Watson v. Tennant Company

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 ----oo0oo---- 11 12 EDWARD WATSON, individually and No. 2:18-cv-02462 WBS DB on behalf of all similarly 13 situated and/or aggrieved employees of Defendants in the 14 State of California, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: UNOPPOSED MOTION FOR FINAL 15 Plaintiff, APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT AND MOTION FOR 16 v. ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS 17 TENNANT COMPANY, a Minnesota Corporation, and DOES 1 through 18 50, inclusive, 19 Defendants. 20 21 ----oo0oo---- 22 Plaintiff Edward Watson, individually and on behalf of 23 all other similarly situated employees, brought this putative 24 class action against defendant Tennant Company (“Tennant” or 25 “defendant”) alleging various claims related to defendant’s 26 failure to properly pay technicians for all hours worked, 27 including minimum wage and overtime, and failure to permit 28 1 legally compliant meal and rest periods. (See generally First 2 Am. Compl. (“FAC”) (Docket No. 16).) Before the court is 3 plaintiff’s unopposed motion for final approval of the parties’ 4 class action settlement and attorneys’ fees and costs. 5 (Plaintiff’s Mot. for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement 6 and an Award of Attorney’s Fees and Costs (“Mot. for Final 7 Approval”) (Docket No. 29).) 8 I. Factual & Procedural Background 9 Plaintiff Edward Watson was employed by defendant as a 10 service technician in California during the class period, 11 including during part of 2016. (FAC at ¶ 6.) Defendant Tennant 12 is a Minnesota corporation specializing in the sale and service 13 of cleaning industry products. (Id. at ¶ 7.) Tennant employs 14 individuals in the State of California who perform service and 15 repair on cleaning equipment, commonly referred to as “Service 16 Technicians.” (Id.) 17 This action was filed on August 7, 2018, and the 18 operative complaint contains the following claims: (1) failure to 19 pay overtime compensation; (2) failure to pay minimum wages; (3) 20 failure to provide meal and rest periods; (4) failure to provide 21 accurate itemized wage statements; (5) failure to pay wages when 22 due upon termination or resignation1;2 and (7) unfair business 23 practices. (FAC at ¶¶ 24–49; 57–61.) 24 1 Plaintiff alleges that because of this failure, 25 plaintiff is entitled to waiting time penalties under Cal. Lab. Code §§ 201-203. 26

27 2 On August 30, 2019, based on stipulation of the parties, the Court ordered the sixth cause of action for 28 Conversion dismissed. 1 The parties engaged in a full day private mediation on 2 September 17, 2019, before Jeffrey A. Ross, where the parties 3 reached an agreement for settlement. (Id.) Plaintiff moved for 4 preliminary approval of the settlement and provisional 5 certification of the class on February 13, 2020. (Id.) On March 6 20, 2020, this court granted plaintiff’s motion for provisional 7 certification of the class and for preliminary approval of class 8 action settlement. (Order Granting Preliminary Approval of Class 9 Action Settlement and Provisional Certification of Class (“Order 10 Granting Preliminary Approval”) (Docket No. 28.) 11 II. Discussion 12 The Ninth Circuit has declared a strong judicial policy 13 favoring settlement of class actions. Class Plaintiffs v. City 14 of Seattle, 955 F.2d 1268, 1276 (9th Cir. 1992); see also 15 Rodriguez v. W. Publ’g Corp., 563 F.3d 948, 965 (9th Cir. 2009) 16 (“We put a good deal of stock in the product of an arms-length, 17 non-collusive, negotiated resolution[.]”) (citation omitted). 18 Rule 23(e) provides that “[t]he claims, issues, or defenses of a 19 certified class may be settled . . . only with the court’s 20 approval.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e). 21 “Approval under 23(e) involves a two-step process in 22 which the Court first determines whether a proposed class action 23 settlement deserves preliminary approval and then, after notice 24 is given to class members, whether final approval is warranted.” 25 Nat’l Rural Telecomms. Coop. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 221 F.R.D. 523, 26 525 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (citing Manual for Complex Litig. (Third), § 27 30.41 (1995)). This court satisfied step one by granting 28 plaintiff’s unopposed motion for preliminary approval of class 1 action settlement on March 20, 2020. (See generally Order 2 Granting Preliminary Approval.) Now, following notice to the 3 class members, the court will consider whether final approval is 4 merited by evaluating: (1) the treatment of this litigation as a 5 class action and (2) the terms of the settlement. See Diaz v. 6 Tr. Territory of Pac. Islands, 876 F.2d 1401, 1408 (9th Cir. 7 1989). 8 A. Class Certification 9 A class action will be certified only if it meets the 10 requirements of Rule 23(a)’s four prerequisites and fits within 11 one of Rule 23(b)’s three subdivisions. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)- 12 (b). Although a district court has discretion in determining 13 whether the moving party has satisfied each Rule 23 requirement, 14 the court must conduct a rigorous inquiry before certifying a 15 class. See Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 16 (1982). 17 1. Rule 23(a)

18 Rule 23(a) restricts class actions to cases where: (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all 19 members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the 20 claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the 21 class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of 22 the class. 23 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). These requirements are commonly referred 24 to as numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of 25 representation. In the court’s order granting preliminary 26 approval of the settlement, the court found that the putative 27 class satisfied the Rule 23(a) requirements. (Order Granting 28 1 Preliminary Approval at 4-7.) The court is unaware of any 2 changes that would affect that conclusion, and the parties 3 indicated that they were aware of no such developments. (See 4 generally Mot. for Final Approval.) Because the court is not 5 aware of any facts that would alter its initial Rule 23(a) 6 analysis, the court finds that the class definition proposed by 7 plaintiff meets the requirements of Rule 23(a), for the reasons 8 stated in the court’s order granting preliminary approval. 9 2. Rule 23(b) 10 An action that meets all the prerequisites of Rule 11 23(a) may be certified as a class action only if it also 12 satisfies the requirements of one of the three subdivisions of 13 Rule 23(b). See Leyva v. Medline Indus. Inc., 716 F.3d 510, 512 14 (9th Cir. 2013). In its order granting preliminary approval of 15 the settlement, the court found that both the predominance and 16 superiority prerequisites of Rule 23(b)(3) were satisfied. 17 (Order Granting Preliminary Approval at 7.) The court is unaware 18 of any changes that would affect this conclusion. Because the 19 settlement class satisfies both Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(3), the 20 court will grant final class certification of this action, for 21 the reasons stated in the court’s order granting preliminary 22 approval. 23 3. Rule 23(c)(2) Notice Requirements 24 If the court certifies a class under Rule 23(b)(3), it 25 “must direct to class members the best notice that is practicable 26 under the circumstances, including individual notice to all 27 members who can be identified through reasonable effort.” Fed. 28 R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B). Rule 23(c)(2) governs both the form and 1 content of a proposed notice. See Ravens v. Iftikar, 174 F.R.D. 2 651, 658 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (citing Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 3 417 U.S. 156, 172–77 (1974)). Although that notice must be 4 “reasonably certain to inform the absent members of the plaintiff 5 class,” actual notice is not required. Silber v. Mabon, 18 F.3d 6 1449, 1454 (9th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). 7 The parties selected Analytics Consulting (“Analytics”) 8 to serve as the Settlement Administrator. (Decl. of Alireza 9 Alivandivafa in Supp. of Final Approval at ¶ 9(C) (“Alivandivafa 10 Decl.”) (Docket No. 29-1).) Defendant timely provided Analytics 11 with the class list, including the class members’ names, social 12 security numbers, last known addresses, and dates of employment. 13 (Decl. of Settlement Administrator at ¶ 3 (“Mitchell Decl.”) 14 (Docket No. 29-3).) 15 To ensure delivery of the notice packets, Analytics 16 processed the class members’ addresses through the United States 17 Postal Service’s National Change of Address Database. (Id. at ¶ 18 4.) Analytics used the class data to calculate each class 19 member’s qualifying workweeks during the relevant time period and 20 each class member’s estimated individual settlement payment. 21 (Id. at ¶ 5). Analytics sent its calculations to the parties for 22 review. (Id.) One individual in the data list was determined to 23 have an award of $0 due to not working during the relevant period 24 and was excluded from the mailing list. (Id. at ¶ 6.) Notice 25 packets were mailed to all class members by First Class Mail on 26 April 22, 2020. (Id. at ¶ 7.) Initially, three packets were 27 returned as undeliverable, but Analytics traced the records with 28 undeliverable notices and re-mailed the notice to those three 1 class members at updated addresses. (Id. at ¶ 8.) Analytics has 2 hosted a toll-free number since April 22, 2020 for class members 3 to contact with questions. (Id. at ¶ 11.) No class member has 4 asked to be excluded from the settlement or disputed their weeks 5 worked during the class period. (Id. ¶¶ 9-10.) Four months have 6 passed since the initial mailing and re-mailing and no class 7 members have objected to this settlement or opted out. (See Mot. 8 for Final Approval at 5.) 9 “Notice is satisfactory if it ‘generally describes the 10 terms of the settlement in sufficient detail to alert those with 11 adverse viewpoints to investigate and to come forward and be 12 heard.’” Churchill Vill., L.L.C. v. Gen. Elec., 361 F.3d 566, 13 575 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Mendoza v. Tucson Sch. Dist. No. 1, 14 623 F.2d 1338, 1352 (9th Cir. 1980)). The notice identifies the 15 parties, explains the nature of the proceedings, defines the 16 class, provides the terms of the settlement, and explains the 17 procedure for objecting or opting out of the class. (See 18 Unopposed Mot. for Preliminary Approval of Class Action 19 Settlement and Provisional Certification of Class at Ex. B (“Mot. 20 for Preliminary Approval”) (Docket No. 25).) The notice also 21 explains how class members’ individual settlement awards will be 22 calculated, and the amount that class members can expect to 23 receive. (Id.) Accordingly, the notice complies with Rule 24 23(c)(2)(B)’s requirements.

25 B. Rule 23(e): Fairness, Adequacy, and Reasonableness of Proposed Settlement 26 27 Having determined that class treatment is warranted, 28 the court must now address whether the terms of the parties’ 1 settlement appear fair, adequate, and reasonable. See Fed. R. 2 Civ. P. 23(e)(2). To determine the fairness, adequacy, and 3 reasonableness of the agreement, the court must balance the 4 following factors: 5 (1) the strength of the plaintiff’s case; (2) the risk, expense, complexity, and likely duration of 6 further litigation; (3) the risk of maintaining class action status throughout the trial; (4) the 7 amount offered in settlement; (5) the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the 8 proceedings; (6) the experience and views of counsel; (7) the presence of a governmental 9 participant3; and (8) the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement. 10 11 See Churchill Vill., 361 F.3d at 575. However, “[t]he factors 12 in a court’s fairness assessment will naturally vary from case 13 to case.” In re Bluetooth Headset Prods. Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 14 935, 946 (9th Cir. 2011). 15 1. Strength of the Plaintiff’s Case 16 One particularly important consideration is the 17 strength of plaintiff’s case on the merits compared to the 18 settlement amount offered. See DIRECTV, 221 F.R.D. at 526. The 19 court, however, is not required to resolve the underlying 20 merits, “for it is the very uncertainty of outcome in litigation 21 and avoidance of wastefulness and expensive litigation that 22 induce consensual settlements.” Officers for Justice v. Civ. 23 Serv. Comm’n of City & Cty. of San Francisco, 688 F.2d 615, 625 24 (9th Cir. 1982). 25 Although plaintiff maintains his claims are meritorious 26 and he would have prevailed at trial, he acknowledges defendant’s 27 3 No governmental entity participated in this matter. 28 Accordingly, this factor is irrelevant to the court’s analysis. 1 contention that its employment policies and practices did not 2 violate applicable laws and that the amount of damages and 3 penalties available would be far less than plaintiffs claim. 4 (See Mot. for Preliminary Approval at 9.) Moreover, defendant 5 further contends that its employment policies and practices were 6 optional and not required, and that employees did not miss breaks 7 or earn compensation for which they were not paid. (Id.) 8 Accordingly, the court finds the proposed settlement is a fair 9 resolution of the issues in this case, reflects the strength of 10 the claims and defenses asserted, and will prevent potential 11 uncertainty. This factor therefore weighs in favor of 12 settlement. 13 2. Risk, Expense, Complexity, and Further Litigation 14 The parties have engaged in extensive formal 15 disclosures and written discovery in this case. (Mot. for Final 16 Approval at 8.) Specifically, the defendant produced important 17 information about the class and claims, thousands of pages of 18 documents, and voluminous electronic data, including the time and 19 payroll records for all members of the putative class. (Id.) 20 Absent settlement, the parties most likely would have had to 21 pursue further discovery and summary judgment, which would cause 22 additional expense and could substantially reduce, delay, or 23 eliminate class members’ recovery. (Id.) Accordingly, this 24 factor also weighs in favor of settlement. 25 3. Risk of Maintaining Class Action Status 26 The court granted plaintiff’s motion for provisional 27 certification of the class earlier this year. (Order Granting 28 Preliminary Approval at 17.) The court is unaware of any 1 potential future development that could upset certification if 2 the plaintiffs obtain final class certification. Accordingly, 3 the court will not consider this factor in this analysis. See In 4 re Veritas Software Corp. Sec. Litig., No.03-0282, 2005 WL 5 3096079, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2005)(favoring neither 6 approval nor disapproval of settlement where the court was 7 “unaware of any risk involved in maintaining class action 8 status”), vacated in part on other grounds by In re Veritas 9 Software Corp. Sec. Litig., 496 F.3d 962 (9th Cir. 2007). 10 4. Amount Offered in the Settlement 11 In assessing the amount offered in settlement, “[i]t is 12 the complete package taken as a whole, rather than the individual 13 component parts, that must be examined for overall fairness.” 14 See Officers for Justice, 688 F.2d at 628. “It is well-settled 15 law that a cash settlement amounting to only a fraction of the 16 potential recovery will not per se render the settlement 17 inadequate or unfair.” Id. 18 Here, the gross settlement fund is $1,100,000.00, with 19 the entirety of the net settlement amount, after fees and costs, 20 to be paid to the class, without reversion. (Alivandivafa Decl. 21 ¶ 9(A).) This represents a recovery of approximately 50% of the 22 claimed overtime lost, if calculated for the entire class period. 23 (Id.) The total net settlement fund is estimated to be 24 $688,715.05, following distribution of the gross amount as 25 follows: (1) $366,666.66 for class counsel fees; (2) $11,441.29 26 for litigation costs; (3) $25,000 for plaintiff as an incentive 27 award; and (4) $8,141.00 for Analytics’ administration fees. 28 (Id. at ¶ 9 (A)–(E).) The distribution of the net settlement 1 fund will occur on a pro rata basis, based on the ratio of the 2 applicable workweeks worked by each class member during the class 3 period to the total number of applicable workweeks worked by all 4 class members during the class period. (Mot. for Preliminary 5 Approval., Ex. B.) The average recovery per class member is 6 estimated to be $8,830.14. (Alivandivafa Decl. ¶ 9(E).) In 7 addition to the monetary award, class counsel’s efforts resulted 8 in defendant changing its pay and scheduling practices to ensure 9 that minimum and overtime wages be paid. (Id. at ¶ 7.) 10 While this amount will undoubtedly “be less than what 11 some class members feel they deserve but . . . more than the 12 defendant feel[s] they are entitled to,” the amount represents a 13 reasonable compromise on plaintiff’s wage and hour claims. See 14 Officers for Justice, 688 F.2d at 615. Generally, “unless the 15 settlement is clearly inadequate, its acceptance and approval are 16 preferable to lengthy and expensive litigation with uncertain 17 results.” DIRECTV, Inc., 221 F.R.D. at 526. This settlement 18 avoids the potential to incur great litigation expenses for both 19 sides and provides a not-insignificant benefit to class members. 20 Considering the risks and expense of further litigation, the 21 court finds the settlement amount to be fair and adequate. 22 5. Extent of Discovery Completed 23 The parties engaged in extensive discovery prior to 24 settlement. (Alivandivafa Decl. at ¶ 14.) The defendant 25 responded to interrogatories and gave important information about 26 the class and claims, produced thousands of pages of documents, 27 and voluminous electronic data, including the time and payroll 28 records for all members of the putative class. (Id.) Further, 1 plaintiff’s counsel was already significantly familiar with 2 defendant’s payroll practices based on plaintiff’s documents and 3 discussions with settlement class members and was able to use 4 that knowledge as leverage. (Id.) The parties also participated 5 in a full day mediation under the supervision of Jeffrey A. Ross, 6 a highly regarded mediator, in Oakland, California. (Id. at ¶ 7 3.) Given the plaintiff’s sophisticated representation and the 8 parties’ joint agreement that the settlement reached was the 9 product of arms-length bargaining, the court finds the discovery 10 conducted adequately informed the settlement negotiation. (Id.); 11 See Fraley v. Facebook, Inc., 966 F. Supp. 2d 939, 942 (N.D. Cal. 12 2013) (holding that a settlement reached after informed 13 negotiations “is entitled to a degree of deference as the private 14 consensual decision of the parties.”) 15 6. The Experience and Views of Counsel 16 “When approving class action settlements, the court 17 must give considerable weight to class counsel’s opinions due to 18 counsel’s familiarity with the litigation and its previous 19 experience with class action lawsuits.” Murillo v. Pac. Gas & 20 Elec. Co., Civ. No. 2:08-1974 WBS GGH, 2010 WL 2889728, at *8 21 (E.D. Cal. July 21, 2010). Here, plaintiff has provided evidence 22 that class counsel has substantial experience in prosecuting 23 class actions, including employment actions and wage-and-hour 24 matters. (Alivandivafa Decl. at ¶ 20–25.) Based on his 25 experience, plaintiff’s counsel believes the proposed settlement 26 is fair, reasonable, and adequate to the class under the 27 circumstances, as it reflects a reasoned compromise which takes 28 into consideration the inherent risks in wage and hour class 1 litigation. (Id. at ¶¶ 3, 13, 16.) This factor supports 2 approval of the settlement agreement. 3 7. Reaction of the Class Members to the Settlement 4 Not a single class member has objected to the 5 settlement or opted out of the settlement. (Alivandivafa Decl. 6 at ¶ 9(F).) “It is established that the absence of a large 7 number of objections to a proposed class action settlement raises 8 a strong presumption that the terms of a proposed class 9 settlement action are favorable to the class members.” DIRECTV, 10 221 F.R.D. at 529. Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of 11 the court’s approval of the settlement. 12 9. Conclusion 13 Having considered the foregoing factors, the court 14 finds that the settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable 15 pursuant to Rule 23(e). See Churchill Village, 361 F.3d at 575. 16 C. Attorneys’ Fees 17 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(h) provides, “[i]n a 18 certified class action, the court may award reasonable attorney’s 19 fees and nontaxable costs that are authorized by law or by the 20 parties’ agreement.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(h). If a negotiated 21 class action settlement includes an award of attorneys’ fees, 22 that fee award must be evaluated in the overall context of the 23 settlement. Monterrubio v. Best Buy Stores, L.P., 291 F.R.D. 24 443, 455 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (England, J.). The court “ha[s] an 25 independent obligation to ensure that the award, like the 26 settlement itself, is reasonable, even if the parties have 27 already agreed to an amount.” Bluetooth Headset, 654 F.3d at 28 941. 1 “Under the ‘common fund’ doctrine, ‘a litigant or a 2 lawyer who recovers a common fund for the benefit of persons 3 other than himself or his client is entitled to a reasonable 4 [attorneys’] fee from the fund as a whole.’” Staton v. Boeing 5 Co., 327 F.3d 938, 969 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Boeing Co. v. Van 6 Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 478 (1980)). In general, courts use the 7 percentage method to calculate attorney’s fees in cases where a 8 common fund is created. Spann v. J.C. Penney Corp., 211 F.Supp. 9 3d 1244, 1262 (C.D. Cal. 2016) (citing Lafitte v. Robert Half 10 Int’l Inc., 1 Cal. 5th 480, 489 (2016) (approving 27 percent 11 share in $50,000,000 settlement)). In evaluating whether a 12 percentage fee award is reasonable, the court may consider 13 factors such as the result obtained for the class, the risk 14 undertaken by counsel, the complexity of the legal and factual 15 issues, and awards in similar cases. results secured for the 16 class, awards in similar cases, and the degree of risk assumed by 17 counsel.” See Romero v. Producers Dairy Foods, Inc., No. 1:05- 18 cv-494 DLB, 2007 WL 3492841, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2007). 19 As part of the settlement, the parties agreed to an 20 award of attorneys’ fees of $366,666.66 which constitutes 33.33% 21 of the gross settlement fund. (Alivandivafa Decl. at ¶ 9(B).)) 22 Counsel represents that this award constitutes a fair market 23 charge for the benefits conferred on the class members. (Id. ¶¶ 24 9(A);9(E).) As a result of the settlement, on average, class 25 members will recover approximately $8,830.14. (Id. at ¶ 9(E).) 26 This is a substantial amount that will be available to class 27 members without further delay. Moreover, class counsel’s efforts 28 resulted in defendant changing its pay and scheduling practices 1 to ensure that minimum and overtime wages would be paid. (Id. at 2 ¶ 7.) 3 Additionally, the attorneys’ fees requested by counsel 4 are in line with awards in similar cases. (Id. at ¶ 18.) A fees 5 award amounting to “33 1/3 % of the total settlement value” is 6 considered “acceptable.” See, e.g., Bond v. Ferguson Enters., 7 Inc., No. 1:09-cv-1662 OWW MJS, 2011 WL 2648879, at *9 (E.D. Cal. 8 June 30, 2011) Furthermore, “a review of California cases . . . 9 reveals that courts usually award attorneys’ fees in the 30-40% 10 range in wage and hour class actions that result in recovery of a 11 common fun[d] under $10 million.” Cicero v. DirecTV, Inc., Civ. 12 No. 07-1182, 2010 WL 2991486, at *6 (C.D. Cal. July 27, 2010; 13 see, e.g., Miller v. CEVA Logistics USA, Inc., No. 2:13-cv-01321- 14 TLN, 2015 WL 4730176, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2015) (citing 15 Vasquez v. Valley Coast Roofing, Inc., 266 F.R.D. 482, 491-92 16 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2010) (approving award of 33 percent.) 17 In light of the fees usually awarded in these types of 18 cases, the risks counsel incurred by taking this case on a 19 contingency basis, the time and effort spent litigating this 20 case, and the reasonable result obtained for class members, the 21 court finds the requested fees are reasonable. Accordingly, the 22 court will approve counsel’s motion for attorneys’ fees. 23 D. Costs 24 “There is no doubt that an attorney who has created a 25 common fund for the benefit of the class is entitled to 26 reimbursement of reasonable litigation expenses from that fund.” 27 In re Heritage Bond Litig., Civ. No. 02-ML-1475 DT, 2005 WL 28 1594403, at *23 (C.D. Cal. June 10, 2005). Here, plaintiff’s 1 counsel seeks to recover their litigation expenses and costs in 2 the amount of $11,441.29. (Alivandivafa Decl. at ¶ 9(B).) These 3 expenses include the fees paid for court fees, fees related to 4 the calculation of potential damages, mediation fees, and travel 5 and lodging expenses, among others. (See Mot. for Final 6 Approval, Ex. A.) The court finds these to be reasonable 7 litigation expenses. Therefore, the court will grant class 8 counsel’s request for costs in the amount of $11,441.29. 9 E. Representative Service Award 10 “Incentive awards are fairly typical in class action 11 cases.” Rodriguez, 563 F.3d at 958. “[They] are intended to 12 compensate class representatives for work done on behalf of the 13 class, to make up for financial or reputational risk undertaken 14 in bringing the action, and, sometimes, to recognize their 15 willingness to act as a private attorney general.” Id. at 958- 16 59. In assessing the reasonableness of incentive payments, the 17 court should consider “the actions the plaintiff has taken to 18 protect the interests of the class, the degree to which the class 19 has benefitted from those actions” and “the amount of time and 20 effort the plaintiff expended in pursuing the litigation.” 21 Staton, 327 F.3d at 977 (citation omitted). The court must 22 balance “the number of named plaintiffs receiving incentive 23 payments, the proportion of the payments relative to the 24 settlement amount, and the size of each payment.” Id. 25 The single named plaintiff, Edward Watson, seeks an 26 incentive payment of $25,000 for his time and effort in 27 representing the class. (Alivandivafa Decl. at ¶ 9(D).) This 28 service award is less than three times the average award to 1 individual class members, which is low relative to similar 2 settlements. (Id.) The court has already found that “the class 3 representative payment of $25,000.00 . . . [was] appropriate 4 given the efforts and work by the attorneys.” (Order Granting 5 Preliminary Approval at 15.) Moreover, plaintiff provided vital 6 information to support the claims asserted and spent significant 7 time discussing the matter with putative class members who later 8 agreed to provide declarations in support of the putative class 9 claims. (Decl. of Azad Marvazy in Support of Plaintiff’s Mot. 10 for Final Settlement Approval at ¶ 7 (“Marvazy Decl. in Supp. of 11 Final Approval”).) Considering plaintiff’s efforts and risks 12 incurred in bringing this action, the court finds his requested 13 incentive award to be reasonable and will approve the award. 14 II. Conclusion 15 Based on the foregoing, the court will grant final 16 certification of the settlement class and will approve the 17 settlement set forth in the settlement agreement as fair, 18 reasonable, and adequate. The settlement agreement shall be 19 binding upon all participating class members who did not exclude 20 themselves. 21 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiff’s unopposed 22 motion for final approval of class action settlement and 23 attorneys’ fees, costs, and incentive award (Docket No. 29) be, 24 and the same hereby is, GRANTED. 25 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT: 26 (1) Solely for the purpose of this settlement, and 27 pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, the court hereby 28 certifies the following class: all current or former employees of 1 Tennant Company employed as non-exempt Service Technicians 2 (including those who performed the same duties as Service 3 Technicians but with a different job title) in the State of 4 California and who were not covered by a valid collective 5 bargaining agreement at any time from August 7, 2014 through 6 March 19, 2020. 7 (2) The court appoints the named plaintiff Edward 8 Watson as class representative and finds that he meets the 9 requirements of Rule 23; 10 (3) The court appoints Alireza Alivandivafa, Esq., and 11 Azad M. Marvazy of Light Law Group APC, as class counsel and 12 finds that they meet the requirements of Rule 23; 13 (4) The settlement agreement’s plan for class notice is 14 the best notice practicable under the circumstances and satisfies 15 the requirements of due process and Rule 23. The plan is 16 approved and adopted. The notice to the class complies with Rule 17 23(c)(2) and Rule 23(e) and is approved and adopted; 18 (5) The court finds that the parties and their counsel 19 took appropriate efforts to locate and inform all class members 20 of the settlement; 21 (6) As of the date of the entry of this order, 22 plaintiff and all class members who have not timely opted out of 23 this settlement herby do and shall be deemed to have fully, 24 finally, and forever released, settled, compromised, 25 relinquished, and discharged defendant of and from any and all 26 settled claims, pursuant to the release provisions stated in the 27 parties’ settlement agreement; 28 (7) Plaintiff’s counsel is entitled to fees in the WQAOe £.40°UV VETO VY MVEUIOT Ot PR Veter OP OY te VI Ot

1 amount of $366,666.66, and litigation costs in the amount of 2 $11,441.29; 3 (8) Analytics Consulting is entitled to administration 4 1 costs in the amount of $8,141.00; 5 (9) Named plaintiff and class representative Edward 6 | Watson is entitled to a service award in the amount of $25,000; 7 (10) The remaining settlement funds shall be paid to 8 participating class members in accordance with the terms of the 9 settlement agreement; and 10 (11) This action is dismissed with prejudice. 11 The Clerk of Court is instructed to enter judgment 12 accordingly. 13 Dated: September 10, 2020 - ak. □□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□ 15 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 19