Washington v. New York Police Department

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedAugust 8, 2023
Docket1:23-cv-05820
StatusUnknown

This text of Washington v. New York Police Department (Washington v. New York Police Department) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Washington v. New York Police Department, (S.D.N.Y. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK CHARMEEN D. WASHINGTON, Plaintiff, 23-CV-5820 (LTS) -against- ORDER TO AMEND NEW YORK POLICE DEPARTMENT; MS. VASQUEZ, Defendants. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who is appearing pro se, brings this action invoking the Court’s federal question jurisdiction. By order dated July 11, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP), that is, without prepayment of fees. Plaintiff also submits an application for the Court to request pro bono counsel. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within 60 days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.

Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. BACKGROUND Plaintiff invokes the Court’s federal question jurisdiction and asserts violations of her

“civil rights” and “grand lawseny.” (ECF 1 at 2.) She states that her claims arose on July 4, 2023, on the corner of 42nd Street and Third Avenue in Manhattan. Plaintiff was “talking to the radio in [her] auditory tube ben[ea]th [her] skin,” when someone in “plain clothing,” whom she had previously seen in an “NYPD suit,” turned suddenly to “jump in [Plaintiff’s] face.” (Id. at 5.) The person also “threatened to fight and hit” Plaintiff. (Id.) Plaintiff filed a complaint about this incident with NYPD Detective Vasquez. (Id.) The following day, the individual “came around [Plaintiff’s] neighborhood.” (Id.) Plaintiff contends that she suffered “harassment,” and a “slight stroke.” (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff sues the NYPD and Detective Vasquez, seeking “the largest amount of cash money [she] can get.” (Id.) DISCUSSION A. New York Police Department Plaintiff’s claims against the NYPD must be dismissed because the NYPD lacks the capacity to be sued in the name of the agency. N.Y. City Charter ch. 17, § 396 (“[A]ll actions and

proceedings for the recovery of penalties for the violation of any law shall be brought in the name of the city of New York and not in that of any agency, except where otherwise provided by law.”); Jenkins v. City of New York, 478 F.3d 76, 93 n.19 (2d Cir. 2007); see also Emerson v. City of New York, 740 F. Supp. 2d 385, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“[A] plaintiff is generally prohibited from suing a municipal agency.”). Moreover, there does not appear to be any proper basis for substituting the City of New York as a defendant in place of the NYPD. To assert a civil rights claim against the City of New York under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, it is not enough for the plaintiff to allege that one of the City of New York’s employees or agents engaged in some wrongdoing. The plaintiff must show that the

municipality itself caused the violation of the plaintiff’s rights. See Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011) (“A municipality or other local government may be liable under this section [1983] if the governmental body itself ‘subjects’ a person to a deprivation of rights or ‘causes’ a person ‘to be subjected’ to such deprivation.”) (quoting Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. Of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978)); Cash v. Cnty. Of Erie, 654 F.3d 324, 333 (2d Cir. 2011). In other words, to state a Section 1983 claim against a municipality, the plaintiff must allege facts showing (1) the existence of a municipal policy, custom, or practice, and (2) that the policy, custom, or practice caused the violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Jones v. Town of East Haven, 691 F.3d 72, 80 (2d Cir. 2012); Bd. Of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty. V. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997). The allegations of the complaint do not show that the City of New York, through its policies, customs, or practices, caused a violation of Plaintiff’s rights, and therefore there is no proper basis for substituting the City of New York as a defendant in place of the NYPD.

B. Detective Vasquez Plaintiff alleges that she filed a complaint with NYPD Detective Vasquez about her interaction with someone at 42nd Street and Third Avenue. Plaintiff names Detective Vasquez as a defendant in this suit but Plaintiff’s allegation that Detective Vasquez accepted her complaint does not show that this defendant was personally involved in a violation of Plaintiff’s civil rights. See Spavone v. N.Y. State Dep’ t of Corr. Serv., 719 F.3d 127, 135 (2d Cir.

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Related

Coppedge v. United States
369 U.S. 438 (Supreme Court, 1962)
Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs.
436 U.S. 658 (Supreme Court, 1978)
Graham v. Connor
490 U.S. 386 (Supreme Court, 1989)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Bennie Cooper v. A. Sargenti Co., Inc.
877 F.2d 170 (Second Circuit, 1989)
Hill v. Curcione
657 F.3d 116 (Second Circuit, 2011)
Harris v. Mills
572 F.3d 66 (Second Circuit, 2009)
Emerson v. City of New York
740 F. Supp. 2d 385 (S.D. New York, 2010)
Cash v. County of Erie
654 F.3d 324 (Second Circuit, 2011)
Cuoco v. Moritsugu
222 F.3d 99 (Second Circuit, 2000)
Green v. City of Mount Vernon
96 F. Supp. 3d 263 (S.D. New York, 2015)
Connick v. Thompson
179 L. Ed. 2d 417 (Supreme Court, 2011)
Jenkins v. City of New York
478 F.3d 76 (Second Circuit, 2007)

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Washington v. New York Police Department, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/washington-v-new-york-police-department-nysd-2023.