Washmood v. United States

1913 OK CR 291, 136 P. 184, 10 Okla. Crim. 254, 1913 Okla. Crim. App. LEXIS 342
CourtCourt of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma
DecidedNovember 12, 1913
DocketNo. A-1210.
StatusPublished
Cited by14 cases

This text of 1913 OK CR 291 (Washmood v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Washmood v. United States, 1913 OK CR 291, 136 P. 184, 10 Okla. Crim. 254, 1913 Okla. Crim. App. LEXIS 342 (Okla. Ct. App. 1913).

Opinion

BAREFOOT,

Special Judge (after stating the facts as above.). First. The first assignment of error is that the district court of Carter county was without jurisdiction to try the defendant for the reason that the crime with which he stood charged was one against the laws of the United States; the crime as alleged having been committed before the erection of the state. To substantiate this contention we are cited to the case of Sill Pickett v. United States, 216 U. S. 456, 30 Sup. Ct. 265, 54 L. Ed. 566, which has been recently decided by the Supreme Court of the United States; the same being a case which went to the Supreme Court from the Western district of Oklahoma. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma soon after the erection of the state had before it this identical question in the case of Higgins v. Brown, 20 Okla. 355, 94 Pac. 703. And in that case the Supreme Court held, in an opinion by Chief Justice Williams, that the state courts had jurisdiction to try cases arising before statehood. This case was followed by this court in the case of Baker v. State, 3 Okla. Cr. 265, 105 Pac. 379, and the Supreme Court of Oklahoma, since the decision by the Supreme Court of the United States in the Pickett case, in the case of Coyle v. Smith, 28 Okla. 121, 113 Pac. 944, has held that the Pickett case was not in conflict with the case of Higgins v. Brown, supra, and, whatever might be our individual opinions as to the ultimate decision by the Supreme Court of the United States when this exact question reaches them, we at this time follow the rule heretofore made by the Supreme Court of this state in Higgins v. Brown, supra, and by this court in Baker v. State, supra.

Second. The second assignment of error is that the seal of the court was not attached to the papers in this case when the same was transferred from Ada to Ardmore, and also when the transfer was made from Tishomingo back to Ardmore, and that therefore the court had no jurisdiction to try defendants. We do not think that this contention is sound, for the reason that *257 Ada, Ardmore, and Tishomingo were all situated in the Southern district of the Indian Territory, and the same clerk was clerk at each of these places, and that it was not necessary for the seal to be attached where the transfer was made from one place to another in the same district. And, besides, the defendant made application for the transfer from both Ada and Tishomingo, and by making this transfer should not be allowed to make a technical objection which would result to his benefit. We think in making the motion to transfer he waived this irregularity.

Third. The third assignment of error relied upon by the defendant is the admission of the evidence of one Dr. Thomas, which testimony was given at the preliminary hearing. Proof being made that the witness was dead, his testimony was read at this trial. This question has been passed upon by this court against the contention of the defendant in the case of Mendenhall v. United States, 6 Okla. Cr. 436, 119 Pac. 594. See, also, Mattox v. United States, 156 U. S. 237, 15 Sup. Ct. 337, 39 L. Ed. 409. The Supreme Court of the United States, in the Mat-tox case, fully and completely discussed this question, giving reasons very fully as to why such testimony is not in conflict with that provision of the Constitution which gives the defendant a right to be confronted with the witnesses against him. It is useless for us to quote these reasons as they can be seen by reading that opinion.

Fourth. It is next contended by the defendant that the court erred in instruction No. 10, which is as follows:

“If the evidence, facts, and circumstances disclosed upon the trial establish to your satisfaction, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Ben Collins was murdered in the Southern district of the Indian Territory on August 1, 1906, in pursuance of a conspiracy theretofore entered into between two or more of the persons referred to in the indictment, and that the defendant, A. Washmood, prior to said murder became a party to said conspiracy, and joined in the furtherance of the common design to murder said Ben Collins, and the circumstances introduced in evidence and relied on by the state having reference to said conspiracy and murder, when taken together and as a whole, tend to show that the defendant, A. Washmood, either committed said murder, as charged, in some one of the last counts of the indict *258 ment, or that he was present, aiding and abetting, or ready and consenting to aid and abet, in the commission of said crime, or that he had advised and encouraged the perpetration of said crime, although not personally present at the time of its commission, and the circumstances in evidence are not susceptible of any other reasonable conclusion or explanation than that to a moral certainty said defendant, A. Washmood, is guilty as so charged, then the requirements of the law as tó the degree of proof necessary to support a verdict of guilty upon circumstantial evidence would be satisfied.”

It is contended by counsel for the defendant that this instruction was so worded that it deprived defendant of his right to be acquitted, if there was reasonable doubt in the minds of the jur)r as to his guilt. There can be no' question but that there is some merit in the contention of counsel. This instruction as it is worded has a strong tendency to confuse the question of reasonable doubt, and to tell the jury that they might convict the defendant whether they believed him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The reasonable doubt part of the instruction seems to refer only to the jury believing that Ben Collins was murdered beyond a reasonable doubt, and not that the defendant committed the murder, or was present aiding and abetting therein, beyond a reasonable doubt. However, if this were the only error committed in this case, this court would not reverse the case upon that ground, for the reason that in the last part of the instruction the court states that “the evidence must not be susceptible of 'any other reasonable conclusion or explanation than that to a moral certainty said defendant, A. Washmood, is guilty as so charged.” We believe that the jury would have inferred from the last part of the charge that it was necessary to convict the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt; while we believe that the instruction is not worded as it should have been, yet this error alone would not be sufficient to reverse this cause.

Fifth. It is next contended by the defendant that the court erred in instruction No. 18, which is as follows:

“If you find from the evidence that the defendant, A. Wash-mood, was not present at the scene of the killing of the said Ben Collins, or that he did not aid, abet, encourage, and advise the taking of the life of the said deceased, or if, after a care *259 ful consideration of all the evidence, facts, and circumstances in the case, as disclosed upon the trial, you entertain a reasonable doubt as to the said killing, and as to his having aided,, abetted, encouraged, and advised its commission, then you should acquit said defendant, and return a verdict of not guilty.

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Related

Johnson v. State
1981 OK CR 86 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma, 1981)
Sleeper v. State
1941 OK CR 8 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma, 1941)
Stevenson v. State
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Schuh v. State
1929 OK CR 360 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma, 1929)
Wolfe v. State
1928 OK CR 2 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma, 1928)
Brister v. State
1926 OK CR 328 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma, 1926)
Foster v. State
1926 OK CR 313 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma, 1926)
Wilson v. State
1925 OK CR 393 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma, 1925)
Bohannan v. State
1923 OK CR 215 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma, 1923)
Wells v. State
1919 OK CR 292 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma, 1919)
Smith v. State
1916 OK CR 74 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma, 1916)
In Re Pruitt
146 P. 1198 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma, 1915)
Wood v. State
1914 OK CR 142 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma, 1914)
In Re Washmood
149 P. 1198 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma, 1900)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
1913 OK CR 291, 136 P. 184, 10 Okla. Crim. 254, 1913 Okla. Crim. App. LEXIS 342, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/washmood-v-united-states-oklacrimapp-1913.