its libraries or other

                 public  facilities  .  .  .it  must  do   so  in  a

                 reasonable  and  nondiscriminatory  manner, equally

                 applicable to all and administered with equality to

                 all. . .  . And it may not invoke regulations as to

                 use--whether  they  are  ad  hoc  or  general--as a
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                 pretext  for  pursuing  those  engaged  in  lawful,

                 constitutionally   protected   exercise   of  their

                 fundamental rights.

            Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 142-43 (1966). 
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                 To be  sure,  the allegations  that the  assault by  Ms.

            Convery and her banning  him from the library were  motivated

            by animus  toward Wayfield's political  views are conclusory.

            Such  conclusory   allegations  become  facts   for  pleading

            purposes "only when such conclusions are logically compelled,

            or at least supported, by the stated facts, that is, when the

            suggested  inference rises to what experience indicates is an

            acceptable  level  of  probability."    Dartmouth  Review  v.
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            Dartmouth College, 889 F.2d 13, 16 (1st Cir. 1989).  
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The   complaint   does   allege  facts   which,   albeit

            circumstantial, support the  conclusion that  the banning  by

            the Director  was politically motivated.  Since  the state of

            mind of an actor  often "must be inferred from  the things [a

            party] says  or does[,]"   Anthony v. Sundlun, 952  F.2d 603,
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            605  (1st  Cir.  1991),  circumstantial  evidence  alone  can

            support a conclusion of discriminatory intent.  Id. 
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                 First, Wayfield  alleges that on the day of the incident

            which led to  the banning he discussed with  the Director his

            political views.   Not only was she thus aware of those views

            but   Wayfield  alleges  that  she  "seemed  very  angry  but

            controlled."   He then alleges  that "within an hour"  he was

            accused falsely of stealing a  menorah and was "assaulted" by

            the Director.  From these facts, it is possible to infer that

            the accusation  of stealing was  a pretext and that  the real

            reason  for the "assault"  and the Director's  letter banning

            Wayfield was animus towards Wayfield's political views.  

                 We also find that, although the  question is very close,

            the complaint alleges  a cause of action against  the Town of

            Tisbury  as  well.   According  to  the  complaint, liberally

            construed,  the Board  of  Trustees  of  the  Vineyard  Haven

            Library banned Wayfield from the library between December 19,

            1990,  and April  2,  1991 because  of  his political  views.

            While  the  Board  purported  to  act  only  because  of  the

            "disruptive  incident" which  occurred  between Wayfield  and

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Convery,  the complaint alleges that this incident was only a

            pretext, a  conclusion we  have decided  is supported  by the

            facts alleged in the complaint.  We do  not find the possible

            inference that the Board, acting  on the basis of information

            provided by  the Director, may  have been aware of,  and even

            shared, the  Director's intent,  to be  so speculative as  to

            require dismissal of  this case without any  further inquiry.

            Since  the Board  of  Trustees is  the  body responsible  for

            managing the library,  see Mass. Gen.  L. ch. 78,    11,  any
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            illegal acts it  may have committed would expose  the town to

            liability.  See  Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475  U.S. 469, 483-84
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            (1986) (municipality is liable under section 1983 even for "a

            single decision  to take  unlawful action  . .  .  [which  is

            made]   by  the   official  or   officials  responsible   for

            establishing  final policy with respect to the subject matter

            in question.").

                 We   affirm  the  district   court's  dismissal  of  all

            Wayfield's  claims except those  against Ms. Convery  and the

            Board  of Trustees  in regard  to  the allegedly  politically

            motivated  banning   of  Wayfield  from  the  Vineyard  Haven

            Library.  As  to those claims, we vacate the dismissal of the

            complaint,  reverse the  denial of  the motion  to amend  the

            complaint,  and  remand  to the  district  court  for further

            proceedings.

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Affirmed in  part; vacated  in part and  remanded.    No
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            costs. 

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