Spies v. People

12 N.E. 865, 122 Ill. 1, 1887 Ill. LEXIS 969
CourtIllinois Supreme Court
DecidedSeptember 14, 1887
StatusPublished
Cited by285 cases

This text of 12 N.E. 865 (Spies v. People) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Illinois Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Spies v. People, 12 N.E. 865, 122 Ill. 1, 1887 Ill. LEXIS 969 (Ill. 1887).

Opinion

Mr. Justice Magruder

delivered the opinion of the Court: This case comes before us by writ of error to the Criminal Court of Cook county. The writ has been made a supersedeas.

Plaintiffs in error were tried in the summer of 1886 for the murder of Matthias J. Began, on May 4, 1886, in -the city of 'Chicago, Cook county, Illinois. On August 20, 1886, the jury returned a verdict finding the defendants August Spies, ¡Michael Schwab, Samuel Bielden, Albert E. Parsons, Adolph ¡Fischer, George Engel and Louis- Lingg guilty of murder, and fixing' death as the penalty. By the same verdict they also found Oscar W. ¡Neebe guilty of murder and fixed the penalty at imprisonment in the penitentiary for fifteen years.

About the 1st day of May, 1886, the workingmen of Chicago and of other industrial centers in the United States were greatly excited upon the subject of inducing their employers to reduce the time, during which they should be required to labor on each day, to eight hours. In the midst of the excitement, growing out of this eight-hour movement, as it was called, a meeting was held on the evening of May 4, 1886, at the Haymarket, on Eandolph street, in the West division of the city of Chicago. This meeting was addressed by the defendants Spies, Parsons and Bielden. While the latter was making the closing speech, and at some point of time between ten and half-past ten o’clock in the evening, several companies of policemen, numbering one hundred and eighty men, marched into the crowd from their station on Besplaines street, and ordered the meeting to disperse. As soon as the order was given, some one threw among the policemen a dynamite bomb, which struck Began, who was one of the police officers, and killed him. As a result of the throwing of the bomb and of the firing of pistol shots, which immediately succeeded the throwing of the bomb, six policemen besides Began were killed, and sixty more were seriously ■wounded.

It is undisputed that the bomb was thrown and that it caused the death of Began. It is conceded that no one of the convicted defendants threw the bomb with his own hands. Plaintiffs in error are charged with being accessories before the fact. There are sixty-nine counts in the indictment. Some of the counts charge, that the eight defendants above named, being present, aided, abetted and assisted in the throwing of the bomb; others, that, not being present, aiding, abetting or assisting, they advised, encouraged, aided and abetted such throwing. Some of the counts charge that said defendants advised, encouraged, aided and abetted one Eudolph Schnaubelt in the perpetration of the crime; others, that they advised, encouraged, aided and- abetted an unknown person in the perpetration thereof.

The Elinois statute upon this subject is as follows (chap. 38, div. 2, secs. 2 and 3):

“Sec. 2. An accessory is he who stands by, and aids, abets, or assists, or who, not being present, aiding, abetting or assisting, hath advised, encouraged, aided or abetted the perpetration of the crime. He, who thus aids, abets, assists, advises or encourages, shall be considered as principal, and punished accordingly.

“Sec. 3. Every such accessory, when a crime is committed, within or without this State by his aid or procurement in this-State, may be indicted and convicted at the same time as the principal, or before, or after his conviction, and whether the-principal is convicted or amenable to justice or not, and punished as principal.”

This statute abolishes the distinction between accessories before the fact and principals; by it all accessories before the fact are made principals. As the acts of the principal are thus made the acts of the accessory, the latter may be charged as ■ having done the acts himself,- and may be indicted and punished accordingly. Baxter v. People, 3 Gilm. 368; Dempsey v. People, 47 Ill. 323.

If, therefore, the defendants advised, encouraged, aided or abetted the killing of Degan, they are as guilty, as though they took his life with their own hands. If any of them stood by and aided, abetted or assisted in the throwing of the bomb, those of them, who did so, are as guilty as though they threw it themselves.

It is charged, that the defendants formed a common purpose, and were united in a common design to aid and encourage the murder of the policemen among whom the bomb was thrown. If they combined to accomplish such murder by concerted action, the ordinary law of conspiracy is applicable, and the acts and declarations of one of them, done in furtherance of the common design, are, in contemplation of law, the acts and declarations of all. This prosecution, however, is not for conspiracy as a substantive crime. Proof of conspiracy is only proper, so far as it may tend to show a common design to encourage the murder charged against the prisoners. It may be introduced for the purpose of establishing the position of the members of the combination as accessories to the crime of murder.

The' questions, which thus present themselves at the threshold of. the case, are these: Did the defendants have a common purpose or design to advise, encourage, aid or abet the murder of the police ? Did they combine together and with others with a view to carrying that purpose or design into effect ? Did they or either or any of them do such acts or make such declarations in furtherance of the common purpose or design, as did actually have the effect of encouraging, aiding or abetting the crime in question ?

The solution of these questions involves an examination of the evidence.

The first inquiry, which naturally suggests itself, is: who made the bomb which killed Degan ?

First—The bomb was round. Zeller, a witness for the defence, says of it, as he saw it going through the air: “It seems to me it was more round and about as big as a baseball.” Taylor, another witness for the defence, says: “I saw the bomb enough to know it was a round bomb.”

There is much evidence in the record as to the different kinds of bombs and as to the mode of their construction. The simplest and cheapest form is what is known as the gas-pipe bomb, the mode of constructing which is hereafter explained. The gas-pipe bomb is the one which the ordinary, unskilled laborer would be most apt to make, if he desired to use such a weapon..

The round bombs, however, are more expensive, and their construction is more difficult and more liable to discovery. Such a bomb consists of two semi-globes, which, if made of iron, must be obtained at a foundry, or if made of zinc or other material, require the use of brass or clay moulds and facilities for melting the metals entering into their composition. The semi-globes must be fastened together by solder or by bolts. Holes must be drilled for the insertion of the bolts and also for the insertion of the caps and fuse. Care must be taken to fill in the dynamite properly and to insert the fulminating cap into the dynamite and the fuse into the cap. The construction of such bombs requires time and skill and involves considerable expense in the purehas'e of materials.

Second—The bomb thrown at the Haymarket was exploded by means of a projecting fuse, ignited before leaving the hand by a match or a lighted cigar. This abundantly appears from the evidence of those who saw it before it fell.

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Bluebook (online)
12 N.E. 865, 122 Ill. 1, 1887 Ill. LEXIS 969, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/spies-v-people-ill-1887.